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Introduction
Claude John Eyre Auchinleck was born in Aldershot on 21 June 1884.1 
He was the eldest son of Colonel John Claude Alexander Auchinleck, 
Royal Horse Artillery and Mary Eleanor, daughter of John Eyre. Claude 
Auchinleck, like many of the senior officers in the British army in the 
Second World War, most notably, Field Marshals Harold Alexander, Alan 
Brooke, John Dill and Bernard Montgomery, was from an Anglo-Irish 
gentry background, though the family’s origins were in the village of 
Auchinleck in Ayrshire. Given the number of Anglo-Irish officers who 
reached high rank in the British army, there is a tendency to see the 
Anglo-Irish officer as over-represented. H. J. Hanham noted that, ‘In 
terms of officers per head the Church of Ireland … was presumably the 
most army-orientated denomination in the British Isles.’2 Correlli Barnett 
believed that the Anglo-Irish were a British version of the ‘Prussian Junker 
class’.3 However, Nick Perry’s careful study of this issue suggests that 
the Anglo-Irish gentry were as likely to be commissioned into the army 
as Scots gentry (40 per cent of male gentry of military age), whereas the 
English and Welsh figure stood at 30 per cent.4
1 Auchinleck is the subject of five biographies and, unless otherwise noted, these 
have been drawn on in writing this introduction: John Connell, Auchinleck: 
A Biography of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (London, 1959), Alexander 
Greenwood, Field Marshal Auchinleck (Brockerscliffe, 1990), Evan McGilvray, 
Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck (Barnsley, 2020), Roger Parkinson, The Auk: 
Auchinleck, Victor at Alamein (London, 1977) and Philip Warner, Auchinleck: 
The Lonely Soldier (London, 1981).
2 H. J. Hanham, ‘Religion and Nationality in the Mid-Victorian Army’ in War and 
Society: Historical essays in honour and memory of J. R. Western 1928–1971, ed. 
M. R. D. Foot (London, 1973), p. 162.
3 Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509–1970: A Military, Political and 
Social Survey (London, 1970), pp. 314–15.
4 Nicholas Perry, ‘The Irish Landed Class and the British Army, 1850–1950’, 
War in History, 18: 3 (2011), 304–32 and Major General Oliver Nugent and the 
Ulster Division 1915–1918 (Stroud, 2007), pp. 1–4. Nicholas Perry is currently 
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Claude Auchinleck himself, when relinquishing the colonelcy of 
the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, which he held between 1941 and 1947, 
identified his Irish origins by stating, ‘My forefathers lived in Enniskillen 
and Fermanagh for very many years and this makes me all the prouder to 
have belonged to the regiment.’5 In fact Auchinleck’s father had equally 
firm roots in Counties Tyrone and Wexford and his mother’s family came 
from Galway.6 Auchinleck’s ‘Irishness’ can be questioned by the fact 
that the Irish Times, which had been the newspaper of the Anglo-Irish 
establishment, though it had moved far away from these origins by 1981, 
did not carry a full length obituary of him and the recently published 
Dictionary of Irish Biography does not devote an entry to him. T. G. Fraser’s 
overstates the contrary interpretation by noting that, ‘Two things stand 
out from Auchinleck’s background and early life: his sense of identity as 
an Ulsterman and his commitment to India.’7 However, it is clear that 
Auchinleck spent most of his school holidays at Crevenagh House, near 
Omagh, Co. Tyrone and visiting the house in August 1946 his private 
secretary, Shahid Hamid, remembered Auchinleck saying, ‘This is where 
I belong and that is why I am glad to be back here again to see you all.’8
Claude Auchinleck’s father, John, had a distinguished military career, 
serving in the Indian Mutiny, Second Afghan War and Third Burma 
War, and reaching the rank of Colonel. Claude Auchinleck was, therefore 
born into what could be identified as a ‘military family’ and was expected 
to follow in its traditions, which he did willingly; his younger brother, 
Armar Leslie, also became a soldier.9 Claude Auchinleck spent his 
undertaking research for a PhD thesis at the University of Kent entitled, 
‘The Irish landed class and the regular officer corps of the British army, 
1775–1903: a distinctive Irish contribution?’
5 Frank Fox, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in the Second World War, 1939–45 
(Aldershot, 1951), p. 143. The Regimental Recruiting District of the Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers had, historically, consisted of the Counties of Donegal, 
Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone. The partition of Ireland in 1920 meant 
that the recruiting district was then Counties Fermanagh, Londonderry and 
Tyrone, all part of Northern Ireland, while Donegal was one of the historic 
Ulster counties situated in the Irish Free State.
6 Connell, Auchinleck, pp. 5–6.
7 Fraser, ‘Claude Auchinleck 1884–1981: Military Leader’ in Nine Ulster Lives, ed. 
O’Brien and Roebuck, p. 36.
8 Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight: A personal record of the partition of India 
(London, 1986), p. 96.
9 Armar Leslie Auchinleck joined the 4th Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) in 1908 
as a second lieutenant with the intention of obtaining a regular commission. 
However, he lost the sight in his right eye in a sporting injury, which prevented 
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early years in Cheshunt in Hertfordshire and, when his father retired 
from the army in 1890, the family moved to Langstone near Havant in 
Hampshire. In December 1892 Colonel John Auchinleck died from the 
effects of pernicious anaemia contracted in Burma.
Mary Auchinleck and her young family were left in genteel poverty 
by the death of her husband. She quickly moved to a smaller house in 
Warblington, Hampshire, in an attempt to economise. Claude Auchinleck 
was then sent to a Dame-school in Southsea and then Crowthorne, a 
preparatory school, in 1894. He entered Wellington College in 1896 as 
a Foundationer. Wellington College, established in memory of the First 
Duke in 1859, had a scheme for the sons of officers who had died within 
five years of being on full or half pay, and whose family could prove 
financial hardship, which meant that they could be educated at a much-
reduced fee of £10 p.a. which included all school fees, food and board. 
It was only because of this scheme that Claude Auchinleck could enjoy 
a public school education and he remained grateful to his old school in 
later years, opening the War Memorial reading room and heading up an 
appeal launched in 1949 so that the number of Foundationers could be 
increased allowing for the sons of deceased officers of the Royal Navy, 
Royal Marines and RAF to take advantage of the scheme.10
Auchinleck was not seen as an outstanding pupil at Wellington, but he 
was above average in history, English, geography and divinity, and was 
given some responsibility by being appointed a Dormitory Prefect. His 
weakness in mathematics meant that he could not think of following his 
father into the Royal Artillery, through the very competitive examination 
for the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. In any case, family finances, 
meant that Auchinleck’s only route to a military career as a commissioned 
officer would be in the Indian Army, where officers could live on their pay. 
Even in an unfashionable county regiment of the British army, young 
officers would be expected to have a private income of at least £100 p.a. 
to cover mess bills, uniforms, horses, band subscriptions, etc.11
him transferring to the regular army. He entered the Colonial Civil Service and 
was posted to Northern Nigeria. On leave on the outbreak of war he was recalled 
to his battalion and killed in action on the Somme on 17 September 1916, as a 
Captain, attached to 123rd Company, Machine Gun Corps.
10 David Newsome, A History of Wellington College, 1859–1959 (London, 1959), 
pp. 30–32 and 376–80.
11 Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, training 
and deploying the British Army, 1902–1914 (Oxford, 2012), pp. 10–12.
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In the entrance examination for the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, 
John Connell suggested that Auchinleck was placed 45th, which would 
then have meant that he took the last competitive place available for a 
commission in the Indian Army; contributing to a rather romantic tale 
of a cadet just scraping into the Indian Army but rising to become its 
Commander in Chief.12 Oddly, when Auchinleck entered the RMC, 
candidates for the Indian Army were selected based on where they were 
placed in the entrance examination, rather than on their final marks at 
the College; a system which was to change shortly after he left. Therefore 
his placing in The London Gazette, announcing his appointment to the 
Unattached List, Indian Army, along with those of the other Gentleman 
Cadets from his cohort at Sandhurst, which placed him thirty-three 
out of forty-seven officers is an accurate statement of where he was 
placed in the entrance examination.13 Auchinleck’s performance in the 
entrance examination may not seem very impressive, but it should be 
remembered that he was at almost the youngest age possible to sit the 
entrance examination when he took it and that he managed to reach 
this position without relying on the expensive crammers which many 
Sandhurst and Woolwich cadets employed. Auchinleck entered the RMC 
in January 1902, five months short of his eighteenth birthday.
The Sandhurst course then lasted for only a year and Auchinleck does 
not seem to have enjoyed his time there. He appears to have passed out 
82nd and seems to have regarded Sandhurst merely as a rite of passage.14 
Of course, with limited private means, many of the activities indulged 
in by gentlemen cadets at the RMC must have been closed to him. 
But 1902 was an unfortunate year in the history of the College with a 
number of cases of incendiarism and the rustication of a large number 
of blameless cadets, which led to questions in parliament. Following a 
public campaign led by Winston Churchill and Lord Hugh Cecil, most 
of the cadets were reinstated, without any loss of seniority, following an 
enquiry by Field Marshal Lord Roberts, the Commander in Chief.15 It 
is unclear if Auchinleck was one of those rusticated or not; if he was, the 
12 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 11; this was followed by Parkinson, The Auk, p. 12.
13 The London Gazette, 20 January 1903, p. 390. The Times, 4 January 1902, p. 10 
noted Auchinleck as placed 40 out of 125 RMC cadets destined for the infantry.
14 Connell merely notes that Auchinleck, ‘was dismayed when he saw how many 
places he had dropped in the passing out list’, Connell, Auchinleck, p. 12.
15 The Times, 5 July 1902, p. 9; 7 July 1902, p. 12; 8 July 1902, pp. 6 and 11 and 
26 July 1902, p. 8.
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threatened additional expense of an extra term’s fees would have been 
a major problem for him.
In March 1903 the eighteen-year-old Second Lieutenant Claude 
Auchinleck boarded the P&O liner, Britannia, at Tilbury en route for 
India. On arrival in India, Auchinleck, as was normal for officers destined 
for the Indian Army who were initially commissioned on to the unattached 
list, was sent to a British army battalion, the 2nd King’s Shropshire Light 
Infantry, for further training before joining the Indian Army proper. 
While with 2nd King’s Shropshire Light Infantry Auchinleck was careful 
with his finances, but the lavish mess dinners and extensive guest lists 
meant that Auchinleck was living beyond his means. Indeed, he was to 
write to his mother to ask her for £10 to settle his outstanding mess bills, 
noting that, ‘Mess-bills are high, and this is an expensive regiment … 
The messing alone comes to Rs90 odd, and everyone has to pay that. 
Then if you only drink sodas and lemonades, the drink bill comes to 
about Rs10 more and guests and Club Bill, subscriptions, etc. bring it 
up to Rs150 to Rs180, and pay is Rs215, so it does not leave much, but 
once I am square I can manage.’ This financial embarrassment remained 
a painful memory for Auchinleck over sixty years later.16
Auchinleck appears to have had a choice of regiments. Captain W. D. 
Villiers-Stuart, the adjutant of the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force), 
who had been told by Lieutenant Colonel James Stewart CO of the 
2/5th Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force) to look out for Auchinleck, met 
him on board the Britannia and, on the long voyage to India, formed a 
very favourable opinion.17 Stewart certainly seems to have applied for 
Auchinleck to be posted to his regiment, though a vacancy there may 
not have been immediately available, so, for reasons which are unclear, 
Auchinleck opted for the 62nd Punjabis.18 The commanding officer of 
this regiment was then Colonel Rainey Robinson, an Ulsterman from 
Co. Down, who had just transferred from the 12th Burma Infantry, so 
Anglo-Irish networks may have been important. It may, again, have been 
a matter of finance, with Gurkha uniforms, designed in the style of the 
British rifle regiments, being more expensive than the standard uniform 
worn by other Indian Army infantry regiments.
16 Connell, Auchinleck, pp. 19–20 citing a letter sent from Auchinleck to his mother 
on 16 September 1903 and Parkinson, The Auk, p. 14 citing an interview with 
Auchinleck.
17 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 16, citing a letter he had received from the then Brigadier 
General W. D. Villiers-Stuart.
18 Connell, Auchinleck, pp. 24–25.
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Auchinleck joined the 62nd Punjabis in April 1904. This regiment 
had originally been formed in 1759 as the 2nd Madras Infantry and was 
reorganised in October 1903, as part of Lord Kitchener’s reorganisation 
of the Indian Army.19 Only three British officers transferred from the 
old 2nd Madras Infantry to the new regiment and men were absorbed 
from a number of other units, including the recently disbanded Hong 
Kong Regiment of Punjabi Musulmans.20 Following the martial races 
theories, evident in the Indian Army then, the 62nd Punjabis recruited 
amongst Sikh, Punjabi and Rajput communities.21
When Auchinleck joined the 62nd Punjabis they were based in Fyzabad. 
This was a ‘regulation pattern’ station, of brigade strength, where the 
62nd Punjabis were in garrison with an Indian cavalry regiment, a British 
infantry battalion, another Indian infantry battalion and a battery of 
the RFA. In the winter months the brigade attended training camps. In 
1906 the regiment, now deemed to be reformed and properly trained, 
was ordered up to the frontier, with half based in the Tibet–Sikkim area 
and half in Assam. The 62nd Punjabi, like most Indian Army regiments, 
had no more than ten British officers serving with it at any one time, 
which meant that junior officers were given considerably more respon-
sibility than their counterparts in the British army. Auchinleck was in 
command of a detachment of about 100 men located in the isolated region 
of Gyantse, about 200 miles inside Tibet, with only a single telegraph 
wire connecting him to regimental headquarters; his first independent 
command and at the age of 23. The frontier was quiet during this posting 
but Auchinleck became accustomed to acting on his own authority and 
seems to have impressed his superiors as in 1907 he was transferred to 
command a larger detachment in Sikkim.
19 A further major reorganisation of the Indian Army in 1922 saw this regiment 
retitled as the 1st/1st Punjab Regiment, with the 66th, 76th and 82nd Punjabis 
becoming the 2nd/1st, 3rd/1st and 4th/1st respectively.
20 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 24.
21 On the concept and development of ‘martial races’ recruitment in the Indian 
Army see Tarak Barkawi, Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World 
War II (Cambridge, 2017), pp. 17–48; David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: 
The Indian Army, 1860–1940 (Basingstoke, 1994), pp. 1–76; Gavin Rand and 
K. A. Wagner, ‘Recruiting the “martial races”: identities and military service in 
colonial India’, Patterns of Prejudice, 46: 3–4 (2012), pp. 232–54; Kaushik Roy, 
Brown Warriors of the Raj: Recruitment & the Mechanics of Command in the Sepoy 
Army, 1859–1913 (New Delhi, 2008), pp. 80–144 and Heather Streets, Martial 
races: The military, race and masculinity in British imperial culture, 1857–1914 
(Manchester, 2004), pp. 87–190.
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In 1908 the regiment was withdrawn from the frontier and sent to 
Benares, where it would remain until the outbreak of the First World 
War. Auchinleck suffered severely from diphtheria in 1908, as a result of 
which he went on his first home leave in six years. When he returned to 
India he had three uneventful years as adjutant of his regiment. In the 
Indian Army of that time recruits were sent directly to their regiments, 
and Auchinleck had particular charge of them, overseeing both recruiting 
and training. He had another home leave in 1912 when he failed in an 
attempt to get seconded to the Spanish Army, then engaged in operations 
in Morocco, but was seconded to the 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 
in which his cousin, Daniel Auchinleck, was then serving as a captain. 
Auchinleck witnessed the large-scale manoeuvres held in East Anglia but 
was not that impressed with what he saw of the British army, believing the 
manoeuvres to have been almost useless as the units taking part were at 
less than half their war strength. When he returned to India, Auchinleck 
was employed as an assistant recruiting officer in the Northern Punjab, 
a post which appears to have given him a real insight into the lives of 
Indian soldiers and the army pensioners who helped to identify potential 
recruits from their local communities.
On 28 October 1914 the 62nd Punjabis, as part of the third Indian Army 
contingent earmarked for France and Belgium, sailed from Bombay on 
board SS Glen Etive and SS Elysia destined for France to reinforce the 
Indian Corps. While the 62nd Punjabis were at sea, the Ottoman Empire 
entered the war, on 29 October, by bombarding the Russian ports of 
Odessa, Sevastopol and Theodosia on the Black Sea Coast. The Bombay 
troop convoy was therefore diverted to Port Said, anchoring there on the 
16 November 1914 and the 62nd Punjabis moved to Ismailia to defend 
the Timsah–Bitter Lake section of the Suez Canal, against an expected 
Turkish advance.
The 62nd Punjabis came under attack from Turkish forces at 3.30am 
on 3 February 1915, as a Turkish force of about 22,000 men, under the 
command of Djemal Pasha, tried to capture the Suez Canal. At this time 
Auchinleck was commanding the battalion machine guns: two Maxim 
guns, placed in a forward redoubt on the eastern side of the Canal. Bitter 
fighting continued through 3 February and into the morning of 4 February, 
at which stage the Turkish forces withdrew. Enemy casualties totalled 
about 2,000 along the Canal front; British and Indian casualties were 
much less; the 62nd Punjabis suffered nine dead and eighteen wounded.22 
22 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 18.
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After this attempt to force a crossing over the Canal, the Turks made 
no new effort to invade metropolitan Egypt and the 62nd Punjabis were 
involved in patrol activity for the next five months.
At short notice, on 12 July 1915, the 62nd Punjabis were moved to 
Aden, along with the 28th (Punjab Frontier Force) Brigade, with the 
intention of forcing Turkish troops to leave Sheikh Othman. This task 
was successfully completed on the 21 July, with the regiment spending 
the rest of 1915 in Aden; regarded as one of the worst postings in the 
British Empire due to the searing heat and lack of fresh water.
In late December 1915 the 62nd Punjabis were sent to Basra, to join 
the relief force, assembled under the command of Lieutenant General 
Sir Fenton Aylmer, to relieve Kut, where 10,000 British and Indian 
troops under the command of Major General Charles Townshend had 
been besieged since 7 December.23 Auchinleck and his regiment were 
embarked on paddle steamers for the journey up the Tigris in the first 
week of 1916. However, the attempt to break through to Kut failed 
dismally on 6 January, while the 62nd Punjabis were still downstream. On 
7 January the regiment arrived at Hissah and were immediately ordered 
to join the force attacking Sheikh Saad, five miles south of Kut. Sheikh 
Saad was captured on 8 January, with the Turks falling back to stronger 
positions, following this the 62nd Punjabis were moved to the left bank 
of the Tigris to join the 35th Infantry Brigade.
A renewed advance was ordered by Lieutenant General Aylmer for 
the night of 12–13 January 1916 with the 62nd Punjabis, still part of 
35th Brigade, acting as part of the reserve. However, by the afternoon 
of 13 January the British forces had been checked, with over 1,100 
British and Indian troops killed. Immediately following this, the 62nd 
Punjabis were moved to the 9th Brigade, part of the newly arrived 3rd 
Indian Division. On 15 January Lieutenant General Sir Percy Lake 
replaced General Sir John Nixon as Army Commander in Mesopotamia 
and ordered a breakthrough to Kut, at all costs. Aylmer’s latest plan to 
relieve Kut relied on the 9th Brigade moving across the Tigris to join a 
renewed offensive on the right bank. However, when the 62nd Punjabis 
reached the crossing point on 17 January, they found that the pontoon 
bridge had been washed away in floods. The decision was then made to 
use the battalion in an attack on Hanna.
23 A fine modern study of the Mesopotamian campaigns is Charles Townshend, 
When God made hell: the British invasion of Mesopotamia and the creation of Iraq, 
1914–1921 (London, 2010).
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Bad weather had prevented an aerial reconnaissance of the enemy 
positions at Hanna and these proved to be much stronger than had 
been expected. The 62nd Punjabis attacked at 7.45am on 21 January 
1916, with the rest of their brigade, and immediately met sustained 
Turkish fire. At 7.55am the British artillery which, in any case, had no 
heavy guns, lifted to the Turkish second line, before it had made much 
impression on the Turkish front line. Heavy rain, turning the ground 
into a quagmire, made it even more difficult for the battalion to advance. 
By mid-afternoon the 62nd Punjabis had advanced to within about 
250 yards of the Turkish line, but a further advance was impossible, 
given both fierce Turkish fire and the danger that the battalion would 
become cut off from its brigade. Major General G. J. Younghusband 
issued orders for a withdrawal at 3.30pm, but the 62nd Punjabis did not 
receive these until after nightfall. Auchinleck, in command of a Double 
Company did not receive the order to withdrawal until about 3am on 
22 January. Later that morning, the 62nd Punjabis was reorganised with 
the senior surviving officer, Major C. H. B. Wright, taking command 
and Auchinleck appointed as acting adjutant. Casualties in the regiment 
totalled 372 men; 30 killed, 327 wounded and 15 missing and the losses 
were so heavy that it was reorganised into just two companies, rather 
than the normal four. Auchinleck was to remember, ‘This costly frontal 
attack was a fatal mistake. Instead of trying to outflank, the infantry was 
pushed in under what was called an artillery barrage, and of course the 
Turks were heavily entrenched, machine guns and all that sort of thing, 
and we were just murdered … Absolute murder. Just stupidity on the 
part of the GOC-in-C.’24
Following this engagement, Aylmer claimed that his relief force, 
having taken heavy casualties in action and through disease, could not 
manage to reach Kut, unless reinforced. The 62nd Punjabis therefore 
remained on entrenching and outpost duties until 14 February, when 
they were attached to the 36th Brigade, in reserve. A renewed attempt 
was made to relieve Kut in March 1916 and on the night of 7–8 March 
the 62nd Punjabis, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel H. H. 
Harrington (recently transferred from the 84th Punjabis) prepared, with 
the rest of the 36th Brigade, to attack trenches about two and a half miles 
south-east of the main Dujaila redoubt. Delays caused during the night 
led to the attack being delayed; originally planned as a dawn attack, 
British artillery did not open fire on Turkish positions until 8.45am 
24 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 22, citing an interview with Auchinleck.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   9 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
10
with a frontal attack by the infantry commencing at 9.45am. The 62nd 
Punjabis managed to seize their initial objective by 11.30am; another attack 
began at 2pm when the regiment advanced to within two hundred yards 
of the main Turkish fortifications. In this action the 62nd Punjabis was 
reduced to just 12 officers and 235 other ranks. Captain Auchinleck took 
temporary command when Lieutenant Colonel Harrington was severely 
wounded, rallying the regiment to the rear of the firing line. Auchinleck 
later reflected on this action, ‘It was absolutely flat and the battalions 
which were advancing were just mowed down. I was only a regimental 
officer but it was quite obvious that this frontal attack business, under 
what was supposed to be an artillery barrage but which was nothing like 
heavy enough – there weren’t enough guns – was quite hopeless. Very 
bad generalship. Terrible.’25
Following this action, Aylmer ordered a general withdrawal to Hanna 
and the 62nd Punjabis arrived at their bivouacs at 11am on the 9 March. 
Shortly after this Lieutenant General Sir George Gorringe replaced 
Aylmer and a series of fruitless attacks were launched by British and 
Indian troops; though not the 62nd Punjabis, over the following six 
weeks. On 29 April 1916, the garrison at Kut surrendered to the Turks; 
the siege and attempted relief having caused 30,000 British and Indian 
casualties. Over the course of the relief operations, the 62nd Punjabis 
alone lost 560 men, dead and wounded. The infamous death march, 
forced upon the POWs captured at Kut, saw the deaths of 4,250 of the 
11,800 men taken prisoner.
The 62nd Punjabis were left to absorb reinforcements during the 
rest of the spring and summer of 1916. Conditions were poor, with high 
temperatures, little water, as the Tigris was then heavily polluted with 
decomposing bodies, and dense clouds of flies infecting all available food 
stocks. Disease was rife amongst the troops with cholera, dysentery and 
scurvy; in August 1916 alone the 62nd Punjabis had a sick roll of 194 
men. During this period Auchinleck was allowed two periods of leave. 
First, for ten days in June at Amara a hundred miles downstream, where 
rations were more plentiful and more varied than at the front. Then for 
a month’s leave in India, starting in August. Auchinleck visited Karachi 
and Simla, but his respite was marred by news of the death of his younger 
brother, killed in action on the Somme.
Auchinleck returned to Mesopotamia to find many changes. The 62nd 
Punjabis had been brought back up to strength with fresh recruits and 
25 Parkinson, The Auk, pp. 24–25, citing an interview with Auchinleck.
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a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel G. M. Morris had been 
appointed. The 62nd Punjabis were still in the 36th Brigade, but this had 
now been incorporated into the 14th Division. General Sir Frederick 
Maude had arrived as the new operational commander and had brought 
renewed dynamism to the campaign, centred on reorganising the logistical 
support available.26 Auchinleck was clearly impressed by the rapid progress 
made by Maude and later commented, ‘The army was alive again.’27
Maude, having taken time to establish proper logistics, planned a new 
offensive, to recapture Kut, which commenced on 13 December 1916. 
The 14th Division, of which the 62nd Punjabis were a part, was held in 
reserve in the initial phases of this campaign. The 62nd Punjabis went 
into action on 1 February 1917, attacking Turkish forces in a narrow area 
where the Shatt el Hai joined the Tigris. The Turks maintained a strong 
defence and in three days the 62nd Punjabis lost 193 men, including 
two British officers killed and three wounded. The commanding officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Morris, protested at orders for the regiment to be 
removed from the frontline and, in response, Maude sent him a message 
on 4 February, ‘How much I admire not only your excellent work yesterday 
but also the splendid spirit which has prompted you to ask to be allowed 
the carry on instead of being relieved.’28 Four days later, Auchinleck 
took command of the 62nd Punjabis, when Colonel Morris assumed 
command of 36th Brigade. On 10 February the regiment took the last 
remaining Turkish position on the south bank of the Tigris.
An advance guard, the 1/9th Gurkha Rifles, was ferried across the 
Tigris on the morning of 23 February 1917 and succeeded in holding 
off a Turkish counter-attack while a pontoon bridge was constructed. 
Auchinleck led the 62nd Punjabis across at nightfall and they relieved the 
Gurkhas. On the night of 23–24 February the 62nd Punjabis occupied and 
extended hastily constructed trenches. On the morning of 24 February 
they, with other battalions of the 36th Brigade (the 1/4th Hampshire 
Regiment and 82nd Punjabis), were committed to a frontal assault. 
However, Auchinleck, as acting CO, had given considerable thought to 
this problem and ordered the battalion to advance in sections to avoid 
casualties. He later explained, ‘The ordinary old advance was a sort of 
extended order, a long line of men. We advanced that day in sections in 
26 Andrew Syk, ed., The military papers of Lieutenant General Frederick Stanley 
Maude, 1914–17 (Stroud, 2012).
27 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 26, apparently from an interview with Auchinleck.
28 Connell, Auchinleck, pp. 44–45.
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single file, five men one behind the other, leaving plenty of gaps … A 
formation like that, with the section commander leading, ensured much 
more control than if the men were extended.’ Auchinleck remembered 
that his men, ‘were very steady’ in the successful advance and the 62nd 
Punjabis reached their objective with eight killed and fifty-eight wounded, 
as opposed to the 82nd Punjabis who had a casualty rate of 50 per cent.29 
By 25 February Turkish forces had abandoned Kut and were in full 
retreat, with Maude’s force now advancing on Baghdad. Baghdad was 
captured, with little opposition, on 11 March 1917, marking the end of 
Maude’s campaign.
On 13 March, Auchinleck relinquished his temporary command of 
the 62nd Punjabis to Colonel Morris. In the summer of 1917 Auchinleck 
moved to 52nd Brigade, Indian Army, to take up the post of Brigade 
Major and early in 1918 he moved with them to the Daur-Tikrit district, 
north of Baghdad. John Connell believed that this posting signified that 
Auchinleck ‘had been noticed as an officer of promise and meritorious 
achievement, to be singled out for promotion’.30 However, the move from 
Acting CO to Brigade Major (a post normally filled by a substantive 
captain in the British army) can hardly be seen as a promotion. Auchinleck 
spent a leave period in Ceylon staying with his sister, Cherry, who was 
now married to a tea planter living in the hill country below Nuwara 
Eliya, over the summer of 1918 and returned for the final stages of the 
Mesopotamian campaign in the Kurdistan mountains.
During his service in the First World War, Auchinleck had gained 
some experience of command, as an acting battalion CO and of staff 
work, as a Brigade Major. He had also developed his own thoughts about 
minor tactics. During the Mesopotamian campaign he had seen the 
importance of developing good logistics and the need for a commander 
to look after the needs of the men under his command. He had also seen 
some of the problems with divided command, with Aylmer, as operational 
commander, being overruled by Lake, the theatre commander which 
had caused confusion.31
At the end of the First World War, Auchinleck remained in the Middle 
East. He was appointed GSO2 with the division garrisoning Mosul and 
in August 1919 he was promoted to GSO1 and transferred to a division 
29 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 27 based on an interview with Auchinleck.
30 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 47.
31 On Auchinleck’s experiences in the First World War see TNA, WO95/5178/1 
and 2, war diary of the 62nd Punjabis 1915–18.
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pacifying the mountains of Kurdistan. When he left the Middle East, at 
the end of 1919, he received a glowing recommendation from his GOC, 
General ‘Snowball’ Fraser, ‘I wish to mention specially Major Auchinleck, 
DSO, OBE, my Chief Staff Officer, who has borne the whole burden of 
“G” work on his own back, and has proved himself a tower of strength. 
He has been most helpful to all my units as well as to myself, and the 
success of the operations is largely due to his vigorous personality, to 
his suggestive mind and to his professional ability.’32
Auchinleck sailed for India as a newly promoted brevet Lieutenant 
Colonel to take up a place at the Staff College in Quetta. This estab-
lishment had been created by Lord Kitchener, when C in C India, as an 
equivalent to the Staff College at Camberley. Auchinleck always viewed 
his education at Quetta as the equal of that at Camberley. However, had 
he attended Camberley he would have mixed with many of those who 
were later to become senior officers in the Second World War and this 
would have given him a greater insight into the subordinates available 
when he was in command in the Middle East in 1941–42.
In late 1920 Auchinleck enjoyed his first home leave since 1912. He 
had saved a lot of his pay during the war and decided to take his mother 
and unmarried sister, Ruth, for a holiday at Hyères in the south of France. 
There he met Jessie Stewart, fifteen years his junior. They were married 
in 1921 and sailed together for India at the end of Auchinleck’s leave. 
It was, unfortunately, not to be a happy marriage, ending in divorce in 
December 1945.
Auchinleck’s next posting was to Simla, the Indian Army HQ 150 
miles north of Delhi, almost in the Kashmir foothills. There Auchinleck 
spent four years as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, working 
directly under General Sir George MacMunn, the Quartermaster 
General. Auchinleck quickly established a good working relationship 
with both MacMunn and with Hastings ‘Pug’ Ismay, who arrived in 
early 1923 as another Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, working 
alongside Auchinleck. This relationship was to become very important 
when Ismay became Chief of Staff to Winston Churchill, in his capacity 
as Minister of Defence, between 1940 and 1945. Ismay was later to 
write of Auchinleck that he was ‘a most impressive figure: dignified, 
commanding, and apparently self-confident. Only those who knew him 
32 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 48.
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well realized that he was shy and sensitive’.33 Auchinleck was later to say 
that he regarded Ismay as, ‘a very great friend of mine’.34
Auchinleck returned to his regiment, which under the army reforms 
of 1922 had been redesignated as the 1st/1st Punjab Regiment in 1923, 
as second in command. The 1st/1st Punjab Regiment was then based 
in Peshawar, only thirty miles from the Khyber Pass. The North-West 
Frontier was quiet during this period, though in March 1926 the regiment 
had to travel 180 miles through the mountains to settle a boundary 
dispute between the Wazirs and Mahsuds. During his period as second 
in command, Auchinleck was seconded to act as GSO2 to the district 
commander, General Sir Robert Cassels, who he had first met in 1917 
when Cassels was GSOI of 14th Division. In this role Auchinleck was 
on the directing staff of a major exercise held around Attock on the 
Indus. Again, Auchinleck seemed to establish a very good working 
relationship with a superior and he was, ultimately, to succeed Cassels 
as C in C India in 1941.
The Auchinlecks went on home leave in 1926, holidaying in Scotland 
and Devonshire, though, interestingly it seems, making no visit to Ireland. 
This period of leave continued into 1927 and ended with Auchinleck 
becoming a student at the newly opened Imperial Defence College. 
The IDC had just opened and offered a one-year higher course to 
officers from all three services, preparing them for the highest military 
commands. It is unclear why Auchinleck was selected for this course. 
In later life, and perhaps with customary modesty, he reflected, ‘There 
were two vacancies for the Indian Army. I was given one of them and 
another friend [Colonel, later General Sir, Eric de Burgh] also home 
on leave, got the other. We always thought we got the two vacancies 
because they didn’t want to have to pay the fares for two other officers 
from India.’35 Attendance at the IDC was clearly of professional benefit 
to Auchinleck as that was where he met John Dill, who was then Chief 
Instructor, and Alan Brooke, a fellow student. Both became Chiefs of 
the Imperial General Staff and certainly one could portray Auchinleck 
as a protégé of Dill.
Auchinleck returned to India to rejoin his regiment, now at Jhelum 
close to the Kashmir mountains. In late 1928 he became the CO of the 
1st/1st Punjab Regiment. This appointment, which lasted for two years, 
33 Hastings Ismay, The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay (London, 1960), p. 269.
34 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 31, citing an interview with Auchinleck.
35 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 33 citing interview with Auchinleck.
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perhaps gave Auchinleck the greatest pleasures of his service life. Roger 
Parkinson noted, ‘Long afterwards he talked about these exhilarating 
months with more enthusiasm than perhaps any other stage of his career.’36
In 1930 Auchinleck was posted to the Staff College at Quetta as Chief 
Instructor of the Junior Division, as a full colonel and GSO1. This meant 
that he was responsible for the instruction of the thirty officers who were 
in the first year of the two year course. Auchinleck later remembered his 
time as Chief Instructor:
You had to study very hard again what you had already learnt at the 
Staff College, what you had learnt from your experience after you’d 
left Staff College, and what you’d read, and you had to be able to 
spread this knowledge among the students. I enjoyed it very much, 
because I liked acquiring the necessary knowledge. And of course 
it was a very good experience of making up one’s mind about the 
problems which you’d set yourself.37
Auchinleck left Quetta in late 1932, taking his wife on a home leave. 
He returned to take command of the Brigade in Peshawar. This was 
seen as a prize posting in the Indian Army as, while a brigade command, 
this consisted of five infantry battalions, one of them British, a cavalry 
regiment and three Royal Artillery batteries plus engineer and signals 
detachments, so in many respects, it was closer to divisional strength. 
Soon after his arrival, the Peshawar Brigade was involved in actions against 
the Mohmand tribesmen in the mountains to the north of Peshawar. The 
actions were short lived and successful in 1933, which saw Auchinleck 
awarded the Companion of the Bath. In 1935 trouble again erupted with 
the Mohmand tribesmen, this time on a wider scale. Major General 
Sir Sydney Muspratt, GOC Peshawar District, was absent on leave at 
the time, so Auchinleck as senior brigadier was ordered to lead his own 
brigade and the neighbouring Nowshera Brigade, supported by tanks, 
into the mountains. The Nowshera Brigade was then commanded by 
Harold Alexander, to be Auchinleck’s replacement as C in C Middle 
East in 1942, and the men soon became firm friends.
The parameters of the campaign against the Mohmand tribesmen had 
been set by Sir Ralph Griffith, Governor of the North-West Frontier 
Province. He had proclaimed that British and Indian troops would 
36 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 34.
37 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 35 citing an interview with Auchinleck.
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continue their march until they reached Kamalai, the heartland of 
Mohmand territory, and would do this even if the tribesmen abandoned 
their defences. Auchinleck opened his operations with the first opera-
tional use of tanks in India. Vickers Mark IIB tanks were sent forward 
in pairs to batter through roadblocks and, by the end of the first day 
of operations they had cleared the road enabling the two brigades to 
advance into the mountains. The road ended soon after the ascent into 
the mountains and Auchinleck then spent six weeks with his troops in 
a defended camp, while engineers extended the road network, allowing 
for a further advance. By mid-September operations could be reopened 
and Auchinleck sent forward three columns, in a night operation, to seize 
the heights on either side of Nahakki gorge, allowed cavalry and tanks 
to advance into the Kamalai Plain the following morning. Auchinleck 
reverted to the command of his own brigade when Muspratt returned 
but he had broken the back of Mohmand resistance and the tribesmen 
submitted on 1 October. This was viewed as a highly successful campaign 
and both Auchinleck and Alexander were created Commanders of the 
Star of India. Among visitors to their camp during the operation were 
Field Marshal Chetwode, C in C India and Sir James Grigg, who was 
then Finance Member of the Government of India and was the become 
Secretary of State for War from 1942 to 1945.
Auchinleck had a home leave in the Summer of 1936 and he returned 
to India in the Autumn as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, based in 
Simla. The C in C was then General Sir Robert Cassels and the Chief 
of the General Staff, General Eric de Burgh; two officers already well 
known to Auchinleck. It was while he was Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff that Auchinleck met Lieutenant Colonel Eric Dorman-Smith, 
who arrived in Simla in early 1938 as Director of Military Training. 
Auchinleck quickly got to know Dorman-Smith well and later reflected:
We used to go for long walks together in the morning before 
breakfast in the Simla hills, 8,000 feet up. We discussed war and 
training, training mostly, and I found him very intelligent and 
very valuable to talk to. I got a lot out of him. Very valuable indeed. 
Very imaginative. Not popular because he was a little bit inclined 
to state his opnions very openly, and the less intelligent didn’t like 
him very much. But I had a very great opinion of him – he proved 
it afterwards.38
38 Parkinson, The Auk, pp. 38–39 citing an interview with Auchinleck.
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Auchinleck was later to choose Dorman-Smith to accompany him, 
effectively as his army Chief of Staff, when he took personal control of 
Eighth Army in 1942, in what proved to be an ill-judged decision.
During Auchinleck’s time as Deputy Chief of Staff the Indian Army 
was undergoing some modest reform. While recruitment of the rank and 
file remained tied to the ‘martial races’, the officer corps was being slowly 
‘Indianised’, that is, opened to educated Indians through competitive 
examinations. From 1918 small numbers of Indian officers had been 
trained at the RMC. However, the numbers only became significant 
when the Indian Military Academy opened in October 1932 at Dehra 
Dun. By May 1941, just 535 cadets had been commissioned. To put this 
in context, the pre-war Indian Army had approximately 2,500 officers. 
Of equal concern to many Indians was the fact that Indian officers were 
often replacing Viceroys’ Commissioned Officers, effectively a variety of 
Warrant Officer, rather than white officers holding the King’s commission 
and the plan to Indianise only one division meant that Indian officers 
would not have the same promotion opportunities as their British 
counterparts.39
The other major issue being debated in the late 1930s was the moderni-
sation of the Indian Army and its capacity to provide an ‘Imperial 
Reserve’ as it had during the First World War. During the summer of 
1938 the C in C India created a Modernisation Committee at Simla, 
which was chaired by Auchinleck as de Burgh, the Chief of General 
Staff, was away on home leave. Other members were Lieutenant General 
G. N. Molesworth, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence 
and Lieutenant Colonel Eric Dorman-Smith as Director of Military 
Training. As laid down by the 1937 Imperial Conference, the primary 
role of the Indian Army was for home defence. Within a month the 
Modernisation Committee had assembled much evidence and prepared 
its report. Five specific functions were outlined for the Indian Army: 
frontier defence, internal security, coastal defence, external defence and 
the creation of a general reserve. The British Government’s contribution 
to the Indian Army was a mere £1,500,000 p.a., which meant that the 
reforms proposed had to be modest and designed to take place over a 
four-year period. Indeed, the Modernisation Committee recommended 
39 P. P. Barua, Gentlemen of the Raj: The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817–1949 
(Westport, 2003), pp. 14–87 and P. S. Gupta, ‘The Debate on Indianization 
1918–39’, in The British Raj and its Indian Armed Forces 1857–1939, ed. P. S. 
Gupta and Anirudh Deshpande (New Delhi, 2002), pp. 228–70.
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the disbandment of three Indian cavalry regiments, fourteen Indian 
infantry battalions and four companies of sappers and miners to help 
meet the costs of mechanisation and motorisation. Within these limita-
tions, the Committee recommended that the General Reserve should 
consist of three brigade groups and the equipping of these formations, 
along with mechanisation, should have the highest priority.
The C in C, General Sir Robert Cassels, accepted the report of 
the Modernisation Committee completely. It is worth noting that a 
sub-committee of the CID, under Major General H. R. Pownall had 
made similar recommendations and, indeed, estimated that the British 
government needed to provide a minimum of £2,285,000 p.a. if moderni-
sation was to progress properly. These reports were to prove timely as, 
with the situation deteriorating in Europe, Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Chatfield had been appointed to chair a committee which was to enquire 
into how best India’s military resources could be used, in the event of 
war. On 24 October 1938 Auchinleck received a letter from Lord Zetland, 
Secretary of State for India, in which he was invited to serve as a member 
of the Chatfield Committee. Auchinleck flew to Port Said to meet Lord 
Chatfield and his other colleagues and on the sea voyage to India was able 
to present his existing report, which was, ultimately, to be incorporated 
in the conclusions of the Chatfield Committee. The Chatfield Committee 
worked throughout November and December, based in Delhi but visiting 
a number of military establishments throughout India. By the end of 
January 1939 the preliminary conclusions had been reached, covering all 
three services in India. Lord Chatfield and his other committee members, 
including Auchinleck, flew from Delhi to London in late January 1939 
to complete their report there.
Recommendations were presented to the British Government in early 
spring. As a result, the Government decided to increase its expenditure 
on the Indian Army by 25 per cent, bringing this up to £2,000,000 p.a. 
and the Government also pledged a capital sum of £5,000,000 to be put 
at the disposal of the Government of India to help implement moderni-
sation. By Spring 1940 there were three Indian Army divisions either 
serving overseas or available for such duty and another three divisions 
in preparation for overseas deployment. This owed something to the 
foundations laid by the Chatfield report.40
40 On the planned reforms of the Modernisation, CID and Chatfield Committees, 
see Pradeep Barua, ‘Strategies and doctrines of imperial defence: Britain and 
India, 1919–45’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 25: 2 (1997), 
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Auchinleck stayed in England after the completion of the Chatfield 
report. He participated in a Higher Commanders’ Course at Aldershot, 
where Lord Mountbatten, with whom he was to work closely during 1943 
to 1947 when Mountbatten was C in C, South East Asia Command and 
then Viceroy of India, was a member of his syndicate. Following this he 
took leave and spent holidays with his wife in England and in the United 
States of America, where his wife had spent her childhood. They returned 
to Scotland in August 1939 and late in that month Auchinleck received 
orders to report at Edinburgh on 3 September. When he arrived there, 
on 2 September, he found his hotel crowded with Indian Army officers, 
who had all been recalled to their regiments and, like him, were to sail 
on the Canadian Pacific liner Duchess of Bedford.
Auchinleck reached Bombay at the beginning of October and immedi-
ately moved to Dehra Dun to take command of the Meerut District. He 
began to make arrangements to prepare the 3rd Indian Division for war 
but within three months he was ordered to return with all possible haste 
to England. On arrival in England, in January 1940 at the height of the 
‘Phoney War’, Auchinleck was ordered to raise, train and command the 
4 Corps. This corps was to be formed in an area to the south-west of 
London and the intention was that Auchinleck would take it to France 
in June. This was an odd posting for an Indian Army officer and later 
Auchinleck was to reflect, ‘I don’t know why they chose me. Most Indian 
Army officers had commands in India rather than in England – it was 
most unusual as a matter of fact.’41 Auchinleck faced many problems 
with his new command. Of his two divisions, the 52nd Lowland Division 
was based in Peeblesshire and the Border country, while his other was 
in Dorset, whereas his HQ , initially to have been at Camberley was 
moved to Alresford in Hampshire, remote from both divisions. Both 
were Territorial Army formations, with many raw recruits, and training 
facilities were sparse. Whilst preparing 4 Corps for its final training and 
240–66; Barua, Gentlemen of the Raj, pp. 89–106; Brian Bond, British Military 
Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980), pp. 121–24; Anirudh 
Deshpande, British Military Policy in India, 1900–1945: Colonial Constraints 
and Declining Power (New Delhi, 2005), pp. 135–39; D. P. Marston, Phoenix from 
the Ashes: The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign (London, 2003), pp. 28–30 
and S. N. Prasad, Official History of the Indian Army in the Second World War 
1939–45: Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939–45 
(Calcutta, 1956), pp. 434–38.
41 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 43, citing an interview with Auchinleck.
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deployment to France, Auchinleck was called to the War Office to be 
given his first independent command in Norway.
Norway first came to the attention of British military planners in 
January 1940 when consideration was given to seizing Narvik, in Northern 
Norway to prevent the port being used to ship Swedish iron ore to 
Germany.42 In February, when a force was being organised to support 
Finland against the USSR, consideration was again given to seizing the 
ports of Trondheim and Narvik to support that operation. Finland capitu-
lated on 12 March 1940, which removed one reason for intervention, but 
the Chamberlain government decided to authorise mine-laying operations 
to block the passage of German ships carrying iron ore on 8 April. On 
this same day German forces invaded Denmark and Norway, occupying 
most of the major cities by 10 April. As a result of the German invasion, 
it was decided that a force, consisting of troops initially earmarked for 
Finland, would be sent to Norway and this force sailed on 11 April 1940. 
Initially, the naval elements were commanded by Admiral of the Fleet 
Lord Cork, with Major General P. J. Mackesy in command of troops. 
Mackesy’s initial task was to establish his force at Harstad on Hinnoy 
Island, opposite Narvik. In mid-April British and French troops also 
gained footholds at Namsos and Aalsund, immediately to the north and 
south of Trondheim. By late April the situation had deteriorated badly as 
German reinforcements arrived. It was decided that the Trondheim area 
would be evacuated, though renewed efforts would be made to capture 
Narvik, more for political, than strategic reasons.
It was against this background that Auchinleck was selected to command 
troops in Northern Norway on 28 April. It is unclear why Auchinleck 
was chosen for this operation; he had never been to Norway and knew 
little of the country, he had never worked closely with the Royal Navy 
and he didn’t speak French. It may well have been that his long-standing 
patron, Sir John Dill, recently appointed as VCIGS, recommended him 
and his experience in mountain warfare in India may have been deemed 
useful, though given that none of the British troops under his command 
had been trained or equipped for mountain warfare, this is questionable. 
On 29 April Auchinleck assembled a staff and obtained what material 
he could about Norway. On the same day Major General Mackesy was 
42 The best modern study of the Norway campaign is John Kiszely, Anatomy of a 
campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940 (Cambridge, 2017). The official 
history, T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (London, 1952), still contains 
much of value.
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ordered to send a small unit to seize Bodo, South of Narvik, to prevent 
German troops reinforcing the town by road.
Auchinleck questioned the wisdom of an attack on Narvik, but 
Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Chamberlain 
government as a whole, maintained that such an attack was needed to 
restore British and, indeed, Allied prestige, given the decision to evacuate 
forces from Southern Norway. Auchinleck had to wait until 5 May until 
he received his official orders to depart for Norway as GOC in C designate 
of Anglo-French military forces and the RAF in Northern Norway, with 
instructions to act in close co-operation with the Senior Naval Officer. 
This created a confused command situation, where Auchinleck would 
immediately supersede Mackesy as commander of British troops, but 
Mackesy would remain under his command. Auchinleck left for Scotland 
on 6 May and on the morning of 7 May boarded the Polish liner Chrobry 
at Leith, which under destroyer escort, took him and his staff to Norway. 
While he was still at sea the German blitzkrieg swept forward in the Low 
Countries and France.
When he heard the news of the German advance, Auchinleck wondered 
what his force could now achieve. He believed that at least twelve 
infantry battalions were needed for the defence of the Narvik area and 
reinforcements would be impossible in the changing circumstances. In 
reality the British forces under his command were to consist of 24th 
Guards Brigade, three Independent Companies which had been specially 
recruited from the Territorial Army and supporting RA and RE units. 
The RA available consisted of the 55th and 56th Light Anti-Aircraft 
Regiments and the 51st and 82nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiments; this 
was below the level of anti-aircraft support which Auchinleck viewed as a 
minimum and, in any case, ammunition supplies were very limited. Not 
only was this British force as, a whole, insufficient to capture and secure 
Narvik in Auchinleck’s view, but it meant that the French contingent, 
four battalions of Chasseurs Alpins and two battalions of the French 
Foreign Legion, outnumbered British troops, while a Polish brigade 
of four battalions, which had been raised in France, was almost equal 
to it. This made Auchinleck’s job as the commander of an Allied force 
difficult and its polyglot nature was further reinforced by the addition 
of two Norwegian battalions.43 When he arrived at Harstad he met with 
Mackesy and Lord Cork, quickly forming the impression that there 
43 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, pp. 266–67; Kiszely, Anatomy of a campaign, 
p. 252 and Parkinson, The Auk, p. 48 citing an interview with Auchinleck.
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was not a good working relationship between the two senior officers.44 
Auchinleck arranged to have Mackesy recalled to London, though had 
to move decisively to remove him on 13 May before authorisation came 
through from the VCIGS. On 12 May, Auchinleck observed French 
troops capture Bjervik, following a bombardment by the Royal Navy.
Over the next nine days the situation deteriorated further. A small 
British force had to be withdrawn from Mo and Luftwaffe attacks 
became very heavy, sinking amongst other ships, the Chrobry. With 
the deteriorating situation in France and Belgium, the Chiefs of Staff 
made it clear to Auchinleck that he could not expect any reinforcements 
and on 21 May the War Cabinet discussed withdrawing British troops 
from the Narvik area. Auchinleck was ordered to evacuate the whole of 
northern Norway by an order sent in the early hours of 25 May, but the 
Chiefs of Staff left it to Auchinleck and Lord Cork to decide whether 
the long-planned assault on Narvik itself should take place before 
withdrawal. Cork and Auchinleck consulted with the senior French 
officer, Brigadier General Antoine Béthouart, and all agreed to carry 
out the assault as planned. Auchinleck later explained, ‘We simply had 
to make a plan to get the troops out without letting the Germans know 
that we were doing it to begin with. So we went ahead and captured 
Narvik – I think that foxed the Germans. I don’t think they expected 
us to retire immediately after we’d taken Narvik.’45 Over the night of 
27–28 May Allied forces captured Narvik. The bombardment by the 
Royal Navy commenced at midnight and by 4am the assault troops, 
drawn from the Norwegian Army, French Foreign Legion and Free 
Polish forces were advancing on the town. Luftwaffe attacks on the 
attacking force remained fierce throughout 28 May, with HMS Cairo, 
on which Auchinleck had established his Headquarters, being struck 
by two bombs, causing heavy casualties. RAF support from Hurricane 
fighters was essential and by 5pm Allied troops had occupied Narvik. 
To be welcomed as liberators by the Norwegian inhabitants of Norway 
was difficult for Auchinleck and other senior officers who knew of the 
plans for evacuation. The evacuation of the 25,000 Allied troops began 
on the night of 3 June and was completed on the evening of 7 June with 
Auchinleck himself leaving on HMS Southampton; completely deceiving 
German forces. The Allied troops sailed for the Clyde in two convoys, 
Auchinleck embarking on HMS Southampton. On 8 June the Gneisenau 
44 Kiszely, Anatomy of a campaign, pp. 251–52 and 257–59.
45 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 51, citing an interview with Auchinleck.
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and Scharnhorst made contact with the convoy sinking the tanker, Oil 
Pioneer, the aircraft carrier, HMS Glorious and two destroyers, HMS 
Acasta and HMS Arden.
On his return from Norway, Auchinleck was informed on 14 June 
that he was to take command of the 5 Corps, in Southern Command, 
the only operational military formation then in the south and west of 
England. His new command consisted of the 4th Division, a regular 
formation and the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, composed of TA 
units, who Auchinleck felt were only partially trained; the 48th (South 
Midland) Division was, on paper, part of 5 Corps but did not come under 
Auchinleck’s direct command. He was ordered to defend the coastline 
between Bognor and Bristol against the threatened German invasion. 
On 19 July 1940, when Alan Brooke was promoted from GOC Southern 
Command to become Commander of Home Forces, replacing General 
Sir Edmund Ironside, who was promoted to Field Marshal; Auchinleck 
was given Southern Command.
In defence planning there were serious discussions amongst senior 
generals and politicians about how a German invasion might best be 
resisted. Some felt that British forces should be concentrated inland, 
allowing them to counter-attack a German landing quickly, with others 
believing that the strongest defence should come on the coast itself. 
Both Ironside and Brooke as C in C Home Forces stressed the need for 
mobility and the need to prevent a ‘Maginot Line’ complex amongst 
British troops.46 Auchinleck did not fundamentally disagree with his 
superiors but, particularly in the immediate aftermath of Dunkirk, 
he feared that with vehicles in very short supply he could not rely on 
reserve troops being moved quickly to invasion beaches. Auchinleck 
also believed that the key element in British defence was to prevent 
the Germans establishing a beach head through which they could land 
armoured units and artillery.
The Local Defence Volunteers (LDV), renamed the Home Guard on 
31 July 1940, provided additional reinforcements to the troops under 
Auchinleck’s command. Auchinleck seems to have seen them as of some 
use, but clearly understood their limitations. Reflecting on the LDV 
many years later he commented, ‘The Home Guard were excellent, 
46 Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London, 1957), pp. 129–34; 
Jonathan Fennell, Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth 
Armies and the Second World War (Cambridge, 2019), pp. 115–16 and David 
French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 
1919–45 (Oxford, 2000), pp. 184–92.
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excellent, and would have been very useful. I liked them very much. They 
wouldn’t have stopped the Germans of course – just shot them up and 
that sort of thing. They weren’t really tactical.’47 The Home Guard gave 
Auchinleck more than a few headaches, with Home Guard officers in 
Southern Command as likely as those elsewhere to raise their grievances 
with senior officers, ignoring the chain of command.48 Auchinleck clearly 
had problems with officers in the Hampshire Home Guard where, it 
appears that Viscount Lymington, who had been Conservative MP for 
Basingstoke, 1929–34, had encouraged some platoon commanders to 
argue for his promotion within the Home Guard, while other platoon 
commanders seem to have threatened to resign if he was promoted, 
citing his supposed Fascist sympathies.49
When Auchinleck was promoted to GOC Southern Command, 
Lieutenant General B. L. Montgomery took over command of 5 Corps. 
Montgomery’s approach was very different to Auchinleck’s as he introduced 
a more demanding training regime and seems to have suggested that any 
time spent on building fixed defences was time wasted. Montgomery 
reported unfavourably on commanders and units who Auchinleck had, 
presumably, found quite satisfactory. Things came to a head between 
them over Montgomery’s ‘poaching’ of officers from other formations 
and his dealing directly with the War Office, ignoring Auchinleck, his 
superior officer. Nigel Hamilton, Montgomery’s biographer, in this case, 
as all others, defended his subject to the extreme, portraying Auchinleck 
as a Blimpish figure, obsessed with static defence and neglecting proper 
training.50 This was a crude caricature of Auchinleck’s position.
In November 1940 Auchinleck was appointed C in C India, taking up 
the post in January 1941 having discussed the situation in the Middle 
East with General Archibald Wavell, en route. The Indian Army which 
he took command of was in the process of transformation from what was, 
essentially a lightly armed constabulary force, into a modern army, with 
considerable expeditionary capabilities. Indeed, it was only in May 1940 
that major expansion of the Indian Army had begun. In the brief period 
in which he was first C in C India (Auchinleck took up the position of 
C in C Middle East in June 1941; he returned as C in C India in June 
47 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 57 citing an interview with Auchinleck.
48 S. P. Mackenzie, The Home Guard (Oxford, 1995), p. 186.
49 JRL, AUC 95, letter Major General G. J. St Clair to Auchinleck, 18 October 
1940, not reproduced below.
50 Nigel Hamilton, The Full Monty: Montgomery of Alamein 1887–1942 (London, 
2001), pp. 377–81.
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1943) Auchinleck appears to have accomplished a lot, although it must 
be acknowledged that major decisions about expansion and resources 
had been taken before he took command. Auchinleck firmly supported 
the commissioning of large numbers of Indian Officers for the expanding 
army, whereas his predecessor, General Sir Robert Cassells had tried 
to relegate Indian officers to garrison or administrative posts.51 While 
recruitment for new classes and in new areas had started in October 
1939, Auchinleck did much to develop this, identifying areas where new 
regiments should be formed and making use of old regimental traditions 
and the Indian Territorial Force in expanding the recruiting base.52 In 
terms of training, Alan Jeffreys has given his opinion that Auchinleck, 
‘provided a new stimulus to the transformation of the Indian Army’, 
introducing effective training pamphlets in 1941.53
While in 1943–47 Auchinleck was to experience no operational 
command as C in C India, in 1941, briefly, he became responsible for 
the campaign in Iraq while holding this post. A pro-German coup in April 
1941 saw the major RAF base at Habbaniya besieged. While Wavell as 
C in C Middle East made it clear that he could offer few forces to relieve 
the situation, and, indeed, he seems to have believed that diplomatic 
rather than military measures would suffice, Auchinleck was able to send 
troops from India, including a small detachment sent by air, which did 
much to retrieve the situation.54
Auchinleck was appointed C in C Middle East in June 1941 to take 
over command from General Archibald Wavell. Churchill had been key 
in this appointment, while General Sir John Dill, CIGS, otherwise a 
patron of Auchinleck, did not think he was the right appointment for the 
Middle East. On arrival Auchinleck quickly came under pressure from 
Churchill to launch a new offensive against the Axis forces. Auchinleck 
insisted on taking time to build up troop levels, tank strength and training, 
with the result that the ‘Crusader’ offensive did not start until November 
1941. This offensive initially faltered under the command of Lieutenant 
General Alan Cunningham, the newly appointed commander of Eighth 
51 Srinath Raghavan, ‘Building the sinews of power: India in the Second World 
War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42: 5 (2019), 586–87.
52 Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes, pp. 49–50 and Prasad, Expansion of the armed 
forces, pp. 79–93.
53 Alan Jeffreys, Approach to Battle: Training the Indian Army during the Second 
World War (Solihull, 2017), pp. 71–72.
54 Ashley Jackson, Persian Gulf Command: A History of the Second World War in 
Iran and Iraq (London, 2018), pp. 54–59.
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Army, who was quickly replaced by Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie. 
Up to January 1942 the ‘Crusader’ offensive had achieved most of its 
aims, having relieved the siege of Tobruk and cleared Cyrenaica of Axis 
forces. However, Erwin Rommel’s offensive, launched on 29 January 
1942, quickly recaptured Benghazi and the Eighth Army fell back on 
the Gazala line. On 26 May, Axis forces attacked the Gazala line which 
then saw confused fighting in the ‘Cauldron’ and ‘Knightsbridge’ box 
battles into mid-June 1942. On 20 June Ritchie decided to fall back to 
Mersa Matruh and on 21 June Tobruk fell to Axis forces with 33,000 
Allied troops captured. At this critical point, Auchinleck took personal 
command of the Eighth Army on 25 June. He then fought what many 
historians refer to as the First Battle of El Alamein between 1 July and 
27 July; though these encounters are referred to as ‘The Fighting in the 
El Alamein Line’ in the official history.55 In these actions Auchinleck at 
least stabilised the British position, and arguably came close to inflicting 
a major defeat on the Axis forces. Nevertheless, Churchill, having visited 
the Middle East with General Sir Alan Brooke, the CIGS, decided that 
Auchinleck had to be replaced as C in C Middle East with General 
Sir Harold Alexander. Initially Lieutenant General William Gott was 
to be put in command of Eighth Army, but his death saw Lieutenant 
General Bernard Montgomery selected for this role.
Auchinleck’s time as C in C Middle East has been the subject of many 
studies.56 His controversial sacking by Winston Churchill in August 1942 
has led his biographers to adopt the approach of defence counsel in their 
works and Correlli Barnett has added a particularly strong argument 
in favour of Auchinleck’s generalship, describing him as ‘The Victor of 
Alamein’.57 Those critical of Auchinleck suggest that he was not a good 
judge of character and made a number of mistaken appointments. They 
also suggest that Auchinleck did not understand armoured warfare and 
broke up established British divisions into ineffective Brigade Groups. 
55 I. S. O. Playfair, ed., The Mediterranean and Middle East: Vol. III: British 
Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb (London, 1960), pp. 331–60.
56 Important recent works include: Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles 
of El Alamein (London, 2004), pp. 11–217; Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale 
in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein 
(Cambridge, 2011), pp. 119–287; Martin Kitchen, Rommel’s Desert War: Waging 
World War II in North Africa, 1941–1943 (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 107–308 
and Douglas Porch, Hitler’s Mediterranean gamble: The North African and 
Mediterranean campaigns in World War II (London, 2004), pp. 235–99.
57 Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (London, 2nd edition, 1983), pp. 7–9 and 
88–248.
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One of the most damning criticisms of Auchinleck is that he was preparing 
the Eighth Army for further retreat in July 1942; an accusation based 
on a misreading of some ‘worst case’ contingency planning.58 The gap 
between Auchinleck’s supporters and detractors is neatly demonstrated 
over the use that he made of ULTRA. Nigel Hamilton suggests that 
Auchinleck made very little effective use of this, whereas Martin Kitchen 
notes that with excellent Sigint and aerial reconnaissance Auchinleck 
was able to anticipate every German move in the El Alamein fighting of 
June and July 1942.59 Bringing much needed balance and a new focus 
to this acrimonious debate between what could, crudely, be termed the 
Auchinleck and Montgomery schools of thought, Jonathan Fennell 
demonstrates that there was clearly a morale crisis in the Eighth Army 
in the summer of 1942 and, whatever Auchinleck’s talents in the area of 
operational command, he was clearly not the man to resolve this crisis; 
Montgomery was.60 Niall Barr’s considered conclusion is that, ‘There 
is no question that Auchinleck could identify what needed to be done 
but encountered real difficulty in translating those ideas into practice.’61
Criticisms of Auchinleck as a judge of character focus particularly on 
his choice of Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie as C in C Eighth Army 
and Major General Eric Dorman-Smith as Chief of Staff ‘in the field’ 
when Auchinleck took direct command of Eighth Army after sacking 
Ritchie. Each of these appointments has found historians to justify 
them. Ritchie was put in a difficult position by Auchinleck as an acting 
Lieutenant General over two more senior corps commanders. There 
was some wisdom in Auchinleck’s choice of Ritchie for this role, in that 
Ritchie, having been DCGS in Cairo, knew the plans and intelligence 
summaries well and promoting either of the existing Corps commanders 
would have led to other command problems. Auchinleck, having seen 
an experienced commander, Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham, 
fail as C in C Eighth Army probably thought that mentoring a younger 
general was a more promising approach. Michael Carver, who ended 
58 The most damning critique of Auchinleck is Hamilton, Monty: The Making of 
a General, pp. 508–11. On Auchinleck’s choice of subordinates see, for example, 
David Belchem, All in the day’s march (London, 1978), p. 101. Belchem was GSO 
I (Staff Duties) in Eighth Army and Duff Hart-Davis, ed., King’s Counsellor: 
Abdication and War: The diaries of Sir Alan Lascelles (London, 2006), p. 41.
59 Hamilton, Monty: The Making of a General, p. 653 and Kitchen, Rommel’s Desert 
War, p. 261.
60 Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African campaign, pp. 188–218.
61 Barr, Pendulum of War, p. 216.
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his own military career as a Field Marshal and served under Ritchie in 
North West Europe in 1944–45, formed a very high opinion of him. He 
thought that Ritchie’s problems stemmed from his being appointed as a 
chargé d’affaires, rather than a plenipotentiary; that is, that Auchinleck 
did not allow him the full authority that he should have possessed as an 
Army Commander and the lack of support he received from his Corps 
Commanders.62
Major General Eric ‘Chink’ Dorman-Smith was a man who was seen as 
deeply problematic by many of his contemporaries; undoubtedly intelligent 
but a dangerous eminence gris whose various plans distracted Auchinleck 
and other planning staff from more essential tasks. Montgomery was 
brief in his analysis, describing Dorman-Smith as a ‘menace’.63 Charles 
Richardson, who was appointed GSO1 (Plans) at Eighth Army HQ in 
June 1942 already knew Dorman-Smith well and noted, ‘His vigorous, 
restless and inventive mind was continually looking for clever, unconven-
tional and daring solutions to the dire battlefield problems with which 
Rommel confronted us. Few if any of these solutions were attuned to 
the capabilities of Eighth Army, which had recently been disastrously 
defeated. Moreover, Chink was seldom content with pursuing only one 
solution … it was not possible to arrange the removal of this dangerous 
supernumerary adviser.’64 Francis De Guingand, recently appointed as 
BGS Eighth Army noted of Dorman-Smith in his role as ‘DCGS in 
the Field’:
His quick brain and fertile mind produced appreciations and plans 
at a quicker rate than anyone I have ever met; he was perhaps too 
clever to be wise. The usual procedure was for these papers to be 
marked by the C.-in-C.: ‘B.G.S., please examine this idea.’ At first 
I sat up all night conscientiously working on these projects, but 
soon I found they took up too much of my time and, I regret to 
say, wasted a lot of it as well. Some had merit and might have been 
of use when we became strong enough but a lot were somewhat 
impracticable.65
62 Michael Carver, Dilemmas of the Desert War: The Libyan Campaign 1940–1942 
(Staplehurst, 2002), pp. 145–46.
63 Stephen Brooks, ed., Montgomery and the Eighth Army (London, 1991), p. 20 
citing IWM, Montgomery Papers, BLM 27/1, ‘Review of the Situation in 
Eighth Army from 12 August to 23 October 1942’.
64 Charles Richardson, Flashback: A Soldier’s Story (London, 1985), p. 103.
65 Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory (London, 1947), pp. 132–33.
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While one might regard this litany of complaints about Dorman-
Smith, by men who were later to rise to the very top of their profession, 
as conclusive, Dorman-Smith has found his defenders, notably Correlli 
Barnett and Lavinia Greacen. They portray Dorman-Smith as an original 
thinker who didn’t suffer fools gladly and who provided the careful 
reading of German intentions which allowed Auchinleck to halt the 
German advance at El Alamein.66 Whatever his merits, Dorman-Smith 
had a nasty habit of alienating those with whom he had to work and his 
subsequent career ended in abject failure when he was put in command 
of an infantry brigade in Italy. It should also be added that at Eighth 
Army HQ Auchinleck had a group of particularly talented and capable 
staff officers and more delegation to them could have proved much more 
effective than imposing Dorman-Smith on a functioning staff system.
One of the many criticisms of Auchinleck is that he broke up established 
divisions into brigade groups and Jock columns, which prevented the 
Eighth Army from concentrating firepower at a decisive point.67 However, 
if, as David French suggests, the main problem suffered by the British 
forces in the Western Desert was their inability to practice combined 
arms tactics, then the development of these formations could be seen 
as an attempt to integrate armour, infantry and artillery; the problem 
then being that they did not have enough armour, infantry or artillery 
to take on an entire Axis division unaided.68 While German tanks did 
not completely outclass British tanks and British tanks were more than a 
match for most Italian models, it would be wrong to downplay problems 
with British tank production. British tanks in 1941 to 1942 suffered 
from inadequate firepower, insufficient armour and slow speeds; these 
were particularly problems with the Valentine tank. The Crusader tank 
was an improvement, but its performance was hampered by poor build 
quality.69 It should also be noted that much later in the war, armoured 
doctrine remained confused and co-operation between armour and 
infantry patchy.70
66 Barnett, The Desert Generals, pp. 181–99 and Lavinia Greacen, Chink: 
A Biography (London, 1989), pp. 172–294. Lavinia Greacen is currently working 
on an edited collection of Dorman-Smith’s papers held in the JRL.
67 Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African campaign, p. 284.
68 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, pp. 220–26.
69 Benjamin Coombs, British Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934–1945 
(London, 2013), pp. 89–91.
70 John Buckley, Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe 
(London, 2013), pp. 129–35.
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The Auchinleck papers reveal, in detail, his problems in dealing 
with Winston Churchill. Churchill’s role as a Generalissimo or, indeed, 
warlord, has been the focus of a number of important studies.71 Churchill 
certainly took a keen interest in military affairs and Geoffrey Best notes, 
‘Churchill may not have been misguided in thinking that his generals 
and the War Office performed the better for his prodding and probing. 
He actually thought the generals would appreciate the interest he showed 
in them. On the whole they didn’t.’72 In May 1942 General Sir Alan 
Brooke, as CIGS, was candid about the problems apparent in Churchill’s 
relationship with Auchinleck:
I can so very well imagine what your feelings must have been 
lately with the decisions you have had to make on your Western 
Front. I do hope you have not felt that I did not realize what the 
conditions are that you are facing, and I can assure you that I 
have done what I could to ensure that your situation was fully 
appreciated and realized by the Cabinet. Some of your arguments 
have made it difficult to support your case, and arguments based 
on mathematical calculations of ratios of tank strengths to the 
exclusion of the main strategical arguments of the situation as a 
whole produced reactions on the part of the P.M. which were very 
hard to counter. It was only with considerable difficulties that we 
induced him to accept your date.
I still feel that it would have been of great assistance if you 
had been able to come home when originally suggested; he has 
not taken it well and repeatedly harps back to this fact. Another 
advice I would give is when possible to send telegrams in your own 
capacity instead of coming from the Defence Council. The latter 
procedure annoys him and I think gives him the wrong impression 
that you are taking cover behind the cloak of the Defence Council! 
I can assure you that I do all I can from this end to make your path 
as easy as possible, but I am afraid that you do not always realize 
what a difficult matter this is when having to handle the Defence 
Committee, War Cabinet and a personality such as the P.M.!73
71 Carlo D’Este, Warlord: A Life of Churchill at War, 1874–1945 (London, 2008), 
pp. 443–689 and Max Hastings, Finest Years: Churchill as Warlord 1940–45 
(London, 2009), pp. 139–343.
72 Geoffrey Best, Churchill and War (London, 2005), p. 171.
73 JRL, AUC 852, Letter from General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS to Auchinleck, 
16 May 1942, not reproduced below.
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Auchinleck did not see himself as a diplomat and it is fair to conclude 
that he did not always appreciate the pressures under which Churchill 
was working. The vision of Churchill as a great war leader can, all too 
easily, ignore the practical problems he faced in needing to show the 
Americans and Soviets that the British army could develop a successful 
‘second front’ and the problems faced from both backbench MPs and 
by-election defeats. It says something for Churchill’s management of 
military affairs and respect for Auchinleck that he personally notified 
Auchinleck of his replacement as C in C Middle East in August 1942, 
rather than leaving that task to Brooke, and offered Auchinleck the newly 
created post of C in C Iraq and Persia, which Auchinleck declined.
Having been removed from command in the Middle East, Auchinleck 
returned to India. There he wrote his official reports and then was 
unemployed for a lengthy period. In June 1943 he was reappointed as 
C in C India, a post he continued to hold until the end of the British 
Raj in August 1947. This period as C in C India is the focus of another 
volume of Auchinleck’s military papers, due to be published by the Army 
Records Society in the near future.
Sources and Editorial Method
This volume of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck’s papers reproduces 
only a selection from those held in the Auchinleck papers at the John 
Rylands Library, University of Manchester. The collection there consists 
of 1,353 individual documents; in total around 1,500,000 words, and it 
was felt that in producing this volume, these papers alone should be 
used, rather than including official papers held in the War Office files at 
The National Archives (TNA), Kew or in the Indian Office collections 
held at the British Library. As it transpired the closure of archives and 
libraries due to the COVID 19 emergency prevented much use being 
made of these additional sources in any case.
These papers were deposited in the John Rylands Library (then an 
independent institution, which merged with the University of Manchester 
in 1972) by the wish of Auchinleck himself in 1967. Michael Elliott-
Bateman, a lecturer in military studies at the University of Manchester had 
visited Eric Dorman O’Gowan (formerly Dorman-Smith), Auchinleck’s 
erstwhile chief of staff, at his home in Ireland to discuss the deposit of 
Dorman O’Gowan’s papers. After some discussion, Dorman O’Gowan 
had agreed to the deposit of his own papers with the John Rylands Library 
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and had suggested to Auchinleck that he might do the same. Auchinleck 
was, at this stage, preparing to emigrate to Marrakech, where he took up 
permanent residence in January 1968 and wanted to safely deposit his 
papers before he left the UK. Writing in 1967, Auchinleck noted that the 
papers, ‘fill a medium sized suitcase’ and that the Department of War 
Studies at King’s College London was interested in having them. The 
papers had already been, ‘roughly classified and filed according to subject 
and period’ by John Connell, when he was working on his biography.74 
Indeed, Connell’s work, which consists of 952 substantive pages makes 
considerable use of these papers, many of which are quoted at length.
The acquisition of Auchinleck’s papers occurred at a time when the 
Department of Military Studies was being revitalised at the University 
of Manchester, and when Professor M. R. D. Foot, one of the official 
historians of the Second World War, held the post of Professor of 
Modern History.75 Foot seems to have been excited by the acquisition 
of Auchinleck’s papers, commenting, ‘this really puts us on the map in 
military studies and as a result of this gift we could easily become a focal 
point for such collections of military history’. Writing to Auchinleck 
himself, Foot remarked, ‘They quite clearly constitute a source of the first 
importance, for the military historian, for the historian of government 
and war, and for the tale of the end of British rule in India.’76 Auchinleck 
was assured that the papers had been catalogued and indexed by October 
1968, though these were not made generally available as Brian Chapman, 
the Professor of Government at the University of Manchester, along 
with M. R. D. Foot and Michael Elliott-Bateman, were supposedly 
preparing them for publication by Manchester University Press. Indeed, 
Auchinleck’s second biographer, Roger Parkinson, appears to have 
made no use of the papers themselves, relying on Connell’s earlier 
quotations, as he believed that the publication of an edited collection 
of the papers was imminent when he published his book in 1977.77 
74 JRL, Auchinleck papers, uncatalogued papers relating to deposit and access, 
letter Auchinleck to Dr F. W. Ratcliffe, 15 August 1967.
75 Obituary of M. R. D. Foot, The Guardian, 21 February 2012. Foot’s best-known 
publications include, S. O. E. In France: An account of the British Special 
Operations Executive in France 1940–44 (London, 1966) and Resistance: European 
resistance to the Nazis, 1940–45 (London, 1978).
76 JRL, Auchinleck papers, uncatalogued papers relating to deposit and access, 
letter Ratcliffe to the Vice Chancellor of the University of Manchester, 
21 November 1967 and letter, Foot to Auchinleck, 22 November 1967.
77 Parkinson, The Auk, p. 8.
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Auchinleck was continually assured from 1968 to 1978 that work on 
this publication, which never appeared, was ongoing.78 M. R. D. Foot 
left the University of Manchester in 1973 to take up a post as director 
of the European Discussion Centre, which may explain this, while 
Michael Elliott-Bateman’s publications had little real focus on British, 
or, indeed, Indian, military history and Chapman’s published work had 
no real military focus at all.79 While the academic staff at the University 
of Manchester conspicuously failed to produce an edited collection of 
Auchinleck’s papers, Dr Margaret M. Wright, the Keeper of Printed 
Books at the John Rylands Library, produced a very detailed and compre-
hensive catalogue. This was originally published in the Bulletin of the 
John Rylands University Library of Manchester and is now available, in 
its entirety online.80 Unfortunately, Dr Wright suffered from ill-health 
over a long period and she died in late 1989, which meant that Dr C. D. 
Field, Head of Publications at the John Rylands Library completed the 
final editing of this work, before it was published.81
It should be noted here that the biographies of Auchinleck produced 
by Philip Warner, a Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst and Alexander Greenwood, who had been one of Auchinleck’s 
ADCs 1943–44 and remained a lifelong friend, made very limited use of 
the Auchinleck papers. Warner’s book on Auchinleck seems to have relied 
heavily on O’Connell’s quotations from the Auchinleck papers, rather 
than the papers themselves, though the lack of proper footnotes does 
not make this clear. Warner’s research consisting primarily of hundreds 
78 JRL, Auchinleck papers, uncatalogued papers relating to deposit and access, 
letter Ratcliffe to Auchinleck, 26 May 1970, 12 June 1970, 11 April 1974, 
16 December 1975 and 15 June 1978.
79 Michael Elliott Bateman, ed., The fourth dimension of warfare. Vol. I, Intelligence, 
subversion, resistance (Manchester, 1970) and Vol. II, Revolt to revolution: studies 
in the 19th and 20th Century European experience (Manchester, 1974) and Defeat 
in the East: The work of Mao Tse-tung on war (Oxford, 1967). Brian Chapman, 
Introduction to French local government (London, 1953), The profession of 
government: the public service in Europe (London, 1959) and British government 
observed: some European reflections (London, 1963).
80 Margaret M. Wright, ‘The Military Papers, 1940–48, of Field-Marshal 
Sir Claude Auchinleck: A Calendar and Index’, Bulletin of the John Rylands 
University Library of Manchester, 70: 2 (1988), 146–393 and: http://
www.library.manchester.ac.uk/search-resources/special-collections/
guide-to-special-collections/atoz/auchinleck-papers/.
81 JRL, Auchinleck papers, uncatalogued papers relating to deposit and access, 
letter, Dr C. D. Field to Alexander Greenwood, 4 January 1990.
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of hours spent interviewing those who worked with Auchinleck. Indeed, 
the origins of this book lie in interviews which David Dimbleby recorded 
with Auchinleck between 1974 and 1976, some of which were broadcast 
as a BBC programme, The Auk at 90. David Dimbleby had planned to 
develop these interviews into a book but with other commitments, he 
passed this opportunity on to Philip Warner.82 Alexander Greenwood’s 
biography of Auchinleck was written without proper footnotes, so it 
is not always clear where he was drawing from the Auchinleck papers. 
Certainly, he had asked for copies of some of the papers, regarding 
Auchinleck’s period as Commander in Chief, India 1944–47. Curiously, 
though, Greenwood devoted only 53 pages of his 320-page book to this 
period.83 Evan McGilvray in his recent biography has made use of the 
Auchinleck papers but has provided very limited quotation from them.
The Auchinleck papers, as they survive, contain nothing before 1940: 
67 documents concern the Norway campaign, 50 Southern Command 
in 1940, 153 Auchinleck’s first period as Commander in Chief, India in 
1941, 749 the Middle East 1941–43 and 288 Auchinleck’s second period 
as Commander in Chief, India, 1943–47. The Middle East collection 
probably dominates as the letters and telegrams Auchinleck received 
and sent in this period could be argued to be ‘personal’ in a way that the 
official paperwork which he generated as Commander in Chief, India 
could not.
None of Dorman O’Gowan’s papers have been reproduced in this 
collection as they do not directly correspond with the Auchinleck papers 
being, in very large part, memoirs written after the war and post-war 
correspondence. Lavinia Greacen published a very readable biography 
of Dorman O’Gowan in 1989 and is now working on an edited collection 
of his papers.84
There have been some difficult decisions to make in editing these 
military papers for the period 1940–42 to remain within a reasonable word 
count. Many of the after-action reports have been omitted, especially 
concerning those at the start of the ‘Crusader’ offensive, as they are 
summarised in other documents and more readily available in war 
82 Warner, Lonely Soldier, pp. 2–3 and 237.
83 Greenwood, Auchinleck, pp. 233–86 and JRL, Auchinleck papers, uncatalogued 
papers relating to deposit and access, letter Alexander Greenwood to C. D. Field, 
11 January 1990.
84 Greacen, Chink. A catalogue of Dorman O’Gowan’s papers is available at: 
https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/manchesteruniversity/archives/a3ebb59b-e147 
-351f-a8d4-7b1119e66190?component=571c7d09-5399-3fde-b68c-0ef1098b00f2.
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diaries held at TNA. The ‘top’ and ‘tail’ of letters and messages have 
been omitted. Documents have been reproduced as per the originals, so 
any spelling variants are true to the source material. Where numbered 
paragraphs commence with number 2, number 1 has not been omitted, 
this is simply the style used in these documents. Where (.) and (,) appear 
in the text of military ciphers and telegrams these are reproduced as in 
the original documents, when this punctuation was inserted by cipher 
clerks or telegraphists. The vast majority of the documents reproduced 
in this volume were typescript; a small number were holograph [6, 7, 36, 
42, 75, 82, 230, 231], a few printed [30, 37, 67, 121] and the others were 
a mixture of typescript and holograph [61, 107, 109, 112, 152, 181, 182, 
189, 199, 204]. The overall introduction has sought to provide an outline 
of Auchinleck’s military career to August 1942, with a brief discussion 
of the main publications concerning this, while the individual section 
introductions have focused on the documents themselves.
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The campaign in Norway was beset with many problems from the outset 
and these are neatly revealed in the Auchinleck papers. Auchinleck’s 
position was, of course, a rather usual one, in that he was appointed to 
take command of an ongoing operation and, rather than being flown 
immediately to northern Norway, he was given time to make his own 
appreciation of the situation. Auchinleck’s concerns about the attempt to 
capture Narvik and the military resources required to do this are clear; 
in particular he was clearly concerned about German air superiority and 
asked for a very large number of anti-aircraft guns, clearly believing that 
RAF support was inadequate [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 16]. It is also clear that the 
decision to capture and occupy Narvik was a political, rather than military 
one, with Narvik harbour having very limited strategic value [4, 5].
The confused system of command, which meant that there was no 
overall theatre commander, and the inability of Admiral Lord Cork and 
Major General Mackesy to work effectively together is very clear [6, 11, 
12]. Similarly, Auchinleck was concerned at how he could establish his 
authority as an Allied commander, given the small number of British 
forces at his disposal [2, 5].
The forces, under Auchinleck’s command, were a very mixed bag. He 
seems to have been impressed by the French troops and the 24th Guards 
Brigade contained some of the best units in the British army. However, 
he was less than impressed by the Independent Companies, which can 
be seen as the precursors of the Commandos. They were designed as 
specialist irregular units, able to engage in irregular warfare; though 
the fact that the area around Narvik was sparsely populated made any 
efforts to develop a guerrilla campaign, with local support, doomed to 
failure. These companies, each consisting of 20 officers and 270 other 
ranks, were recruited from throughout the TA in the UK; one company 
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raised from each of the ten TA divisions (only five of these companies 
saw service in Norway). They had a high allocation of officers and each 
company included a doctor, demolition experts, a Norwegian interpreter 
and a mountain warfare officer from the Indian Army. They were well-
equipped, with a higher than normal allocation of light machine guns, 
mortars and radios, and with specialist winter clothing, Alpine rucksacks 
and snow shoes. However, Auchinleck did not think this experiment was 
particularly useful and he did what he could to form the companies under 
his command into a standard infantry battalion [2, 5].1
There was remarkably little co-operation with the Norwegian 
government over the operations in the Narvik area. It seems that 
the British government was concerned that information shared with 
Norwegian forces, would quickly leak to German forces; though there 
is little evidence of this [15, 16].
The need to abandon the campaign to bolster the defences of France 
and the UK is evident amongst these papers [8, 13]. There was some 
concern that while the troops were evacuated with few casualties, many 
of the anti-aircraft guns were left behind, when some Royal Artillery 
and merchant marine officers felt that more could have been done to 
save them [13, 16].
1 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, pp. 168–69 and Kiszely, Anatomy of a 
Campaign, pp. 260–61.




‘Narvik: appreciation of the situation’ 
by Auchinleck, with marginal 
comments by Sir John Dill, VCIGS2 
[the latter noted in italics], 3 May 1940
MOST SECRET
The Object
1. Object, as provisionally stated, is to develop NARVIK area to 
provide:-
(a) defended naval anchorage.




2. (a) Understood that defended anchorage needed as base for 
naval operations in NORTHERN waters and to counter 
GERMAN naval operations on NORWEGIAN coast from 
bases such as TRONDHEIM, NAMSOS, etc., and to prevent 
establishment of similar bases further NORTH as at BODO, 
MOSJOEN, etc.? Yes
(b) Understand that purpose of anchorage is not merely to defend 
port and potential army base at NARVIK? No
(c) It is to be taken, therefore, that a defended anchorage at 
NARVIK (or elsewhere) is essential irrespective of its relation 
to any other purpose for which NARVIK may be used? Yes
(d) If this is so, is NARVIK best site for naval anchorage?
(e) Would a more SOUTHERN site be suitable for the purely 
naval aspect?
(f) If so, where?
2 Dill was appointed VCIGS on 22 April 1940; relinquishing command of 1 Corps 
of the BEF to take up this appointment.
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Army Base
3. (a) Assumed that when we get NARVIK, port and railway facilities 
will be so destroyed as to render them incapable of being used 
for at least six months or more, dependent on the possibility 
of work from October onwards. Agree
Understand that therefore NARVIK as an ORE PORT unlikely 
to be of real use to us or Germans before 1st December, 1940, 
assuming restoration work starts 1st June.
(b) With railway destroyed and (b) no road, operations on 
sufficient scale to capture ore areas KIRUNA (100 miles) 
or GALLIVARE (160 miles) against GERMAN ground 
and air opposition based on LULEA and BODO, are not a 
practicable proposition unless overwhelming air superiority 
has been obtained? Agree
(c) If this is so, only chance of operating with an organized force in 
NORTHERN SWEDEN is with full SWEDISH co-operation 
especially in so far as use of air bases is concerned? Yes
(d) Unless such co-operation is forthcoming, is there any object 
in developing army base for future offensive eastwards?
(e) If, in future, efforts should be made by combined operations 
on coast to recover footing in SOUTHERN NORWAY, it 
would not be essential to hold NARVIK or the railway solely 
for this purpose? Yes, because we can’t be in a position to help 
Sweden should opportunities occur.
(f) Should GERMANS try to retake NARVIK (unlikely if reports 
that they are now busy destroying it are true) via LULEA 
and the railway, it should be possible to provide adequate 
landward defence for defended anchorage without holding 
NARVIK itself, and, at the same time, to deny exit by sea 
from NARVIK to GERMANS?
Air Bases
4. Assumed that unless bases for operation adequate fighter and 
bomber aircraft are provided, GERMANS will soon make defended 
anchorage and/or army base untenable or virtually useless. Yes we 
know that.
(a) GERMAN air attack most likely to come NORTHWARD 
from TRONDHEIM, NAMSOS, and such other landing 
grounds as they can get NORTH of NAMSOS. I agree.
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(b) To meet this attack our air bases should be SOUTH of 
NARVIK, otherwise defence will lose much power?
See in consultation with RAF.
(c) GERMAN air attack may come from SWEDISH bases. To 
get air bases in SWEDEN for our aircraft means SWEDISH 
co-operation. Only alternative seems air base or bases NORTH 
or N.E. of NARVIK?
(d) Essential requirements seem therefore at least one air base 
SOUTH of NARVIK, one to NORTH and another centrally 
situated?
Three bases is the minimum?
(e) Defence of air bases SOUTH of NARVIK implies defended 
naval anchorage and small land garrison in vicinity to repel 
seaborne raids?
(f) Air base or bases NORTH of NARVIK probably need small 
land garrison only?
(g) All air bases and defended anchorages need anti-aircraft 
ground defences?
(h) Unless fighter and ground defences for all bases large and 
small can be established before bases are put to use, probability 
is bases will never be established at all?
SUMMARY
5. (a) NARVIK port and the railway may not be available for the 
transport of ore, troops or supplies for six months or more?
(b) Unless NARVIK is essential from an ore point of view, is it 
necessary to go there at all?
(c) If not, cannot a better defended anchorage be found further 
SOUTH?
(d) If so, should not every effort be made now to obtain such an 
anchorage obtained with an air and army base?
JRL, AUC 6
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2
‘Defence of Narvik: note on requirements’ 




(a) That the force of infantry which it is proposed eventually to 
send to NARVIK and its vicinity may comprise:-
One British Infantry Brigade (three battalions)
Two French Light Divisions (twelve battalions)
Foreign Legion (two battalions)
Polish Contingent (four battalions).
Should this be the eventual [size] of the force, I wish to 
emphasise that only one seventh of it will be British and this 
fact may very possibly make it extremely difficult for me to 
exercise command as freely as may be required. I strongly 
advocate the proportion of British troops be increased at an 
early date.
(b) That the independent companies, which may eventually 
number ten, operating at the SOUTH of BODO will 
eventually come under my command, as their operations 
must be considered as being an essential part of the general 
plan for the defence of the NARVIK area.
(c) 144 heavy anti-aircraft guns )
144 light anti-aircraft guns ) will be provided.3
Land Forces.
2. I have made a provisional estimate of the land forces which I think 
may be needed for the defence of the NARVIK area. These forces 
3 It seems unlikely that Auchinleck had access to so much AA support and this 
comment probably reflects Auchinleck’s concern at the lack of RAF support for 
the forces in Norway. Auchinleck never had more than five AA Regiments under 
his command in Norway, which suggests a total of 120 AA guns of both types.
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are exclusive of any that might at some future date be needed for 
an offensive into SWEDEN.
Exclusive of the independent companies, these requirements are:-
(a) One divisional cavalry or light tank regiment,
(b) One or two squadrons of armoured cars,
(c) Three or four companies of mounted infantry (e.g. Lovats 
Scouts)4
(d) Five batteries of field or mountain artillery
(e) One or two medium howitzer batteries
(f) Four field companies of engineers (exclusive of engineers for 
construction work)
(g) Twelve infantry battalions (four brigade commands)
(h) One machine gun battalion (might have to be increased to 
two later).
I understand that these troops may be British or French, or even 
Norwegian, should these be found suitable.
I wish to stress the fact that this estimate is extremely theoretical.
As regards (b), (c) and (d) I consider it essential that some mounted 
units should be included in the force in order to ensure the efficient 
patrolling of roads and coasts and the rapid reinforcement of outlying 
detachments, of which there will be many.
4 Lovat’s Scouts had been formed in January 1900 as a specialist unit of 
mounted infantry, recruiting amongst gamekeepers, ghillies and stalkers in 
the Highlands of Scotland for service in the South African War. In 1903 the 
force was re-established as two regiments of Yeomanry, becoming part of the 
Territorial Force in 1908. During the First World War Lovat’s Scouts saw 
action in Gallipoli, Egypt, Salonika and on the Western Front. Following the 
establishment of the Territorial Army in 1920 and conversion of many Yeomanry 
regiments to an artillery or armoured car role, the renamed Lovat Scouts were 
reformed in 1922 as a three squadron TA regiment, 400 strong, with one-quarter 
of the men equipped with ponies and the rest with bicycles. In 1935–36 the 
regiment was reformed, with the aim of having most men mounted on horses, 
with motorised transport and an above average allocation of BREN light machine 
guns. Then it was stated that the regiment’s role would be, ‘to provide mobile 
troops for duties of reconnaissance and protection, probably in a minor theatre 
of war’. Thus, in asking for Lovat Scouts, Auchinleck was demonstrating a 
familiarity with one of the specialist units of the TA and seeking a unit which 
would be fully mobile in the difficult Norwegian terrain. M. L. Melville, 
The Story of the Lovat Scouts, 1900–1980 (Edinburgh: St Andrew Press, 1981).
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As regards (d) and (e) some form of artillery support for troops 
operating inland must be provided, and that asked for is, I consider, 
the minimum.
As regards (h) the numerous landing places, dumps and detached 
posts which will require continuous protection, make it most desirable 
that a reasonable quota of medium machine guns should be provided, 
so that the maximum number of infantry can be kept mobile.
AIR FORCES.
3. It is the intention to establish and protect at least three landing 
grounds from which fighting and bomber aircraft can co-operate 
in the defence of the occupied area.
It is intended to have one of these at BARDU FOSS N.E. of 
Narvik.
It is hoped to put another near HARSTAD or in the area 
HARSTAD – NARVIK.
I am convinced that the air defence of NARVIK will not be 
adequate unless a landing ground can be established and maintained 
south of NARVIK.
In my opinion it is essential to make every effort now to establish 
such a landing ground at or near BODO, where I understand a 
landing ground already exists.
BARDU FOSS should be established first and then under cover 
of fighters from BARDU FOSS, the BODO landing ground should 
be established at once.
In my opinion this is the only way the bases of the independent 
companies operating SOUTH of BODO can be secured from 
capture by German forces, operating by sea under cover of bomber 
aircraft; and the maintenance in being of these independent 
companies is, in my opinion, essential to the eventual security of 
NARVIK.
This may entail the installation of seaward defences for the 
protection of the BODO landing ground but this must be faced.
Anti-Aircraft artillery will necessarily be required and have been 
included in the provisional estimate of requirements.
JRL, AUC 8




Personal instructions from the CIGS to 
Auchinleck, appointing him commander of the 
Anglo-French forces when it has been decided that 
the system of unified command should cease. 
Signed by Sir John Dill, VCIGS, 5 May 1940
MOST SECRET.
With reference to paragraphs 3 and 4 of your instructions.
It is the intention that you should take over command of the Anglo-
French forces at the same time that His Majesty’s Government decides 
that the system of unified command is to cease.
If, however, when you arrive in the NARVIK area you consider that 
local conditions necessitate, you may assume command of the Anglo-
French troops, thus placing yourself under Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Cork and Orrery for as long as His Majesty’s Government decide that 
a single commander is necessary.
JRL, AUC 9
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Note by Admiral of the Fleet 
Lord Cork and Orrery to Auchinleck, given 
on board HMS Effingham, off Skaanland, 
expressing his views on the proposed 
attempt to capture Narvik, 11 May 1940
The position as I see it in the light of recent events is:-
The forces in the NARVIK area are sufficient for the moment. With 
what is now here the frontier could well be established at the VEST, 
OFOT, and ROMBAK Fiords, leaving only some 20 miles of land 
frontier to the Swedish frontier.
The position at BODO could be held to deny enemy possible aerodrome 
sites, but by gaining NAMSOS a nearly completed aerodrome has been 
acquired.
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With the development of aerodromes at BARDUFOSS, SKAANLAND 
and BANAK (PORSANGER) however, the situation could no doubt be 
kept in hand and the frontier stabilised from the SOUTH.
An additional force, however, will be required to watch the approaches 
from MURMANSK and, if the neutrality of SWEDEN is violated, the 
frontier of that country.
The actual town of NARVIK is of no material value, everything of 
potential use has been destroyed, the harbour is blocked with wrecks 
which would take some months to clear.
Nor if HUNDALEN is in our hands can the railway be used by the 
enemy.
The value of NARVIK from a political point of view is high, in the 
opinion of H.M. Government, and the desire to occupy it great. I should 
like to make a determined attempt to bring this about.
My views on the subject are known. It could, in my opinion, be carried 
out with some loss.
The contrary opinion, however, is very strong, so much so that I feel 
it would be hopeless to attempt it with the British troops.
However devotedly the duty might be carried out, the necessary 
optimism to ensure success would be lacking.
This is not meant as a reflection on anybody; to go into any trial of 
strength believing you are foredoomed to failure is half way to that result.
The development of the enemy’s air power, which will increase consid-
erably in a few weeks as a result of the enemy’s gain of the NAMSOS 
area does introduce an additional difficulty which cannot be ignored.
My recommendation is that the present military movements continue, 
and by them, in time NARVIK will be neutralised if not evacuated, and 
the line HUNDALEN – Swedish frontier established.
That the Navy should guarantee the safety of the water frontier – 
NARVIK to the extreme Western entrance to the VESTFIORD, and 
the Army assisted by some Naval units maintain an advanced position 
in the BODO area.
JRL, AUC 12




Report by Auchinleck addressed 
to Sir John Dill, VCIGS, describing 
the first meeting with Lord Cork, 
from HMS Effingham, 13 May 1940
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL.
1. I hope to send you at the same time as this the report called for in 
my Instructions. I am afraid that it is rather long, but the subject 
is a wide one and I trust that I have covered all the ground and 
given you the information you need.
2. I disembarked at Harstad, which is Force H.Q. and the general base 
area, on the morning of the 11th, apparently rather unexpectedly. 
Lord Cork was away in his flagship, and Mackesy5 was also out. 
I had a talk with Mackesy later in the morning. He looks well and 
seems in good heart, though I suspect that he is sore inwardly. He 
seemed to have a good grip on the situation, and was particularly 
firm on the need for retaining BODO at all costs. Here I am in 
entire agreement with him; it is essential to the continued security 
of NARVIK and TROMSO.
3. He explained a proposed operation by the French which has since 
taken place and his reasons for it which were to enable him eventually 
to establish artillery on the OIJORD POINT opposite NARVIK 
town to support a landing on the opposite shore. As you will see 
from my report I consider NARVIK in its present condition to be 
of NO military value. However, his plan and reasons were sound 
and good in their way and I saw no reason to interfere with them, 
particularly as the impending operation had been approved and 
ordered by Lord Cork.
4. Mackesy explained his ideas on BODO which he is reinforcing at 
once with the 24th Infantry Brigade, less the [2nd] S[outh]. W[ales]. 
B[orderers]., who are at ANKENES. This also I agreed with, and 
with Mackesy’s order to the Brigade Commander that BODO was 
to be held at all costs. Later Lord Cork asked if he should cancel 
5 Major General P. J. Mackesy was the original commander of land forces in the 
Narvik area.
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this reinforcement order in view of the probability of my assuming 
command from Mackesy. I said that I agreed with it, and asked him 
to let it stand. It may yet be necessary further to reinforce BODO 
unless we can get some land based aircraft quickly.
5. After lunch I and Gammell6 motored to SKAANLAND anchorage 
and went on board EFFINGHAM; Lord Cork’s flagship. He 
was charming and most forthcoming, and acceded at once to my 
suggestion that I should stay on board and witness the impeding 
operation which was fixed for the following night. I may say here 
that I think it odd that neither Mackesy nor any member of his 
staff was present on the flagship, although General Bethouard,7 to 
whom Mackesy had entrusted with execution of the operation, was 
on board with his staff in close liaison with Lord Cork. However, 
both Mackesy and Cork assured me that relations were most cordial 
and co-operation good; the latter is certainly true, and I have no 
reason to doubt the former.
6. I showed Lord Cork my Instructions and explained the situation 
to him. He, on his part, told me what had happened. He is I 
think disappointed and surprised that any project for a landing at 
NARVIK itself should have been so definitely and unanimously 
negatived by the British soldiers. Yesterday I sailed past NARVIK at 
one thousand yards range and had a good look at it while the ship’s 
guns did some field firing at motor lorries, possible machine gun 
posts and the like. I admit at once that, if the enemy has as many 
machine guns as he is reliably reported to have, the houses of the 
town and the ground generally provide all that can be needed in 
the way of cover for them, and that a landing there in the face of 
strong opposition is bound to be costly and might end in failure. 
The trouble is that information as to the enemy strength and 
dispositions is practically non-existant and appears unobtainable. 
However, the enemy cannot be strong everywhere.
7. I then asked Lord Cork directly whether he thought I should take 
over from Mackesy as soon as the impending operation was over. 
He answered “Yes” without hesitation. As there was no immediate 
urgency I sent you a telegram asking you to recall Mackesy for 
6 Brigadier James Andrew Harcourt Gammell, Auchinleck’s BGS.
7 Brigadier General Antoine Béthouart, commander of French forces in Narvik 
area.
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consultation. I did this because I feel that there appear to be no 
obvious grounds for imputing blame to Mackesy, who may have 
done all or more than anyone else might have done. In fact, if Lord 
Cork’s reply had not been so unhesitating I might very well have 
recommended to you that Mackesy should remain in command. 
Even now I am a little doubtful about it, but I think I am right. 
I want to keep Dowler8 and others of Mackey’s staff for the present 
at any rate.
8. Last night and in the early hours of this morning the French landed 
two battalions of the [French Foreign] Legion at the head of the 
HERJANG FJORD after a preliminary bombardment by the Fleet. 
Though no previous practice had taken place, and though landing 
craft of the right type were few and far between, the operation 
appears to have been completely successful.
(I am writing at 7.a.m., the operation having been started at 
midnight and been carried out in broad daylight throughout – there 
is no night here now).
Luckily, the opposition appears to have been slight, though 
there may have been half a dozen enemy machine guns in action. 
The French landed four tanks, and I thought their infantry worked 
very well indeed. I watched the whole operation from the ship, half 
a mile from the shore. I like General Bethouard, who knows what 
he wants, and the French officers seem most capable. The Navy 
did their part very well indeed. The only pity is that no British 
units participated. The success represents a definite advance, and I 
hope that prisoners may have been taken. It will I hope be good for 
morale and show the troops that such things can be done. Needless 
to say, it was a most interesting experience.
9. I have a feeling that the Navy dislike these operations as at present 
prosecuted. They are being subjected daily to a lot of bombing 
and have had losses and casualties on an appreciable scale. They 
do not like being bombed in these narrow waters, which is natural 
as they have no really effective reply. They would not mind if they 
could see some result in the shape of a definite and quick decision, 
but they do not like the rather objectless work which they perforce 
have to do day after day. They are also anxious as to the feasibility 
of discharging efficiently and quickly the shipping which will be 
8 Colonel Arthur Dowler who was then GSO1.
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needed to maintain the forces as a whole. Here again, it is the 
bombing which worries them. I do not mean that they are faint-
hearted – far from it – but there is no doubt that the advent of land 
based fighter aircraft would make them much happier. Incidentally, 
I have yet to meet a sailor who thinks that a defended anchorage 
at NARVIK is a necessity to the Navy, so it is NOT a question of 
the Army protecting the anchorage for the use of the Navy on the 
high seas, but of the Navy using the anchorage for the protection 
of the Army in the coastal waters of Norway. I rather thought that 
this would prove to be the true situation, and I am laying my plans 
accordingly.
10. I am a little anxious about the situation at MO and as to the chance 
of stabilization at BODO. There is no doubt whatever that the 
enemy bombers, if unmolested, can offset the value of sea power 
in these narrow waters, and that they can make the maintenance of 
small forces almost impossible unless we can provide an adequate 
counter in the air and on the ground. I know that you know this 
well enough, and I hope that the War Cabinet realise it too. I hope 
to have fighter aircraft in the air on or about 20th May. I did not 
expect much from the “independent” companies. To be a successful 
guerrilla you must, I think, be a guerrilla in your own country, not 
in someone else’s. I now propose to coalesce them into a unit of light 
infantry under Gubbins and to put them under the Commander, 
24th Infantry Brigade. I notice that in one or two recent War Office 
messages they speak of the “desirability” of holding BODO. In my 
humble opinion it is not a question of “desirability”, but of sheer 
necessity. I hope you will agree, for if BODO goes I can not long 
be responsible for NARVIK.
11. I know how hard pressed you must be to find men for all require-
ments, but I would like to remind you that with the departure of 
the 24th Brigade to BODO my British troops in NARVIK will be 
reduced to one battalion, exclusive of artillery, sappers, etc. I do 
feel it most desirable that I should be given another British brigade 
if it can possibly be made available.
12. In every campaign there is a certain minimum of force which must, in 
my opinion, be provided in fairness to the responsible Commander 
and to the troops under him. This applies at present particularly 
to air forces and anti-aircraft artillery, but also in the long run to 
all the other forces specified. I have done my best to reduce my 
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estimate to the great extent compatible with security, but it would 
be criminal to pretend that one can make bricks without straw. If 
H.M.G. think that the commitment involved in the preservation 
of Northern Norway is worth adding to their other commitments, 
I trust that they will set aside definitely the forces required for 
the purpose. I feel very strongly that if they are not prepared to 
do this it would be better to come away now than to risk throwing 
good money after bad by failing to provide the necessary forces. 
I would like to point out also that even if the forces required can be 
provided the difficulty of finding an adequate number of suitable 
landing grounds in this very broken terrain might still prove to 
be the deciding factor, though I hope that things may possibly be 
better in this respect than they appear at present. I cannot say yet. 
If there is any chance of it being decided to evacuate Norway the 
sooner the decision is taken the better, as every day’s delay must 
increase the difficulty of the operation of withdrawal. In any event, 
land based aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery will be needed to cover 
the evacuation, so the development of landing grounds and the 
installation of artillery must continue.
13. I do not wish to appear pessimistic, and I am not pessimistic, but 
I feel that I must say what I think without fear or favour. That is 
what I have tried to do in this letter, and what I shall continue to 
do.
14. One thing more I would like to add, and that is if we do hold 
Northern Norway, and I hope we will, our defence should be 
active and not passive. As soon as we are in position to do so we 
should give the German a taste of his own medicine. This can be 
done, I think, without seriously increasing our commitments in 
the country, and I am already looking ahead with this in view.
JRL, AUC 14
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Personal letter from Auchinleck to 
Sir John Dill, VCIGS, 14–15 May 1940
Private & Personal
Since writing my letter yesterday, things have happened. I got back to 
Harstad in [HMS] Effingham after lunch and at once Fraser9 (24th 
Guards Brigade) and Dowler10 (G.S.O.I.) came onboard to discuss 
with Lord Cork plans for the reinforcement of the Scots Guards at 
Mo, at which place the situation, owing to the rapid German advance 
has become unpleasant and may become critical. I listened in and 
soon realised that all was not well. The fact that Mackesy was not 
there to discuss what might easily become a serious commitment 
(it has since become so) made me suspicious at once. As this matter 
was bound to concern me vitally in a few hours time I confirmed 
my suspicious by a few words aside with Maund11 the Admiral’s 
Chief of Staff and with Dowler. I then spoke to the Admiral and 
with his concurrence, announced that I have assumed command 
via Mackesy (your telegram had not then arrived).
2. I then, with the Admiral’s agreement issued orders for Fraser and 
the Scots Guards to go to Bodo instead of Mo. Mo is at the end 
of a long and narrow fjord in which ships are and have been very 
exposed to bombing attacks, so much so that the Admiral is very 
averse from having to maintain it by sea. The road north from Mo 
to Bodo is reported still unusable because of snow so the detachment 
there is in an unpleasant position. It was no use, however, putting 
more troops into the same bag, so I plumbed for Bodo and told 
Fraser to work South as fast as possible and get touch with Mo if 
he could, but in any way, to hold Bodo. The transport which put 
the Scots Guards ashore at Mo was very heavily bombed all day 
and only escaped being sunk by a miracle it seems! The Germans 
are advancing by road from the South and put almost a battalion 
ashore at Hemnesberget 20 miles SW of Mo. The Navy missed 
9 Brigadier William Fraser.
10 Colonel Arthur Dowler.
11 Captain, L. E. H. Maund.
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this lot by 40 minutes but sank their ship after they landed and 
with it, we hope their equipment and stores.
3. I am reinforcing Bodo at once with the third battalion of the 24th 
Bde – ([2nd] S[outh]. W[ales]. B[orderers].) and am also going to 
send a whole 25 pdr battery and some Bofors.12 I hope these will 
be in time to take the Mo chestnut out of the fire but it is a tedious 
business – Anyway, we must keep Bodo.
If I have to let go at Mo, I will have a shot a[t] getting it back as 
soon as I can, but you will see that this Southern front is becoming 
a relatively serious commitment. I have put Gubbins13 and his 
companies under Fraser.
4. I saw Mackesy again yesterday evening and tackled him about his 
curious aloofness when major matters were being decided. His 
answers were most unconvincing and I am sure he is unfitted to 
command anything. He is, I think a complete megalomaniac, more 
concerned, in fact alone concerned with what the world will think 
of Mackesy, the War office scapegoat than with getting on with 
the war. He has allowed his cleverness and cynicism completely to 
outweigh his reason and I honestly think he is unbalanced. Sorry 
to have to say this, but I am sure I am right. He is of no use to 
anyone in his present condition and I hope he will not be allowed 
to command any troops anywhere. He is also in a nervous state and 
suffering from insomnia. He told me with pride he had dictated a 
long screed at 2:30am in the morning for no valid reason whatever. 
I know you think highly of him but I must tell you what I think. He 
has been charming to me and helpful, but his whole mental outlook 
is warped. The clash between him and Cork was not all his fault. 
I am sure of that. They were quite impossible bedfellows from the 
start, entirely incompatible temperaments. Nothing would make 
them work together, I thought at first that nothing was seriously 
wrong but I was wrong in this – quite wrong. I am thankful I found 
out in time, though the legacy I inherit is not altogether pleasant.
5. The combined operation by the French was a complete success 
and a very good show indeed. The French have exploited well 
and are all for going on. They have got 60 prisoners and some 
12 The Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft gun.
13 Brigadier Colin McVean Gubbins, an expert in irregular warfare, who had been 
instrumental in the formation of the Independent Companies.
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material. Casualties were few. I have now put Bethouard who I like 
very much indeed, in charge of the whole centre sector – Narvik-
Bardu Foss and this should work well. I have had a long talk with 
him to day and been very full and frank with him. He is a most 
refreshing person to work with. They are getting on with Bardu 
Foss aerodrome and we hope to use it on the 20th but meanwhile 
the German bombers are a damned nuisance even though we have 
some AA artillery in position. They bomb us every day more or less 
and usually make a dead set at the warships. We have been lucky 
to have so few casualties as they make good practice at 15,000 feet, 
being almost uninterrupted.
If only we could get something into the air we could hit back and 
give him some of his own medicine, and also I am sure bite him in 
his hinder parts, instead of letting him always bite us.
There is a hell of a lot to do here especially on the administrative 
side and I shall shortly have to have a wholescale clearing out of 
the inhabitants from the occupied areas. The place is riddled, I am 
convinced, with spies.
I apologise for the writing but bits of this letter are too private 
to have typed. I hope you are very well.
P.S. 15th May
Last night as you know, the ship taking the Irish Guards and 24th Bde 
HQ to Bodo was bombed and set on fire. It was bad luck and all due to 
one lucky bomb.
Unfortunately, the bomb hit the officers’ cabins and killed the C.O. 
and several others. Very few men were hurt but the ship and all in her, 
including three light tanks is lost. We had the battalion back here by 9 
this morning thanks to the Navy who did splendidly – they are grand.
The Battalion is now in rest billets and will be refitted. They have no 
rifles, machine guns or anything. I saw them came ashore and was much 
impressed by their bearing – a fine crowd. I have been all day arranging 
to set the S[outh]. W[ales]. B[orders]. off in their place and the Admiral 
is taking them down in his flagship. We must get them there somehow. 
Fraser who had gone ahead to Mo & Bodo in a destroyer – Somali – is 
also away, as Somali was badly damaged by a separate attack on the same 
night and is now on her way to Scapa. I have put Gubbins in command 
at Bodo-Mo and am sending him with the 24th Bde staff. I can not say 
I am happy about the situation down there but, if we can hang on till we 
get our aeroplanes functioning, we ought to be all right.
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It is our turn to have a bit of luck!
I am just off to say a few words to the Irish Guards.
Mackesy sails tonight, the best thing I think.
These fleet air arm fighters do their very best but they have not got 
the performance to keep off the Hun and he does not seem to think much 
of our AA fire!!! However, our tails are up!
JRL, AUC 20
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Note by Major General P. J. Mackesy, written 
just before his departure for England, restating 
his view that Mo should be held at all costs. 
With marginal comments by Auchinleck 
[the latter noted in italics], 15 May 1940
Excuse manuscript but my typewriter has been taken from me.
1. I have always been very puzzled as to what the Boche has been 
doing here. The word NARVIK has always meant very little to 
me. I have always tried to study the map, and to understand what 
the Boche is after in order to check it.
2. I think for some reason, which we can imagine but cannot be sure 
of, the Boche, in addition to destroying NARVIK as a source of 
ore supply to us, has been endeavouring to maintain a sort of 
bridgehead in the area GRATANGEN–BJERVIK–OIJORD–
NARVIK–ANKENES, for future operations. Yes Movements South 
from this area by land seem to me to be nonsense. Movement North 
on TROMSO seems to be possible. It may of course be neither, and 
the intention may be to maintain a base for operations from which 
it may in time seem to him profitable to undertake operations form 
land, sea or air. Yes
3. Whatever the answer, I feel that our right procedure is to destroy the 
Boche forces wherever they are. That, while holding the OIJORD 
peninsular against possibility of counter attack, and establishing 
upon it artillery to command NARVIK itself and the approach 
South of ROMBAK FJORD, the French should endeavour, if it 
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is a reasonable military operation, to operate against the right flank 
of the Germans in the HUNDALEN area. Yes
4. It has always been my intention to occupy BEISFJORD area from 
the south, but the urgent need of sending troops to the BODO-MO 
area has held this up for the time being.
5. In short I believe our right strategy is, if physical conditions make 
it possible, to destroy German concentrations East of NARVIK and 
establish troops in the mountains which will definitely prevent any 
incursion of German forces along the midway from SWEDEN.
 Yes
6. Either after this, or at any time during this operation, I am sure 
that NARVIK itself will fall into our hands like a ripe plum, the 
moment it is considered right to bother about it. On the whole 
I would be inclined to take up the operation as soon as possible 
and I think carry it out soon because if the Germans manage to 
bring guns down the midway, our shipping position in the WEST 
FJORD might become serious. The railway must be kept cut, 
and the Germans and the big viaduct at HUNDALEN should be 
constantly bombed.
7. I should like to warn against a direct attack on NARVIK until:-
(a) It is worth it
(b) We can defend it against concentrated air attack
(c) It is quite clear that machine guns on those steep slopes East 
of NARVIK itself, can be effectively dealt with by artillery 
fire and tanks. A different time?
I see no difficulty in getting ashore, it is subsequent operations 
which matter.
8. As regards what has now become the Southern front, I personally 
regard the definite holding of MO as being vital. The instruc-
tions given by me were that MO was to be held at all costs. These 
instructions were altered on the night of May 13th.
Yes they were and for good reasons.
I am very much afraid that if we do not hold MO and its 
aerodrome, our ships will be bombed out of this area, and our 
position here will become impossible.
JRL, AUC 21




Letter from Auchinleck to 
Colonel Colin Gubbins, commanding troops 
in the Bodo-Mo area, 16 May 194014
SECRET.
You will have had my telegram telling you that I wish the detachment 
at Mo to hold on to its position, and not withdraw.
I think it most important that we should give up no more ground. 
I know the detachment is somewhat isolated at present, and I know the 
Germans may be in superior force to the south of you, but I am pretty 
sure that they are groping in the dark very much as we are, and I hope 
that when they come up against really determined opposition that they 
will sit back and think about it.
Reinforcements for you should arrive with this letter, and I hope that 
their arrival will enable you, in your turn, to reinforce Trappes-Lomax15 
at Mo.
He is very anxious to get back Fotheringham’s Company to his own 
Battalion. However, I leave all this to you.
Gammell is going down with this letter, and I want you to tell him 
exactly what you think about the situation, and what your requirements 
are to enable you to hold on in the Bodo – Mo area. I will do my utmost 
to send you whatever you may want.
It will not be long now, I hope, before we have our own aircraft in the 
air, and that ought to make a lot of difference.
Things are going well here, and the French are pushing on towards 
Narvik.
Thank you very much for all you have done so far. I wish you good 
luck. I have the greatest confidence in you. I hope to get down before 
long to see you.
JRL, AUC 25
14 Note by Auchinleck, ‘Sent by hand of Brigadier Gammell in HMS Effingham 
but never received as ship struck a rock’. HMS Effingham ran aground and was 
lost on the 17 May. S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945 (London, 1954), 
Vol. I, p. 192.
15 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Trappes-Lomax, commanding 1st Scots Guards.
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Order of the Day, issued by Auchinleck on 
re-embarkation for the UK, 8 June 1940
Now that the North-Western Expeditionary Force has re-embarked for 
the United Kingdom I wish to express my sincere thanks to Commanders, 
Staffs and All Ranks of the Force for their loyal and willing co-operation 
on all occasions, and to express my admiration for your unfailing deter-
mination and good-cheer.
Some of you have fought under adverse conditions against the enemy 
in the face of strong hostile air attack. Others have worked hard at the 
Base to produce all that was necessary to enable the campaign to be 
conducted to a successful conclusion.
Thanks to the excellent work of the Air Component, the splendid 
co-operation of the Royal Navy and the magnificent achievements of 
our French Allies on the NARVIK PENINSULA, we were well on the 
way to meeting the enemy on equal terms.
But Great Britain and France are now in danger and it is for this reason 
that our Governments have ordered us home to help in the defence of 
our own countries.
Therefore, to my great regret, we have had to relinquish our task but 
other and more urgent ones lie ahead.
I wish you all success, and rely upon you all to play your full part in 
re-building our Armies and so achieving final victory.
JRL, AUC 67
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Draft report, Auchinleck to 
the Secretary of State for War on the operations 
in Northern Norway, 14 May–7 June
I have the honour to inform you that in accordance with your Instructions 
the Forces under my command:-
(a) Have captured NARVIK.
(b) Have evacuated Northern Norway.




The landing round BJERKVIK, at the head of the HERJANGS FJORD, 
was carried out with the object of attacking from the rear the enemy 
forces which were holding up the advance of the French and Norwegian 
forces pushing South [South – repeated] from GRATANGEN towards 
NARVIK.
These enemy forces were holding a very strong position at the head of 
the pass astride the road which leads from GRATANGEN to BJERKVIK 
and ELVEGAARDE. The flanks of the position rested on high mountains 
deeply covered with snow, and the Germans, who were mainly supplied 
by air, were well equipped with machine guns and ammunition.
It was anticipated that a successful landing in the HERJANGS FJORD 
would have the effect of cutting the normal road communications between 
NARVIK and the German detachment further North, and force that 
detachment either to surrender or fall back along the road past Lake 
HARTVIG and thence along the difficult track leading to the Eastern 
end of the ROMBAKS FJORD and the railway at HUNDALEN.
A landing was therefore planned and carried out by General Bethouart 
with two Battalions of the Foreign Legion on 13 May. The launching 
craft available for the operations were three M.L.C.s and four A.L.C.’s.16 
Troops were transported in the cruisers Effingham and Aurora, the 
repair ship Vindictive, and the net layer Protector, while the battleship 
Resolution had, in addition, the task of transferring the French tanks, 
which were to lead the assault, into M.L.C.’s.
The first flight of the infantry were carried in four A.L.C.’s, the second 
in tow of ships’ boats further reinforced by the A.L.C.’s when they were 
available after their first trip.
The force collected gradually in OFOT FJORD on 13 May, but, 
thanks to low cloud and mist, there was no interference from hostile 
aircraft throughout the whole operation.
Late in the evening the force moved up to the head of Herjangs 
Fjord, preceded by five destroyers which opened fire on all the houses 
which fringed the head of the Bay round the selected landing places. 
This bombardment was very effective and within a few minutes the 
houses were ablaze. The cruisers then got into position, joined in the 
bombardment with their six inch guns and pom poms, and the M.L.C.’s, 
16 Motor Landing Craft and Assault Landing Craft.
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carrying the tanks, moved forward to the beaches followed by the four 
A.L.C.’s carrying 120 men.
The advance was met by machine gun fire from the right flank and 
the A.L.C.’s sheered off from the original landing place selected. The 
infantry managed, however, to effect a landing further to the West, and 
quickly secured, without serious opposition, some high ground in this 
area which overlooked the beaches further East. The bombardment in 
this Western sector had proved effective since no machine gun fire was 
experienced and from prisoners’ statements it was learned that about 100 
Germans were killed in one group of buildings and some 20 in another. 
An ammunition dump was set on fire and at least one German machine 
gun position was destroyed. One tank, later followed by a second, landed 
close to the landing place originally selected.
The successful advance inland of the tanks and infantry on the left 
enabled further landings to be made at the head of the bay near the 
quay, and soon the whole of this areas as far East as the road landing 
northwards towards GRATANGEN was in French hands.
Although one or two machine guns which could not be located 
continued to fire, two more tanks were landed on the East shore of the 
bay. Concurrently, further detachments of infantry were landed from 
A.L.C.’s and ships’ boats still further to the East, close to the road running 
South towards OYORD along the Eastern shore of the FJORD. These 
landings were covered by heavy fire from the six inch guns and pom poms 
of H.M.S. Effingham and a destroyer, and were effected without loss.
Once ashore the tanks and infantry, working in excellent co-operation, 
rapidly overcame such enemy opposition as still remained and advanced 
[deleted – rapidly] along the road leading to Lake HARTVIG. The enemy 
retreated into the hills to the Eastwards leaving some 60 prisoners in 
French hands.
General Bethouart’s next concern was the security of his left flank, and 
he organised a force of one company of the Foreign Legion, supported 
by a destroyer, to move along the West bank of the HERJANGS FJORD 
towards BOGEN. Before this movement materialised, however, the Polish 
battalion which was advancing from BOGEN arrived in the area, having 
succeeded in traversing a road which had been considered impassable 
owing to snow.
His left flank now being secure, General Bethouart organised immedi-
ately a party of some thirty motor cyclists to move along the coast road 
towards OYORD and arranged to support them from the sea with a 
destroyer.
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This mobile detachment met with no opposition, and at OYORD 
was met by a landing party put ashore from the destroyer. By this rapid 
movement the control of the North shore at the entrance of ROMBAKS 
FJORD passed into French hands, and the enemy’s line of retreat was 
restricted to the difficult road through the hills to HUNDALEN.
By these successful operations, carried out with the loss of less than 
twenty casualties, General Bethouart prepared the ground for the eventual 
capture of NARVIK. The way was cleared for the advance of the French 
forces from GRATANGEN, and the Germans were gradually forced 
Eastwards through the difficult country North of the ROMBAKS FJORD 
until sufficient room was available to launch an attack on NARVIK across 
the ROMBAKS FJORD without risk of enemy interference.
The success of the operation was due, in my opinion, first to the fact 
that the enemy appeared to be taken by surprise and had not organised 
his defences against a landing in BJERVIK as thoroughly as might have 
been expected. Secondly, it was due to the skill and thoroughness with 
which the operation was prepared and carried out both by General 
Bethouart and his troops, and all ranks of the Royal Navy. Thirdly, it 
was due to the favourable weather conditions – complete calm with low 
clouds and mist. This facilitated the movement of landing craft and 
ships’ boats, and, most important of all, prevented any interference at 
all from hostile aircraft throughout the operation.
JRL, AUC 68
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Letter from R. H. Dewing, 
Director of Military Operations and Plans at 
the War Office to Auchinleck, 21 June 1940
I am directed to request that you will forward, for the information of the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, a report on the reasons which led 
you to consider it advisable to exercise the authority given by him in his 
personal instructions to you, and to assume command of the Anglo-French 
troops and air components in Northern Norway on 13th May, 1940.
JRL, AUC 70
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Auchinleck’s report in reply to the above, 
addressed to the Undersecretary of State, 
War Office, 24 June 1940
1. In reply to your letter 0157/1089 (M.0.1) of 21st June 1940, I have 
the honour to inform you that the reasons which led me to consider it 
advisable to exercise the authority, given by the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff in his personal instructions to me, to assume command 
of the Anglo-French troops and air components in Northern 
Norway on 13th May 1940, are stated briefly in paragraph 12 of 
the “Report on the Operations in Northern Norway” submitted 
by me to you on the 19th June 1940.
2. Should this explanation not suffice, I give the following details in 
amplification. I may mention here that before I left London, I had 
been given to believe by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
that relations between Major-General Mackesy and Lord Cork 
were not cordial.
3. (i) I disembarked at HARSTAD in the forenoon of the 11th May 
1940 and met Major-General Mackesy at his quarters and 
learned the general tactical situation from him and his senior 
general staff officer, Colonel Dowler. My original intention 
had been first to see Lord Cork, the Commander-in-Chief 
and then General Mackesy, but Lord Cork was away in his 
flagship at SKAANLAND, about two hour’s journey from 
HARSTAD by car and boat.
(ii) General Mackesy had apparently been unwell and suffering 
from insomnia, but so far as I could judge from what he said, 
the relations between him and Lord Cork seemed to be then 
satisfactory, whatever they might have been in the past.
(iii) I then visited Lord Cork and explained my position to him and 
said that, in accordance with my instructions and in view of the 
fact that an operation for landing French troops at BJERVIK 
had been fully planned and was to take place the following day, 
I had set aside any idea of taking over command at once.
I asked Lord Cork directly whether he thought I should 
take over command as soon as the present operations were 
over and he replied unhesitatingly in the affirmative. I then 
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sent a personal telegram to the Vice-C.I.G.S., General 
Sir John Dill, asking him to recall Major-General Mackesy 
“for consultation”.
I did this as, at that time, I did not think that the need for 
a change in command was urgent, and because I did not wish 
it to be publicly apparent that Major-General Mackesy had 
been superseded.
(iv) I then obtained permission from Lord Cork to stay in the 
flagship and watch the forthcoming operation as a spectator. 
I may mention that though General Bethouart, in actual 
command of the troops who were to carry out the operation, 
and his staff were on board, neither Major-General Mackesy 
or any of his staff were present. This struck me as unusual 
and gave me cause to doubt whether relations between Lord 
Cork and Major-General Mackesy were in fact satisfactory. 
Major-General Mackesy told me afterwards that he thought 
that the presence in the flagship of himself or his staff might 
have embarrassed General Bethouart.
(v) After the operation had successfully concluded, I returned 
to HARSTAD in the flagship, which on arrival was boarded 
by Brigadier Fraser, Commanding 24th Guards Brigade and 
Colonel Dowler, G.S.O.I to General Mackesy.
These two officers came to discuss with Lord Cork, the 
Commander-in-Chief, whether certain reinforcements, 
destined for the Southern front and already embarked, should 
be sent to MO, where a detachment had recently landed under 
heavy air attack, or to BODO, with a view to disembarkation 
there and subsequent movement by land to reinforce MO. 
Again I was disquieted by the absence of Major-General 
Mackesy but was later informed that it was due to his state of 
health. The decision to be taken was a most important one, and 
as I listened to the discussion, it became quite apparent to me 
that all was not as it should be. As, in any event, I expected to 
succeed Major-General Mackesy in a few days time, I hastily 
consulted Lord Cork’s Chief of Staff and was confirmed in my 
opinion that Lord Cork and Major-General Mackesy were so 
antipathetic to each other as to make it impossible for them 
to work together in complete accord. I then consulted Lord 
Cork privately and told him that I considered that I should at 
once take over command instead of waiting for the result of 
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my telegram to General Sir John Dill. With his concurrence 
I then announced my decision to the conference and issued 
orders on the spot for the despatch of the reinforcements to 
BODO. I then disembarked and informed Major-General 
Mackesy of the action I had taken and my reasons for taking it.
4. I hope I have made it clear that in acting as I did, I was moved 
solely by what seemed to me the urgent need for ensuring that the 
commander of the army should be able to co-operate fully and 
willingly with the Commander-in-Chief.
I came to the conclusion that, for personal reasons, which I 
thought irremediable, relations between Lord Cork and Major-
General Mackesy were such as to make it impossible for them 
to co-operate whole-heartedly one with the other, and I acted 
accordingly.
I am not in a position to impute the blame for what appeared to 




Copy of a letter from Sir J. S. Barnes, 
Secretary, Admiralty, to Admiral of the Fleet, 
the Earl of Cork and Orrery, 3 July 1940
MOST SECRET
I am to refer to Admiralty telegram 2005/24th May [see document 14 
below] in which you were informed of the decision of His Majesty’s 
Government that the forces under your command were to evacuate 
Northern Norway and that the reason for this decision was that the troops, 
ships, guns and certain equipment were urgently required for the defence 
of the United Kingdom. That telegram stated that the evacuation of all 
equipment, vehicles and stores would clearly take too long and that the 
following were required to be evacuated in order of importance from 
the point of view of the defence of this country:-
(a) Personnel.
(b) Light Anti-Aircraft guns and ammunition.




(d) Heavy Anti-Aircraft guns and ammunition.
These instructions were supplemented by Admiralty Telegram 1637/6th 
June which stated that in addition to the items of equipment mentioned 
in Admiralty Telegram 2005/24th May, great importance was attached to 
removing as many rifles and as much small arms ammunition as possible.
Exact information of the numbers of Anti-Aircraft guns brought 
away from Northern Norway is not yet available. According to present 
information, the numbers are as follows:-
Light Anti-Aircraft guns: 16 out of 60.
Heavy Anti-Aircraft guns: 6 out of 48.




Copy of Admiralty Telegram to 
Flag Officer, Narvik, 24 May 1940
Following from Chiefs of Staff:
H.M. Government has decided your forces are to evacuate Northern 
Norway at earliest moment. Reason for this is that the Troops, Ships, 
Guns and certain equipment are urgently required for the defence of 
the U.K.
We understand from Military point of view operations of evacuation 
will be facilitated if enemy forces are largely destroyed or captured. 
Moreover, destruction of railways and Narvik Port facilities make its 
capture highly desirable.
Nevertheless, speed of evacuation once begun should be of primary 
consideration in order to limit duration of maximum naval effort.
Two Officers will be sent at once from U.K. to concert evacuation 
plans with you and General Auchinleck.
Evacuation of all equipment, vehicles and stores will clearly take too 
long. Following are required to be evacuated in order of importance from 
point of view of defence of U.K. (a) personnel (b) light A/A guns and 
ammunition (c) 25-pounders (d) Heavy A/A Guns and ammunition.
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Tactical conditions must rule but so far as they permit plans should 
be framed accordingly.
Norwegian Government have not, repetition not, been informed and 
greatest secrecy should be observed.
JRL, AUC 74
15
Copy of message to Flag Officer, Narvik, 
from Admiralty, undated [24 May 1940?]
Following from Chiefs of Staff.
Since Admiralty Telegram 1637/6 was despatched, Norwegian Authorities 
here have made urgent requests for supply to Norwegian Forces of a 
minimum 4500 rifles together with not more than 2 million rounds of 
ammunition. If any way possible to meet this request you should do so.
JRL, AUC 74
16
Report from Lord Cork to Sir J. S. Barnes, 
the Secretary of the Admiralty, 4 July 1940
1. In reply to Admiralty letter N. 012261/4 of the 3rd July, 1940, be 
pleased to inform Their Lordships that action on the Admiralty 
Telegram 2005/24th May was based upon –
(1) Tactical considerations.
(2) The necessity for secrecy.
(3)  Paucity of resources.
In forwarding the report called for upon what I regret to note is 
considered the “small proportion” of A/A guns saved, the following 
remarks are submitted.
2. (1) The directions contained in the Telegram referred to (a 
complete copy of which is attached) were studied and discussed 
and it was decided that, for tactical reasons (mentioned in (d) 
of the message quoted), –
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(i) The A/A defences must be kept efficient and in action to 
protect the embarkation and to cover the final retirement.
(ii) That a limited amount of thinning out of guns could 
be done – but that it was essential that aerodromes and 
points of embarkation should be adequately protected 
up to the end.
(2) The necessity for secrecy was great – and, in fact, the “greatest 
secrecy” was enjoined in the final paragraph of the message 
quoted. There was every reason to believe that what happened 
in the HARSTAD area was soon known to the enemy, in 
addition to which, enemy aerial reconnaissance was a daily 
occurrence. How would it have been possible to have started 
the dismantling and embarkation of A/A guns in the fourth 
week of May, after all efforts had been devoted to mounting 
them in the third week, without arousing suspicion? It was 
not until June 2nd that, on my initiative, the Norwegian 
Government was informed of impending evacuation. June 
2nd was the original date fixed for the start.
(3) Apart from all other considerations, in order to remove any 
large proportion of the guns, time was essential – owing to 
the wide dispersion, water distances to be covered, and almost 
negligible means of transport and facilities existing. Time was 
not available.
3. The distribution of the guns was approximately as follows:-
Heavy Light
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4. BARDU FOSS:
The guns were required to protect the aerodrome. Communication 
with BARDU FOSS was by 20 odd miles of indifferent road (on 
which much labour had been expended to get guns up) from 
SORREISA, at which place everything of any weight had to be 
embarked or disembarked on an open beach.
5. At TROMSO, the guns had only recently been sent there. Under 
the circumstances prevailing prior to the evacuation – at first secrecy 
from latterly somewhat delicate relations with the Norwegian 
Government – it was not in my view advisable to attempt their 
withdrawal but instructions were sent for the control instruments 
to be embarked in DEVONSHIRE.
6. At HARSTAD, it was essential to retain defence against aerial 
attack – which, in suitable weather, had become heavy and frequent 
– for these were the only wharves available that allowed vessels of 
any size coming alongside and loading up – and which were in use 
until midnight June 7th both for loading stores and troops into 
destroyers. We had no steamers or destroyers to spare.
7. SKAANLAND was one of the four main areas of embarkation and 
was in use on the final night. The Batteries here had been established 
by the use of M.L.Cs. and their movement across the water was only 
possible by means of M.L.Cs. There was only one M.L.C. available 
and this formed an essential item in the re-embarkation of French 
and Polish Troops at ANKENES, NARVIK and ROMBAKS. It 
was by means of this M.L.C. that two Bofors Guns were embarked 
in the Trawler “Man o’ War” at SKJOMEN FIORD on the 6th. It 
is important to bear in mind that the distance from HARSTAD to 
SKAANLAND by water is just 14 miles and from SKAANLAND 
to NARVIK 50 miles.
8. BALLENGEN, ANKENES and BJERVIK were the embarking 
places of French and Polish troops actually in touch with the enemy, 
and where the troops had to be ferried to the waiting destroyers in 
fishing boats from the open beaches. Aerial attacks were actually 
delivered in this area during the afternoon of the day of departure.
9. Owing to the weather conditions prevailing during the last few days 
of embarkation, heavy low clouds and rain, German air activity 
was small. Immunity could not be counted on – attacks could 
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and, in fact, were renewed as soon as conditions improved – and 
subsequent events seem to have shown German efforts to interfere 
with the departure were maturing, and that the departure was just 
in time.
10. No doubt, some artillery officers thought they could save more of 
their guns, some mercantile officers considered their ships might 
have remained rather longer alongside. Such sentiments may be 
laudable, but are the product of a restricted view of the general 
position.
11. A timetable was being worked to and my object was to get the ships 
away and into convoy under cover of the final withdrawal of the 
men-of-war without delay.
To retain a ship, already well loaded because another gun or two 
might have been got onboard would have been either to delay the 
last convoy or cause the ship to miss it and, in my view, neither 
would be justifiable.
It was the ships out of convoy that were sunk, e.g., VANDYCK; 
none of those that took part in the evacuation were lost. This alone 
might be held to justify the arrangements made; arrangements 
which, I suggest, merit praise, rather than blame, to the officers 
who were directly responsible for the details of their execution.
12. In conclusion, I am not quite clear as to the reason of the intro-
duction of the subject of rifles in this letter, in view of the message 
1625/7 (copy attached), upon which, however, I took no action.
My interest in this Message was that it seemed to justify my judgement 
as to the inadvisability of taking any action as regards the withdrawal of 
A/A guns from TROMSO.
13. I regret if the efforts made by the Senior and Staff Officers on the 
occasion under discussion do not meet with the approval of His 
Majesty’s Government – I can only state my personal opinion that 
praise not blame, is due – and, finally, I would emphasise that the 
retirement was carried out in a perfectly orderly manner in every 
respect and that freedom from heavy attack on the last days was due 
to an act of Providence and could not possibly have been foreseen 
or counted upon when the final orders for evacuation were put into 
execution.
JRL, AUC 75
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Letter from Lord Cork to Auchinleck, 4 July 1940
Personal
I was glad to get your letter and copy of your report. I wish I could 
think mine would be as concise & interesting. Mine hangs fire because 
all ships scattered at once, many going direct to the French Coast, and 
their letters are only now arriving.
The enclosed will interest you and hope the answer will suffice – 
Mr Sandys17 is at the bottom of it, he & some naval or mercantile marine 
officers he has got to agree they could have stayed longer.
I find a general & fairly free criticism went on in this building about 
the delay in capturing Narvik & on receipt of this letter on the subject 
of the saving of guns, I went and saw the 1st Lord and said that if they 
were not satisfied with me would they have an enquiry & allow my side 
of the matter to be heard.
He himself had nothing to do with it, & was sympathetic.
Yesterday afternoon I had a talk with the C.I.G.S. who mentioned a 
possible Court of Enquiry upon the abandonment of guns, he had been 
approached on the subject & declined to have anything to do with it – 
but named me. On my return to Adray. [Admiralty] the letter of which 
I send you a copy awaited me.
One would think they had plenty to occupy themselves without taking 
up each matters on which they form a judgement never having troubled 
to learn the conditions.
My hope is to be employed somewhere shortly which will remove me 
from this atmosphere.
I hope all goes well – in fact am sure it does – with your new command.
There is far too much talk about how we are going to repulse the 
enemy not enough as how to down him.
17 Presumably (Edwin) Duncan Sandys, Conservative MP for Norwood and 
son-in-law of Winston Churchill, having married his eldest daughter, Diana. 
Sandys had been a prominent opponent of appeasement and in 1938 had been 
threatened with a court martial for revealing classified material, which he had 
obtained as an officer in the Territorial Army, in a parliamentary debate. Sandys 
had been in command of an AA Regiment during the Norway campaign.
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I hope to be in your vicinity soon on a few days leave and if I am will 
try a run over to see you – but who knows where anyone will be in a few 
days ahead.
My best wishes to you however for all good fortune and great success.
JRL, AUC 76
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Letter from Auchinleck to Lord Cork, 7 July 1940
Thank you very much for your letter of the 4th July. I was very surprised 
and disappointed to read the letter which you received. It can, I suppose, 
be justified on the grounds of ignorance of the facts, but not on any 
grounds in my opinion. I think your own letter is a complete answer. 
Should, however, more reasons be needed, which I hope will not happen, 
then these can be adduced.
As you know on the 24th May, the Bodo situation was critical and 
unless Gubbins could have been reinforced, he would probably have 
been pushed into the sea, as happened at Namsos and Andalsnes, or 
been surrounded. As you know also, we had reinforcements actually 
embarked and ready to go down; if the order for evacuation had not 
come, these reinforcements would have had to be sent. Similarly, if the 
general evacuation had been appreciably delayed or postponed, these 
reinforcements would have had to go, as Bodo could not be evacuated too 
far in advance of the evacuation of Harstad, for the reason that the enemy 
pushing up the coast (as they did do) would have seriously compromised 
the latter operation. In actual fact, the period between the evacuation of 
Bodo and the final evacuation of Harstad – Narvik was only just long 
enough as you will remember.
If Bodo had had to be reinforced and a delaying action fought around it, 
the withdrawal from that area would have been infinitely more complicated 
and difficult and might well have become another Andalsnes or minor 
Dunkirk. As it was, owing to lack of suitable ships and port facilities, 
the four field guns and two Bofors had to be abandoned there (the other 
two Bofors were left at Mo as you will remember).
I heartily agree with you that all things considered, we ought to be very 
grateful that we got all the men away, which is what we were primarily 
asked to do. I think it was a fine feat. I take full responsibility for any 
orders issued about the A.A. artillery.
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If you are in this neighbourhood I would be delighted to see you.
I am living at Clive House, Tidworth – it is near the big club – Tidworth 
House and is occupied by O.C. Troops at Tidworth, Brigadier Hawtrey. 
Telephone number is Tidworth 197.
JRL, AUC 77




and the Defence of the 
United Kingdom, 1940
Auchinleck, in command of 5 Corps and then Southern Command, 
was keen to instil in the troops under his command the idea that they 
were on active service and in the front line, defending, as they were, 
a long and vulnerable section of the South Coast of England [20, 27, 
30]. Auchinleck summed up his own ideas on defence as the ‘offensive 
defensive’, which meant both that he wanted to fight a mobile war, but did 
not have enough transport to ensure mobility, and that he believed that 
the Germans would be considerably more difficult to defeat if they were 
allowed to establish a beach head and land heavy equipment [21, 22, 30].
Auchinleck was concerned at the disparities between the regular and 
Territorial troops under his command. These were seen throughout the 
army with some TA officers complaining that they were patronised by 
regulars to a much greater extent than that seen during the First World 
War.1 Auchinleck was not convinced that the standard of training of 
British regular troops was much better than that of the TA, but he did 
wonder why, if it was believed to be the case, the regulars were not broken 
up and dispersed amongst TA formations to provide a solid cadre [21, 
23, 24]. By mid-August 1940 Auchinleck was developing interesting 
ideas about how officer–man relations could best be fostered in the new 
citizen army [26].
Auchinleck clearly felt that LDV and Home Guard units would be 
useful in defence, particularly in scouting and reconnaissance duties and 
1 Peter Dennis, The Territorial Army 1907–1940 (Woodbridge, 1987), pp. 251–58.
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in guarding lines of communication [22, 29]. However, he was concerned 
that if anti-tank emplacements were built incorrectly, they would serve 
to prevent the rapid movement of British reinforcements to launch a 
counter-attack [22]. Auchinleck was clearly drawn into some acrimonious 
correspondence regarding the appointment of senior officers in the Home 
Guard. This was seen most clearly in the appointment of Lieutenant 
Colonel C. E. Turner as a Zone Commander in the Gloucestershire Home 
Guard [28]. Defending his decision over this appointment, Auchinleck 
was to explain, ‘I selected him after full consultation with, and with 
the concurrence of, the Duke of Beaufort, who is Lord Lieutenant of 
the County and the Area Commander, in whose good sense and sound 
judgement I have full confidence. I also took special care to ascertain 
whether he was likely to prove physically capable of doing the job. The fact 
that he is a M.F.H., and a Chairman of the Conservative party does not 
interest me in the slightest. I don’t hunt the fox and I have no politics!’2
Auchinleck’s difficulties with the then Lieutenant General B. L. 
Montgomery over Montgomery’s dismissal of officers who Auchinleck 
had felt were perfectly satisfactory, revised training regime and, most 
problematically, Montgomery’s attempts to bypass Auchinleck, his 
superior officer and deal directly with the War Office to obtain certain 
officers and equipment, are well covered in the letters below [23, 24, 25]. 
The fact that Auchinleck wrote initially to ‘My Dear Monty’, with this 
subsequently as, ‘My Dear Montgomery’ [24, 25] is telling.
Otherwise, Auchinleck’s correspondence for this period is useful in 
demonstrating his concerns about troops being regarded as available to 
help with all sorts of civil defence work [31] and the establishment of 
the separate Anti-Aircraft Command [34].
2 JRL, AUC 90, Letter Auchinleck to Lieutenant General B. C. T. Paget, CGS, 
Home Forces, 1 September 1940. See also JRL, AUC 89, Report defending the 
appointment of Colonel C. Turner, Gloucestershire Home Guard.
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Sir John Dill, CIGS,3 21 June 1940
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
The operations which the British Army has been called upon to undertake 
have involved many withdrawals in the face of superior numbers and 
often with open flanks threatened by armoured formations. Formations 
and units have fought most gallantly under these adverse conditions, 
and have inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy. Having constantly to 
withdraw is not, however, good for any Army and it is important to take 
drastic measures to counteract its evil effect. The first requirement is a 
vigorous discipline combined with a spirit of self-sacrifice. The second 
is an offensive spirit which can primarily be developed by training.
All experience goes to show that the Germans do not withstand 
determined counter-attacks. It is essential, therefore, to get back to a 
realization of the fact that attack is the best defence.
The enemy must be struck many blows before we gain the victory. To 
strike him and strike him hard not counting the cost must be the aim of 
every commander. And when a blow cannot be struck there must on no 
account be any withdrawal. To withdraw in order to maintain continuous 
lines of defence is not the way in which to beat the German. The German 
is not over-anxious about his flanks. Nor must we be. If any enemy does 
not penetrate between defended localities he automatically exposes his 
own flanks, and at those flanks we must strike.
To strike effectively there must be the closest possible co-operation 
between all arms. Something much closer than we have ever known before. 
Brigade Groups must be as one unit. Initiative and energy, combined 
with aggressive spirit and selfless determination to destroy the enemy, 
must be the keynote of our action in defence of our country.
JRL, AUC 71
3 Dill was appointed CIGS on 27 May 1940.
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Special Order of the Day, issued by Auchinleck 
as Commander, 5 Corps,4 25 June 1940
1. All troops in the 5 Corps Area whether mobile or static or whether 
they belong to field units or instructional or other establishments 
are now in a forward area of a theatre of war and will act accordingly.
2. There is now no question of being on or off “duty”. All ranks are 
permanently on duty and will be ready to act against the enemy at 
a moment’s notice.
3. Commanders will impose the necessary restrictions so as to ensure 
that in an emergency all available personnel will be at their posts at 
the shortest notice fully armed, equipped and rationed for 24 hours.
All commanders will exercise the strictest supervision over the 
movement of personnel under their command and permission to 
leave the immediate vicinity of quarters, except on duty, will be 
granted only in exceptional cases – this applies particularly to officers.
4. All parties and detachments which leave their quarters for whatever 
purposes on duty which entails them being unable to return to 
quarters within ten minutes will be fully armed and in “fighting 
order”.
Working parties while at work will have their weapons under 
armed guard (at least two sentries) placed ready for instant use in 
their immediate vicinity. No civilian or unauthorised person will 
be allowed to approach within ten yards of such arms.
5. All despatch riders, orderlies, messengers and other individual 
soldiers on duty whose work takes them more than ten minutes 
distance from their quarters will be fully armed and in fighting 
order.
6. Soldiers granted permission to be away from quarters for purposes 
of recreation such as attendance at or participation in games, 
entertainment etc., will proceed in organized parties with their 
arms and sufficient equipment and ammunition to ensure that 
they can defend themselves if suddenly attacked and regain their 
4 Auchinleck took over command of 5 Corps on 14 June 1940.
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quarters without delay. When necessary these parties will be under 
command of officers of suitable rank.
7. The orders regarding the carrying of arms will be strictly enforced. 
Officers are personally responsible for the safe custody of their 
individual weapons.
8. (a) The posting of “ceremonial” or “peace time” guards and 
sentries throughout the Corps Area will cease herewith. 
The Corps Area is now a “war zone” and all guards and 
sentries will be posted solely for security purposes as dictated 
by war needs.
(b) Guards and sentries will be tactically sited and protected 
wherever they may be. Every guard or piquet will have an 
alarm post which it will man in emergency. If it is necessary 
to make use of private or civilian public property for this 
purpose it will be done through the appropriate civil authority.
Instances of lack of co-operation by the civil authorities 
will be reported at once to Corps H.Q.
(c) No compliments will be paid to anyone by guards and sentries. 
Sentries, who will invariably be posted in pairs, will make 
themselves as inconspicuous as possible and will not slope 
arms but will carry them ready for instant use. They will not 
march up and down on a fixed beat. The fixing of bayonets 
by sentries is left to the discretion of commanders concerned. 
The two sentries of a pair will always be disposed so as to 
cover each other and never so that both can be disposed of 
at once by an enemy.
(d) Sentries whose duties demand that they shall move about will 
do so as if on patrol making intelligent use of cover. Flying 
Sentries or patrols must at all costs avoid following the same 
track or doing the same thing in the same way twice running.
(e) Guards and piquets must be ready instantly to support their 
sentries or to man their alarm posts and will sleep in fighting 
order with their arms at their sides protected by sentries to 
prevent them being surprised.
(f) No civilian or unauthorised person is to be permitted to 
loiter in the immediate vicinity of guards or sentries or to 
enter into conversation with them on any pretext whatever. 
When necessary the aid of the local civil authorities is to be 
invoked to enforce this order.
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9. All troops will always carry Eyeshields, anti-gas. On receipt of an 
Air Raid Warning eyeshields will be adjusted by all personnel in 
the open.
10. It is the duty of every commander down to platoon and equivalent 
commanders to impress on all under their command that they are 
now in a forward area which may at any moment become a battle 
zone without notice and that their duty as soldiers comes before 
any other consideration and must always be in their thoughts.
To be distributed down to Coys. and equivalent sub-units.
JRL, AUC 72
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Letter from Auchinleck to Lieutenant General 
Sir Robert Haining, VCIGS, 30 June 1940
URGENT AND SECRET
Sorry I could not hear more of your thoughts the other day. I know you 
are full of work, but I would value a good talk with you. I am pretty busy 
here making bricks without much straw. Two Divisions on a 100 mile front! 
However, we are getting on with it and every day makes things better, 
but the lack of mobile reserves is serious. At the moment we have all our 
goods in the front window which, in my opinion, is the right policy, as 
our lack of equipment and transport does not make it possible for us to 
fight a mobile battle in the interior. I hope we will be in a position to do 
so before long as equipment seems to be coming along well, though the 
distribution of it seems patchy and incoherent. But this may be justified 
by reasons beyond my ken.
Anyway, I am sure that we should make every effort to prevent the 
enemy landing on the beach. I still believe that this is the most difficult 
task, and my recent small experience confirms me in this opinion. After 
all, the holding of a “line” such as the coast line cannot be likened to the 
holding of a “line or the attempt to hold a line” in France, which some 
say was the cause of our downfall.
Until he can get his heavy stuff ashore the enemy cannot do much. 
Therefore he must be prevented by all possible means from getting it 
ashore. At least, that is how I see it. Once he does establish himself at 
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all securely it won’t be so easy to get him out, if experience goes for 
anything. Anyway, he’d be a damn nuisance if nothing worse!
I have been thinking a lot about the Army of Tomorrow – the Army 
of the offensive which is to come! I have a lot of half-baked ideas, but I 
suppose you have a gang of capable people who are thinking of nothing 
else. I hope you have!
By the way, there is some bizarre “guff” about a “Dunkirk Medal”: 
which is causing some alarm amongst level-headed people. I hope it isn’t 
true, and I can’t believe it is. We do not want to perpetuate the memory 
of that episode, surely?
What might be appreciated, so I gather, is a “1940 Star” (France and 
Norway), if anything is contemplated at all, which seems to me to be 
unlikely. However, the gossip may interest you.
Another thing – people are still persisting in perpetuating and 
stressing the difference between Regular and Territorial Divisions. 
This, to my mind, is lamentable. If the Regulars are so much better than 
the Territorials (which is not generally true, in my opinion) then they 
should be used to leaven the Territorials, and not be kept as a corps d’elite 
in separate Divisions. We shall not win this war so long as we cling to 




5 Corps, Conference minutes, 9 July 1940
SECRET
1. ARMY COM[MAN]D[ER]’S POLICY.
Corps Com[man]d[er] outlined policy as laid down by Army 
Com[man]d[er]:
(a) General lines similar to those already adopted. Enemy to be 
stopped on beaches; but maximum possible reserve to be made 
available for hitting enemy. Briefly – an offensive defensive.
(b) A formation to be organized as mobile striking forces for 
immediate counter-attacks against landings. Defence would 
NOT be passive.
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(c) War mentality must be cultivated; i.e. phrase “IF we are 
attacked” should never be used; the phrase should be “WHEN 
we are attacked.” Attitude of mind to be cultivated was that 
attack was not improbable but practically certain.
(d) All resources, civil and military to be co-ordinated, Army, 
L[ocal]. D[efence]. V[olunteers]., Police, A[ir]. R[aid]. 
P[recautions]., etc. Corps Com[man]d[er] stressed there 
must be give and take.
(e) Army Com[man]d[er] had stressed necessity for countering 
defeatism and fostering offensive spirit. On this point Corps 
Com[man]d[er] added that it was easy to talk in a defeatist 
manner without being defeatist minded. All ranks must think 
before they speak. Offenders, if necessary, should be arrested 
and even court martialled. Any officer who failed to behave 
himself as an officer must be dealt with very firmly. Offences 
should NOT be condoned.
(f) L[ocal]. D[efence]. V[olunteer].s to be issued with Ross rifles5 
and ammunition to release army equipment.
(g) First reinforcements would remain with units unless formation 
moved considerable distance for tactical reasons.
(h) S[mall]. A[rms]. A[mmunition]. economy, even in action, 
would be necessary.
(i) Statements had been issued on the power of military author-
ities to deal with:-
(i) Civilians
(ii) Requisitioning of lands and buildings.
Statements cleared up many doubts.
5 75,000 Ross rifles were ordered from Canada in May 1940 and they arrived in 
the United Kingdom during July and August 1940. The Ross rifle had been 
designed and manufactured in Canada between 1903 and 1918 and was used 
to equip the initial Canadian Expeditionary Force in 1914–15. However, it 
was not a successful battlefield weapon, being prone to jamming and, indeed, 
had been withdrawn from Canadian units during the First World War, seeing 
them re-equipped with British Short Magazine Lee Enfield rifles. Those Ross 
rifles ordered in 1940 were of 1903–18 vintage and arrived coated in thick 
grease, which it took a considerable effort to clean off; another reason for their 
unpopularity with Home Guard units.
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2. DISPOSAL OF ALIENS.6
G.2 (I) explained regulations with regard to aliens in defence areas. 
Latter were divided into two classes:-
(i) Class A Area. (at present extending West to BEXHILL) from 
which Chief Constables were instructed to remove all aliens 
forthwith.
(ii) Class B Area. Only enemy aliens to be removed.
Chief Constables had power to arrest and intern aliens between 
the ages of 16 and 70. Military powers limited to detention for 
24 hours, after which, civil police would deal with case.
3. COMBINED HEADQUARTERS.
B[rigadier]. G[eneral]. S[taff]. raised the necessity for combining 
headquarters in PORTSMOUTH and SOUTHAMPTON Areas, 
quoting need for such organization to deal with petrol demolitions.
After discussion, Corps Commander directed:-
Com[man]der 4 Div[ision] to go into the question of setting up 
combined H.Q.s in the PORTSMOUTH and SOUTHAMPTON 
Areas; suggesting PORTSMOUTH Area Commander to 
establish these with C-in-C., PORTSMOUTH or representative. 
Headquarters should be located at FAREHAM.
Com[man]d[er] 50 Div[ision] to explore the necessity for combined 
headquarters in PORTLAND; or to ensure that liaison between 
R.N. and military was sound.
6 Upon the declaration of war on 3 September 1939, some 70,000 Germans and 
Austrians resident in the UK were designated as enemy aliens. By 28 September, 
the Aliens Department of the Home Office had established internment tribunals 
which classified enemy aliens into three categories: Category A, to be interned; 
Category B, to be exempt from internment but subject to the restrictions decreed 
by the Special Order; and Category C, to be exempt from both internment and 
restrictions. By February 1940 some 73,000 cases had been investigated by the 
tribunals. The vast majority of enemy aliens (about 66,000) were then classed as 
Category C. In May 1940, with the invasion threat at its height, 8,000 of these 
enemy aliens, living in Southern England, were interned and, with Italy’s entry to 
the war 4,000 Italians, mostly known members of Fascist organisations, were also 
interned. The Home Office remained convinced that this widespread internment 
would prevent the ‘Fifth Column’ activities supposedly seen in France and the 
Low Countries in May 1940.
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4. ROAD BLOCKS STOP POLICY.
(a) Corps Com[man]d[er] outlined plans for the stop lines A[nti]. 
T[an]k islands; latter selected, some by G.H.Q., some by 
div[ision]s. In 50 Div[ision] area also, L[ocal]. D[efence]. 
V[olunteer]s. independently making own village into A[nti]. 
T[an]k islands. Corps Com[man]d[er] stressed that NO 
permanent road blocks should be placed on roadways.
Army Com[man]d[er] was very anxious that military traffic 
should not be obstructed as it had been in France. Road blocks 
should therefore be of a moveable type.
Important points to decide were:-
(i) When should these moveable road blocks be erected?
(ii) Who should be responsible?
(b) During discussion, following points were decided:-
(i) All road blocks must be easily removable; Various types, 
including rails, wire hawser, loaded lorries, tetrahedra 
were approved with foregoing proviso.
(ii) Columns on the move must have advanced guards well 
ahead, with role NOT only of dealing with enemy but 
of removing road blocks where necessary.
(iii) Reference military A[nti]. T[an]k islands, decisions as 
to time of erection of road blocks to be decentralized 
down to b[attalio]n areas.
Corps Com[man]d[er] directed draft to be prepared 
and sent out on this basis.
(iv) Reference A[nti]. T[an]k islands manned by L[ocal]. 
D[efence]. V[olunteer]s.,
Corps Com[man]d[er] stated this needed further 
thought to avoid danger of every village being an obstacle 
to troop movements.
5. DEFENSIVE FIRE.
C[orps]. C[ommander]. R[oyal]. A[rtillery]. raised question of policy 
for defensive fire plan. Necessity for system of signals and numbered 
targets on beaches where landings likely.
Com[man]d[er] 4 Div[ision] asked for defensive fire to be brought 
down on water and guns to be kept off beaches until enemy definitely 
ashore.
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Com[man]d[er] 50 Div[ision] suggested observed fire while boats 
coming in and concentrations to be called for on points affected 
by successful landing.
C[orps]. C[ommander]. R[oyal]. A[rtillery]. said at present guns 
were prepared to bring down fire on the water; and to take on the 
beaches by observed and predicted fire is landing affected.
Corps Com[man]d[er] directed C[orps]. C[ommander]. R[oyal]. 
A[rtillery]. to issue defensive fire plans in writing. Army H.Q. to 
be informed.
6. ADDITIONAL GUNS.
C[orps]. C[ommander]. R[oyal]. A[rtillery]. notified two new btys 
[batteries]:-
(i) Mob[ile] A[nti]. T[an]k guns (3-pdr and 12-pdr)
(ii) Four 4-inch guns.
Corps Com[man]d[er] directed both to be allotted to 50 Div[ision].
7. MOB[ILE] COL[UM]NS IN DIV[ISIONAL] RES[ERVE].
Present position:-
4 Div. Res[erve] B[riga]des Mobile; each b[attalio]n capable of 
moving independently.
50 Div. Res[erve] b[riga]de mobile.
Buses allotted to each b[attalio]n.
Corps Com[man]d[er] laid down policy that Res[erve] B[riga]de 
Groups should be organized with b[attalio]ns as separate col[um]ns. 
Guns and A[nti]. T[an]k guns to be sub-allocated to b[attalio]n 
groups.
Training of Res[erve] B[riga]des to be carried out in these roles.
8. DEFENCE OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES.
Corps Com[man]d[er] drew attention to question of defending 
blocks inside towns. Directed that officers concerned should 
consider feasibility of placing defensive posts in the upper floors 
or roofs of houses rather than ground floors.
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9. 4 CORPS.
Corps Com[man]d[er] stated that, in event of necessity, 
Com[man]d[er] 4 Corps had already discussed with him possible 
moves to support 5 Corps. Concentration areas had been agreed 
to deal with threats on either right or left flanks or from air-borne 
troops on Salisbury Plain.
10. MEDICAL.
Question of evacuating casualties was being considered at Army 
H.Q. (S[outher]n. Com[man]d).
11. ACCOMMODATION 4 DIV[ISION].
Com[man]d[er] 4 Div[ision] asked for additional R[oyal]. E[ngineer]. 
facilities for men under canvas.
C[ommander]. E[ngineers]. asked for forecast of moves and probable 
B[riga]de areas; facilities would then be arranged.
Corps Com[man]d[er] directed 4 Div[ision] to give forecast.
12. WARRANT TO CONVENE GENERAL COURTS MARTIAL.
D[eputy]. A[ssistant]. & Q[uarter]. M[aster]. G[eneral]. to arrange 
necessary warrant for Com[man]d[er] 4 Div[ision].
13. TROOP MOVEMENT 50 DIV[ISION].
(a) If 2 Corps Art[iller]y move away, 50 Div[isional] reserve 
would be reduced to 2 b[attalio]ns.
Corps Com[man]d[er] promised to help ease this position 
if possible.
(b) Com[man]d[er] 50 Div[ision] asked if 11 S[outh]. 
Staff[ord]s[hire] [Regiment] would remain in his area; at 
present working on RINGWOOD Line. Definite answer not 
possible at this stage.
14. DEMOLITIONS.
Com[man]d[er] 4 Div[ision] asked for clarification on policy for 
demolitions.
Present position:-
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(a) On certain roads no demolitions carried out.
(b) On other roads demolitions which would take more than 
7 days to repair not to be carried out.
Result that main road and railway bridges could not be demolished.
Corps Com[man]d[er] raised question of demolitions on stop lines.
Under present policy, was informed by C[ommander]. E[ngineers]. 
that only subsidiary bridges could be blown, others must be held. 
Corps Com[man]d[er] stressed need for more clear-cut policy to 
be obtained.
15. VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.
Arrangements for the visit of Secretary of State for War to 5 Corps 
Area, 10 July, were discussed.
JRL, AUC 78
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Major General Giffard Le Quesne Martel, 
Commander, 50th Division, 15 July 1940
My dear Q
Thank you very much for yesterday which I thoroughly enjoyed.
I was very pleased indeed with all I saw from Lyme Regis to Abbotsbury.
Great progress has been and is being made, and I thought the whole 
sector was being run in a very thorough and businesslike way. More power 
to you and those under you. Will you tell them from me.
JRL, AUC 80
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General B. L. Montgomery, 
commanding 5 Corps, 29 July 1940
Confidential
My dear Monty
Thank you very much for your notes on the 50th Division
1. I agree with much of what you say and I see you realise the reasons 
for the present state of affairs. I think you have perhaps overstated 
the situation in one or two respects. For instance, to my knowledge, 
P.T. and drill has not been by any means entirely neglected, though 
the time allotted to it has had perforce to be restricted. The remedy 
is, of course, to relieve the forward units periodically and they have 
already been told to do this, as you are aware.
2. As regards morale, I thought it was good and I still think so. 
No doubt a good deal remains to be done in the instilling of the 
offensive spirit and this can be done as training becomes more 
intense, consequent on cessation of work on the beaches. I want to 
make it quite clear, however, that I wish the instructions as to the 
urgent need for the completion of the defences so as to admit of 
the withdrawal of men for training, which I issued to the Corps just 
before I left, (Operation Instruction No. 14), carried out. I intend 
to issue a Command Instruction to the same effect.
3. My own estimate of the time required to get Divisions ready for a 
major offensive overseas is about 6 months, assuming the necessary 
equipment to be forthcoming.
4. We have already discussed the “drain” on manpower from Divisions 
and I am doing all I can to stop it but orders are orders and will, of 
course, be obeyed. I am returning to the charge at G.H.Q. tomorrow.
5. The organization of the Divisional front is your affair. I have asked 
for the adjustment with Eastern Command on the Hants/Sussex 
boundary, and will find out about it tomorrow, I hope.
6. I entirely agree with your estimate of the contentment and will to 
co-operate of the Division as a whole. It is remarkable and reflects 
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great credit on the Commander. I think in our Army there can be 
no true and lasting efficiency without contentment!




Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General B. L. Montgomery, 
15 August 1940
My dear Montgomery
I want to draw your attention to your 84/A of the 7th August. In this 
it is stated that you interviewed the Adjutant-General on the transfer of 
personnel with B.E.F. experience.
There are two points with regard to this minute. I am quite aware that 
it is a common practice in the Army for officers of all ranks to visit the 
War Office, but in this case it appears that you interviewed the Adjutant-
General on a matter which directly concerned my Headquarters, in that 
they had issued orders for certain transfers to take place. I do not consider 
this the proper manner in which this, or any other matter of this nature, 
should be handled. When orders are issued from these Headquarters, 
whether they come from the War Office or direct from these Headquarters, 
and you wish to make a protest, from whatever point of view, against 
orders, I wish such protests to be made to these Headquarters and not 
to the War Office officials over my head.
The second point is that I think it is unfortunate that, having inter-
viewed the Adjutant-General, special reference should have been made in 
the memo to which I have referred above to this fact, thereby indicating 
to your subordinates that you had gone over the head of my Headquarters 
to deal with the problem direct with the War Office.
I would like to add that the subject of transfer of personnel with B.E.F. 
experience from your formations to others in England had actually been 
the subject of protest both by my predecessor and myself to the War Office, 
in order to save formations under your command from being depleted of 
their trained personnel, and moreover these protests were made as the 
result of representations made by the 5th Corps. These protests having 
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been turned down by the War Office, there was no alternative but to 
issue orders for the transfers to take place, and these should have been 
obeyed without any further reference to anybody.
I am afraid I must ask you to cancel the memorandum in question. 
You will, I am sure, understand that my sympathies are entirely with you 
in this matter and that my object in writing to you as I have is to ensure 
that our common object shall not be defeated by the “short cut” method 
of conducting business, which in my experience, nearly always ends in 
confusion, however efficient it may appear at the time.
Please show me the cancellation.
JRL, AUC 85
26
Letter from Auchinleck to 
Sir Robert Haining, VCIGS, 19 August 1940
Very many thanks for your long and most interesting letter of the 14th 
August. I quite see the value of getting early information as to the general 
state of feeling in the Army, particularly at the present time when as you 
say, it is living cheek by jowl with the ordinary public and, moreover, 
contains a very large number of men of considerable intelligence and 
experience, competent and quick to criticise any stupidities or lapses on 
the part of their officers.
So long as this information is got by discreet methods and not mixed 
up with a petty inquisition into minor disciplinary failures, I am sure no 
one can have any objection. I certainly have not.
I am uneasy about the disparity of wages earned by the civilian and the 
soldier. It may not matter how much now, but thinking ahead in terms 
of years, not months, it seems to me that it has in it the germs of really 
serious trouble – possibly mutiny on the largest scale!! I cannot help 
feeling that something drastic should be done in the very near future to 
equalize conditions. I know it bristles with difficulties.
I am sure that the more that can be done to impress on the officer 
class as a whole, and particularly on the less imaginative and more rigid 
type of regular officer, the fact that the rank and file of the army of today 
need quite different treatment to that which suited the regular soldier 
of the old army, the better.
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There is no doubt that the man-mastership and force of example to 
be displayed by all officers must be of the very highest standard, and that 
it will be necessary for officers to be more self sacrificing and spartan 
in their habits than many of them are today. The critical faculties of a 
great majority of the modern soldier in the ranks are very keen and we 
can no longer afford to gloss over or hide away failure in their leaders. 
Dirty linen may have to be washed in public, but that cannot be helped.
We should take to heart Kipling’s “Song of the Old Guard”,7 even 
though it was written forty years ago!
JLR, AUC 86
27
Memorandum from Auchinleck 
addressed to Lt. Gen. H. E. Franklyn,8 
Lt. Gen. B. L. Montgomery and 
Maj. Gen. J. A. H. Gammell,9 27 August 1940
PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
As a result of our conference on Saturday the 24th August, I am 
seriously perturbed as to the possible effects on our war efficiency 
and training of the restrictions which are apparently to be imposed 
on the use of transport etc., in the interests of the economy.
2. I am fully alive to the need for economy and so, I am sure, are you, 
but to my mind we have only one task at the moment and that is to 
win the war. To do this we must first prevent an enemy occupation 
of this country and, secondly, prepare an army fit to invade his 
country at the first favourable opportunity.
3. The prevention of invasion is so essential that nothing can be allowed 
to lessen the efficiency of the troops entrusted with this task. The 
training of the army for this counter-offensive which must come is 
7 This poem reflects on the hidebound nature of the British army at the time of the 
South African War (1899–1902).
8 GOC 8 Corps.
9 GOC 3rd Division.
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so urgent that it too should not be hampered by purely peace-time 
conceptions of administration.
4. I feel quite sure that if the matter is put fairly and squarely to the 
troops, the instances of wilful extravagance and misuce of our 
resources will be so few and far between as to be negligible.
In order to assure myself that the restrictions now being imposed 
will not in any way affect our efforts to achieve our objects, I shall 
be grateful if you will let me have your considered opinion on the 
whole subject, as soon as you conveniently can, bearing in mind 




Report from Auchinleck, defending the 
appointment of Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Turner10 
as Zone Commander, Gloucestershire 
Home Guard, c. 28 August 1940
In reply to your memo in regard to the appointment of Col. C. Turner, 
D.S.O. as Zone Commander Gloucestershire.
When the choice of a successor to General Sir R. Stephens had to 
be made, four names were submitted to me by the Area Commander.
The Lord Lieutenant was consulted and had no hesitation in picking 
Col. Turner, who was duly appointed by the Area Commander with my 
approval, though according to A.C.I. 924 of 15th August, 1940 this was 
not necessary.
I admit that the battalion commander was not consulted, but the 
procedure adopted had the full approval of the Area Commander.
10 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Edward Turner had served in Lumsden’s Horse 
in the South African War and in the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars during the 
First World War. He commanded the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars when they 
were reformed as an Armoured Car Company between 1923 and 1926. He was 
to command the Gloucestershire Home Guard from August 1940 to November 
1944. He was Joint Master of the Berkeley Hounds, 1928–41.
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Col. Turner had a good war record, was awarded the D.S.O., commanded 
the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, is a D.L., also a member of the T.A. 
Association, which fact alone will be of great help to the H.G. organization.
He is at present High Sheriff of the county.
It is true that he is a Master of Hounds, but as on account of local 
conditions his pack is not going to hunt this season, he will be able to 
give all his time to Home Guard affairs.
He is well known throughout the county and in my opinion eminently 
suitable for Zone Commander.
JRL, AUC 89
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Southern Command Operation Instruction 
no. 27, 7 September 1940
The Home Guard
1. The Home Guard is capable of playing a great part in the defence 
of the country against attack from the air or from the sea. This 
instruction shall be used to the best advantage.
ROLE.
2. The Home Guard forms a most important part of the land forces 
but it is essentially a voluntary and localized force. Home Guards 
are not meant to be far away from their homes and will not be so 
used.
Home Guards are not designed or armed to attack considerable 
bodies of highly trained and powerfully equipped enemy troops, but 
they are well adapted to carry our surprise attacks and ambushes 
against small parties of enemy, and in properly sited and prepared 
positions should be able to repulse attacks by enemy troops even 
when these are helped by armoured cars, light tanks or light artillery.
Home Guards, by their local knowledge, are also admirably fitted 
to act with other troops as observers, guides, scouts and messengers.
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TASKS.
3. It follows then that Home Guards can best be used:-
(a) To make and man defence works of all kinds for the local 
protection of their own towns and villages with or without 
the help of other troops.
(b) Wherever possible, to hold defences on “Stop Lines” and in 
“Anti-Tank Islands” either with or without the help of other 
troops.
(c) To patrol beaches, possible air landing grounds, and roads 
near their homes on which an enemy might land or advance.
(d) To guide troops arriving from a distance to prepare positions 
already prepared on “stop lines” or in “anti-tank islands”.
(e) To act as scouts, observers and messengers within the limits 
of their own local knowledge for troops preparing in these 
areas and to provide the commanders [directing troops?] with 
detailed information about local conditions.
(f) To round up and [destroy?] quickly enemy patrols or parties 
of parachutists [unreadable].
These activities [unreadable] will thoroughly dishearten the enemy.
4. To make up for their relative weakness in arms and equipment it is 
essential that all defence works to be manned by the Home Guard 
shall be sited with the greatest care [unreadable] An enemy is most 
unlikely to hit works which he cannot see however powerfully 
[unreadable] and it is vitally important that every possible artifice 
and trick should be used to hide any defences wherever they may 
be made. In the circumstances in which the Home Guard will move 
to fight, concealment is ninety per cent of the battle. No defence 
work should be recognisable for what it is at over fifty yards range. 
Much well-intentioned work which was done in the earlier stages 
of the battle for this country suffers from being too obvious and 
it is necessary now to put this right without delay. The mere sight 
of a sandbag is enough to put an enemy on his guard. A good deal 
of the earlier work is not proof against rifle fire, and is therefore 
an actual danger rather than a safeguard.
PATROLS.
5. The efficient patrolling of wide open tracts calls for training and 
practice especially at night. The way to avoid the ambushing of a 
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whole patrol by the enemy and the methods of moving from cover 
to cover are simple and easy to learn, but if neglected will lead to 
casualties. It should be the constant aim of every Home Guard to 
avoid being killed himself so that he can kill as many of the enemy 
as possible. To do this he must be cunning and skilled in scoutcraft 
and this entails steady practice by day and night. The use of patrols 
mounted on horses and ponies for the patrolling of downland and 
common land is to be encouraged wherever possible.
6. The patrolling of roads and beaches calls for different methods 
but the principles are the same and only common sense is needed 
to apply them. Here again the object is to see the enemy before he 
sees you and to kill him before he kills you.
GUIDES.
7. The guiding of troops to chosen positions needs first class knowledge 
of tracks and roads and a quick brain so as to admit of alternative 
routes being used should the direct road be blocked for any reason. 
The way to approach each position without being seen by an enemy 
needs study and practice. When the time comes, every minute may 
count.
MOBILITY.
8. The training of men to act as scouts and messengers needs careful 
attention, as unless these can get about the country quickly and 
cunningly they are likely to lose a lot of their value. If messengers 
and scouts can be provided with motor cycles or ordinary bicycles 
their value is likely to be much greater.
SKIRMISHING
9. The rounding up of enemy patrols, tanks, armoured cars and stray 
vehicles of all sorts is a task particularly suitable for Home Guards 
and one in which they should be [unreadable]. For this work men 
should be organized in special parties trained to [unreadable].
DRILL
10. Drill and smartness of turnout are as good for discipline in the 
Home Guard as in any other kind of troops, but time should not 
be wasted in teaching men useless movements merely for the sake 
of doing them. All forms of drill should be of the simplest kind 
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and such as are needed as for the work in hand. For instance Rifle 
Exercises might well be confined to the following movements:-
The Order.
The Trail.
The Shoulder (as in Rifle Regiments)
The Port Arms.
The Examine Arms.
While the following drill movements should meet all ordinary 
needs:-
Platoon in Line (3 ranks).
Column of Route (threes).
The usual formation for Home Guards on the move in action should 
be in single file following the section leader, until it is necessary 
for them to shake out into open order. Home Guards should be 
“Skirmishers” in the proper sense of the term and should not be 
tempted to become rigid and set in their methods. Their methods 
should be those of the “light companies” of Wellington’s day. 
Instructors lent to the Home Guards from other units should bear 
these facts in mind and not waste their own and other’s time by 
trying to teach all the movements and exercises set out in the drill 
books. Simplicity, utility and speed should be the watchwords in all 
forms of instruction. Home Guards should be trained to shoot to 
kill at short ranges, that is not exceeding 200 yards. At this distance 
every shot should tell.
WINTER.
11. The enemy may not try to invade us this autumn. No one can tell 
how the war may go elsewhere in the world in the near future. If it 
goes well for us, we may early in the New Year need to send large 
forces of our field army abroad to carry the war into his country. 
Should the tide be slower to turn in our favour, Hitler may still 
have a fling at invasion next Spring. Whichever way things go, 
there is no doubt at all that the Home Guards’ part in the defence 
of this country will become more and not less important, and that 
they will be called on to an ever growing degree to relieve other 
more mobile troops of this duty. It is most important, therefore, 
that their training should continue all through the winter and that 
their strength should be maintained at the highest possible level.
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WORK WITH FIELD ARMY.
12. Commanders of formations and units of the Field Army and Area 
Commanders will do all they can to help Home Guard commanders 
to train their men and will share their training facilities with them to 
the greatest extent possible in the circumstances. The Home Guard 
should be invited to take part in exercises and schemes whenever 
this can be arranged and soldiers and Home Guards should be 
accustomed to working together as part of one common army.
JRL, AUC 91
30
Southern Command Order 
no. 78, 20 September 1940
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Not to be published
1. The enemy is said to be ready to invade this country. He seems to 
have enough aircraft, ships and troops to attack in strength on a 
wide front should he care risk it.
2. To invade us he has first to cross the Channel in the face of 
continuous attack by the Navy and the R.A.F. He has then to land 
on open beaches well covered by the fire of weapons of all sorts and 
exposed to the attack of our bombers. His is one of the hardest tasks 
an army can be asked to do and he knows it. He knows, therefore, 
that to have any chance of success at all he must surprise us in one 
way or another.
3. In his efforts to surprise us:-
(a) He may choose rough weather in which to cross the Channel, 
hoping that we will have relaxed our guard.
(b) He may try to cross by day under cover of his fighter and 
bomber aircraft, or under cover of fog and mist, hoping we 
expect him only to cross at night and attack in traditional 
fashion at dawn.
(c) He may pass by the obvious beaches and try to land on the more 
difficult places, hoping that we may think them impossible 
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for boats or that the cliffs behind them are unscalable (Wolfe 
at Quebec.)
(d) He may very likely use smoke and gas, or both, in the hope of 
blinding and confusing our forward troops and thus making 
their fire useless.
(e) He may use gas spray against our reserves in the hope of 
disorganising them and preventing them from carrying out 
their task.
(f) He is likely to use his dive bombers against our positions in 
the hope of paralysing us, as he did the Norwegians, Danes, 
Dutch, Belgians and others.
(g) He is likely to use every device to get his tanks and light 
artillery and mortars ashore quickly, and we must expect to 
see large ships run aground so that he can disembark directly 
from them.
(h) He is likely to land troops by parachute and from troop carriers 
in rear of our forward troops with the object of diverting them 
from their proper task of preventing landings on the beaches.
(i) He will try to land advanced detachments from the air or from 
the sea dressed in our uniforms which he has thousands of 
suits, in the hope of disorganising our defence and defeating 
us by treachery.
(j) He will try spreading lies, rumours and false orders, to break 
up our defence and shake our confidence in ourselves.
4. We, knowing what to expect, will not be surprised. If the enemy 
cannot surprise us, he is beaten before he starts.
To avoid any chance of being surprised:-
(a) We must be on our toes at all times, in clear weather or fog, 
wet or fine, rough or smooth, dark or light. We must never 
relax our watch at any point from Bognor to Bristol.
(b) We must give the enemy full credit and expect him to do the 
desperate and dangerous thing. He is a desperate man.
(c) We must keep our powder dry, our weapons bright and our 
equipment, especially our anti-gas equipment, in tip-top 
condition and ready at all times for instant use.
(d) We must meet his air attacks without a moment’s hesitation 
by the heaviest possible fire from all available weapons, and 
confuse the aim of his airmen by using every trick to conceal 
our positions from them.
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(e) We must never take anything, or anyone, for granted, but must 
at all times take every possible step to make sure that friends 
are friends and not enemies disguised as friends. Strangers 
in or out of uniform must be looked on as possible enemies 
until they have been proved to be friends.
(f) We must at all times be ready to defend every post and every 
position from attack from any direction, and must always be 
on the watch against attacks from the flanks or rear.
5. We must remember:-
(a) That the experiences of the B.E.F. in France showed that the 
bark of the dive bomber is much worse than its bite.
(b) That gas is a feeble weapon against vigilant troops who know 
how to protect themselves against it.
(c) That an enemy trying to invade this country starts under a 
tremendous handicap and has to face unknown dangers and 
hazards. He has every reason to have doubts and fears. We 
have none.
6. Forewarned is forearmed, and no trick or ruse will avail the enemy 
if we remember that there are only two orders which really matter 
and from which nothing should distract us:-
For those in front line positions “Hang on.”
For those in reserve … … … “Push on.”
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, C-in-C, 
Home Forces, 2 October 1940
PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
I am loath to bother you, but I think the enclosed copy of a paragraph 
in the “Spectator” of last week needs attention.
I suggest that it is a most dangerous statement which should be refuted 
as soon as possible by the highest authority. It is also grossly unfair to 
the troops, who, for the most part, have really been working, and still are 
working, pretty hard. I have told my Commanders that whenever they 
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   97 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
98
can, they are to give all possible help to the civil authorities in salvage 
work such as the clearing of debris etc., but any large scale use of soldiers 
to take the place of the civil defence services can hardly fail to have a 
most serious adverse effect on training.
You may know that the “Spectator” recently violently repudiated the 
idea that there could be any need for a large scale offensive by the Army 
in this war. This new effort on its part may be connected with this theory.
Extract from “A Spectator’s Notebook”
The Spectator, September 27th 1940.
Page 309.
“Support, I see, is being given in other quarters to the suggestion I 
made a fortnight ago that soldiers should be called in where desirable to 
reinforce the civilian defence services. The reasons for this are obvious. 
Some of the services concerned, the air-raid wardens in particular, are 
working under an immense strain. They are in perpetual danger, their 
hours are too long and their numbers in some localities too few. At the 
same time there are tens of thousands of soldiers all over the country 




Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General B. L. Montgomery, 
19 October 1940
PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
It has come to my notice that in your understandable desire to get the 
best officers available in your Corps, you have been dealing direct with 
the branches of the A.G.’s department at the War Office, and asking 
them to post officers to specific appointments in your Corps from units 
and headquarters of other formations in this Command. You will, no 
doubt, recollect one or two incidents.
I want you to realise that this procedure, however justifiable it may 
seem to you, is likely to cause extreme annoyance to the commanders 
of the formations and units concerned, more particularly where, in 
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their opinion, your selections do not tally with their ideas as to who is 
the best man in the unit concerned for the job for which you want him. 
I am sure that you do not mean to cause friction or to give offence, but 
I am afraid that, unless you first consult the commander, you will do so 
and I do not want friction!
I shall be grateful, therefore, if in future when you want a particular 
officer for a particular appointment from another formation in this 
Command, you will either approach me or the formation (Corps) 
commander first. I am sure that generally your wishes can be met.
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General H. C. B. Wemyss, 
Adjutant General, 19 October 1940
PERSONAL
You probably know that Monty, commanding the 5th Corps, is in the 
habit of going direct to branches of your department in order to work 
transfers of officers from other formations to his own Corps. He has 
done this recently more than once I think.
I sympathise with his desire to get the best and his energy (binge, 
he would call it!) in making personally sure that he gets what he wants. 
Heaven helps those who help themselves! However, this practice tends to 
cause friction and I have had complaints from Commanders of formations 
from which Monty has kidnapped officers, to the effect that his selections 
do not always coincide with their own ideas as to the relative efficiency 
of officers in the units concerned, and that, consequently, the officers 
passed over by these personal selections become disgruntled. I know the 
whole subject is a very difficult one, but I daresay you will agree that it 
is undesirable that this practice should become prevalent.
I have written to Monty telling him my views on the subject. I shall 
be grateful if you will treat this letter as private between ourselves.
JRL, AUC 98
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, C-in-C, 
Home Forces, c. 25–26 October 1940
Forgive me for returning to the charge.
Sometime ago I wrote pointing out the apparent dangers involved in 
the further separation of the A.A. formations from the rest of the Army, 
and suggesting that they should be administered in the same way as any 
other troops. I know that higher authority has decided otherwise, but 
I still feel so strongly that a big mistake is being made that I venture to 
raise the subject again.
I have just seen a copy of the “Report of the Committee Reorganization 
of the Anti-Aircraft Command”. It has been compiled apparently by a 
committee of four A.A. Commanders sitting in judgement on themselves, 
and is a voluminous affair which I would not dream of suggesting you 
should read in full. But, if you have time I think you should look at 
Appendix “D” to the Report, which shows how absolutely and completely 
they propose to cut themselves adrift from the Army. So much so that 
it really seems as it might be better to put them in to Air Force uniform 
at once! You will see that, although A.A. personnel are to be dispersed 
in large numbers in every army command, ordinary commanders are to 
have no say in their discipline or administration. Items 1, 6, 9, 10, 11, 
27 (vi), 29 (Note), 46, 51, 53, 61, 62, and 63, are illuminating.
While not wishing to make more work for myself or my staff, I cannot 
really see how this system is going to work economically and smoothly. It 
has been difficult up to date. Now it looks likely to become worse. Perhaps 
I am unduly pessimistic and I dare say there are factors of which I know 
nothing, but I thought I had better tell you how the business struck me.
I hope you will have a very good leave.
JRL, AUC 100
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Sydney Muspratt, 
India Office, 5 November 1940
I am sorry to bother you but I have just had a pitiful letter from “Taffy” 
Davies who is, as you know, marooned in Iceland.
He considers that India has treated him very shabbily and I am 
bound to say that, on the face of it, it looks as if she had. He is a Major 
(Bt. Lt.-Colonel) who was temporary Lt.-Colonel in command of his 
battalion in India. On my application he was sent home to be G.S.O.1. 
on the H.Q. of the N.W.E.F. He never got there through no fault of his 
own and then became G.S.O.1. of a division as you know.
He has lost command of his battalion, also his temporary rank in 
the I.A. (He is, or was, really permanent Commandant of his battalion) 
and is being paid as G.S.O.1. (Major and Temporary Lt.-Colonel in the 
British Service). If I had known that this was likely to happen to him, 
I would certainly never have asked for him. I thought that I.A. officers 
brought home for duty were paid at Indian rates, but I am afraid I have 
not had the time or opportunity to make myself au fait with the rules. 
I do feel, however, that it is wrong at this juncture that an officer should 
be penalised financially because he has been specially chosen to fill an 
important post.
I am sure you will sympathise and I do hope you may be able to help 
to get things put right.
JRL, AUC 102
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Letter from General Sir Alan Brooke, C-in-C, 
Home Forces, to Auchinleck, 22 November 1940
My dear Auchinleck
I was longing to congratulate you yesterday morning but felt a must 
wait till you have seen Dill.
I am delighted about your appointment, but very sad that it entails 
losing you from Southern Command.
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We shall miss you badly in “Home Forces” but shall have to comfort 
ourselves with the thought that though our loss India gains the best 
possible selection for the appointment.
I do hope I shall see you before you leave to thank you for all your 
help and assistance.
With heartiest congratulations, and with best of luck.
JRL, AUC 104
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Southern Command Special Order of the Day 
no. 103, 12 December 1940
On leaving Southern Command I wish to thank all ranks of the staffs, 
units, services and departments for their unfailing help during the last 
four months.
It has not been an easy time for any of us, but, looking back, it is a good 
record. A great stretch of coast line has been fortified and made secure.
At the same time, formations and units have been completely 
re-organized and re-equipped, and have started training intensively to 
fit themselves to take the offensive against the Germans overseas.
Much help and support has also been given to the Home Guard, the 
results of which are becoming more and more apparent every day.
It has been mainly due to your determination and good cheer on all 
occasions and in all conditions of weather that the work has been well 
done. I know that the even more strenuous task which lies before you 
will be done well and truly, too.
I am very sorry to leave you and wish you all the very best of luck in 
the future.
JRL, AUC 119
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Commander in Chief, 
India, 1940–41
Auchinleck as C in C India was anxious to develop a programme which 
would modernise and expand the Indian Army. On his return to India, he 
was impressed by what had been achieved in his absence and believed that 
within seven months armoured units would be sufficiently developed to 
take the field [40]. The development of armoured forces was something 
Auchinleck was to return to [50, 57]. Auchinleck’s desire to develop the 
Indian Army’s AA capabilities, when the number of guns was limited 
is also evident [41]. Most surprising, in terms of modernisation, was 
Auchinleck’s desire to develop a parachute brigade within the Indian 
Army. A lesser general might have concluded that the lack of aircraft, 
gliders or parachutes made this a pointless task [65, 66].
Auchinleck was keen to expand the recruiting base of the Indian 
Army far beyond that of the traditional martial races by resurrecting 
old regiments and forming new ones. In doing this he promoted the 
development of modern recruiting campaigns [43, 67]. He believed that 
expansion should go ahead, even if the British contingents normally 
supplied to each Indian Division were not forthcoming [68]. With regard 
to the martial races, Auchinleck also outlined the problems seen in the 
rapid expansion of the number of Gurkha battalions within the Indian 
Army, which led to serious shortages of officers and NCOs [41].
Auchinleck maintained his belief in the need to Indianise the officer 
corps of the Indian Army, but at the same time he was keen to obtain as 
many trained officers as possible from the UK and from British families 
living in India. Perhaps with memories of his own early career he did not 
want cadets coming from Britain to be put to the expense of equipping 
themselves with civilian clothes and he was concerned at the pay disparity 
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   103 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
104
between British and Indian officers serving in the Indian Army [40, 43]. 
He was particularly concerned at the lack of middle-ranking officers in 
the expanded Indian Army and resisted attempts to obtain such regular 
officers for irregular units being formed in Singapore [43]. Auchinleck 
also believed that a wartime spirit should be adopted by officers in India, 
insisting that all officers should wear uniform, and he was also keen to 
centralise all headquarters staff in Delhi [40, 59].
Of course, while Auchinleck was C in C India in 1941 it was amongst 
much else an operational command, with oversight over the campaign 
in Iraq. This was not the case in 1943–47 when the Indian Command 
was shorn of operational responsibilities and, of course, memories of the 
poorly managed Mesopotamia campaign of the First World War cast a long 
shadow over Indian involvement in British strategic planning at the start 
of the war. From March 1941 Auchinleck was organising Indian Army 
units to send to Iraq, and the CIGS agreed that Auchinleck should be in 
charge of this theatre [42]. This was originally unproblematic as Wavell, 
C in C Middle East, made it clear that he could spare no troops for Iraq 
[45]. However, Iraq was soon put back under Middle East Command, 
at least temporarily [52, 53]. Auchinleck’s dispatch of troops, including 
by air, and obvious interest in the Iraq theatre impressed Churchill and 
the War Cabinet [48, 49, 50, 55, 56, 61, 62].
It is important to note the lack of correspondence here on the growing 
Japanese threat in the Far East [39, 41, 43, 61]. In Auchinleck’s defence 
it might be noted that the pressure from the British government was 
for Indian troops to be sent primarily to the Middle East in this period.
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Archibald Wavell,1 8 February 1941
1. Since I arrived here I have been considering the question of 
SYBIL [?] and SABINE2 and the implications entailed by their move 
on the dates arranged to the theatre for which they are intended. 
I am not at all happy in my mind regarding the progress which 
has been made in the planning for this force either operationally 
or administratively. I feel that time is getting short and also that 
the situation in Iraq looks none too pleasant. I am therefore most 
anxious to clear the air on major problems as soon as possible so 
that we can then get down to detailed planning here in India.
2. We have revised the Order of Battle on the lines of a completely 
Indian force and we understand that you are shortly sending your 
own comments. There is, however, much more in it than that: the 
only War Office instructions on the subject date, I believe, to the 
days when France was still our Ally. All they have done is to say 
that you are still to be responsible and that “a Corps Commander 
will be appointed soon.” On this latter point I should be glad if 
you would send a reminder as I have several senior appointments 
to fill and I must know whether to nominate somebody for this 
role or not. Furthermore, the Commander elect should obviously 
come in now on the planning.
3. I know well that you and your staff have many pre-occupations in 
Africa and to the North and I therefore think that my staff here 
can make a useful contribution to solving the problems involved. 
I am therefore having an appreciation made now from which I will 
send you as early as possible by air mail for your consideration. In 
addition to the appreciation, I will also send you a draft directive 
to the Force Commander based on it. If we can come to an early 
agreement on this I think we shall be able to get down straight away, 
1 Wavell took up his post as General Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East 
on 2 August 1939.
2 SABINE was the codename for an operation which envisaged the occupation 
of Basra by British or Indian troops to hold the oilfields and installations of 
South-West Persia and the Gulf.
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with nucleus Force and Base Staffs in India, to detailed planning. 
The sooner we can do this the better as we shall have to have our 
plans cut and dried well in advance if the shipping problem is to be 
dealt with satisfactorily. To put you into the preliminary picture of 
the lines on which we are thinking I attach a copy of the minutes 
held here recently at which Armstrong was present. I would however 
like you to await the appreciation I have promised before you come 
to any definite conclusions.
4. In addition I am also examining the possibility of sending a force 
– even if only partially trained and equipped – to Iraq in a sudden 
emergency should the situation there deteriorate seriously in the 
intervening period before SABINE and SYBIL are ready. This 
examination has not yet been completed but my present feeling 
is that if troops are required suddenly as a stabilising element in 
the Baghdad Habbaniyah area it would be simpler and quicker to 
employ LOBSTER (or some force of that nature)3 from Palestine, 
if necessary replacing it from here.
JRL, AUC 123
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Letter from L. S. Amery, Secretary of State 
for India, to Auchinleck, 19 February 1941
By the time you get this you will have had the best part of a couple of 
months in which to feel your feet and size up things and I should be 
very glad to have your impressions of how the present first stage of the 
expansion of the Indian Army is getting on and what you feel about the 
possibilities of the next stage, what you have in mind to do and whether 
I can help you if help is required from this end.
I think I was not far wrong when I suggested to you before you left 
that you might find yourself quite as much in the thick of things in India 
as here. I think the Japanese definitely mean mischief and while I doubt 
if they will act precipitately, but rather move by stages into Indo-China 
and Thailand, I have a feeling that things may well come to a head 
3 This, presumably, refers to the forces which were to be assembled in Palestine as 
Habforce to relieve RAF Habbaniyah in May 1941.
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between them and us by May. If so, you will no doubt have to make a 
big immediate effort to help Brooke-Popham4 and your whole problem 
will in every way become more difficult and more urgent. However weak 
our position, I am sure it would be a mistake now to show any signs of 
hesitation in face of Japanese action. As long as a cat arches her back, 
spits and faces the dog in front of her, he will hesitate and sometimes 
go away: the moment she turns tail she is done for. Similarly, if once 
war becomes inevitable, I believe we shall be wise either to attack, i.e. 
seize or torpedo all Japanese ships we can everywhere, or at any rate 
take up advance defensive positions, e.g. by seizing the Isthmus of Kra 
and so having a narrower front to defend on land against any movement 
through Thailand.5
On the West6 I hope Wavell will have cleared out the Wops7 from 
North Africa before the German push against Greece through Bulgaria 
becomes effective. If only the Yugoslavs and the Turks had had the 
courage to coerce Bulgaria and present a solid Balkan front, we could 
have steadily reinforced it.8 It will be much more difficult to reinforce 
the Greeks at Salonika and the Turks, especially if the Turks simply stay 
on the defensive and refuse to join in the war till they are invaded.9 It 
is difficult to see what is going to happen in that part of the world, but 
it may well be that sooner or later you may have to face the necessity of 
sending troops to Basra.
Altogether, the next six months promise to be exciting, if anxious. If 
we can hold our ground well during those months it will bring the end 
4 Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was appointed Commander in 
Chief, Far East in October 1940. Prior to this, he had retired from active service 
with the RAF and was Governor of Kenya.
5 It was only on the 5 December 1941 that the British Cabinet authorised Brooke-
Popham to take up defensive positions in Thailand, breaching Thai neutrality.
6 A reference to the Western Desert campaign.
7 A demeaning phrase, referring to Italians.
8 Initially neutral, Bulgaria became allied to the Axis powers when it became a 
signatory to the Tripartite Pact on 1 March 1941 under pressure from Germany 
who wanted to move troops, unopposed, through Bulgaria to attack Greece.
9 There was an Anglo-Turkish declaration of martial co-operation and assistance 
signed in May 1939 and a tripartite agreement between Britain, France and 
Turkey signed in October 1939. Crucially these agreements only committed 
Turkey to action at such time as Britain and France had delivered sufficient 
quantities of war materials; something which was never achieved. The Turco-
German neutrality pact of June 1941 saw Turkey move away from its earlier 
alliances.
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of the war much nearer. If not, we and the Americans may have a long 
uphill road before us.
However, I didn’t mean to take up your time with these generalisa-
tions, which will be out of date by the time you get this, but just to say 
that I hope that when the spirit moves you you will write and tell me 
about things as they strike you.
JRL, AUC 125
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, CIGS, 
20 February 1941
Thank you very much for arranging to have the verdict of the 
Chiefs of Staff regarding the air threat to Eastern India altered. 
It has made things very much easier for us here. It is not that we 
are experiencing any obstruction from the Finance people – quite 
the reverse; they are extremely helpful and most reasonable. All 
the same they have to carry out their job of doing watch-dog over 
Defence expenditure and they are very loath to take action against 
professional advice, especially the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, 
which, quite rightly, in their minds overrides the opinion of the 
local military experts.
2. I am beginning at last to be able to get some kind of general idea 
of what is going on out here and of what has been done in the last 
year. Knowing what India was like a year ago, I am quite frankly 
astonished at what has been done out here and also at what is being 
done now. There is a tremendous lot still to do of course, but I 
think we really are getting on with the job. I need not tell you – you 
know it only too well – that the limiting factor is equipment, as 
it is everywhere else. However, things have improved a lot in this 
respect since you gave us our quota of 10%, and we have also had 
several other unexpected windfalls lately, such as the 3″ mortars 
from South Africa.
Our vehicles too look like materialising at last and when we 
get them I think we ought to have some pretty useful armoured 
units, which we may be able to offer you towards the beginning 
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of the autumn should you have need of them. Strictly speaking, 
as you know, these armoured formations are designed for the 
defence of India, but if there is no threat to our Western Frontier I 
personally would have no hesitation in offering them to you. What 
the Government of India would say is another matter, but I don’t 
think it is any use trying to gauge their attitude so far in advance.
As I said before, I think things really are moving in this country 
and there is any amount of enthusiasm and keenness. The army is 
training hard and so far as I can see on sound and up to date lines.
3. I am sorry I was not able to meet you in the matter of Norton for the 
Western (Ind.) District,10 but I hope you understand how matters 
lie. As a matter of fact, since I sent you my telegram about him 
the position has changed and now there seem to be possibilities of 
securing two or three other vacancies for Lieut.-Generals. However, 
between ourselves, I have heard recently, from what I think is a 
reliable source, that Reuben [?] has got very old lately and that he 
is not really fit for an important and active command. I don’t know 
what truth there is in this, and as he is a very old friend of mine, 
I only mention it to you for your personal information.
4. Bill Holden11 arrived here the day before yesterday and has been 
staying with me for a couple of nights before going on to take up 
his abode with Clement Armitage.12 He has got by no means an 
easy job in front of him and I think he has realised that already. 
However, he ought to do it very well and I am sure he will.
5. Carter [?] has also arrived but I have not had an opportunity of 
talking to him yet.
6. I have put all the army out here into uniform in the same way as 
they are at home and although this met with a certain amount of 
grousing from some quarters I am sure it is a good thing and that 
10 Lieutenant General E. F. Norton, who was Acting Governor of Hong Kong, 
1940–41 and Commanded Western (Independent) District, India 1941–42 after 
which he retired.
11 Major General W. C. Holden was, at this time, Military Member of the Eastern 
Group Supply Council (Delhi–Simla) in which capacity he visited Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa, Malaya, Burma, Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda and the 
Netherlands East Indies to investigate munitions output.
12 General Sir (Charles) Clement Armitage, Master General of the Ordnance, 
India, 1938–42.
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it will do nobody any harm. If it does nothing else it will stop this 
ridiculous nonsense of cadets and young officers coming out to this 
country with a complete civilian outfit which they may never use.
7. By sending our only two bomber squadrons to the Far East we have 
left ourselves very naked indeed as regards aircraft – dangerously 
so in fact. I know you realise this and I am sure the C.A.S. realises 
it too, as he has just encouraged us all tremendously by sending 
us a telegram to the effect that he is speeding up the delivery of 
Lysanders13 and Glen Martin bombers14 to us.
I am not really worried about having a lot of aircraft on the 
Frontier so long as it is only the tribes whom we have to face. 
I would be quite prepared to take the tribes on with troops alone 
with no aircraft at all. On the other hand our ports, Calcutta, 
Bombay, etc., are really extremely ill defended. Coast defence 
guns are either obsolete or too few to be any good. As you know, 
we have no A.A. at all except for one miserable battery of eight 
guns, and we are still short of craft for local naval defence. The 
adverse moral effect on public opinion generally in this country 
of an uninterrupted bombardment by enemy ships of any of our 
ports might be very serious, much more serious than it would be 
at home. At the moment, to assist in the defence of these ports, 
all we have are a few old aircraft, Wapiti,15 Audax16 and the like, 
which really are not reliable enough to be sent to sea at all and 
would not, I am afraid, make much impression against a modern 
13 The Westland Lysander had been introduced into the RAF in 1936 as an Army 
Co-operation Aircraft. Losses were heavy, against modern fighter aircraft, in 
France in 1940 and during the rest of the Second World War most were employed 
on duties with Special Operations Executive, landing agents, munitions and 
radios behind enemy lines.
14 Presumably Martin Maryland Bombers, which entered RAF service in June 
1940. These aircraft were manufactured in the USA and had originally been 
adapted for service with the French Air Force. By the standards of the time these 
were fast and effective aircraft, faster than the Bristol Blenheim.
15 The Westland Wapiti was a single engine biplane. It entered service with the 
RAF in 1928 and remained in production until 1932. It was withdrawn from 
RAF service in 1940.
16 The Hawker Audax was developed from the Hawker Hart, for service in India 
and Singapore. It was a single engine biplane and entered service with the RAF 
in 1932. A considerable number remained in service in 1940, seeing active service 
in Iraq in 1941 and, elsewhere, were used for training purposes until 1944.
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cruiser. However, we will carry on as best we can until you can help 
us out with some modern aircraft.
8. I see that Far East have recommended to you the formation of a 
Corps in Northern Malaya. If you agree to this I presume we shall 
be called upon to provide a Commander and most of the staff. 
I have got this in hand already and have asked Wavell if he can 
spare Heath17 for the job should the proposal materialise. He has 
proved himself a good divisional commander in the Sudan and his 
experience of modern fighting, even though the country may be 
different, would be invaluable in a new formation. Wavell may, of 
course, have ideas of forming an Indian Corps of his own in Egypt 
out of the 4th and 5th Divisions and might want to keep Heath for 
this. However, he has not said anything about this yet.
9. Some time ago we had a telegram from you saying that a Commander 
for Sabine would be nominated shortly, but we have heard no more 
about this. I am a little worried about Sabine generally, because 
up to date no reasoned plan for its possible employment seems 
to have been worked out. There are so many permutations and 
combinations which might affect operations in Iraq should it ever 
become necessary to send troops to that country that we have tried 
our hand at making an appreciation of the situation in respect of 
the possible employment of Sabine. I am sending this to Wavell 
and am sending a copy to you personally in a separate letter. I feel 
that if there is any chance of troops going in that direction in the 
near future, detailed planning should start at once, particularly on 
the administrative side. I feel, also, that a draft directive for the 
Commander should be agreed upon and put on record.
JRL, AUC 126
17 Lieutenant General Sir Lewis Heath who commanded 3 Indian Corps in Malaya, 
1941–42.
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Archibald Wavell, 13 March 1941
Thank you very much for your letter of the 5th March, which I received 
today.
1. With regard to the brigade of Gurkhas which you say might be of 
use to you, I will be only too glad to let you have it as soon as I can 
get it ready for you, if you feel you want it. There is, however, a 
difficulty. When I mentioned the matter to you in Cairo I did not 
know what the situation regarding the Gurkhas as a whole was. 
The older battalions which were in existence when the war broke 
out have been very severely drained of officers and n.c.os. in order 
to form new battalions of Gurkhas as for each old battalion one 
new battalion is being formed. This, in addition to the peculiar 
conditions attaching to Gurkha recruitment, has resulted in all 
Gurkha battalions being not only under strength for the time being, 
but also in rather a backward state of training. This condition will 
not last long, of course, but it might be two or three months before 
I could produce for you a properly trained and efficient brigade 
of three Gurkha battalions. However, if you think you are likely 
to want such a brigade some time during the summer, I will work 
to that end. Meanwhile, should you want a brigade of infantry 
accustomed to and trained in hill warfare I could probably find 
you one made up of battalions of the ordinary Line, that is to say, 
Frontier Force, Punjabi or Baluch battalions, as these units are 
not suffering under the same handicap as the Gurkhas are at the 
moment. It would of course be of great advantage in a detached 
brigade of this sort if all three battalions were of the same class so 
that the brigade could be homogeneous, but if your need is urgent 
I think I would have to send you the ordinary infantry battalions 
instead of Gurkhas.
As for political reactions, I do not see why there should be any, 
but I will make discreet enquiries in the right quarter and find out 
whether there would be any objection to the use of Indian troops 
in the theatres which you have in mind.
Perhaps you will let me know what you think about the situation 
as explained by me above.
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2. Thank you very much for promising to look after the Nawab of 
Bhopal.18 I hope he won’t be a nuisance.
If it is really no trouble to you and your staff, I should very much 
like to continue to send you visitors of this type, that is to say, ruling 
Princes, prominent politicians and other public men. Their visits 
do a tremendous lot of good in the education of public opinion in 
this country and make our task of pulling our weight in the war 
correspondingly easier. But if they are a nuisance I hope you will 
say so at once and I will try to discourage the idea of sending any 
more of them, though I should be very sorry to have to do this.
3. Thank you very much for your remarks about the Sabine plan and 
for getting things on the move so quickly. I shall feel much easier 
in my mind when we really have got something concrete on which 
we can work at short notice, because I feel myself that, with events 
moving at the pace they are, the notice we shall get may be very 
short.
I have nominated Quinan as Commander of the Force and have 
sent his name home to the War Office. I propose to give him Slim 
as his B.G.S. and I think the combination should be a good one. 
Quinan is an educated soldier, i.d.c. and all the rest of it, and has 
had considerable experience in command on service lately, even if 
only on the Frontier. Beresford,19 whom you may know, has been 
nominated for some time as the Commander of the Base and I do 
not propose to change this selection. Quinan and Beresford, with 
Slim20 and one or two other senior nominees for the staff of the 
Force, are coming here on the 17th to be put into the picture and to 
rough out the first outline plans. As soon as they have done that, I 
18 Sir Hamidullah Khan Sikandar Saulat (1894–1960) became ruler of the 
independent state of Bhopal in March 1926. Bhopal, with a population of more 
than 800,000 people and occupying 7,000 square miles, was a Muslim ruled state 
amongst the many Hindu principalities in Central India. Auchinleck’s fears of 
the Begum being a nuisance were misplaced; indeed, he was seen to be a strong 
supporter of the British war effort and as Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes 
from 1944 he was important in maintaining the loyalty of this body to the King 
Emperor.
19 Major General George de la Poer Beresford.
20 Brigadier W. J. Slim, the future Field Marshal. Slim had been wounded serving 
against the Italians in East Africa and when Auchinleck was considering potential 
staff officers for service in Iraq, Slim was employed in Army Headquarters, 
India, working on contingency plans considering a German breakthrough in the 
Caucasus or the defection of the Iraqis to the Axis.
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propose to send them straight off to Cairo if that will be convenient 
to you. I will, of course, send you an official telegram asking for 
your agreement. With them I propose to send a representative of 
the A.O.C.-in-C. in India or possibly the A.O.C.-in-C. himself, 
to discuss the question of the air component with you and the 
A.O.C.-in-C. Middle East. I take it that we shall only be concerned 
with the air forces actually required for close co-operation with 
the Force itself and that the bigger strategical question connected 
with air offensives at a distance will continue to be dealt with by 
the A.O.C.-in-C., Middle East.
4. Thornhill,21 your propaganda merchant, has been staying with 
me for the last week or so and has been of very great help to us in 
connection with the handling of the Italian prisoners of war in this 
country. He has given me some very valuable notes and advice, of 
which I hope to be able to make the fullest use.
5. I wonder if you could possibly manage to spare us any of your 
captured Italian A.A. artillery, heavy or light, or both. We are 
frightfully short of anything of the kind in this country, in fact we 
really have none at all as the only 3 guns we have (3″) are all being 
used to train the personnel of the A.A. regiments which we are 
raising in anticipation of receiving equipments from home. The 
result is that at the ports and in our vulnerable areas where our 
big factories are we have no A.A. protection at all other than light 
machine guns. India being what she is, it is most important that we 
should have something to make a noise and to show that action is 
being taken against attacking aircraft in order to keep the morale 
of the people, and especially the factory workers and workers in 
the dock areas, as high as possible. So long as we could get some 
guns it would not matter very much to us whether they had only 
got a little ammunition; some guns with a few rounds which they 
could fire should an attack take place would be quite invaluable to 
us. I know that you must have demands on you for these guns, but 
perhaps you might be able to spare us a few.
6. I have not yet had a firm reply from the War Office about the 
formation of the Indian Corps in Malaya, but so far as I know the 
21 Colonel Cudbert Thornhill had been sent to Cairo by Department E H, the 
predecessor of SOE and the Political Warfare Executive, to draft and disseminate 
Allied propaganda amongst Italian soldiers and POWs in North Africa.
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project has been, for all practical purposes, approved; perhaps they 
are waiting for the C.I.G.S. to get home before they finally decide. 
I mention this because I think you must be wondering why I have 
not given you a definite reply about Heath and Mayne.22
7. I won’t take up any more of your time as I am sure you are very 
busy and have very many more important things to think about. 
I will write again before long.
JRL, AUC 130
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Letter from Field Marshal Sir John Dill 
to Auchinleck, 13 March 194123
As I seem to be a little nearer to you than usual I feel that I must write 
you a line. Archie Wavell & I have discussed ‘Sabine’ as fully as we 
could and are agreed, as I think he has told you, that you should do the 
planning and that, in the early stages at any rate, you should control. My 
own feeling is that the necessity for ‘Sabine’ will arise sooner or later – & 
probably sooner than later.
Conditions in Iraq are, as you know, bad & show little sign of improving. 
We have had that nasty little red fox Tewfiq Suwaidi, the Foreign Minister, 
over here. He has been all honeyed words but is obviously quite unreal-
istic. The Regent, they tell me is good, but can he control or deal with 
the soldiers who have gone political?
In all these plans and preparations it is a race against time. The Foreign 
Secretary & I have had a not too easy time and it is impossible to say yet 
whether or not we have done any good.
The Turks are sound at heart – the Foreign Secretary had a wonderful 
reception from them – but will do all in their power to postpone the day 
they must fight. They are woefully short of modern equipment and are, 
I should say, quite incapable of any offensive action. The great danger is 
that they will try to fight it out in Thrace, where they would be destroyed 
by German armoured divisions, rather than fight back to the Bosporus 
where they really could hold a German advance.
22 Major General Mosley Mayne.
23 At the time he sent this letter, Dill was visiting H.Q. Middle East in Cairo.
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Cakmak24 is old & none too fit, but I fancy he is pretty wise. He and 
the rest of them are much more inclined to accept British advice since 
Archie Wavell’s victories – & that is all to the good.
The Greeks are fighting & are quite determined to continue to fight 
even if – or I should say when – the Germans come in. Their moral is 
high at present but is apt to go up and down with incredible velocity!
The question is, what are the Yugo-slavs going to do? I expect you 
will know by the time you get this letter.
By the way, to return to ‘Sabine’. I will take up the question of your 
dealing direct with me, & cutting out the India Office, when I return 
to London. Knowing the India Office and the present S. of S. as I do, 
I may have some difficulty.
I will, of course, promise to keep the India Office fully in touch 
[missing section of document].
I hope that all [illegible] well with you and your lady. Please give her 
my best.




Letter from Auchinleck to L. S. Amery, 
Secretary of State for India, 17 March 1941
Thank you very much for your letter of the 19th February which 
reached me on the 14th of this month. I must apologise for not 
having written to you sooner, but it has taken me all my time since I 
arrived at the end of January to get a grasp of what has been done in 
the last year and of proposals for the future. I am still in the process 
of learning what the situation really is and I am afraid I am likely 
to stay in that state for some little time to come.
I am amazed at what has been done in so short a time, and at the 
ingenuity, flexibility and energy which has been shown, particularly 
in the production of munitions. Things are being done which two 
24 General Fevzi Cakmak (1876–1950) was Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish 
Army from 1922 to 1944.
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years ago would not have been considered possible in India. This 
is all very good I think and augurs well for the future. There is a 
colossal amount still to be done of course, but this is likely always 
to be so, I suppose.
2. The expansion of the army has gone very well and wonderfully 
smoothly all things considered. Here again, I am very much 
impressed with the results achieved and I am deeply grateful to 
those, including my predecessor, who are responsible for this state 
of affairs. I think that the moment has now come to review the 
position generally and make certain modifications in the original 
proposals. These modifications which I am now thinking over, 
will be aimed at simplification of the organisation generally and 
the prevention of the springing up of new corps and units which 
have no very definite purpose or firm foundation.
Generally speaking, I have found very little to quarrel with in 
the actual composition, organisation or equipment of the new 
formations we are raising. Such alterations, and they are of minor 
character, as I am making are again aimed at simplification. You ask 
for my ideas on the next stage. I do not myself think that for the 
moment we can look further ahead than we are doing at the moment. 
You know what present plans are. The production of formations 
for H.M.G. as they say they need them, and then replacement by 
similar formations to be kept in India for its own immediate defence. 
We can get the men without difficulty, I think, but one can not go 
beyond a certain limit in the raising of new formations unless there 
is a prospect of being able to equip them within a reasonable time.
It is possible to do a lot in the training line with dummy weapons 
and the like, but I do not think one can keep troops in an unequipped 
state indefinitely.
3. Equipment and officers are the two bottlenecks and likely to remain 
as such, I think, till the end.
4. Equipment is coming in, steadily if slowly and the progress made in 
manufacture in this country is most encouraging. I recently visited 
the ordnance and other factories at Calcutta and Tatanagar and was 
very favourably impressed. Much more can and, I hope will be 
done. The Roger Mission25 has done most valuable work out here 
25 This was a group of technical experts, assembled under the leadership of 
Sir Alexander Roger, Chairman of the Automatic Telephone Company and a 
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and has presented, as you know, a remarkable series of reports. All 
the same, equipment is short – very short – and it disturbs me to 
think that I shall not have a single division in the country equipped 
for modern war once “Capable”26 has departed for Singapore, until 
next July. We have certainly got troops and plenty of them which 
could be sent, say to Iraq to restore the internal situation in that 
country, and if necessary deal with the Iraq army, but they would 
not be fit, from the equipment point of view, to go to Anatolia to 
fight the Germans! I feel more and more certain that it will not 
be long before we shall have to send troops to Iraq, and that this 
alternative L[ines] of C[ommunication] via Basra, Baghdad, Mosul 
and Aleppo may become really important strategically before the 
war is much older. However, as you know, we are preparing for that 
contingency and planning has now started in earnest.
5. The supply of suitable “middle-piece” officers is getting more 
difficult every day and I have had, much against my will, to refuse 
demands from Singapore for regular officers for various irregular 
units that they propose raising. I have always been rather sceptical 
(hidebound – I suppose!) of the value of these specialized small 
units. I feel that the officers and N.C.Os. they absorb could be 
much greater value training and leading regular units on which 
we must rely on to win the battle finally.
I am not too happy about our system for the recruitment of 
Indians for emergency commissions. We are getting some quite 
good stuff, but I feel we are losing many of the best of them. I have 
this in hand. Of one thing I am quite sure – we can no longer afford 
to differentiate between Englishman and Indians in the matter of 
pay etc. when both are doing the same job side by side. There are 
many anomalies which need adjusting and I am hoping to be able 
to do this.
The Indian Office have been very good in sending us out so many 
good cadets from Home and we are correspondingly grateful. All 
the same, we must at our end see that we get an adequate supply 
former Chairman of B.S.A. This group had been formed in August 1940 and was 
charged by Herbert Morrison, the Minister of Supply, with advising the British 
and Indian Governments on the possibility of expanding munitions production 
in India.
26 15th Indian Brigade was sent to Singapore in March 1941, followed by the 22nd 
Indian Brigade and the headquarters of 9th Indian Division in April.
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of Indians, both as regards quantity and quality. I am sure we shall 
want them all before we have done.
The cadet colleges are working well and turning out good 
material. I hope to visit most of them during the next month. 
The “middle-piece” officers simply are not there, so we must do 
the best we can without them, I suppose.
6. As regards recruitment for the rank and file, I have no doubt at all 
that, apart from any political considerations, we must broaden our 
basis and this was already in hand before I arrived. I propose to 
continue and hasten the process. There is plenty of good untouched 
material which we can and should use. Politically too it is, I think, 
essential to meet to an appreciable extent the almost universal 
demand for general recruitment and to give the process proper 
publicity.
This I hope to be able to do by reviving old units, such as the 
Madras Regiment and raising new regular (as opposed to Territorial 
Force)27 units to represent provinces hitherto unrepresented, such 
as Bengal, Assam and Bihar. This can easily be done as in some 
cases territorial units, which can be converted to regular units, 
already exist.28
These units will by no means be “for show” only. They can be 
made and will be made, to take their share of the work. Generally 
speaking, I am opposed to any further expansion of the Territorial 
Force as such. It is an anomaly in war time and a great complication 
in many ways. I hope in fact to be able to regularize most of the 
existing T.F. provincial units.
I don’t think it will be difficult, and it will help greatly in meeting 
the political demand for wider representation in the Army.
27 The Indian Territorial Force had been raised in 1920 and was largely composed 
of Indian personnel; the Auxiliary Force recruited amongst Europeans and 
Anglo-Indians. Members of the Indian Territorial Force were only liable for 
service within their own districts and these units were used for internal security 
duties during the Second World War, to relieve regular units for active service. 
The Territorial Force was approximately 20,000 strong in 1938.
28 By June 1941 six new Indian Army Regiments had been created; the Bengal 
Regiment, Assam Regiment, Bihar Regiment and Madras Regiment, which relied 
on voluntary recruitment amongst specific Indian Territorial Force regiments, 
effectively seeing some ‘regularised’; and the Mahar Regiment and Mazbhi Sikh 
Regiment.
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7. The Air Force is desperately weak and worries me greatly. I hear 
that the Air Ministry will not agree our fifteen squadron expansion 
scheme for the Indian Air Force. This is a disappointment to all of 
us but I realize that they can not help themselves. We are now busy 
on a new scheme based on such aircraft as are actually in sight, 
and there are quite a number of them, though most of them are 
obsolescent. I feel we must expand the I.A.F. by hook or by crook 
as it is becoming more and more evident that we have very little 
hope getting anything from outside. Even if we do not need our 
expanded I.A.F. in India, they may be able to lend a hand outside 
India and I hope they will.
8. The Navy is going on well and expanding with great energy. I like 
the looks of what I have seen of the personnel very much (the 
ratings) and I hope to see a good deal of them next week at Bombay 
and Karachi. I am off tomorrow by air to Secunderabad, Madras, 
Bangalore, Bombay and Karachi. I hope to do the N.W.F. and the 
Punjab in April.
9. Wilson has just handed over Adjutant-General to Haig,29 whose 
place as Q.M.G. has been taken by Noyes.30 De Burgh31 gave place 
some weeks ago to Hutton. I think the new team is a good one 
and should do well. The Wilson change was difficult to make and 
distressing to me, but it necessary for the good of the whole.
10. This letter already is inordinately long and I will finish.
As I indicated earlier, I am anxious that the machinery of 
expansion shall not get out of control and over-run itself. Some 
consolidation and reconsideration is wanted, I think, but this need 
have no deterrent effect on eventual progress. I think probably it 
will have the reverse effect.
May I thank you for your generous help in arranging that in 
operational matters affecting Force Sabine the War Office should 
deal direct with us.
JRL, AUC 132
29 General Sir Arthur Brodie Haig.
30 Lieutenant General Sir Cyril Noyes.
31 General Sir Eric De Burgh, Chief of the General Staff, India, 1939–41.
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Auchinleck to General Sir Archibald Wavell, 
10 April 1941
Certain personal telegrams have passed between S. of S. India and Viceroy 
regarding despatch of (a) a force immediately to Basra and (b) a battalion 
by air to SHAIBA (.) Action being taken to make this correspondence 
official but in meantime regard it as private and personal (.) Gist of 
Viceroy’s reply as follows (.) Begins (.) First (.) Proposes to divert to 
Basra one infantry brigade and one field regiment with ancillary troops 
now in ships at Karachi and destined for Malaya (.) This force not 
(repeat not) tactically loaded so naval and air support will be necessary 
if landing likely to be opposed (.)
Second (.) Between 13/4 and 22/4 we will despatch one C.G Hospital 
and base stores (.)
Third (.) We are convinced that force in and around Basra should be 
brought up as soon as possible to equivalent of at least one division (.) 
We should follow first brigade group by two further brigade groups and 
base units for SYBIL (.) Second echelon could probably be embarked 
after twenty-one days.
Fourth (.) We can send approximately 400 British infantry with twelve 
L.M.Gs and six Vickers guns32 by air to SHAIBA starting move 13/4 
and completing in seven to eleven days (.)
Fifth (.) We are examining possibility of sending infantry brigade groups 
later to Palestine but unless it is to have priority over troops for Basrah 
or special shipping can be provided it will have to sail after division is 
established at Basrah (.) End (.) I understand H.M.G. would consider 
these proposals on 9/4 (.) We have asked for urgent decisions (.)
JRL, AUC 137
32 Heavy, water-cooled .303″ machine guns, based on the Maxim pattern.
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Cipher message from 
General Sir Archibald Wavell to 
Auchinleck, 10 April 1941
This proposal involves critical decisions. It is just possible that this 
Force might suffice to swing the scale in Iraq. I am fully committed 
in Cyrenaica and can spare nothing for Iraq. Longmore33 could spare 
squadron Wellington’s temporarily r[e]p[ea]t. temporarily to support 
landing at Basra in addition to Air Force already in Iraq.
JRL, AUC 138
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Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, 
Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 12 April 1941
My Dear Laithwaite,
I attach a copy of a telegram from the India Office which we have just 
received (No. 4030 of 12/4). You will have a copy of telegram No. 314 
of 11/4 from Cornwallis, Baghdad to F.O. London rep[ea]t[e]d 
Cairo and G[overnment]. of I[ndia].
2. My own opinion is that the acceptance of the Ambassador’s advice 
to defer action for the securing of Basrah may very well result in 
our never getting Basrah at all.
3. I have already informed His Excellency of my considered opinion 
that it is essential for us to establish ourselves in Basrah so as to 
secure its use for us as a base as soon as we possibly can. I am 
convinced myself that the possession of base at Basrah may be 
the difference between success and failure to us in the Near and 
Middle East during the next six months. This being so, I view 
with the greatest anxiety the decision of H.M.G. to postpone the 
immediate action proposed by us to secure it.
33 Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore.
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In my opinion, the time for diplomatic parleying has past. I think 
there is a very definite danger that Rashid34 will use the breathing 
space Cornwallis35 proposes to give him to consolidate his position 
and, probably, to invoke German aid, which might even take the 
form of air borne troops and aircraft.
I am convinced that, if we are to prevent a general deterioration 
of the situation in Asia generally, and especially in Turkey, Iran, Iraq 
and Arabia, we must show now that we are prepared to maintain 
our position by force.
I view this with the gravest misgiving the proposal of H.M.G. to 
temporise and compromise, and I shall be grateful if you will ask His 
Excellency whether he is prepared to represent these views to the 
Secretary of State. I regard the matter as one of extreme urgency.
JRL, AUC 139
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Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, 
Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 17 April 1941
Your letter of the 17th just received.
I have sent a telegram to London regarding the importance of not 
disclosing the fact that the force was originally intended for another 
destination. The telegram has been repeated to other authorities 
concerned.
2. I will send the C.-in-C., East Indies, a message regarding the 
development of the port and the arrangement to be made for its 
defence against attack from the sea.
3. Our suggestion that a portion of the British battalion might in 
emergency be sent on from Shaiba to Habbaniyeh was made so as to 
give the A.O.C., Iraq, the chance of availing himself of this potential 
reinforcement should the situation at the latter place become really 
critical. In view of the latest development in the situation, I propose 
34 Rashid Ali el Gailani, a leading Iraqi nationalist politician who was in close touch 
with the Axis powers.
35 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, recently appointed as British Ambassador to Iraq.
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not to despatch the remainder of this battalion from Karachi unless 
I hear from Fraser,36 after he has arrived, that it is really required. 
If he does not want it I shall not send it at all and, as soon as he 
can relieve the advance guard that has already been despatched, 
I will get that back to India. It does not look at the moment as if 
the A.O.C., Iraq, is likely to require aid at Habbaniyeh, although 
of course the situation is liable to change rapidly.
4. So far as I know, complete secrecy is being maintained as heretofore 
and there is no intention of breaking it so far as we are concerned.
5. I think it is too early yet to consider whether the force shall remain 
at Basra or whether a part of it can move up-country soon after it 
arrives. Details of such moves will have to be decided by Fraser and 
later, when he arrives, by Quinan. My own opinion is that, to begin 
with, it would be wise to concentrate on consolidating our position 
in Basra; when we are sure of our footing there we can then begin to 
think about extending ourselves. This process will include, probably, 
the establishing or the opening of a rest camp at Baghdad, the 
stationing of troops at Habbaniyeh and, in order to give force to our 
reasons for exerting our rights under the treaty, the actual despatch 
of troops or transport through from Basra to Palestine. We are now 
drafting a telegram to the Secretary of State suggesting a course of 
action on these lines; a copy of the draft will be sent to you for His 
Excellency’s information and concurrence before it is despatched.
6. As regards the billeting of troops in Basra or elsewhere, I do not 
anticipate any immediate difficulties as the number of troops is 
very small at present and I am told that the whole contingent is 
well off for tentage and other camp equipment. If we can not get 
permanent accommodation for them, temporary hutting should 
present no difficulties; we had plenty of experience of it in the last 
war. His Excellency may rest assured that I shall do everything in 
my power to see that the troops are as well found as possible; this 
is already under the active consideration of P.S.Os.
7. I have already given you my comments and those of the F.A.,M.F. 
[Financial Authority, Military Finance?] on the draft of the telegram 
which His Excellency has since sent to the Secretary of State.
JRL, AUC 141
36 Major General W. A. K. Fraser.
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Cipher message from Field Marshal Sir John Dill, 
to Auchinleck, 25 April 1941
Since War Office Telegram 62661 21/4 was despatched War Cabinet 
have been told of the programme outlined in your 4265/G 21/4 and 
have expressed anxiety at the prospect of no reinforcements for Force 
Converse reaching Iraq before the middle of May. They feel that the 
sooner we can increase our forces in Basra the less the risk of losing 
our initial advantage. War Cabinet are most grateful for the speed with 
which you have helped us and I am very reluctant to press you further 
especially as my request may be impracticable. Would it however be in any 
way possible to expedite the despatch of the whole or a portion of Force 
Cling. Alternatively or even perhaps additionally could the third brigade 
be despatched simultaneously with Cling or immediately afterwards.
JRL, AUC 143
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Paraphrase of cipher message no. 412 from 
HQ , RAF, Middle East to Auchinleck, 1 May 1941
Following is the text of leaflets headed in each case to people of Iraq 
from British Government:-
(1) Your Government have sent military forces to Habbaniya and 
informed A.O.C that normal training can no longer be permitted 
that any aircraft or troops leaving enemy camp will be fired on. 
British Government do not understand reason for this action which 
is not in keeping with Treaty between our two nations. They have 
no quarrel with their friends the people of Iraq, and have told your 
government that British Forces at Habbaniya will continue their 
training, and that if any hostile act is committed against the British 
Forces the British Government will retaliate at once by bombing 
headquarters of the Government in Baghdad and the army.
(2) Your government have been informed by British Government 
that if Iraq Armed Forces, which in opposition to Treaty between 
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us, have surrounded British camp at Habbaniya are not ordered 
to return to Bagdad within four hours, strong air action will be 
taken against Government in Bagdad and Iraq Army and Air Force 
wherever they may be. The British Government have no quarrel 
with the Iraqi people, but merely with their misguided Government 
and few senior Officers who are wilfully misleading them.
JRL, AUC 151
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Draft appreciation: India and the situation in the 
ME by Auchinleck, 2 May 1941 [Working copy]
India and the situation in the Middle East
1. The enemy’s recovery of CYRENAICA gives him bases from 
which the German and Italian Air Forces may be able to deny:-
(a) the use of ALEXANDRIA to our fleet
(b) the use of SUEZ, PORT SAID and the Canal to our shipping.
2. The enemy’s conquest of GREECE gives him bases from which the 
German Air Force can threaten TURKEY and the communications 
from that country to EGYPT through SYRIA and PALESTINE. 
The possession of these bases also lays open ALEXANDRIA and 
the Canal to air attack from the NORTH as well as from the WEST, 
thereby increasing the risk of their usefulness to us being reduced 
or nullified by enemy action.
The Italian air bases in the DODECANESE will be of material 
aid to the enemy in these operations.
3. Should the fleet be forced to leave ALEXANDRIA owing to enemy 
attacks from the air or on land, there is no other base in the Eastern 
Mediterranean from which it can operate. In this event the enemy 
may be able to transport troops and stores freely in these waters.
The French in SYRIA are most unlikely to be able to offer any 
effective resistance to a German attack on the country and it is 
highly probable therefore that the enemy, making full use of his 
superiority in the air, will try to obtain a footing in that country 
with the objects:-
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(a) of encircling TURKEY and forcing her to submit to his 
dictates.
(b) of striking at EGYPT and the Canal from the NORTH as 
well as from the WEST.
(c) of moving against IRAQ so as to deny to us the use of BASRA 
and the lines of communication thence to TURKEY and 
EGYPT, and also to secure the IRAQ oil fields.
(d) of setting all the Middle Eastern Muslim countries against 
us and of causing serious disaffection in India.
(e) of cutting off our supply of oil from South-Western Iran, and 
also, possibly, from Bolivia and the Persian Gulf generally.
4. The effect on our position in the East generally of the loss of 
control at sea in the Eastern Mediterranean, and of the total or 
partial denial to us of the use of the Canal and its ports would be 
most serious but not necessarily disastrous.
We shall doubtless make every effort to retain our hold on 
EGYPT, but even the loss of it, once we had ceased to be able to 
make use of ALEXANDRIA and the Canal, need not be decisive.
Even if the enemy secured LOWER EGYPT it should still 
be possible for us to retain our hold on UPPER EGYPT and the 
SUDAN using PORT SUDAN as a base, and we should be able 
also to prevent the enemy using the Canal to pass his war ships 
into the RED SEA and INDIAN OCEAN. It is most important 
that he should not be able to do this, as by doing so, he begins at 
once to turn our flank in the PERSIAN GULF.
The loss of LOWER EGYPT would however give the enemy 
a good sea base in ALEXANDRIA and a land line of advance 
thence against PALESTINE, SYRIA and IRAQ. The advantages 
of maintaining our position in EGYPT for as long as possible with 
a view to our ultimate resumption of the offensive are too obvious 
to need definition and this must, for the present, remain our main 
object in this theatre.
5. On the other hand if we are to prevent TURKEY joining the Axis, 
actively or passively, and to deny our enemies access to IRAQ , the 
PERSIAN GULF, IRAN and eventually INDIA, it is essential for 
us to retain our hold on PALESTINE and to prevent the enemy 
establishing himself firmly in SYRIA.
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It seems then that our primary object in the Middle East may 
soon become the retention of our hold on PALESTINE, SYRIA 
and IRAQ.
6. It is apparent that, should the use of ALEXANDRIA, SUEZ and 
PORT SAID as bases for our armies and air forces in the Middle 
East be denied to us, BASRA and PORT SUDAN are the only 
possible substitutes. Of these two ports BASRA is by far the most 
useful as it can be used to maintain not only forces in EGYPT but 
also forces in ANATOLIA, SYRIA, PALESTINE and IRAQ , as 
well as in IRAN, should it be necessary to send troops into that 
country. Before next autumn BASRA may well become the principal 
port of disembarkation for personnel and munitions for the Middle 
East not only from INDIA but also from AUSTRALASIA and 
the U.S.A.
In short, BASRA and the various lines of communication leading 
thence, have now assumed a major strategic importance.
7. BASRA is of no use in itself except as a fortified port of entry at 
which troops could be landed to restore the situation in the Middle 
East should IRAQ , PALESTINE and SYRIA fall into enemy 
hands. Such a contingency is by no means impossible but it is 
supremely important to prevent its arising. This can only be done 
by consolidating our hold in IRAQ , and developing the commu-
nications leading through it NORTH and NORTH WEST from 
BASRA to their utmost capacity as soon as possible, so that we can 
use them to forestall the enemy in SYRIA and to help TURKEY 
to resist enemy pressure in ANATOLIA. It is quite likely that the 
alternative line of aid to TURKEY through SYRIA may not be 
available, either because of French action, or on account of enemy 
air attack. Hence the whole of IRAQ becomes just as strategically 
important to us as BASRA.
8.  At the moment INDIA seems to be the only part of the Empire 
capable of producing even the minimum number of troops necessary 
to consolidate our position in IRAQ. At a later date help might be 
forthcoming from AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND.
9.  Ever-increasing calls are being made on INDIA for help in personnel 
and material for the Middle East and FAR EAST Commands and 
these demands are not likely to diminish.
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Meanwhile, INDIA herself, no doubt for very good strategic 
reasons, has up to date been denied any appreciable share of modern 
equipment, particularly tanks, anti-aircraft artillery and aircraft, 
which are being produced in the Empire and the U.S.A.
The result is that though INDIA can produce considerable force 
measured in terms of men, she cannot equip this force to fit it to 
meet an enemy provided with modern weapons.
The responsibility for securing IRAQ to our use has been placed 
on INDIA and to enable her to carry out this task, she must be 
given her proper share of such modern equipment as she can not 
produce herself. Otherwise, we run the risk of incurring in IRAQ 
yet another disaster similar to those which we have experienced in 
NORWAY, FRANCE and GREECE.
10.  We entered IRAQ on the pretext of availing ourselves of our rights 
under the treaty, that is, of our rights to open a line of communi-
cation from BASRA to HAIFA. It is imperative now that we should 
as soon as possible make it clear to IRAQ and the World that we are 
compelled to occupy IRAQ and that we intend to do so by force if 
necessary.
11.  The conclusions are:-
(i) If we can no longer use ALEXANDRIA and the Canal because 
of enemy air action, the loss of EGYPT though serious need 
not be a major strategic disaster, though the importance of 
continuing to hold it can not be minimised.
(ii) Even if we lose EGYPT we should be able to hold the SUDAN, 
and control the RED SEA.
(iii) To support TURKEY and to stop he enemy penetrating into 
ASIA, it is essential for us to deny him SYRIA, PALESTINE 
and IRAQ , and this may soon become our strategic object 
in this theatre.
(iv) BASRA and IRAQ are assuming a major strategic importance 
as a base and line of communication area for operations in 
the Middle East.
(v) The development of BASRA and the communications leading 
thence NORTH and NORTH WEST is an exceedingly 
urgent necessity.
(vi) The consolidation, by force if necessary, of our position in 
IRAQ is an urgent necessity and diplomatic considerations 
must not stand in its way.
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(vii) At the moment INDIA alone can produce troops for the 
occupation of IRAQ , but these troops will be inadequate for 
the task unless they are provided with the modern weapons 
and aircraft which INDIA can not give them.
JRL, AUC 159
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Memorandum from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General E. P. Quinan, 2 May 1941
1. You will command all British Empire land forces in IRAQ from 
the time of your arrival at BASRA.
2. You will be under my orders.
3. It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government:-
(a) To develop and organise the port of BASRA to any extent 
necessary to enable it to maintain such forces, our own or 
allied, as may be required to operate in the Middle East, 
including EGYPT, TURKEY, IRAQ and IRAN.
(b) To secure control of all means of communication including 
all aerodromes and landing grounds in IRAQ and to develop 
these to the extent requisite to enable the port of BASRA to 
function to its fullest capacity.
4. You will be responsible for carrying out these intentions, and may 
find it convenient to do so in the following stages:-
(a) Occupation and development of BASRA as a base for the 
maintenance of at least three divisions. The base must be 
capable of expansion to serve at least six divisions.
(b) Occupation of BAGHDAD and the development of L. of C. 
installations there.
(c) Development and protection of the L. of C. from BAGHDAD 
westwards to the frontier of TRANS JORDAN.
(d) Development and protection of the L. of C. from BAGHDAD 
northward to MOSUL.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   130 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, india, 1940–41
131
Notes
(i) Middle East Command have been asked to assume respon-
sibility for the development and protection of the L. of C. 
westwards beyond the Trans Jordian frontier.
(ii) The order of priority as between (c) and (d) above may have 
to be altered at your discretion in accordance with circum-
stances existing at the time.
5. You will at once begin to plan a system of defence to protect the 
BASRA base against attack by armoured forces supported by strong 
air forces.
An estimate of the equipment, stores and material required 
should be sent to me as soon as possible.
Note:
The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies is already considering 
the defence of BASRA against attack from the sea and your plan 
should be made in consultation with him or his representative and 
with the A.O.C. IRAQ.
6. You will examine without delay in conjunction with the naval 
authorities and the Port Authority BASRA the possibility of estab-
lishing an alternative port to BASRA at KOWEIT [Kuwait], UMM 
KASR or elsewhere and consider the measures necessary for its 
protection from attack by land, sea and air.
7. You will be ready if necessary to take special measures to protect:-
(a) Royal Air Force installations and personnel at HABBANIYEH 
and SHAIBA.
(b) The lives of British subjects in BAGHDAD and elsewhere 
in IRAQ.
(c) The KIRKUK oilfields and the pipeline to HAIFA. You 
will be prepared on the orders of H.Q. M.E. to carry out the 
demolition of the KIRKUK oil field installations.
8. (i) You may be called upon to protect the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company’s installations and its British employees in S.W. 
IRAN, and plans should be laid accordingly.
(ii) Meanwhile, you will take great care to ensure the strictest 
observance by all under your command of IRANIAN 
neutrality, which presents particularly difficult problems on 
the SHATT-EL-ARAB below BASRA.
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(iii) Any hostile act on the part of IRAN is to be reported at once 
to me. Reprisals for such acts except in self defence are not 
to be undertaken except on my orders.
9. You may have to resist enemy attempts to invade IRAQ with air or 
ground forces from SYRIA, and you may be called on to co-operate 
with TURKISH forces in ANATOLIA or the CAUCASUS.
10. (i) It is the desire of His Majesty’s Government to act throughout 
in friendly co-operation with the IRAQ authorities and 
people, so long as such co-operation is forthcoming. If it is 
withheld you will take such forcible measures as you think fit 
to achieve your object, after consultation with H.M. Minister 
in BAGHDAD so long as he is available for the purpose.
(ii) To enable you to carry out your task you have been given 
certain financial powers and you are to take any steps you 
consider essential to ensure the safety of your force at all times. 
Such steps may if necessary include the assumption of control 
over the civil population, the occupation or destruction of 
buildings, the impressment of transport of all kinds and of 
labour, the taking over of public utility services, the confis-
cation of weapons and the taking of hostages etc.
(iii) You will make special efforts to establish and maintain friendly 
relations between your troops and the local inhabitants. Special 
Service officers will be attached to your headquarters to assist 
you in this task.
11. It is my present intention to increase your force by two more 
divisions, making three in all, and, possibly, by an armoured division, 
as soon as these troops can be despatched from INDIA.
12. Demands for air action in all forms in Iraq will be addressed by 
you to A.O.C. Iraq who, under the A.O.C.-in-C. Middle East, is 
responsible for meeting your requirements.
13. Should the British Military Mission in Iraq cease to operate as 
such in the normal way under the Iraq Government its personnel 
will come under your command.
14. You will maintain the closest possible touch with H.M. Minister in 
BAGHDAD and whenever possible, obtain his concurrence to any 
military dispositions you wish to make. In the event of a difference 
of opinion, military considerations affecting the attainment of your 
object and the security of your forces will be paramount.
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15. You will work in the closest co-operation with the G.O.C.-in-C 
Middle East, to whose headquarters you will depute a liaison officer 
of suitable standing.
16. You will work in close co-operation with the Senior Naval Officer 
Persian Gulf and keep in touch with the Resident in the Persian 
Gulf.
17. You will report to me periodically and you will receive further 
instructions from me from time to time. Copies of your situation 
reports to me will be sent by you to:-
(a) The War Office.
(b) G.H.Q. Middle East.
(c) A.O.C. IRAQ.
(d) C.-in-C. East Indies, so far as co-operation with the Navy is 
concerned, through the Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf.
JRL, AUC 160
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Cipher message from the Chiefs of Staff 
to Auchinleck, 2 May 194137
Part one. In view of situation in Iraq which is not that which was 
visualised when India took responsibility it seems that operational 
command should now pass temporarily to Middle East whence alone 
immediate assistance can be given. This will take place forthwith unless 
you see strong objections.
Part two. Reference Air Officer Commanding Iraq telegrams No. SA 
433 of May 1st and AW 502 of May 2nd hope Commander-in-Chief 
Middle East will send all assistance possible to Air Officer Commanding 
Iraq. Troop carrying aircraft from India now believed at Shaibah or 
Habbaniya might be used.
Middle East please pass to A.O.C. in Chief.
JRL, AUC 162
37 A duplicate of this message was sent to General Sir Archibald Wavell, as C in C 
Middle East.
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53
Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, CIGS, 3 May 1941
In consultation with my Chief of Staff have appreciated India’s situation 
relative to Middle East and my conclusions are:-
First (.) If ALEXANDRIA and the Canal should be closed to us by 
enemy air action, loss of EGYPT would not be major disaster, though 
importance of continuing to hold it can not be minimised (.)
Second (.) Even if we lose EGYPT we should be able to hold SUDAN 
and deny use of RED SEA to enemy (.)
Third (.) To support TURKEY and to stop enemy penetrating ASIA, 
it is essential to deny to him SYRIA, PALESTINE and IRAQ , and this 
may soon become our primary strategic object in this theatre (.)
Fourth (.) BASRA and IRAQ are assuming major strategic importance 
as a base and line of communications area for operations in Middle East (.)
Fifth (.) Development of BASRA and communications leading thence 
NORTH and NORTH WEST is urgent necessity (.)
Sixth (.) Consolidation, by force if necessary, of our position in IRAQ 
is urgent need (.)
Seventh (.) At present India alone can produce troops for occupation of 
IRAQ but these troops can not perform task unless provided with modern 
weapons and aircraft which INDIA can not give them (.) Provisions of 
these exceedingly urgent (.)
JRL, AUC 164
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54
Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lord Linlithgow, 3 May 1941
Yesterday evening Your Excellency mentioned the question of providing 
money for propaganda purposes in Iraq.
I have been thinking over the whole situation in that country and 
I have come to the firm conclusion that we must establish ourselves 
in Baghdad at the earliest possible moment. If the country as a whole 
is against us, and this is now a possible contingency in view of recent 
happenings, we are unlikely to be able to get to Baghdad by force except 
after considerable delay owing to our present weakness in troops and 
aircraft. There is the possibility of forcing our way to Baghdad by river 
up the Tigris, using gunboats and river steamers, and I have pointed this 
out to Quinan. In any event, we can not afford to be delayed and I think 
we should begin to spend money at once with the object of establishing 
ourselves in Baghdad as soon as possible. If we do not get to Baghdad 
soon, the Germans will.
I know the control of operations has passed to the Middle East tempo-
rarily, but I do not think this should preclude us from urging on H.M.G. 
the immediate need for spending money on a large scale.
The people on whom it should be spent in the first instance are, 
I consider, the Euphrates tribes who can cut the Basra–Baghdad railway 
at any time. I think that Quinan and his political officers may very well 
be the best agents for this purpose. The whole of this affair concerns 
India and her future in this war so closely that I feel we can not leave this 
important factor to be dealt with by the Ambassador of the Middle East 
Command which has so many other things to think about and has not 
so far, in my opinion, shown a real grasp of the Iraq problem as a whole. 
It is because I hold these views strongly that I venture to write to you.
JRL, AUC 168
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lord Linlithgow, 3 May 1941
We are using all our serviceable troop carrying aircraft (including one civil 
B.O.A.C. flying boat) to take more of the King’s Own Royal Regiment 
to Basra. They are under orders to start tomorrow morning, probably 
about 120 men, with some anti-tank rifles and extra light machine guns. 
It is not a large number but we can not transport any more and every 
little helps.
Where this party will eventually arrive I can not say.
We propose to leave the aircraft (about nine of them altogether) in 
Iraq temporarily to help in ferrying troops about that country.
I have asked A.O.C.-in-C. to go into the matter of trying to get back 
our Blenheim squadrons from Malaya.
JRL, AUC 169
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Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, 
Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 4 May 1941
Reference my conversation with His Excellency last night. We are 
proposing to take the following steps.
(a) We are sending a telegram at once to Troopers [War Office] 
telling them in general terms that, if they can provide us with 
shipping, we may be able to accelerate the despatch of the 
reinforcements to Basra to a considerable extent. This is the 
nature of a warning message.
(b) We are following this up this afternoon by a more detailed 
telegram giving, so far as we can foresee them at the moment, 
our actual requirements in shipping for the troops which we 
think we may be able to send.
2. We have already arranged for the despatch about the 23rd of this 
month of another infantry brigade, a field artillery regiment and 
various odds and ends of the 10th Division, the leading two brigades 
of which have already been dispatched.
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In addition, we now hope to despatch in our own shipping a 
fourth infantry brigade, which up to date has been destined for 
Malaya to complete the 9th Division with its 3 infantry brigades. 
This we hope to get off somewhere towards the beginning of June, 
if all goes well.
3. We have already asked the War Office whether we can re-allot to 
Iraq the 2 I.S.F. battalions which are due to sail for Mideast on the 
6th of May. The arrival of these battalions at Basra would release 
the infantry brigade already there for a more mobile role.
4. We are taking immediate steps to prepare the following units for 
despatch overseas as soon as possible. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade 
H.Q. (Meerut); the 13th Lancers (Armoured Car regiment, from 
the N.-W. Frontier); the 14/20th Hussars (Meerut, and to be 
equipped through with Mark VI light tanks); one field artillery 
regiment belonging to the 1st Armoured Division; one battery of 
6″ How[itzer]s and an infantry brigade of the 8th Division.
We are also investigating the possibility of sending one of the 
motorised infantry battalions which belong to the Support Group 
of the Armoured Division.
In addition to the above, there would be of course administrative 
and base units.
It is for the transport of these troops that we propose to ask 
H.M.G. to allot shipping from other sources for our use.
5. I enclose a note from Air H.Q. India which contains what I think is 




Cipher message from Auchinleck 
to War Office, 5 May 1941
Part I.
First (.) In view of the present critical situation in IRAQ we have 
examined the question of what is the maximum force with which we can 
reinforce BASRA in the immediate future (.)
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Second (.) Decisive factor is shipping and if additional personnel and 
M[ilitary]. T[ransport]. ships can be made available in time we may be able 
to bring force up to five inf Brigades and ancillary troops by 10 June (.) 
Details follow but we must emphasise that we shall still be deficient of 
A.A. A/Tk. and AFVs and that we shall have to take risks in India to 
make troops available (.) We are wiring separately about shipping (.)
Part II.
Third (.) In addition to SYBIL we can if you agree divert to BASRA
(a) Following earmarked to replace BASIN in Malaya (.) Inf Bde (.) 
Field Regt (.) Bde Transport Coy (.) G.P. Transport Coy (.) Field 
Ambulance (.) M.A. Section (.) Necessary Workshops (.)
(b) Two of remaining four I.S.F. battalions instead of the two I.S.F 
battalions referred to your 64035 of 29/4 (not to MIDEAST) which 
we are sending to Port Sudan (.)
Fourth (.)
(a) We are sending following also additional to SYBIL (.) Inf Bde 
less one battalion (.) Frontier armoured regiment (withdrawn 
from frontier equipped with frontier pattern armoured cars only 
(Crossley body conventional Chevrolet chassis) no (repeat no) 
tanks) (.) Field Ambulance (.) Inf Bde Transport Coy (.) C.G. 
Hospital (.) Necessary workshops (.)
Above will be ready embark 2 June and will be at expense 
postponement which we can accept certain non-divisional units 
SYBIL unless extra shipping for which we are asking separately 
provided (.)
(b) Following also ready embark 2 June if additional shipping available (.) 
One 6-inch how[itzer] battery (.) One section 3-inch A.A. guns (.)
Fifth (.) Following armoured component (additional to SYBIL – 
SILAS) will be ready embark 25 June (.) Armoured Bde Headquarters 
and Signal Section (.) 14/20th Hussars (41 (41) Mark VI light tanks and 
we hope some armoured carriers) (.) Field regiment (.) Field squadron (.) 
Light Field Ambulance (.) Bde Transport Coy. (.) Necessary workshops (.)
Sixth (.) Balance SYBIL will follow above as shipping becomes 
available (.)
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Part III.
Seventh (.) Equipment of armoured units is very poor and seriously 
denudes India (.) Moreover maintenance of Mark VI Tanks and Mk VII 
Vickers will be difficult owing shortage components (.) Lt Tanks and 
Armoured cars have no repeat no A/Tk weapons (.) Both vehicles are 
being fitted with Boys rifle,38 but as we have no stocks available can you 
send 100 (100) Boys rifles and repeat and ammunition quickest possible 
means (.) In any case request you despatch armoured cars and tanks fitted 
with A/Tk weapons in replacement our vehicles as early as possible (.)
JRL, AUC 176
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, CIGS, 9 May 1941
One. Although control of forces in IRAQ now rests with Mideast it is 
impossible for India to disassociate herself from the formulation of policy 
in that area. Not only is success or failure in IRAQ vital to the safety 
of India but most of the forces and material employed in that theatre 
must come from India. I gather also that it is intention that control of 
operations will eventually revert to India.
Two. We are prepared to make great efforts and to take great risks to 
support a sound policy which in our opinion has some prospect of success 
and also will continue as in the past to give all help possible to Mideast. 
The opportunity for controlling the situation in IRAQ by means of force 
stationed in N. Palestine is however passed and the main advantage of 
that proposal is now nullified by the fact that we are firmly established 
at BASRA. In our opinion there is now only one policy which will call 
a definite halt to German penetration into IRAQ IRAN and possibly 
TURKEY and SYRIA. As you are aware German influence is already 
firmly established in IRAN and failing some positive action on our part 
will no doubt greatly influence the situation both in IRAN and elsewhere.
Three. This policy is to establish ourselves with the minimum delay 
in sufficient force at Baghdad and other key points such as MOSUL 
38 The Boys .55″ anti-tank rifle.
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and KIRKUK so as to be able to resist any attack internal or external 
by the Axis. These forces must have a secure L of C and this must in 
our opinion load from BASRA. Except as very temporary alternative 
the BAGHDAD – MAIFA L of C is too difficult and too vulnerable to 
Axis forces based on SYRIA.
Four. The present time when (vide AOC IRAQ a 518 date 7/5) IRAQ 
forces have suffered a serious set back, are short of ammunition and 
indecisive of purpose is ideal for obtaining our objective with the minimum 
effort and if we act boldly and employ suitable personnel methods we 
may do it with the support rather than the opposition of the tribes.
Five. The forces we can make available were shown in our signal of 
May 5th and it is only lack of equipment that prevents them from being 
augmented. Provided no time is lost there is in our opinion a very good 
prospect that they will be sufficient to ensure success. If they are not we 
should at any rate be in a better position to re-establish our position than 
if we restrict ourselves to passive defence attitude at BASRA.
JRL, AUC 191
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lord Linlithgow, 9 May 1941
At my request the P.S.Os., F.O.C. [?], A.O.C.-in-C. and Financial 
Adviser considered recently the circumstance which would arise 
should it appear necessary for the Government to move to Delhi 
before the end of the summer. They reached the conclusion that 
no attempt should be made to move to Delhi before the beginning 
of the cold weather, unless a situation arose in which there was a 
real risk of communications to Simla being cut.
2. The reasons which influenced them in coming to this decision 
were, briefly –
(a) The first effect of a sudden move down to Delhi would be 
completely to dislocate the working of the Supply Department, 
which is now housed in the Secretariat at Delhi.
(b) An immediate move following upon a sudden emergency 
would not be possible because the organisation of the various 
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H.Q. of the Defence Forces would be entirely upset, so that 
in any event the move would probably have to be postponed 
for some weeks after the initial emergency.
(c) So far as I know, no really adequate arrangements have been 
made in Delhi to ensure suitable accommodation for officers 
and to those who would have to work for long hours in the 
heat. As a result efficiency would be bound to suffer. It would 
be essential to grant leave at regular intervals and this would 
probably entail an increase in establishments.
(d) Except for wireless facilities, communications from Simla 
are practically as good as they are from Delhi.
(e) Operations could be conducted more efficiently from Simla 
than from Delhi in the hot season, unless India herself 
invaded.
The chief advantage of the move to Delhi would be that 
all the Defence Services could be housed under one roof.
3. I agree generally with the conclusions reached by the P.S.Os. and 
I don’t think that a sudden move from Simla to Delhi is practi-
cable in the circumstances. I must add, however, that I feel most 
strongly that steps to make Delhi habitable in the hot weather 
should be pushed forward in accordance with instructions already 
given by Your Excellency. We may easily be faced next year with a 




Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lord Linlithgow, 11 May 1941
I heard today from General Quinan that Major-General W.A.K. Fraser, 
the Commander of the 10th Division, who went with the first contingent 
of troops to Basra, had asked to be relieved of his command on the grounds 
that he had no longer the confidence of his subordinate commanders. 
General Quinan recommended the immediate acceptance of his request 
and added that the strain of the past few weeks had undoubtedly adversely 
affected General Fraser’s power of command.
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I have cabled General Wavell asking his concurrence to the replacement 
of General Fraser in command of the 10th Division by Brigadier Slim, 
who is Brigadier, General Staff, to General Quinan. I have every reason to 
expect that Slim’s energy, determination and force of character generally 
will prove equal to the task. I propose to replace Slim by Colonel Boucher, 
whom I know very well personally and consider to be admirably suited 
to the appointment. I know he will be acceptable to Quinan, as rather 
fearing that this situation might arise, I mentioned the matter to Quinan 
before he left.
I am sorry about Fraser but, as you know, I have not been easy in my 
mind since he first reached Basra. He was appointed by my predecessor 
on, I imagine, his past record, which is very good. I have asked for him 
to be returned to India at once.
I have troubled you with this letter as I did not wish you to hear of 
the affair, which will soon get out, at second hand.
JRL, AUC 199
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lord Linlithgow, 11 May 1941
As you know I am most uneasy about the situation in Iraq in 
particular and about the views of G.H.Q., Middle East, on the 
strategic situation in Western Asia generally. The telegrams we 
have received today have not allayed my anxiety.
2. As I see it, “Mideast” are looking at the Asiatic strategic situation 
from a parochial angle and visualise North Africa and the Levant 
as one fortress, India as another and Malaya–Burma–Hong Kong 
as a third.
3. I would prefer to look at this situation as being one continuous and 
united front divided into three sectors, each interlocking with and 
interdependent on the other. The right sector is Far East Command, 
the centre sector the India Command and the left sector the Mideast 
Command.
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The annexure explains my meaning in diagrammatic form.39
I feel that until all concerned are prepared to accept this view 
and work to it to a common end, we shall waste much of our effort 
in voicing our divergent views one against the other.
I had considered cabling General Dill on these lines, but I feel 
I have done a lot of cabling lately and I wondered whether Your 
Excellency thinks it worth while trying to press this point of view 
any further at the moment.
JRL, AUC 200
62
Telegram from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 14 May 1941
I am very glad you are going to meet Wavell at Basra. He will tell 
you about Tiger40 and Scorcher.41 A victory in Libya would alter 
all values in Iraq both in German and Iraqi minds.
2. We are most grateful to you for the energetic efforts you have made 
about Basra the stronger the forces India can assemble the better. 
But we have not rep[ea]t not yet felt able to commit ourselves yet 
to any advance (except with small parties when the going is good) 
northward towards Baghdad and still less to occupation in force of 
Kirkuk and or Mosul. This cannot rep[ea]t not be contemplated until 
we see what happens about Tiger and Scorcher. We are therefore 
confined at the moment to trying to get a friendly Government 
installed in Baghdad and building up the largest possible bridgehead 
at Basra. Even less can we attempt to dominate Syria at the present 
39 No attempt has been made to reproduce this diagram here.
40 Operation Tiger involved five fast merchant ships, capable of 15 knots: Clan 
Chattan, Clan Lamont, Clan Campbell, Empire Song and New Zealand Star, which 
were loaded with 295 tanks and 53 Hurricane aircraft. They were brought under 
Royal Navy escort to Alexandria through the Western Mediterranean, which had, 
effectively, been closed to British convoys since January 1941. The convoy passed 
through the Straits of Gibraltar during the night of the 5/6 May, and arrived in 
Alexandria on the 12 May. En route the Empire Song was sunk by enemy action, 
and while her crew were saved, 57 tanks and 10 Hurricanes were lost.
41 The code name for the defence of Crete.
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time though the Free French may be allowed to do their best there 
the defeat of the Germans in Libya is the commanding event and 
larger and longer views cannot rep[ea]t not be taken till that is 
achieved and everything will be much easier then. Ends.
JRL, AUC 211
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Telegram from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General E. P. Quinan, 4 June 1941
One (.) It is essential to clarify as early as possible your position vis-à-vis 
Cornwallis the new Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Army (.) Following 
is a draft telegram which subject to consideration of any comments you 
wish to make will be sent to H.M.G. (.)
Two (.) Draft begins (.)
First (.) On the taking over of military control in Iraq by INDIA 
we consider we should simultaneously regularize the position of the 
Force Commander in the political field vis-à-vis the Ambassador 
the Iraqi Government and the loyal elements of the Iraqi defences 
forces (.) We consider that the present lull presents an opportunity 
to provide and install adequate machinery for future developments 
in the situation which may later deteriorate either as the result of 
direct Axis attack or internal disorders (.)
Second (.) In our judgement primary consideration is that Iraq 
is now a war zone, that our forces are in Iraq to aid the Iraqi 
Government and people against external aggression and internal 
disorder, and military considerations must be paramount (.) Force 
Commander must therefore be empowered to override political 
considerations or objections from any source if military situation 
necessitates this (.)
Third (.) We therefore ask your early approval to the following 
proposals (.)
(a) H.M.G. should deal direct with Governor General (Defence) 
on all matters of policy (.)
(b) Governor General (Defence) should communicate all orders 
and decisions on policy to Force Commander repeating to 
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Ambassador if necessary (.) Ambassador should continue to 
address H.M.G. direct on matters not affecting major policy 
sending copies to Force Commander and Governor General 
(Defence) (.)
(c) Ambassador should act as Chief Political Adviser to Force 
Commander and his intermediary with the Regent and the 
Iraqi Government on all questions affecting policy except as 
regards purely military matters affecting the carrying out of 
his role (.)
(d) The Force Commander should deal with matters affecting 
the Iraqi defence forces through the Military Mission (.)
(e) Contact between local military commanders and local 
civil officials should be by liaison officers on staff of local 
commanders (.) A Chief Liaison Officer on staff of Force 
Commander will control local liaison officers (.)
Fourth (.) These arrangements should not (repeat not) be commu-
nicated to Iraq Government between whom H.M.G. Ambassador 
should maintain façade of normal diplomatic relations (.) Draft 
ends (.)
Three (.) Submit your comments immediately (.)
JRL, AUC 255
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Letter from Lieutenant General E. P. Quinan 
to Auchinleck, 13 June 1941
Dear Chief
This is to acknowledge receipt of your D/O Q-1/? Of 29 May 41 
for which I thank you.
I am very clear as to what you expect from us: the various 
problems are being solved as time and our resources permit.
2. The chief problem is the development of the TIGRIS L of C. 
By pushing and pulling I have managed to get Weld’s HQ42 and 
42 Brigadier C. J. Weld, who commanded the 21st Indian Brigade Group.
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a battalion with a lot of supplies started off to KUT en route to 
BAGHDAD. The fact is now clear that there is very little craft on 
the TIGRIS that is suitable for our purposes. Those that took Weld’s 
party were functioning here in the last war. We shall not be able to 
get hold of mahailas in time: for the present their owners will not 
co-operate, nor will they run up the river on their own business. 
I am sure that half their show of reluctance is designed to squeeze 
higher rates out of our transportation people. The latter have been 
reinforced so I expect great improvements in performance.
3. The problem next in importance is the stocking of HABBANIYA 
and BAGHDAD.
This implies the retention here of SLIM’s third Bde 
(MOUNTAIN’s) which however can put in some very necessary 
collective training in the SHAIBA – ZUBAIR area.
4. The arrival of a Labour Bn here will help matters here considerably.
The 17 Bde (GRACEY) is in the BASRA area and is already 
settling down to work and training.
5. The Mutassarif43 has taken over the administration and this has 
reduced the number of Det[achment?]s very considerably. He is 
100% more efficient than MADFAI.44
6. We are still awaiting sanction to begin expending money on the 
QASI [?] project.
I have seen the site and the day before yesterday examined charts 
at FAO and saw some of the gear there that WARD has stored for it. 
It is essential that we should have a sea survey of the KHOR from 
the ROOKA float. I sent the C[hief]. E[ngineer]. and my Survey 
man today to see if we can help until the R.N. produce the men 
for whom BERESFORD45 has cabled you. The weather at present 
permits of some survey work being done, next month it becomes 
worse and worse. The survey has to be hydrographic and a survey 
ship is needed for 3 months.
43 Nuri Pasha al-Said.
44 Jamal Madfai, a pro-British former Prime Minister of Iraq and leading supporter 
of the Regent.
45 Presumably Major General George de la Poer Beresford.
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7. SLIM has gone up to BAGHDAD to ensure that POWELL46 
pushes on at once to MOSUL and KIRKUK. I joined him on the 
16th for the best part of a week in order to become au fait with the 
local difficulties. I know the Ambassador and by means of letters 
and liaison visits on my behalf SLIM, BOUCHER47 and others 
am well acquainted with his policy, and personal views.
8. As for MIDEAST and HABFORCE, their only thought as regards 
IRAQ has been to get shot of the country and have HABFORCE 
back in PALESTINE.
It was to help them in this direction that I have remained here 
to push things along and to overrule the Jeremiahs that abound in 
the railway and other administrations.
9. The health of the troops is much better, but with the advent of 
melon and other fruit I expect the figures for dysentery to rise.
JRL, AUC 259
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lord Linlithgow, 17 June 1941
Secret.
Thank you very much for your letter of the 16th June enclosing a letter 
from the Secretary of State, dated the 28th May, concerning air borne 
troops.
We are, as you know, already considering this matter in India, though so 
far on a very small scale only. A couple of days ago I actually issued instruc-
tions for the preliminary arrangements to be made for the formation of 
an air borne brigade at Delhi.
This particular project was referred by us some time ago to the Chiefs 
of Staff at home for a statement of policy by them. A considerable time has 
elapsed since this reference was made but we have had no answer as yet.
The aircraft, parachutes, and the other special equipment required 
for this brigade are not, of course, in sight, but I think that we should get 
46 Brigadier Donald Powell, commanding 20th Indian Brigade Group.
47 Major C. H. Boucher.
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on with its formation and start its training, of which a very considerable 
amount can be done on the ground, even though it may be months before 
we can begin to equip it for its special task.




Extract of letter from Lord Linlithgow 
to L. S. Amery, 17 June 1941
2. On the matter of finance I indicated some of my hesitations to you 
in my letters of 3/4th June, paragraph 10, and 6th June, paragraph 
5, and I do not propose to develop the matter further now. I would 
only add to what I have said in my earlier letter on this matter of 
India and her financial contribution, direct or indirect, to the war, 
that, as I know you realise, we cannot escape from the consequences 
of our constitutional position. The first thing I think is to get the 
answer (so far as air-borne warfare is concerned) to the problems 
of manufacture in this country of gliders and of parachutes, and 
when I know where we stand about that it will be easier to see 
the problem in its true perspective. Auchinleck has already been 
active on the general issue of air-borne warfare, and a few days 
ago issued instructions for the preliminary arrangements to be 
made for the formation of an air-borne Brigade at Delhi. He tells 
me that this particular project was referred home by us some time 
ago to the Chiefs of Staff for a statement of policy by them, but 
that though a considerable time has elapsed since that reference 
was made, there has been no answer yet. Clearly the issue is one 
of the first importance and urgency; and I should be grateful for 
your help over it, and for a telegraphic indication of how things 
stand. Meanwhile, though the aircraft, parachutes, and other 
special equipment required for the Brigade I have just mentioned 
are not yet in sight, Auchinleck feels, and I entirely agree, that we 
should get on with its formation and start on its training, of which 
a very considerable amount can be done on the ground and before 
planes or gliders become available. I propose to discuss further with 
Auchinleck the general issue and will let you know the result. But 
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as you will see, we are held up both over gliders and over air-borne 
troops by delays at home, and I am sure I can rely on your personal 
interest and assistance to overcome these.
JRL, AUC 261
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Letter from Lord Linlithgow to the 
Governors of Madras, Bengal, the Punjab, 
Bihar, the Central Provinces and Berar, 
Assam, the North-West Frontier Province, 
Orissa and Sind, 18 June 1941
It is matter, as I know you appreciate, of very great importance, from the 
point of view of countering enemy propaganda and anti-war sentiment, 
in this country, to stimulate and maintain the interests of the public in 
the war, and particularly in India’s war effort.
This can be, and is being done by means of speeches and the encour-
agement of subscriptions to war funds and war loans, but the extent to 
which these can maintain interest in India’s war effort for any length of 
time is limited.
I was much impressed by the reports of the recently completed War 
Week in Bombay City and by the extraordinary enthusiasm aroused by 
the displays given on that occasion by the Royal Indian Navy and by the 
sight of a few armoured vehicles. I am sure that displays of this kind are 
the quickest way to appeal to the imagination of the masses, and the best 
possible corrective to any defeatist tendency in public opinion generally.
The Commander-in-Chief, who is fully alive to the importance of this 
matter, and also to the difficulties of lending troops at all frequently for 
such displays (as training is likely to suffer), proposes to start travelling 
“circuses” which would visit various big cities and cantonments, with 
a nucleus of tanks and other modern vehicles and equipment, round 
which the local Commander can build an expanded exhibit from his local 
resources. He also proposes to collect teams of lecturers who would go to 
schools, universities, public gatherings, &c., and talk on the war situation 
and matters affecting the Defence Services on a good deal larger scale 
than is being done at present.
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I should be very grateful for any suggestions you may have to make on 
these proposals, as well as for other means of simulating and maintaining 
public interest in the war.
JRL, AUC 262
68
Letter from L. S. Amery, Secretary of State 
for India, to Auchinleck, 14 August 1941
You may be interested to hear that just after you left I managed to 
get the Defence Committee to allow me to authorise India to go 
ahead with your 1942 expansion programme without waiting for 
the War Office to make up their minds whether they could find 
the necessary European complement or not. You will remember 
you asked for sanction to this expansion at the beginning of May. 
Three months later the War Office were no nearer making up their 
minds, and would be no nearer three months hence, if I had not 
insisted that they should be brushed aside.
2. What frightens me is that a minute’s reflexion should have made it 
clear from the outset that such an offer could not be refused, seeing 
that it gave the War Office five divisions in the field next year at 
the cost of one division’s worth of British personnel. Somehow or 
other the men obviously must and will be found, even if it meant 
breaking up a British division. Even if they were only found in 
part and the Indian force proportionately reduced, the surplus 
of Indian personnel would be worth something, as drafts if for 
no other purpose. Besides it is absurd to think that the total man 
power figure here cannot be stretched when it comes to the pinch, 
whether by raising the age or by internal economies.
3. What appals me is this awful obsession with fixed figures laid 
down and with fixed programmes and formations which cannot be 
sanctioned unless and until every item is definitely provided for in 
advance. War is a business above all of time and of improvisation 
in which regular schemes and formations are quite secondary. The 
first thing is to begin at once to make all the weapons you can. 
The second is to begin at once to raise and train all the men you 
can. The third is to match the two in such units and formations 
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as circumstances allow and, if necessary, make your tactics and 
even your strategy conform to the kind of units you can provide. 
The weapons and formations that are most suitable for the dense 
network of European communications are not necessarily the best 
for deserts or mountains, and, if we can’t make our production fit 
our strategy we can adapt our strategy to our production.
4. Similarly I am always rather alarmed by the unquestioning 
acceptance of the principle that whatever weapon or formation 
the enemy adopt we should follow. Nobody argues that the best 
way of dealing with a rhinocerous is to fix a horn on your own 
nose. But everybody assumes that if the Germans have done well 
with tanks our answer is more and heavier tanks of our own. Is it 
possible that the same effort might not be better put into more and 
heavier anti-tank guns, mounted on high speed lightly armoured 
vehicles, or heavily armed low flying aeroplanes? I don’t know, but 
I have an uncomfortable feeling that the question has never been 
faced.
5. The Boers put up a wonderful fight just because they had a tactical 
system fitted to their way of life and their country. They had only two 
weapons, the rifle and the pony. If they tried to build up an army on 
British lines, they couldn’t have raised and equipped two brigades 
and the war would have lasted a month at most. The Germans have 
built up a wonderful tactical system based on their industries and 
on the dense communications and comparatively level ground of 
Europe. Is there no tactical system of our own which we can build 
up to beat theirs, at any rate in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe 
and perhaps even in Western Europe as well? We once had such a 
system in the use of the long bow, and for a century 5,000 English 
could walk all over Europe. The Macedonian phalanx – the ancient 
Panzer division – was irresistible against all similar shock tactics. It 
broke down against the loose open order and short range throwing 
spear of the Roman legion.
6. But I fear I have strayed all over the place with these reflexions of 
mine, which have probably very little bearing on your problem, 
which is to make what use you can of the troops and weapons 
that we send you. I can only hope that they will enable you to put 
together a besom with which to sweep Africa clean from Sollum 
to Casablanca. One of Mahomed’s generals – I’ve forgotten his 
name at the moment – did just that, and only stopped when he had 
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ridden his horse breasthigh into the Atlantic. There is, of course, 
the alternative of following the old Ottoman trail through Belgrade 
to Budapest and Vienna. Not being Defence Minister, I have no 
instructions to give you, but leave the choice to you!
JRL, AUC 293
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4
Commander in Chief, 
Middle East, 1941–42
A consideration of Auchinleck’s time as C in C Middle East must 
consider four aspects of his command, which are, of course, inter-related. 
The first concerns Auchinleck’s relationship with Winston Churchill; 
this is difficult as Churchill communicated to Auchinleck as Churchill 
often failing to make it clear if he was acting solely as Prime Minister, 
as Prime Minster with the authority of the Cabinet and/or Chiefs of 
Staff behind him, as Minister of Defence or as trusted confidant. The 
second aspect of Auchinleck’s command concerns his relationship with 
the CIGS, Field Marshal Sir John Dill and General Sir Alan Brooke. 
This, of course, is difficult to divide from Auchinleck’s relationship with 
Churchill as, often, Auchinleck looked to Dill or Brooke to defend his 
position. Indeed, Auchinleck’s problems in dealing with Churchill may, 
partly have stemmed from the fact that Auchinleck expected the CIGS 
to back him and defend his position as theatre and army commander, 
while the CIGS sometimes took on this role and sometimes tried to 
act as honest brokers between Churchill and Auchinleck. Auchinleck’s 
relationship with Dill was closer than that with Brooke, but this, of course, 
was problematic in itself as Dill was not always well placed on how best 
to advise Auchinleck on how to deal with Churchill’s demands, given his 
own difficult relationship with the Prime Minister. The third aspect of 
Auchinleck’s command which comes through in these papers is concerned 
with the military appointments Auchinleck made, especially with regard 
to the command of Eighth Army. Auchinleck picked his own commanders, 
but sacking Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham was no easy task 
and Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie was probably not the right man for 
the job in that Auchinleck did not have complete confidence in him and 
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Ritchie’s subordinates did not easily accept his authority. More broadly, 
the papers show Auchinleck’s wider decisions about staff and command 
appointments to have been, at times, less than inspired, particularly 
with respect to Major General Eric ‘Chink’ Dorman-Smith. Finally, 
the papers are revealing about the problems Auchinleck confronted as, 
effectively, a coalition commander, commanding British Dominion and 
Indian Army troops, Free French and Free Poles as well as British troops.
Underlying all of these discussions were considerations of how effective 
British armour and equipment was compared to their German equivalents, 
leading to lengthy discussions about the quality and quantity of tanks 
sent to British forces in the Middle East, many, of course, manufactured 
in the USA. Allied to this were discussions concerning the organisation 
of British forces in the Middle East, especially concerning how armour 
could be integrated with infantry and the possibilities and difficulties 
associated with the development of the so-called ‘Jock’ columns.
Churchill’s initial communication with Auchinleck, when he took 
up the position as C in C Middle East, in July 1941, suggested that he 
would have considerable latitude in deciding how to balance his forces 
amongst the competing demands placed on them and over when to renew 
the offensive in the Western Desert [71]. Auchinleck clearly believed that 
his first duty was to secure his base and to defeat Vichy French forces in 
Syria [72]. A matter of days after suggesting that Auchinleck would be 
left to decide on priorities, Churchill then urged a rapid resumption of 
the offensive in the Western Desert, supposedly to assist the Royal Navy 
and RAF operating in the Western Mediterranean [73]. Churchill was 
then confronted with a closely argued response from Auchinleck, who 
had consulted with his counterparts in the Royal Navy and RAF and 
gave his considered opinion that resources, especially in terms of tanks 
and trained personnel, were insufficient to launch a new offensive in the 
Western Desert and, indeed, that the Northern front of Middle Eastern 
Command could become active in the very near future [74]. Churchill 
retorted, in late July, with the authority of the Chiefs of Staff behind 
him, again urging a renewed offensive in the Western Desert and noting 
that Auchinleck would receive a considerable armoured reinforcement 
in September [76]. Intervention by Field Marshal Sir John Dill, CIGS, 
as discussed below, along with the briefings Auchinleck gave to the War 
Cabinet and Churchill personally on 31 July and 2 August seem to have 
decided Churchill to leave the decision over a renewed offensive to 
Auchinleck. By August Churchill was promising major reinforcements 
to assist a renewed offensive, which was envisaged for November 1941 
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[83]. In October Churchill seemed in a much more supportive mood 
and was reminding Auchinleck that success in the Western Desert would 
provide Britain with valuable military credit in dealing with the USA 
and USSR [87].
A further short delay to what was by then the Crusader offensive, was 
explained in some detail by Auchinleck to Churchill, where problems in 
the training of South African troops and in the mechanical reliability of 
certain tanks were explained [89]. This seems to have been appreciated 
by Churchill, who regarded Auchinleck’s explanation as useful and he 
shared in Auchinleck’s optimism for the success of the offensive [91]. 
Churchill was then treated to regular, and rather optimistic reports 
about the Crusader offensive in November and December 1941 [98, 99, 
114]. Churchill himself, reviewing the deteriorating situation in the Far 
East, had to order some forces, notably 18th Division and squadrons 
of Hurricane aircraft, to be diverted to the Far East, but he clearly felt 
that Auchinleck would be able to maintain momentum in the Crusader 
offensive without these [125, 133]. On 24 January 1942 the Prime Minister 
was treated to a summary of the Crusader offensive, which noted consid-
erable successes [138].
Churchill was then deeply shocked, as was Auchinleck himself, by 
the counter-offensive launched by Axis forces in the Western Desert. 
Having recently congratulated Auchinleck on the recapture of Benghazi, 
Churchill was very concerned at its loss in late January 1942 [139]. At 
the same time Churchill was expressing particular concern that British 
armour had been defeated by ‘inferior enemy numbers’.1 The deterio-
rating situation meant that Churchill asked Auchinleck to journey to 
London for consultation with him in mid-March, which Auchinleck 
refused to do [170, 171]. At the same time Churchill wrote of the ‘special 
sources’ he had which informed him of exact German tank strength, 
which was at variance with the figures Auchinleck had quoted. This was 
Churchill acknowledging that he had access to ULTRA sources which 
Auchinleck either did not have access to at all, or received only many hours 
after Churchill had seen them [173]. Auchinleck queried the German 
tank strength quoted by Churchill in a later communication [183]. By 
mid-May Auchinleck was telling Churchill what he really didn’t want 
to hear, which was that Allied and Axis forces were so evenly matched 
that a future Allied offensive in the Western Desert was, ‘NOT likely 
1 JRL, AUC 662, Cipher message from Churchill to Auchinleck, 28 January 1942. 
Not reproduced in edited papers.
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to be rapid or spectacular’ [194]. Churchill responded by calling for a 
renewed offensive in the Western Desert and urged Auchinleck to take 
personal command of the Eighth Army [196]. In urging new offensive 
action, Churchill promised major reinforcements to Auchinleck, though 
noting that some formations in the Middle East would also have to be 
transferred to the Far East [208]. Auchinleck kept Churchill informed 
of his plans for new defensive positions, crucially over plans to hold 
Tobruk in the face of Rommel’s latest offensive in June 1942 [213, 214]. 
Churchill cautioned about fighting the war as a defensive war in the 
model of the First World War noting that ‘Armoured Warfare seems to 
favour the offensive’ [215]. On a visit to Washington, Churchill again 
referred to his ‘special Intelligence’ (i.e. ULTRA) which showed that 
Axis forces had suffered serious losses and urged Auchinleck to stage a 
stubborn defensive. Churchill was concerned about the plans to defend 
the Nile Delta and also that there was a real danger that British Imperial 
forces would be pushed back to the position they had held eighteen 
months previously [219]. In response, Auchinleck reassured Churchill 
that the position had been stabilised and a new offensive was planned as 
soon as armoured formations were regrouped. He sadly reflected that 
the situation was no better than it had been a year ago, when he took 
command in the Middle East, and possibly worse as the Axis forces had 
now captured Tobruk [222]. As the situation worsened in June and July 
1942, Churchill raised concerns about the speed with which Auchinleck 
was receiving ULTRA intelligence [226].
One of Churchill’s favourite topics was to discuss tank strengths in 
the Middle East and Auchinleck’s concerns about the poor quality of 
Valentine Tanks, which arrived in the Middle East in June 1942, must 
have been unsettling [232]. As late as 27 July 1942 communications from 
Churchill suggested confidence in Auchinleck’s ability to manage both 
the Eighth Army and Middle East Command [236]. However, Churchill’s 
letter, effectively relieving Auchinleck of command, was sent from Cairo 
on 8 August 1942 following the visit of Churchill and Brooke to the 
Middle East and their series of meetings with senior commanders. This, 
of course, was not a brutal sacking, offering Auchinleck command of the 
newly planned Iraq and Persia theatre and noting both that Auchinleck 
himself had suggested a change of command in late June [221] and that 
the decision to remove him was a collective one by the War Cabinet [237].
Churchill showed considerable naïveté over the complexities of 
desert warfare. As the Desert War reached a critical phase in June 1942, 
Churchill was urging that, ‘every fit male should be made to fight and die 
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for victory’, suggesting that the situation was essentially similar to that if 
German troops invaded the UK. This showed incomprehension of the 
complicated logistics of desert warfare and the large numbers of troops 
needed to maintain supply lines [223]. In November 1941 Churchill had 
shown little consideration of the need to train and acclimatise troops 
for desert warfare, stating, ‘You have no doubt had my message about 
the rest of the 1st. Armd. Div. landing SUEZ today. Ram it in if useful 
at earliest without regard for future. Close grip upon the enemy by all 
Units will choke the life out of him.’2
Auchinleck can be seen, very much, as a protégé of Dill. It was therefore 
very unfortunate that Dill’s letter to Auchinleck, giving him some advice 
on how to deal with political pressure from London and outlining the 
problems which Wavell had experienced as GOC in C Middle East was 
sent with no priority and did not reach Auchinleck until he had already 
come under pressure from Churchill to renew the offensive [70]. Further 
useful advice on how to handle Churchill’s requests was provided by 
General Hastings Ismay, who was Chief of Staff to the Minister of 
Defence [82]. Auchinleck appears to have followed Pug Ismay’s advice 
for a time as in October 1941 Churchill was reflecting on three letters 
he had recently received from him [87].
In total Dill sent Auchinleck thirty-one direct communications while 
Auchinleck was GOC in C Middle East and Dill was CIGS, but many of 
these were brief and Auchinleck received little sense from these either of 
Dill’s own deteriorating relationship with Churchill, or that Auchinleck’s 
own communications with Churchill were not always well received. Dill 
also gave a rather misleading impression on the extent to which the newly 
appointed Minister of State, resident in the Middle East, would be able 
to relieve Auchinleck of political pressure from London [75]. Auchinleck, 
in his communications with Dill, made it clear that he believed that a 
theatre commander should have considerable latitude over the decision 
to renew an offensive and should also have his own choice of subordinates 
[77, 79, 85]. A more lengthy communication to Dill, written at a time 
when Auchinleck was ill with a cold, perhaps demonstrates Auchinleck’s 
desire to keep Dill more fully informed of his decisions [88].
Alan Brooke was not as close a confidant of Auchinleck as Dill; 
however, Auchinleck seems to have quickly built up a very good working 
relationship with him and Auchinleck’s outline of the problems facing 
2 JRL, AUC 462, Cipher message from Churchill to Auchinleck, 25 November 
1941. Not reproduced in edited papers.
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him and the decisions he had made, expressed to Brooke in late December 
1941 [131] bears comparison to the earlier communications with Dill 
[88]. Brooke had initial concerns about the way in which Auchinleck 
was communicating directly with Churchill and some of his earliest 
correspondence with Auchinleck was to restore the proper channels of 
communication through the CIGS [119, 120]. Managing Churchill’s 
expectations of what Auchinleck could achieve in the Middle East was 
then a major problem for Alan Brooke, and Auchinleck voiced concerns 
that his position was not being made clear to the Prime Minister by 
Brooke and other senior officers in London [164, 188]. For his part, 
Alan Brooke noted that work by the Chiefs of Staff had meant that some 
of Churchill’s more intemperate telegrams to Auchinleck had been 
modified [165, 178, 179]. Auchinleck was also concerned at the paucity 
of senior officer training for command and staff positions in the Middle 
East. He advocated the establishment of a Higher War Course and this 
was approved by Alan Brooke [167, 186, 211].
In writing to Alan Brooke about the fall of Tobruk, Auchinleck was 
clear that he felt able to carry on and retrieve the situation, but, interest-
ingly, he suggested Harold Alexander as his possible successor [221]. It 
is telling that when Auchinleck was removed as GOC in C Middle East 
the news came directly from Churchill, though the earlier exchange with 
the CIGS was noted, rather than from Alan Brooke [237].
One of the major charges levelled against Auchinleck is that he was 
poor at selecting subordinates. The Auchinleck papers demonstrate 
that Auchinleck was both aware of the criticisms and shortcomings of 
some of his senior subordinates and dogged in his defence of those who 
he had selected for senior command or staff posts. Major General Eric 
Dorman-Smith was possibly the most controversial of Auchinleck’s senior 
appointments. In seeking, unsuccessfully, Dorman-Smith’s appointment 
to direct a Higher War Course for senior officers in the Middle East 
in May 1942, Auchinleck revealed some of the problems facing him; 
finding senior officers with sufficient staff and command experience at 
that stage in the war was difficult and the senior officer who he would 
have preferred for the appointment, rather than Dorman-Smith, was 
commanding a division [186]. In June 1942, when taking direct personal 
command of Eighth Army, Auchinleck blithely informed Alan Brooke that 
he was taking Dorman-Smith with him as Chief of Staff [224]. Not only 
did this action seem to ignore the reservations which Alan Brooke had 
previously shared about Dorman-Smith, but it created an unorthodox 
new senior staff role without reference to the CIGS.
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Alan Brooke’s concerns were not alleviated by other news in this 
communication [224] which informed him that Lieutenant General 
Thomas Corbett, CGS, Middle East, another officer who Brooke did 
not rate, would effectively be left with wider executive powers in Cairo 
in Auchinleck’s absence. It is unclear why Alan Brooke had taken against 
Corbett, it may have simply been that Alan Brooke’s preferred candidate 
for the position was Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall [119, 125]. 
When Corbett communicated directly with Churchill, in Auchinleck’s 
absence from Cairo, his telegram demonstrated sound staff work and 
a good grasp of the realities of the situation [227]. Corbett was clearly 
a trusted confidant of Auchinleck [169, 191, 197, 200] and in commu-
nications with Alan Brooke, Auchinleck praised Corbett’s abilities 
[168, 188]. If, in the crisis of June 1942, the Eighth Army had been 
forced to abandon the El Alamein position, Corbett was designated by 
Auchinleck to take command of the Eighth Army, while shortly before 
his removal, Auchinleck was planning to put Corbett in charge of Tenth 
Army [225, 235].
Auchinleck inherited Brigadier Eric James ‘John’ Shearer as his 
DMI. Shearer’s appointment was a rather odd one in that he had left the 
regular army in 1929 to pursue a career in business and only returned 
to the army on the outbreak of war. He was initially put in charge of a 
Military Intelligence training establishment in England and later sent to 
the Middle East when Wavell was appointed C in C. When Auchinleck 
took command in the Middle East he kept Shearer on as DMI, possibly 
on Dill’s or Wavell’s recommendation. Certainly, in the early months of 
Auchinleck’s command Shearer seemed to be a perfectly capable officer, 
impressing Churchill and Ismay [82, 83]. However, Brooke was far from 
impressed by Shearer, complaining of his highly optimistic intelligence 
reports and how these severely under-estimated Axis capabilities [137, 
152]. Characteristically, Auchinleck supported Shearer and noted that as 
C in C he was ultimately responsible for reports on German intentions 
[157].
When selecting Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham to command 
Western Desert Force (renamed Eighth Army on 26 September 1941), 
Auchinleck resisted pressure from Churchill who wanted Henry Maitland 
Wilson in this role. Auchinleck was selecting Cunningham based on 
his successful war record, not on personal knowledge, and he clearly 
thought that Cunningham’s Corps and Divisional commanders would 
provide the experience of using armoured formations which Cunningham 
himself lacked [79, 89]. Auchinleck’s papers show something of the 
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role of Brigadier Alexander Galloway, BGS, Eighth Army in having 
Cunningham removed from this command [92, 93]. Sacking Cunningham 
was clearly a difficult task for Auchinleck, made rather more difficult by 
an attempt to suggest that Cunningham was medically unfit to continue 
in command [94, 95, 98, 100, 105]. Auchinleck removed Cunningham as 
he felt that he was lacking in offensive spirit [97, 98]. Initially it seemed 
that Cunningham would quietly accept Auchinleck’s decision but soon 
he raised the issue of an appeal to the Army Council [100, 103, 112, 
122]. There were also questions as to how to explain Cunningham’s 
supersession to the public [106, 116].
In November 1941, when Auchinleck removed Cunningham as 
commander of Eighth Army, he decided to replace him with Major 
General Neil Ritchie, who was DCGS in Cairo. Churchill thought 
that Auchinleck should assume direct command of Eighth Army after 
removing Cunningham, ‘C.I.G.S. and I both wonder whether as you saved 
battle once you should not go up again and win it now. Your presence 
on spot will be an inspiration to all. However this is of course entirely 
for you to judge.’3 Auchinleck responded in detail to this suggestion 
[102]. Dill agreed with Churchill writing, ‘What I had in mind was that 
moment will come in fact may already have come when your drive and 
personality will be essential to reap full fruits of victory. Troops will be 
dog tired vehicles badly needing overhaul and petrol and water short. 
Every one will say they cannot press on and with your drive will find 
they can go another hundred miles at least.’4 In March 1942 Churchill 
again wanted Auchinleck to take command of Eighth Army. Auchinleck 
asked Alan Brooke to use his influence against the idea.5
Auchinleck’s relationship with Ritchie was a complex one and the 
lengthy correspondence between them is illuminating on this. Auchinleck 
probably saw his role as a ‘mentor’, conscious of Ritchie’s lack of seniority 
and, indeed, of command experience. Indeed, in some communica-
tions Auchinleck stated that he did not want to interfere in what was, 
properly, the business of the GOC Eighth Army [154, 191]. Auchinleck 
was also fully supportive of Ritchie when he had trouble with one of his 
Corps Commanders [140, 148]. For his part, Ritchie provided detailed 
3 JRL, AUC 477, Cipher message from Churchill to Auchinleck, 27 November 
1941. Not reproduced in edited papers.
4 JRL, AUC 483, Cipher message from Field Marshal Sir John Dill to Auchinleck, 
28 November 1941. Not reproduced in edited papers.
5 JRL, AUC 747, Cipher message from Auchinleck to General Sir Alan Brooke, 
8 March 1942. Not reproduced in edited papers.
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appreciations of the situation which, at least up to May 1942 seemed to 
be well-considered [see, for example, 104, 124, 149, 182]. In May 1942 
Ritchie was confused about whether he should be preparing to attack 
German positions or await a German offensive [187, 189], though it 
must be noted that he had concerns about the ability of Eighth Army to 
hold Tobruk [192]. However, it must be acknowledged that Auchinleck 
was also uncertain about a German offensive and did not read German 
intentions accurately [202]. It is worth noting that Ritchie claimed that 
he modelled his command style and relationship with Corps commanders 
on the relationship set up between General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson 
and Lieutenant General Richard O’Connor in the early stages of the 
Desert War [195].
With regard to the Axis offensive, which commenced on 26 May 
1942 it is clear that, had he been in direct command of Eighth Army, 
Auchinleck would have reacted differently, launching a counter-attack 
[203, 204, 205]. One can then note Auchinleck’s confidence in Ritchie 
ebbing. Ritchie’s appreciation of 11 June, with annotation by Auchinleck, 
shows the disagreements between them [210]. This was not resolved by a 
personal visit by Auchinleck to Eighth Army HQ on 12 June. Auchinleck 
then noted that he had issued, ‘very definite orders’ to Ritchie on 16 June 
[214] before removing him from command on 25 June [224]. Unlike 
Cunningham, Ritchie went quietly, apparently glad to escape, ‘the greatest 
hell’ which he had experienced in commanding Eighth Army [231]. 
Unlike Cunningham, Ritchie retained the confidence of Alan Brooke 
and it is interesting to note that, shortly after being removed from his 
command, Brooke was holding lengthy discussions with Ritchie about 
future equipment and, presumably, what exactly had gone wrong in the 
Western Desert [233].
Those minded to criticise Auchinleck’s ability to judge subordinates 
and commanders properly might note how the career of Brigadier 
Frederick de Guingand, later to become a highly effective Chief of 
Staff under Bernard Law Montgomery, prospered under Auchinleck’s 
patronage, with promotion to DMI, Middle East and then BGS Eighth 
Army [168, 235]. Auchinleck was also a dogged defender of Air Chief 
Marshal Arthur Tedder, AOC in C, Middle East, when Churchill wanted 
to relieve him of his command [96, 123].
Commanding a multi-national force created various problems for 
Auchinleck. Some of these were alleviated by the appointment of a 
British Minister of State resident in Cairo, who was a member of the War 
Cabinet. This role was originally held by Oliver Lyttleton from June 1941 
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to February 1942 and then by Richard Casey, though Walter Monckton 
held the post as, effectively, Acting Minister, for two months in 1942 as 
Casey was not immediately able to take up the appointment [75, 98, 109, 
180, 188, 214]. It is notable though that, as late as June 1942 the role of 
the Minister of State was still being clarified [207]. The post of Intendant 
General, Middle East, meant to relieve the C in C of responsibility for 
administrative affairs was a less happy experiment [75, 77].
Of the Dominion Forces, Auchinleck was most impressed by the New 
Zealand Division. He found the division to be well-trained and with its 
own integrated forced of heavy tanks [88]. Auchinleck also found Major 
General Bernard Freyberg to be a very effective divisional commander, 
despite some early reservations by the New Zealand Government [80, 
88]. Auchinleck found the New Zealand Government themselves very 
accommodating, commenting, in February 1942 that they had been, ‘so 
wonderfully good all through’ [157].
Auchinleck’s relationship with the Australian Government was more 
strained. It is, indeed, noticeable how little his supposed Deputy C in C 
Middle East, General Sir Thomas Blamey, appointed to this post in 
April 1941 when the Australian Government insisted on a share of senior 
command positions for their officers, features in these papers [134, 152]. 
The insistence by the Australian Government that their forces should be 
removed from Tobruk in July 1941 caused serious problems and Auchinleck 
was also concerned at the role of Blamey in this [77]. The decision of 
the Australian Government to remove most of their troops from the 
Middle East to face the Japanese threat to Australia caused Auchinleck 
further anguish [137]. Of course, this removal of Australian troops was 
a particular problem given how highly he rated their abilities [84].
Field Marshal Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa was in regular 
contact with Auchinleck. South African troops presented a particular 
challenge to the British military establishment as they could not serve 
outside Africa [77], and given the South African Government’s desire 
to recruit only white soldiers it was clear that maintaining two South 
African Divisions with a 20 per cent reinforcement was impossible [159]. 
What the South African Government sought were assurances that the 
South African Divisions would be quickly mechanised, allowing armour 
to be substituted for manpower [86, 88]. The training of South African 
troops was seen as deficient, which led to a postponement of the Crusader 
offensive [89, 109]. One of the bleakest communications Auchinleck had 
to send was that informing Smuts that Tobruk had fallen to the enemy, 
with the loss of the 2nd South African Division [220].
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Auchinleck’s appointment to be C in C Middle East was only ever 
meant to be temporary, with the role of C in C India kept open for 
him [69]. With that in mind, Auchinleck, quite properly, remained 
very interested in Indian Army matters while in the Middle East. He 
noted the importance of the Indian Army in the Middle East noting 
that 216,270 Indian soldiers were serving in this theatre by May 1942 
[163, 185]. He remained concerned about officer supply for the Indian 
Army and thought that battle experienced British, Australian and New 
Zealand soldiers should be considered for commissions [128 and 156]. 
Not surprisingly, Auchinleck rated highly the abilities of Indian soldiers, 
especially in 4th Indian Division [89, 113, 150] and was concerned at 
the demands of the Far Eastern Theatre removing experienced Indian 
soldiers from his command [137, 209]. The strategic responsibilities and 
demarcation between the C in Cs Middle East and India continued to 
exercise Auchinleck [86, 88, 119].
Commanding the Free French Brigade proved to be demanding of 
Auchinleck’s time. It was regarded as under-strength and, as late as 
January 1942, was still seen as an unknown quantity. However, General 
de Gaulle was concerned that it should not be relegated to rear areas 
as a ‘guard and duty’ force [88, 116, 131, 135, 176]. Of course, once 
the Free French Brigade went into action it was seen to do well [177, 
212]. Dealing with the diplomatic aspects of Free French forces proved 
more problematic and Auchinleck found it particularly difficult to deal 
with Major General Edward Spears who had a liaison role with the 
Free French; it seems that the Minister of State removed some of these 
pressures from Auchinleck [77, 180].
Many of the problems which Auchinleck encountered in the Middle 
East came from the lack of a proper armoured doctrine within the British 
army. Major General Vyvyan Pope’s untimely death robbed Auchinleck 
of an armoured expert and commander who he seems to have valued 
[78]. Auchinleck regarded other RAC senior officers as purely interested 
in developing their own arm as a corps d’elite rather than considering 
how armour should operate in an all arms approach to modern warfare 
[131, 134, 147, 152]. Auchinleck was concerned about the standards of 
training and leadership in the RAC [174]. He was also critical of the 
quality of British tanks, suggesting that he needed a 50 per cent superi-
ority over German armour for a reasonable chance of success [146, 175]. 
Auchinleck’s solution to the problem of integrating armour with infantry 
and artillery saw the formation of ‘Jock’ Columns and then more formal 
Brigade Groups. Initially these seemed to perform well [113, 115, 117] 
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but by February 1942 this was being questioned by Ritchie, who had his 
own ideas on the use of armour [153, 184, 210].
With regard to the other services, Auchinleck had limited contact 
with the Royal Navy; not surprising given that he had sacked Alan 
Cunningham, the brother of Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, the C in C 
Mediterranean. Co-operation with the RAF was well developed though. 
Auchinleck clearly built up a very good working relationship with Air 
Vice Marshal Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham, who commanded the Desert 
Air Force, and felt that the support which he provided to the army was 
of a very high standard [131, 147, 216]. Auchinleck also worked closely 
with Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, AOC in C, Middle East and was, 
it appears, instrumental in retaining his services in the Middle East when 
Churchill thought he should be removed from command [74, 96, 123].
Finally, given the comments made by some historians regarding the 
collapse of morale in Eighth Army, it is worth considering the Orders of 
the Day issued by Auchinleck in December 1941 and July 1942 [121, 234]. 
These seemed to be well-written and inspirational but are clearly harking 
back to the methods of the First World War rather than the methods 
introduced by Field Marshals Bernard Montgomery and William Slim.
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Telegram from L. S. Amery, 
Secretary of State for India to Lord Linlithgow, 
Viceroy of India, 25 June 1941
Losing Auchinleck is a great blow but you were clearly right in appreci-
ating without demur or qualification in view of supreme issues at stake. 
I have however strongly urged Prime Minister to make the change over 
an avowedly temporary one (a) in Auchinleck’s own interest to enable 
him to complete his appointment; (b) in India’s interest for the organi-
sation of defence at the end of the war; (c) because German advance 
through TRANSCAUSASIA into Iran may before many months are 
out make Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan the main theatre. Meanwhile 
please convey following message from me to Auchinleck. (Begins.) 
Warmest congratulations on great opportunity. I know you will fully 
justify Prime Minister’s confidence. Deeply as I regret your loss for 
India at this creative moment I look forward to you coming back with 




Letter from Sir John Dill to 
Auchinleck, 26 June 19416
On your taking over command in the Middle East, may I add to my 
congratulations, which I have sent to you by telegram, a few words on 
the situation and perhaps of advice.
After Wavell had captured Benghazi, there was a possibility that he 
might have pressed on to Tripoli. He could only have done this with 
very small forces (as the so-called 7th Armoured Division was worn 
out) in the hope that the Italians were so demoralised that they could 
6 This letter was sent to Auchinleck marked ‘c/o Commander-in-Chief, Middle 
East’; however, misdirected, misplaced in the postal system or delayed by enemy 
action, it was not received by Auchinleck until 21 July 1941. See document 77 
below.
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offer no effective resistance. But any hope there was of such a venture 
was ruled out by the decision of H.M.G. to support the Greeks. It then 
became a case of sending the maximum strength to Greece and leaving 
the minimum to hold Cyrenaica.
The result you know. We did not leave enough to secure Cyrenaica and 
the forces we sent to Greece and subsequently to Crete suffered heavily 
and lost much precious material – material which, as you will realise 
from your experience in England, is desperately difficult to replace. To 
right the situation, we did our best to send equipment at express rate 
and some 295 tanks were sent through the Mediterranean at great risk, 
and with great luck and good management on the part of the Navy, 238 
arrived, only one ship containing 57 was sunk. Then came a difficult 
period. It was most desirable to clear the Germans back in Libya at the 
earliest possible moment, so that the Navy might be able to get the air 
protection necessary to enable it to attack the enemy’s communications 
with Tripoli and also maintain Malta.
It was also highly desirable to act rapidly in Syria to forestall the 
Germans.
From Whitehall, great pressure was applied to Wavell to induce him 
to act rapidly, and, under this pressure, he advanced into Syria with 
much less strength than was desirable and in the Western Desert, he 
attacked before in fact he was fully prepared. The fault was not Wavell’s, 
except in so far as he did not resist the pressure from Whitehall with 
sufficient vigour.
You may say that I should have minimised this pressure or, better still, 
that I should have seen that, having been given his task in broad outline, 
he was left to carry it out in his own way and in his own time. I might 
possibly have done more to help Wavell than I did, but I doubt it. The 
fact is that the Commander in the field will always be subject to great 
and often undue pressure from his Government. Wellington suffered 
from it: Haig suffered from it: Wavell suffered from it. Nothing will stop 
it. In fact, pressure from those who alone see the picture as a whole and 
carry the main responsibility may be necessary. It was, I think, right to 
press Wavell against his will to send a force to Baghdad, but in other 
directions he was, I feel, over-pressed.
It is about this question of pressure which I particularly want to 
speak. You may be quite sure that I will back your military opinion in 
your local problems, but here the pressure often comes from very broad 
political considerations; these are sometimes so powerful as to make it 
necessary to take risks which, from the purely military point of view, 
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may seem inadvisable. The main point is that you should make it quite 
clear what risks are involved if a course of action is forced upon you 
which, from the military point of view, is undesirable. You may even 
find it necessary, in the extreme case, to disassociate yourself from the 
consequences.
Further, it is necessary that such a Commander should not wait for 
pressure and suggestions or even orders. He should anticipate these 
things and put clearly before his Government in the most secret manner 
how he views the situation and the action he proposes to meet it. He 
should point clearly to the risks he is prepared to accept and those which 
he considers too great. He should demand the resources he considers 
strictly necessary to carry out any project and he should make it clear 
what he can and cannot do in their absence.
You, in your responsible Command, will never have in the near 
future all the resources which you would like to have to carry out your 
great task. You, having served here, know something of the situation 
and the immediate paucity of our resources. You know too what the 
essentials are in our great picture – to hold England, retain a position 
in the Middle East, maintain a firm hold in Malaya and keep open 
our sea communications, which last-named involves such things as 
continuing to be able to use West Africa. The time will come when 
we can strike out with effect and there is hardly a soul in the world 
outside Germany who will not rejoice at our success and join in our 
final victory. But in the meantime we have a grim fight to fight and we 
cannot afford hazardous adventures. So do not be afraid to state boldly 
the facts as you see them.
The second and last point upon which I would like to touch concerns 
‘air co-operation’. Nowhere is it good. Nowhere have we had sufficient 
training. You will find the ‘Air’ out to help, but they have no complete 
understanding of what is required of them from the purely Army point 
of view and how necessary training is. Also, to ensure that our military 
and air strategy works in complete harmony is uncommonly difficult. 
It is quite clear that Tedder7 has to serve the Navy as well as the Army, 
but his main mission in life is to support the Army to the nth degree in 
any operation it has to undertake and to support it in the manner most 
acceptable to the Army Commander concerned. When you have had 
time to look round, you may be able to let me know how you view the 
problem and whether I can do anything to help.
7 Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, AOC in C, Middle East.
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I would add that telegrams marked ‘Private from General Auchinleck 
to C.I.G.S.’ are in fact private, whereas ‘Personal’ telegrams have a certain 




Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 1 July 1941
You take up your great command at a period of crisis. After all the facts 
have been laid before you it will be for you to decide whether to renew the 
offensive in the WESTERN DESERT and if so when. You should have 
regard especially to the situation at TOBRUK area and the process of 
enemy reinforcement in LIBYA and temporary German preoccupation 
in their invasion of RUSSIA. You would also consider vexatious dangers 
of operation in SYRIA flagging and need for a decision on one or both 
these fronts. You will decide whether and how these operations can be 
fitted in together. The urgency of these issues will naturally impress itself 
upon you. We shall be glad to hear from you at your earliest convenience.
JRL, AUC 275
72
Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 4 July 1941
Thank you again for your telegram 0.61 (0.61) (.) Fully realize critical 
nature situation (.) Subject to further investigation and consideration 
my views are as follows (.)
1 (.) No further offensive Western Desert should be contemplated until 
base is secure (.)
2 (.) Security of base implies completion occupation and consolidation 
SYRIA (.)
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3 (.) Consolidation SYRIA includes making CYPRUS secure against 
attack (.)
4 (.) Immediate action required is therefore elimination Vichy French 
from SYRIA earliest possible moment and completion defence 
measures in CYPRUS (.)
5 (.) Offensive in SYRIA being prosecuted already with all vigour but 
hampered by shortage mechanical transport (.) IRAQ force is giving 
all possible aid (.)
6 (.) Reconnaissance shows at least one division required ensure 
reasonable possibility successful defence CYPRUS and plans are 
being made accordingly (.)
7 (.) Once SYRIA is secure (,) and this implies consolidation of our 
position in IRAQ (,) offensive in Western Desert can be considered 
but for this adequate and properly trained armoured forces say at 
least two and preferably three armoured divisions with a motor 
division will be required to ensure success (,) this is first essential (.)
8 (.) Final object should be complete elimination enemy from Northern 
AFRICA but administrative considerations would entail advance 
by stages so that first objective would probably be re-occupation 
CYRENAICA which itself would have to be effected by stages for 
same reason (.)
9 (.) It is quite clear to me that infantry divisions however well trained 
and equipped are no good for offensive operations in this terrain 
against enemy armoured forces (.) Infantry divisions are and will be 
needed to hold defenced localities and to capture enemy defended 
localities after repeat after enemy armoured forces gave been 
neutralized or destroyed but the main offensive must be carried out 
by armoured formations supported by motorized formations (.)
10 (.) Second essential to successful offensive is adequate and suitably 
trained air component at disposal Army for all its needs including 
fighters medium bombers tactical reconnaissance and close support 
on the battlefield (.) This is non-existent at present (.)
11 (.) In my opinion there can be no question of carrying out simultane-
ously offensive operations in Western Desert and SYRIA (.) To do 
so is to invite failure on both fronts (.)
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12 (.) Third essential to success in any offensive operation in this theatre 
is close and constant co-operation of Fleet both in close support 
of Army and in harrying enemy sea communications (.) This 
co-operation is taken for granted but itself entails constant close 
support by air forces which must be at the disposal of the Navy 
and additional to those required for close support of Army and for 
long-range strategic air operations.
JRL, AUC 280
73
Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 6 July 1941
MOST IMMEDIATE CLEAR THE LINE
1. Your telegram No, 1527 of 4th July. I agree about finishing off 
SYRIA and here [we?] always thought holding SYRIA is necessary 
foundation for holding or re-taking CYPRUS. One hopes that 
SYRIA may not be long now and that you will not be forestalled 
in CYPRUS. This priority of both these operations over offensive 
action to complete WESTERN DESERT after what has happened 
is fully recognised.
2. Nevertheless WESTERN DESERT remains decisive theatre this 
autumn for defence of NILE VALLEY. Only by reconquering the 
lost airfields of Eastern CYRENAICA can Fleet and Air Force 
resume effective action against the enemy’s seaborne supplies.
3. In General Wavell’s No. SD/57777 of 18th April he stated he had 
six regiments of trained armoured personnel awaiting tanks. This 
was a main element in decision to send ‘TIGER’.8 Besides this, 
8 The ‘Tiger’ convoy was made up of five fast merchant ships which, under RN 
escort, were to risk the hazardous route through the Western Mediterranean to 
bring urgently requested reinforcements of tanks and aircraft to Egypt. Since 
January all reinforcements to Egypt had been sent via the Cape of Good Hope 
as the Luftwaffe had taken a heavy toll of Allied shipping. 295 tanks and 53 
Hurricane aircraft were sent; one ship, the Empire Song was lost due to enemy 
action, with the loss of 57 tanks and 10 Hurricanes; her crew were all saved by a 
RN destroyer. The convoy arrived in Alexandria Harbour on 12 May 1941.
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personnel for three additional tank regiments are now approaching 
round the CAPE. Your need for armoured vehicles is therefore fully 
realised in spite of stress which WAVELL and you both lay upon 
further training for these fully-trained armoured units. We make 
out that you should have by the end of July 500 cruiser, infantry 
and American cruiser tanks workshops are properly organised, 
beside a large number of ill-conceived light tanks and armoured 
cars.
4. This cannot be improved upon in months of July and August 
except by certain American arrivals and a few replacements from 
Home. Even thereafter remember we have to be at concert pitch to 
resist invasion from September 1st and General Staff are naturally 
reluctant to send another substantial instalment of tanks around 
the CAPE (now the only way) thus putting them out of action 
till early October at either end. After October American supplies 
should grow and our position here be easier but much will have 
happened before then.
5. At present Intelligence shows considerable Italian (reinforcements) 
of LIBYA but little [?] German. However, a Russian collapse might 
soon alter this to your detriment without diminishing invasion 
menace here.
6. Scale of our air reinforcements had been laid before you. Air Staff 
are becoming anxious about our heavy struggle and are disinclined 
to repeat RAILWAY.9 Even so it seems probable during July, August 
and part of September you should have decided air superiority but 
then again a Russian collapse would liberate considerable German 
air reinforcements for AFRICA and if enemy do not attempt 
invasion but merely pretend, they can obtain air superiority on 
your Western Front during September.
7. On top of this comes the question of TOBRUK. We cannot judge 
from here what offensive value TOBRUK will be in two months’ 
time or what may happen meanwhile. It would seem reduction 
or complete panning of TOBRUK by enemy is indispensable 
preliminary to serious invasion of EGYPT.
9 It is unclear what operation this referred to and, indeed, this is queried in the 
original.
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8. From all these points of view it is difficult to see how your situation 
goes to be better after middle of September than it is now and it 
may well be worsened. I have no doubt you will maturely but swiftly 
consider whole problem.
9. In light of your decision and as a part of it please tell us if you desire 
any alteration of composition convoys W.S.10 and W.S.11 bearing 
in mind reinforcements in man power from AUSTRALIA and facts 
which are already on their way. When I queried as I have during the 
last six months the immense proportion of rearwards services and 
non-combatant troops included in our convoys I recognised the 
fact that we have to supply these services for Australian and New 
Zealand man-power fighting units. Nevertheless when I am told 
that you have 33 Field Artillery Regiments and three on way apart 
from A.A. Regiments surely wonder in what battle circumstances 
this mass of artillery can be deployed. There is hardly time to alter 
composition of W.S.10 which leaves at the end of this month but 
I should like to know that it is what you want.
10. Convoy W.S.11 is still however in hand. Over 75,000 men are 
earmarked for this convoy although at present there I only shipping 
for under 30,000. It would be possible by making costly sacrifices 
here like bringing home ships from SOUTH AFRICA without 
cargoes though circuitous and dangerous routes which alone are 
open some other measures to make efforts to carry a much larger 
reinforcement in W.S.11 than is now planned. On present showing 
Defence Committee does not think these sacrifices justifiable. But 
if you have plans which require special implementing you should 
ask us wants and we will do our best.
11. About air. I feel for all major operational purposes your plans must 
govern employment of whole Air Forces throughout MIDDLE 
EAST bearing in mind of course that Air Force has its own dominant 
strategical role to play and must not be frittered away in providing 
small umbrellas for Army as it seems to have been in SOLLUM 
battle. In your telegram No. 1527 you speak of aircraft supporting 
the Army and aircraft supporting the Navy and aircraft employed 
on independent strategical tasks. The question is what are the 
proportions? This will have to be arranged from time to time by 
C. in C. in consultation. But nothing in these arrangements should 
mar the integrity of Air Force contribution to any major scheme 
you have in hand. One cannot help feeling in SOLLUM fight our 
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air superiority was wasted and that our forces in TOBRUK stood 
idle whilst all available enemy tanks were sent to defeat our desert 
offensive.
12. I shall be obliged if you will consider foregoing points, consulting so 
far as necessary with Mr. LYTTELTON and General HAINING 
and thereafter let me know how we can best help you.
JRL, AUC 281
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 15 July 1941
A (.) I have carefully considered your telegram 0.64 (0.64) of 6 (6) July 
and have consulted with Minister of State10 and the Intendant 
General11 (.)
B (.) Your para. one (.) After consultation with C.-in-C. Med[iterranean] 
and A.O.C.-in-C. I have decided to adhere my predecessor’s plan 
to re-inforce CYPRUS as soon as possible by one division (.)
C (.) Your para. two (.) I fully appreciate need for reconquering 
CYRENAICA but see para. II below (.)
D (.) Your para. three (.) Personnel of six regts referred to in our telegram 
SD 57777 (57777) of 18 April were fully trained with their own 
type of tanks but lacked individual and collective training for the 
different types of tank many of them had to man (.) Characteristics 
and armament of American tanks introduce certain modifications 
in tactical handling and a certain time must be allowed for these 
lessons to be studied and absorbed (.)
E (.) While I agree I shall have here end of July about 500 (500) 
Cruisers (,) Infantry and American tanks (,) past experience has 
10 Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of State and Member of the War Cabinet, resident in 
Cairo.
11 The post of Intendant General, Middle East was a short lived one, established in 
June 1941 it was abolished in January 1942 with General Sir Robert Haining as 
the only incumbent.
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clearly demonstrated that for any given operation we need 50 (50) per 
cent reserve of tanks (.) This permits 25 (25) per cent in workshops 
and 25 (25) per cent available for immediate replacement of battle 
casualties (.) Allowing for 50 (50) tanks in TOBRUK and requisite 
reserves I shall not have more than 350 (350) available for active 
operations (.)
F (.) Owing to casualties to tanks and number in workshops units have 
had little opportunity for training (.) Would stress importance of 
time being allowed for both individual and collective training (.) 
BATTLEAXE showed that present standards of training is not 
repeat not enough (,) and we must secure that team spirit which 
is essential for efficiency (.)
G (.) Your para. six (.) This is understood and agreed to by TEDDER 
and self provided enemy offensive does not develop from North 
against SYRIA and/or Iraq (.)
H (.) Your para. seven (.) Consider there is every indication that enemy 
would like to be free of commitment of containing TOBRUK 
and while I do not intend to alter our present policy of holding 
TOBRUK (,) I cannot be confident that TOBRUK can be main-
tained after September (.) Everything possible is being done but 
enemy air action against ships at sea and in harbour is taking 
its toll (.) Furthermore should enemy secure SIDI BARRANI 
(which he could do at any time) it will not be possible to provide 
the present scale of fighter protection for supply ships to and from 
TOBRUK (.)
J (.) Your para. eight (.) I agree that with possible threat from the North 
our situation may well be worsened (.) North repeat North may 
become the decisive front (.)
K (.) Your para. nine (.) I wish no change in composition W.S.10 (.) 
Regarding artillery I have twenty-seven field and five R.H.A. regts 
here including those of 50 (50) Division (.) Further five field regts 
belonging to South African Divisions are due to arrive from EAST 
and SOUTH AFRICA as operations and shipping permit (.) This 
total of artillery represents about the correct allotment for the 
number of divisions in my Command (,) but allows nothing for 
Corps or Army artillery (.) It will be divided according to circum-
stances between the two fronts (,) Northern and Western (,) the 
bulk being concentrated on the decisive front for the time being 
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which may be West or repeat or North (.) Our shortage of armoured 
formations and absence of adequate close support artillery makes it 
essential that we should man as many of the artillery pieces as are 
available in the country for use in an emergency anti-tank role (.) 
With the guns here and those reported en route we should be able 
to equip all regts with 25-pdrs on a 24 gun basis by about end of 
September (,) but owing to shortage of personnel for manning (,) 
five British regts could not be increased above a 16 gun basis (.) 
It is essential that we should obtain the necessary personnel for 
transfer to the artillery to enable us to provide for manning the 
additional 8 (8) guns in each of these regts (.) With forecasts of 
reinforcements en route I see no alternatives but to obtain this 
additional personnel by the disbandment of certain British units 
in this country and the matter is now being investigated here (.) 
The position is further complicated by the fact that I am short of 
a number of anti-tank regts which should be allotted to Middle 
East forces (.) The eight which I will be equipped only with 36 (36) 
2-pdrs the remaining guns being completed by using 18-pdrs and 
captured weapons (.)
L (.) Your para. ten (.) I have just received some details regarding 
composition W.S. 11 (.) I will have its composition considered 
and forward priorities (.) In meantime it would greatly help if I 
could be given some idea as to what units and drafts are likely to 
be available (.) Would stress urgent need for draft of at least 750 
(750) R.A. F[iel]d personnel to be included in W.S. 11 (.) I would 
draw your attention to cable to TROOPERS A1/72585 (72585) of 
12 June giving full particulars of manpower situation mid June 
on assumption that W.S.10 contained drafts of 26,600 (26,600) (.) 
Casualties SYRIA and BATTLEAXE have made the position 
worse (.)
M (.) Your para. eleven (.) Have discussed with TEDDER (.) We both 
agreed that principles enunciated by you for use of Royal Air Force 
are correct (,) but C.-in-C. MED[ITERANNEAN] suggests that 
employment of R.A.F. cannot be subordinated exclusively to imple-
menting Army plans since there may well be an urgent operational 
requirement for co-operation with Navy (.) This aspect applies 
with particular force while the Fleet is without a carrier (.)
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N (.) Your para. twelve (.) Have consulted Mr. LYTTELTON (,) General 
HAINING and CUNNINGHAM12 as well as TEDDER (.) All 
agree (.)
O (.) Above answers seriatim questions of detail raised in your cable (.) 
Cs.-in-C. are preparing strategical appreciation dealing with major 
issues involved (.)
P (.) Minister of State is also cabling you on this subject.
JRL, AUC 282
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Letter from Sir John Dill to 
Auchinleck, 16 July 1941
I hope that you are settling down to your general problems all right. And 
I hope very much that the Minister of State is going to be a help to you. 
I was always anxious to have a representative of the War Cabinet in Egypt 
since I saw the situation out there myself. Archie Wavell too was anxious 
to have one there & said so on paper, but the P.M. would have none of it 
till quite recently. I am not so happy about the Intendant General. I feel 
that he should be under you with direct authority to deal direct with the 
War Office on certain subjects – much as the M.G.As in Commands do 
at home. Also I hope that Haining will play the game. He has plenty of 
ability & experience but is inclined to think too much about himself.
Russia has done much better than I expected & I hope that she will go 
on doing so. But now that the Germans have reached the open country I 
would fear that the superiority in material, training & command would tell.
I watch the situation very closely because if I were sure that the 
Germans were [bogged?] in Russia & England were safe from invasion 
this year I could give you much more help. But, as you know, we are 
none too thick on the ground in men & material in this island. Don’t 
over-load yourself & let me know in what direction you want help & 
I will do all I can.
Good luck & God bless you.
JRL, AUC 283
12 Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, C in C Mediterranean.
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Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 20 July 1941
MOST SECRET
1. Prolonged consideration has been given by both Chiefs of Staff 
and Defence Committee of War Cabinet to your telegram number 
1533 of 15th July in reply to my 064 of 6th July. Chiefs of Staff 
now send you their number 148 of today with which we are in full 
agreement.
2. It would seem if you had a substantial further consignment of tanks 
from here and U.S.A. approaching during middle of September 
together with other large reinforcements, this might act as a reserve 
on which you could count either to press your offensive if successful 
or to defend EGYPT if it failed.
3. Defence Committee were concerned to see 50th Division, your 
one complete BRITISH Division, locked up in CYPRUS in what 
appeared to be a purely defensive role, and wonder whether other 
troops might not have been found.
4. It did not see how a GERMAN offensive could develop upon 
SYRIA, PALESTINE and IRAQ from North before end of 
September at earliest. Defence Committee felt PERSIA was in 
far greater danger of GERMAN infiltration and intrigue and that 
strong action may have to be taken there. This however is in General 
WAVELL’s sphere, and he wishes evidently to act [?] telegram 
9392/G of 17th July is receiving urgent and earnest attention here.
5. If we do NOT use the lull accorded us by GERMAN entanglement 
in RUSSIA to restore situation in CYRENAICA, opportunity 
may never recur. A month has passed since failure at SOLLUM, 
and presumably another month may have to pass before a renewed 
effort is possible. This interval should certainly give plenty of time 
for training. It would seem justifiable to fight a hard and decisive 
battle in WESTERN DESERT before situation changes to our 
detriment, and to run those major risks without which victory has 
rarely been gained.
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6. It is difficult to understand on information we have at present the 
reason underlying the plan of offensive of June 15th. Our forces 
were defeated in detail by (1 group) @ [see note at end of document] 
on 3rd morning (1 group) the enemy’s tanks from TOBRUK, 
whose garrison meanwhile stood idle. It would have seemed more 
consistent (have) accepted principle strategy and common sense to 
have engaged the TOBRUK garrison in heavy and continuous action 
before or during climax attack upon SOLLUM.13 There may of 
course be reason which we are NOT aware which rendered these well 
worn principles of war inapplicable. Neither can we judge from here 
on our present information whether it was right to break off battle on 
3rd day. There are always excellent reasons in favour [of] retirements. 
Victory (rewards) those whose will-power overcomes those reasons.
7. Thirdly, it seems Air Force was used as a more series small 
UMBRELLAS spread over our march (?columns), and that its 
large superiority was frittered away in passive defence by standing 
patrols, instead of being used in offensive strategic combination 
with Army for general purposes of battle. No doubt this arose 
from earnest desire of Air Force to protect Army. This however 
does NOT alter facts of what happened.
8. Before battle I expressed to your predecessor my doubt whether 
General WILSON,14 with his vast experience WESTERN DESERT, 
would NOT have been a better choice than General BERESFORD-
PIERSE15 whose standing in Army was so much less. We still think 
WILSON should have the Command next offensive if there is to be 
one unless of course you propose to take personal command yourself.
9. I should be very much obliged if you will let us know waht your 
general intentions are for immediate future; and you may be assured 
that our only desire is to sustain you and furnish you with means 
success.
@ (Group omitted in vicinity of this stage of message. This message 
delayed – one group was missing from cryptogram)
JRL, AUC 288
13 This garbled sentence is reproduced exactly as in the original document.
14 General Henry Maitland Wilson, then GOC of British troops in Palestine and 
Trans-Jordan. He had commanded British troops in Egypt 1939–41.
15 Lieutenant General Noel Beresford-Peirse, who had been appointed 
Commander, Western Desert Force.
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Sir John Dill, 21 July 1941
I apologise for not having written to you before this, But I have 
really hardly had time to turn round, and I am afraid I am still very 
much a “new boy” here. I think I have grasped the broad outline 
of the situation, but there are many essential matters about which I 
have still to gain a more complete knowledge. It is a most complex 
problem and is not made any easier by the disorganisation and 
improvisation resulting from GREECE, CRETE, TOBRUK and 
the recent SOLLUM fighting.
However, things will straighten themselves out gradually, but there 
is a lot of mixing of formations and even units which, though 
unavoidable in the circumstances, does not make for increased 
efficiency.
2. I have two letters from you:
(i) Dated 26th June which arrived some days ago and was written 
in answer to my D/5 of 3rd May and mainly concerns INDIA. 
Thank you very much for it and the information it contains. 
I am passing it on to Wavell.
(ii) Also dated 26th June which has just arrived. This deals with 
recent events here and how they came about, and goes on 
to explain my position vis-à-vis Whitehall and the pressure 
which I may expect to be put on me from there. I am most 
grateful to you for this letter, which puts the whole matter 
very clearly, and also for your promise of support, of which 
I have never been in doubt. I quite understand the position 
and am prepared for it. I had, if you remember, a minor 
experience in these matters at Narvik!
The pressure has already begun as you know. The Prime 
Minister’s telegram No. 069 of 20th July is an instance.
You may be quite sure that I shall give my opinion firmly and 
without reservation and that if I think a risk is unjustifiable I shall 
say so. I am a little disturbed by the implications of paragraphs 3 
and 8 of the telegram I have just mentioned, as I feel that these 
are matters in which I alone can be the deciding authority, and I 
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intend to be that authority. I fully realise the burden that rests on 
the Prime Minister and the supreme need for not increasing it, 
by seeming to run counter in any way to his wishes, and I shall 
not forget this. All the same there are matters such as these I have 
indicated, which can not be settled by any one except myself, I think 
you will agree with me in this.
3. I have not much time as the liaison officer who takes this to you 
leaves early tomorrow, but I will try very briefly to give you my 
ideas on the main issues current at the moment.
4. TOBRUK
(i) I feel that we must do all we can to hold TOBRUK. At present 
we are managing to make supply keep abreast of expenditure 
and we have reserves in the place – about 50 days. Maintenance 
is however, a difficult problem and may become more difficult, 
if, for instance, the enemy deny the use of SIDI BARRANI 
to our air force.
All the same, I am not going to abandon the place except 
in the last resort. It is most valuable as a thorn in the enemy’s 
side and if he could get it and use it as a base, it would be 
most damaging to our position.
(ii) Blamey (pressed by his Government, I imagine) is pressing 
me to relieve the 9 Australian Division and the 26 Australian 
Infantry Brigade, which form the major part of the garrison. 
The morale of the garrison is high and they have been doing 
some excellent offensive patrolling, but their health and 
stamina is said to be beginning to suffer.
In any event, it would be a good thing to get them out 
for a change but it is going to be a difficult and perhaps an 
impossible business. The Joint Planning Staffs are working on 
it now. If I can carry out the relief I shall put the 6 Division 
(British) into the place. Blamey is also insistent on the need for 
concentrating all the Australian troops under one command 
and wants them put into Syria and Palestine. This would 
suit me all right and I propose to work to this end, but it 
will take time. Blamey’s idea is that he should then take 
command, under Wilson of course, of this Corps himself 
(see note enclosed).
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5. CYPRUS
Having decided to hold CYPRUS I am determined to make a job of 
it. Putting in scratch units and formations with improvised staffs is 
no good, and hence my decision to put in the 50th Division. I took 
this decision after the most careful consideration and in face of 
some opposition from my staff and I am not prepared to go back 
on it. Some relevant considerations are:
(a) Decision had to be taken before I knew whether Syrian 
operations were going to end soon or not. Hence 6th Division 
(British) was not available for an immediate move, and speed 
was, and is, essential in my opinion.
(b) I am sure that we cannot afford to use any more Dominion 
formations in these “detached post” and “forlorn hope” 
operations. British troops must take their share.
(c) In any event, the South Africans cannot be used outside 
Africa, the 4th Indian Division is in BAGUSH, the 5th Indian 
Division is not yet concentrating or re-equipped, the New 
Zealanders are reorganising and re-equipping as are the 6th 
Australian Division.
So you see I had not much choice if my decision to use a homoge-
neous formation was the right one, as I am sure it is. If the Defence 
Council really want to know the reasons there they are!
Of course I realise that the force in CYPRUS suffers from all the 
disadvantages of a detachment and that it has little offensive value, 
though it has some as providing air and sea bases. In any event, 
I am sure that it is a necessary outpost of the defence of SYRIA 
and must be held. If it is to be held it must be held properly. We 
have had our lessons.
6. SYRIA:
(i) This is going ahead and you will have had our joint appre-
ciation on the subject. It is most important that we should, by 
some means or other, be enabled to go forward on to the line 
KHARPUT–MALATIA–TAURUS, which would make it 
possible to oppose an advance by superior enemy armoured 
forces with a reasonable hope of success. Once the enemy can 
deploy armoured divisions in the open, relatively flat country 
South of the Turkish Frontier, our positions round ALEPPO, 
in the LEBANON or round MOSUL will always be liable 
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to be turned unless we can oppose him with armoured forces 
more or less equal to his.
It would be a tremendous thing, therefore, if we could reach 
agreement with TURKEY to allow us to prepare and hold 
these positions before the enemy moves against ANATOLIA. 
I know the difficulties, but I would urge that every effort 
should be made to reach such agreement.
As regards the command in SYRIA, I have already told you 
that I do not wish to move Wilson who is, I think, admirably 
suited for it (see enclosed notes).
My ideas for the defence of SYRIA and PALESTINE are 
roughly not lines but a series of localities capable of all round 
defence blocking the defiles and approaches. I am elaborating 
this now. The localities may hold anything from a Brigade 
Group to a Division but this requires further examination.
(ii) We are going to have trouble, I fear, and plenty of it from 
De Gaulle over the Free French position in SYRIA. It has 
already started as you will have heard. It is absolutely essential 
that they should not be allowed to do anything to prejudice 
the security of our position in SYRIA so far as its defence 
against the enemy is concerned. If they refuse to see reason 
and persist in their present illogical and unrealistic attitude, 
I am afraid they will have to be dealt with firmly and drasti-
cally. After all, we are paying the piper and must call the tune. 
I realize the delicate political issues involved, but to win the 
war is our primary object I imagine.
7. The Intendant General:
This is going well in spite of the anomalous nature of the situation 
created by his appointment. Bob Haining and I know and understand 
each other well and there will be no trouble, but I am sure you will 
realize that the system is not too easy to run, as it cuts across all 
established ideas as to organization and responsibility. Many officers 
will to a large degree be serving two masters, and Hutchinson’s16 
position is not too easy. However, as I have said, it will be worked 
all right. This leads me to another matter.
16 Lieutenant General Balfour Hutchinson, Deputy QMG, Middle East.
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8. The High Command:
I feel myself that the administrative control in this command is 
too highly centralized and too concentrated altogether. I have not 
had time to get down to detail yet, but I am pretty sure in my own 
mind that what is wanted is an operational staff here at G.H.Q., 
with directors or advisers dealing with the broad administrative 
policy required to give effect to my operational decisions, and that 
all or nearly all administrative detail can be decentralized to the 
Army Commanders, leaving the really big administrative problems 
of bases, base depots, railways, major repairs, etc., to be dealt with 
by the Intendant General, who becomes a sort of super-Inspector 
General of Communications. After all a G.O.C.-in-C. should be 
capable of dealing with nearly all administrative matters, including 
discipline, awards, promotions, etc. within his own command – we 
did it at Home. I have given my ideas to Bob Haining and we are 
both working on them, but I am anxious not to make them public 
until they are more definite. There are vested interests involved! 
One thing I am very anxious to do and that is to get G.H.Q. out of 
CAIRO if I can. There are far too many distractions here, social 
and otherwise, and the climate is enervating. This too I do not want 
to say too much about at the moment.
9. Central and East AFRICA:
I can see no advantage and many disadvantages in retaining Central 
and East AFRICA in this command now that they have ceased, or 
practically ceased, to be theatres of active operations. I would like to 
be rid as soon as possible of all of that area, including ERITREA, 
ABYSSINIA and all three SOMALILANDS. We must, I am sure, 
keep the SUDAN for military as well as political reasons. I hope 
that nothing will arise to prevent this shedding of unwanted terri-
tories! I am anxious to concentrate all of our energies to the North.
10. The Western Desert:
You will have had our applications and reviews, so I need not go 
into the factors and considerations again here.
What I would like to repeat is that it is not sound to take unrea-
sonable risk (I am quite ready to take a reasonable risk) as I think 
you know, but to attack with patently inadequate means is to take 
an unreasonable risk in the present circumstances, and is almost 
certain to result in a much greater delay eventually than if we wait 
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until the odds are reasonable. I am afraid I shall be quite firm on 
this point and all the more so because I feel you will agree with 
me. As to what constitutes a reasonable risk, I think that I alone 
can be the judge. You may be assured that no-one is more anxious 
than I to get going.
In our recent papers sent to you we have tried to balance the 
needs of our two fronts and I am sure that this is essential. Neither 
front can be viewed in isolation, and it perturbs me a little to see 
that in the recent telegrams received from Home, this balance 
between the two fronts is not always maintained. As I see it, there is 
now one continuous front in ASIA and North AFRICA stretching 
from AFGHANISTAN through IRAN, IRAQ , SYRIA and 
PALESTINE to CYRENICA, and action on it must be co-ordinated 
throughout. You know all this of course far better than I do, and 
it is presumptious of me to talk to you like this, but I am not sure 
that others are equally alive to it. INDIA and the Viceroy certainly 
understand it.
11. Communications:
Assuming that this War is going to last a good deal longer and that 
eventually we may find ourselves taking an offensive into Southern 
and South-Eastern EUROPE from bases in the MIDDLE EAST, 
I am impressed by the need of a really far-seeing policy for the 
development of communications in this part of the world. Much, 
as you know, is already being done, and in outlining further sugges-
tions, I am speaking without data and in comparative ignorance. 
Taking the long view, I look on the following as important –
(a) The putting through of the standard gauge from HAIFA to 
RAYAK thus obviating the need for breaking gauge;
(b) The connecting of BAGHDAD or KARBALA with HAIFA 
by rail;
(c) The connecting of MARDIN and DIARBEKR by rail;
(d) The joining up of WADI HALFA and ASWAN by rail.
These are all big projects and if they are to be done, need the 
greatest impulse and co-ordination from the centre, that is from 
Whitehall. They entail the provision of a tremendous amount of 
labour and material, which can only be provided by centralized 
co-ordination. As you know, these are all under consideration, but 
I feel only tentatively because the subordinate authorities who are 
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considering them don’t really feel that the highest command is in 
earnest or that it will see things through urgently and consistently. 
I may be wrong, but that’s how I feel. As you are probably aware, 
there is a school which says “Don’t build these railways – they will 
help the enemy IF he comes on”. I think this is rank heresy to say 
the least of it. We must make up our minds that it is we who are 
going to use them not the enemy!
12. By the way, the Prime Minister suggested in his 0.69 that I might 
possibly take command in the Western Desert myself. This is a 
possibility, but would not be sound if there were any chance of 
our being attacked in SYRIA and IRAQ at the same time. In this 
event, I feel I must remain detached and able to take an unbiassed 
view of the whole situation, but please see my note enclosed.
I do not think I can usefully add anything to this letter, which 
will I hope give you some idea of what I have in my head at the 
moment. If it is not the sort of letter you want, will you please tell 
me so and say what you would like.
I hope you are very well.
JRL, AUC 289
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Sir John Dill, CIGS, 5 August 1941
As you know, the question of the desirability of having a major-general 
at G.H.Q., Middle East has been considered for some time. In view of 
the large increase in A.F.V.’s in Middle East and the probability that 
in the near future there may be two or more armoured divisions fully 
equipped in the Western Desert, I am convinced that it is desirable to 
have a senior officer of the R.A.C. at my Headquarters to supervise 
and co-ordinate training and be prepared, if required, to command an 
armoured corps in the field. If you agree to this in principle, I should like 
Major-General Pope17 appointed both on account of his seniority and 
17 Major General Vyvyan Pope was then Director of AFV at the War Office and was 
sent to the Middle East at Auchinleck’s request. He was to briefly command the 
newly formed 30 Corps before being killed in an air accident on 5 October 1941.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   185 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
186
experience and because he is an officer who came from the Royal Tank 
Regiment. I would like him to come out as soon as possible to Egypt, 
where he can study his requirements as to staff and signal communica-
tions. I think that his responsibilities and staff should be on the lines 
outlined in a letter addressed to G(S.D.) by the Commander, Home 
Forces (HF/6086/R.A.C.).
With regard to the command of 7th Armd. Division., I feel that 
General Creagh has had a long time in the desert and in some ways will 
need a change. His experience as the Commander of the only armoured 
division that has seen considerable active service should be of great value 
in England, and I would like to recommend that General McCreery18 and 
General Creagh change places. I particularly suggest General McCreery 
because he has knowledge of conditions in the Western Desert.
With regard to the H.Q. 1st Armoured Division, I understand that 
the remainder of 1st Armd. Division will probably leave England in 
October, arriving in Egypt in December. I would be very grateful if 
the Commander, Staff and Signal of 1 Armd. Div. could be sent out to 
arrive in Egypt not later than the first week in October. I have no means 
of improvising a commander and staff for a second Armd. Division out 
of my resources in Middle East and feel that a second divisional H.Q. 
might be required before the arrival of the remainder of the 1st Armd. 
Division.
I would be most grateful if you could see your way to agreeing to 
these requests.
I would like to make it quite clear that I am not trying to oust Creagh 
against whom I have nothing whatever. Should you agree to exchange 
him, I think it must be made very clear that he is being sent home 
because you wish to make use of his unrivalled experience to train your 
new tank formations.
Thank you very much for all your kindness.
JRL, AUC 292
18 Major General Richard McCreery, Major General AFV, Middle East.
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Sir John Dill, CIGS, 16 August 1941
I hope you had a pleasant trip with no alarms or excursions and that 
you were able to get a rest. I want to thank you most sincerely for 
all your kindness and help, and for your hospitality to Phillpotts19 
and myself. It made a lot of difference being so well looked after 
and so comfortable. I would not have missed those ten days for 
anything in spite of the rushing about and talking! We had a very 
good journey back and no mishaps, though we were delayed for a 
night at Plymouth.
2. I am sending you today a wire about command in the Western Desert 
and I hope you will approve of my proposals. I realise very well that 
I am taking a risk in removing commanders who have fought in the 
desert, and that my suggested replacements, except McCreery, are 
new to that part of the world. In spite of this drawback I think the 
changes should be carried out. I feel in my bones that the windows 
and doors need opening very wide so that fresh air and new ideas 
can enter, and I believe that this would more than offset any initial 
and temporary lack of local knowledge in the new men.
3. Beresford-Peirse should I think be moved, partly because I do 
not think he is really suited to that kind of fighting and partly 
because I feel that his prestige has suffered as a result of the last 
battle. All the same he has many good points and would I think be 
a useful commander in the Sudan, which is not yet by any means 
a backwater; he is quite young still and has a reputation from Sidi 
Barrani and Keren. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to agree 
to his going to Khartoum. On the whole I’d rather have him there 
than Nosworthy20 I think, and his local knowledge will be valuable.
4. Creagh should have a change, I am now quite sure of this. He has 
been at one job and in one atmosphere for too long. Here again I 
think that we must avoid any suspicion of “stellenbosching”, as he 
has a great record and vast experience. I hope you will be able to 
19 Captain A. B. Philpotts, Auchinleck’s aide-de-camp.
20 Lieutenant General Sir Francis Nosworthy.
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give him a division at Home. I am not prepared to recommend him 
for a Corps at present. I hope you will be able to spare McCreery, 
but if you cannot, I will think again. As you know he has been in 
the Desert and knows the conditions. He would be welcomed here 
with open arms.
5. Cunningham I have now met as he came up here with Smuts, and 
from what I have seen of him and heard of him, I feel that he ought 
to fill the bill very well as G.O.C.-in-C Western Desert. The South 
Africans who will be under him, know him well and think a lot of 
him, which cannot fail to help. He will bring a fresh brain to old 
problems which I feel are getting a bit stale and fishlike. In view of 
the Prime Minister’s strong advocacy of Wilson for the Western 
Desert, I have sent him a private wire today telling him that my final 
choice is Cunningham, I hope he will understand. I am quite sure 
that Jumbo21 is better where he is and I have a very strong feeling 
that Lyttelton agrees with me. I want you to know that I have been 
thinking very hard over this problem as I realise how essential it is 
to have the right man in the right place. It means everything. I am 
handicapped by my lack of personal knowledge of most of those 
concerned, but I am convinced that I am right, and have now no 
further doubts in the matter. My mind cleared today and I came 
out of the fog into clear weather! I now want to go straight ahead 
and get the new men into their stride as soon as I can.
6. Holmes22 should, I think, be all right in charge of the “Coast Corps” 
whose job it will be to mop up and break down the resistance of 
enemy strong places. We will give him his own Corps Staff and 
make a new staff for Cunningham out of Beresford-Peirse’s present 
staff.
7. We have occupied Jiarabub and our Long Range Desert Patrols 
have been putting in some really good work forward of El Agheila.
Tobruk too has its tail well up, and I hear that the 18th Cavalry 
(Indian Army) have been doing particularly well against the Italians 
on their front. This goes home to you by Shearer,23 who is due to 
21 General Henry Maitland Wilson.
22 Lieutenant General William Holmes.
23 Brigadier Eric James ‘John’ Shearer, DMI, Middle East.
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leave tomorrow evening for a short visit. If you can spare the time, 
I think a few minutes with him would interest you.
I will write again very soon on more general topics.
JRL, AUC 295
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Cipher message from Field Marshal 
Sir John Dill, CIGS to Auchinleck, 20 August 1941
MOST SECRET
MOST IMMEDIATE
NEW ZEALAND PRIME MINISTER has had information from various 
sources which leads him to doubt if FREYBERG is right man to command 
NEW ZEALAND Division. While Mr. FRASER likes FREYBERG 
and is keeping an open mind this is causing him grave anxiety. It is clear 
that NEW ZEALAND’s only Division of such splendid men must have 
a really good Commander. Could you let me have your opinions which 
I could communicate to Mr. FRASER and if Gen. AUCHINLECK is 
not (rept not) satisfied I will ask him to initiate a confidential report.
JRL, AUC 297
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, CIGS, 23 August 1941
1 (.) Many thanks for your telegram 85411 (85411) 85500 (85500) 85583 
(85583) 85614 (85614)24 (.)
2 (.) Agree to PLATT25 succeeding CUNNINGHAM would be grateful 
for immediate official telegram appointing him (.)
24 This suggests code that could not be properly deciphered.
25 Lieutenant General Sir William Platt, GOC in C East Africa, 1941–45.
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3 (.) Also request at the same time official appointment BERESFORD 
PEIRSE to SUDAN where he should remain Lieut. General (.) 
Will help me if notification these appointments is made in press 
at same time (.)
4 (.) GODWIN AUSTIN26 will command EAST AFRICA tempo-
rarily and sequence of relief will be GODWIN AUSTIN relieves 
CUNNINGHAM who relieves BERESFORD PEIRSE who 
relieves PLATT who takes holiday in EAST AFRICA or U.K. 
and then relieves GODWIN AUSTIN (.)
5 (.) About GOTT (.) Have been very seriously considering him for 
command 7 (7) Armd Div but most anxious there shall be no repeat 
no suspicion that CREAGH is being displaced hence my desire to 
represent change as transfer of commanders between home and 
this theatre (.) Am very willing to appoint GOTT but would beg 
that CREAGH be given new equivalent or better appointment 
and that this be announced first or at least simultaneously with 
GOTT’s appointment (.) Consider it most important from point 
of view my personal influence I should not be regarded as firer of 
tried commanders on large scale (.) Would help me tremendously if 




Letter from Major General Hastings Ismay, 
Chief of Staff to Minister of Defence27 
to Auchinleck, 28 August 1941
My dear Claude,
I am taking the opportunity of John Shearer’s return to send you a 
line. It has been valuable to have him here; and he had a long and useful 
talk with the P.M., which he will of course tell you about.
26 Lieutenant General Alfred Godwin-Austen, then commanding 13 Corps.
27 Winston Churchill combined the roles of Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence, 1940–45. The post of Minister of Defence gave him an overview of the 
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The P.M. thoroughly enjoyed his visit to the President, and has 
returned full of health and energy. He was, on the whole, pleased with 
the results, and is particularly delighted at having established such an 
intimate personal contact with Roosevelt. I dare swear that they admire 
each other immensely. Personally, I cannot help being a little disap-
pointed. It is true that the Joint Declaration, if read carefully, is a very 
weighty document, but I had hoped that America would take a more 
definite and more dramatic step towards full participation. We’ll never 
get a third of the production for which they have the potential until they 
are in the fight.
I shall be very interested to hear about your impressions of Smuts. 
Everything that he has said and done since the war started seems to 
stamp him as a very wise old bird. Incidentally – and this is, I think, 
a justifiable breach of confidence – he was loud in your praises in his 
private wire to the P.M.
Your telegraphic appreciation met with a mixed reception. The C.O.S. 
entirely agreed with it, and said so emphatically; but the P.M. went all 
over the ground that he traversed during that stormy meeting before our 
visit to Chequers, and marshalled exactly the same arguments. At the end 
of it all he seemed – temporarily – resigned, but, like Rachel, refused 
to be comforted. You needn’t worry at all that his confidence in you has 
been impaired. I know it hasn’t; but I do advise you most earnestly to 
write him a long private letter, telling him your hopes and fears more 
fully and freely than is possible in a telegram or even in an official letter.
The point that you want to get over above all others is that a tank force, 
which has not got superiority, cannot take as much or as little as it likes 
of a fight: and that if it starts off with the idea of making the enemy use 
up his substance, it may quite easily get knocked out. Isn’t a tank battle 
in these days quite like a naval battle, than a land battle of the last war? If 
so you might paint your picture in those colours. I’ve tried to, but failed!
Another point is this. He was quite hurt that you applied epithet 
‘appreciable’ to the reinforcements of the M.T. that you have recently 
had from the U.S.A. If you had said ‘M.T. from the U.S.A. is coming 
along splendidly; but the demands of modern armies in desert warfare 
are so insatiable that we are still short’, you would have made your point 
and he would have been perfectly happy. As it is, he regards the epithet 
work of the service ministries: Admiralty, War Office and Ministry of Air, which 
continued to function, under their own cabinet ministers.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   191 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
192
‘appreciable’ as a reflection on or at least a grudging acknowledgement 
of the efforts and sacrifices made at Home to keep you well supplied!
But the main point is – do write him long personal chatty letters 
occasionally. I know that normally you would recoil in your modesty 
from doing so. But he isn’t a normal person (Thank God), and these 
aren’t normal times.
I’m so sleepy Claude; and brain and hand are very tired. So forgive 
this very disjointed and illegible scrawl.
I think of you a lot in your immensely responsible job; and like all 
your friends, I’m supremely confident of your success.
JRL, AUC 303
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Letter from Winston Churchill to 
Auchinleck [n.d., but August 1941]
I was depressed by receiving your Telegram No. 1549, in which you 
spoke about no action before November and advocated patience. It is 
not a question of ‘impatience’ or ‘patience’ but of balancing risks, which 
are grievous either way.
I was also chilled by your remark that M.T. was now arriving in 
“appreciable quantities”; because my figures show me you have received 
in June, July and August over 18,000 trucks, while in the same time the 
enemy have not received above 1,700.
However, I have had the advantage of several long talks with General 
Shearer, and he has explained to me for my most secret information 
something of what you have in mind, the look of which I like very much. 
I agree that it would be worth waiting for something like that, providing 
the enemy and the general march of events allow it. It looks much more 
likely than it did when you first took over the Command in M.E., or 
even when you were here a month ago to-day, that the necessary time 
for thorough preparation and massing will be given us. The Russian 
resistance is impressive, and it seems almost certain that Hitler will be 
entangled in the Russian miscalculation and morass during the whole 
winter. This will be hard for him on account of our bombing in the West 
and of the difficulties supplying his vast army in the East, which will, I am 
assured from Russian sources, be subjected to strenuous counter-attack. 
All reports tend to show no increase in the German Africa Corps, and 
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that their health and conditions are far from good. The maintenance of 
this force by Germany and Italy in Africa is costly, and as we sink 25 per 
cent. of their convoy shipping and damage another 10 per cent., I agree 
that it is doubtful whether they will be able to maintain a substantially 
larger force than they have now got upon the ground. There remains the 
serious danger of their rapid reinforcement by Air, tending to deprive 
us of our Air superiority, so painfully acquired. However, here again the 
Russian prolongation and the German Air Force losses of that campaign 
give further reassurance. It may therefore be possible that you will have 
the time you need or demand. General Smuts, with whom I have been in 
correspondence, was favourably impressed by all you told him in Cairo.
You are I am sure aware of the dangers of delay, and the very high 
price which may have to be paid for it. It is inexplicable to the general 
public that we should remain absolutely inert during these months when 
the enemy is involved in Russia; but I can assure you I am only looking 
at the merits of the Middle Eastern problem, and not worrying about 
public opinion here, which I believe I can guide. It is on those merits 
that I am sure you will feel that every day that could be saved would be a 
diminution of risks of the situation altering to your detriment. However, 
I say no more on the point, as I am sure you must after all our talks see 
the case in all its bearings.
Meanwhile, I have set in motion a good many things which should 
help you. First, the whole of the 1st Armoured Division will be sent, 
and should be with you by mid-November.
The fact that this powerful reserve will be approaching should make 
you more free to throw all in when the time comes, because even in the 
event of failure (and no one can guarantee success in a great battle) you 
would have additional means of defending Egypt against counter-stroke 
by a damaged and weakened enemy. Secondly, the 250 Bofors guns are 
on their way, so that you should be able to have a proper moving ‘flak’ for 
your columns and assembly points. As this consignment is additional to the 
regular supplies, I trust it will not be inroaded upon for the static defence 
of ports, but will be used to liberate the Air Force for its main strategic 
and tactical contribution to the battle. [annotation?] Thirdly, in order to 
hamper the enemy’s accumulation of supplies, I have arranged to send our 
last four suitable submarines from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean 
and for two additional Blenheim Squadrons to operate from Malta. This 
should greatly increase the stringency of the enemy’s supplies.
While, however, we thus try to turn off the tap by which the enemy’s 
barrel is filled, can you not make it leak more freely by boring holes in 
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its bottom? Tobruk should surely be the scene of ceaseless wearing down 
action, our troops being relieved in a manner not open to the enemy. 
I still feel that here is a place where the I. Tank with its short range might 
play an important part. It is not a question of moving far out into the 
Desert, or capturing El Adem at this stage, but simply of forcing the 
enemy to fire off his scanty ammunition and use up the life strength of 
his troops, cumbering himself also with wounded. An endless gnawing 
action developed from Tobruk would seem to be in harmony with all 
your larger conceptions. Now we can see how foolish were those who 
thought Tobruk should have been given up, and what a decisive strategic 
part is played in the defence of the Nile Valley.
I hope you are reconstituting the Commandos as we agreed, and will 
make them and their landing vessels play their part.
Persia has gone extremely well, and you must now feel very great 
reassurance for your Eastern flank. I find it difficult to believe that Turkey 
will be attacked by Germany while the Russian situation is so tense and 
heavy. Nor can I feel that the Turks will allow Germans to walk about 
their country or through it. The renewal of the Staff conversations is 
important, and we must do all we can to magnify their scope. I am trying 
very hard to obtain shipping from here and the United States to send 
two more division from here to the Middle East, arriving in December 
or early January. Whether I shall succeed is not yet known.
I am also considering an additional reinforcement of the Middle East 
Air, having regard to Persia and the Caspian, by drawing on the fighter 
strength available for home defence (now 100 Squadrons) after the 
invasion season has passed. It is of the utmost importance to gain Turkey 
at any rate so far as is necessary to make her maintain a forbidding and 
resolute neutrality against German passage or intrusion. If we can be 
sure of her as a solid oblong pad impassable by the enemy in the North, 
that is almost as good as if she were fighting and drawing heavily upon us.
Arrangements must be made at once to improve the railway from 
the Persian Gulf to the Caspian. General Wavell, who will be with you 
as soon as this letter, I hope, has a plan for doubling the metre-gauge 
railway by the Spring. I am having the whole problem examined here 
with extreme priority, and hope to telegraph fully about it next week.
You are no doubt apprised of the remarkable strength of the Russian 
naval force in the Caspian Sea, and of the reports we have had that they 
are gathering a very large reserve army behind the Volga. Our endeavour 
must be to give them a good through railway route to the warm water 
of the Persian Gulf, along which United States supplies can flow in an 
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ever-broadening stream during 1942 and 1943. The great half-circle 
from the mouth of the Volga to the Western Desert with Turkey as a dull, 
stubborn bastion of its centre, should prove a barrier to the Nazi conquest 
dreams in the East. It is the shield of India, for which her troops may 
rightly be used to keep war from the Indian peoples and their homes.
All this brings me back to the Western Desert. The destruction of 
Rommel’s army and Italian auxiliaries is by far the greatest military event 
open to the British arms in 1941. It justifies the greatest sacrifices and 
hazards. The defeat of a German corps by the British will have resounding 
effects in every land. Indeed, no one can measure the benefits that might 
flow therefrom. Once you have settled your Western flank satisfactorily 
by destroying the armed force of the enemy, it seems unlikely they would 
try the same game again. All your armies would therefore be free in 
conjunction with Wavell’s to give their right hand to the Russians, and 
to animate or even draw in the Turks. Nothing can compare with this, 
and you may be sure that we shall back you to the utmost, well knowing 
the hazards and disappointments of war.
You are I am sure as you told me always reviewing the position of 
the 50th Division in Cyprus, which is clearly affected by any improved 
attitude in Turkey and any reinforcement of our Air Force in Syria.
I am very glad you sent General Shearer home at this time, and the 
talks I have had with him have added to my confidence in you and all 
your plans.
With every good wish
Believe me
P.S. Perhaps you will show this letter to the Minister of State to whom 
I have mentioned it.
JRL, AUC 305
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 23 October 1941
Thank you very much for your letter of 16 October, which I have shown 
to the Minister of State.
I am not and have not been unduly anxious about the air situation 
in spite of the way in which the relative strength of ourselves and the 
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enemy may have been displayed from time to time. Unless there is a 
tremendous disparity one way or another, which does not seem likely 
in this particular case, I feel that the gaining of a reasonable degree of 
superiority, which I feel is the most one can legitimately expect in the 
circumstance, is more a matter of leadership, skill and general efficiency 
than of numbers.
I have confidence in the ability of Tedder and his subordinate 
commanders to do what we require of them, and I am glad to be able 
to think that the confidence of the Army generally in the R.A.F. in this 
theatre, which was somewhat shaken after the campaigns in Greece and 
Crete, is now restored. The co-operation between the two Services is 
very good and I hope that they understand each other’s capabilities and 
the limitations much better than has sometimes been the case in the past.
As regards estimates of opposing strengths, I feel that one must 
always consider the worst possible case and state it, though one need not 
necessarily be overawed by it when making plans for future operations. 
Figures can be made to prove anything, but I do not think we have allowed 
ourselves to be governed by them.
I have sent you a telegram replying to the observations on the second 
page of your letter, and I now confirm what I said in it.
Air Chief Marshal Freeman’s28 visit has been of the greatest value 
to us, especially in connection with WHIPCORD.29 I will not conceal 
from you that I view this project with a certain amount of misgiving, 
because of the timing of it. I would feel much happier if I knew that I 
could complete the task you have given me first, before having to divert 
energy and resources in another direction.
I fully realise the need for speed in this new project and the magnitude 
of the prize to be gained, should it be successful. Nevertheless, an 
operation of this kind demands the most careful planning and preparation 
and the possession of really accurate information.
So far as we are concerned, I shall find great difficulty in finding 
sufficient troops adequately trained for the purpose. As you know I 
have devoted all my available resources in men and weapons to give 
Cunningham all he wants for CRUSADER and I have little left except 
the Australians who cannot be made available, even if they were trained 
for the business, which they are not. I am not making difficulties, but you 
know I have stripped everything else for CRUSADER and to provide a 
28 Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, Vice Chief of the Air Staff.
29 A planned invasion of Sicily.
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division without weakening CRUSADER is going to be a tricky problem. 
The use of troops without special training for an operation of this kind 
is, in my opinion, out of the question. A brigade is just starting training 
at our instructional establishment. The course lasts from two to three 
weeks, and there is only sufficient equipment to train one brigade at a 
time. Other brigades have been through this course before but they are 
now irretrievably committed elsewhere and cannot be extricated without 
seriously dislocating CRUSADER.
With regard to the sequel to CRUSADER, now called ACROBAT, 
I fully realise the need for speed and the avoidance of delay, and I assure 
you again that there will be no avoidance delay. All the same, no advance 
can take place until adequate supplies of petrol, ammunition and other 
supplies can be accumulated and carried forward, and this must take time. 
The distances to be covered are great and the means of transportation 
scanty. General Cunningham and all others concerned have been firmly 
impressed with the imperative necessity for haste and for improvisation 
to overcome the very real difficulties of maintenance.
I hope that Brigadier Whiteley has been able to give you the infor-
mation you desire.
This morning I saw the first Medium American tank to reach this 
country. It had just reached our tank testing establishment at Abbassia, 
having come from Suez by road under its own “steam”, a good distance 
of about 80 miles, in 4 or 5 hours, which is very good going for a monster 
of this kind.
It is a most formidable looking affair – very high when compared with 
our Infantry and Cruiser tanks which as you know, are rather squat. Its 
height may be held by some to be a disadvantage but I do not attach 
any real importance to this myself. I spent an hour or so crawling about 
it and having its parts explained to me by Major Colby, the U.S. Army 
expert who is helping us here. He had a major part in the designing of 
this tank and was very interesting and instructive to listen to.
Its armament is most impressive and looked to me to be exceptionally 
well arranged for ease of control and use generally. This tank is what we 
have been waiting for to enable us to “see off” the German tank which 
mounts a field gun, as so far we have nothing comparable to this. This 
medium machine with its .75 mm field gun .37 mm anti-tank gun in the 
turret, and its three .30 machine-guns, to say nothing of its anti-aircraft 
machine gun, looks to me to be a first class answer to anything the Germans 
have so far produced, and its speed on the road and across country is 
remarkable for its weight and size. It has, of course, the rubber tracks 
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and these may need watching, in the light of our recent experience with 
the tracks of the American light tank in a certain type of stony ground. 
However, forewarned is forearmed and on most types of ordinary ground, 
the rubber tracks have proved an outstanding success. The engine is 
similar to that of the light tank whose reliability and ability to keep itself 
out of the shops are still the wonder of our tank units.
We want as many of these medium tanks as we can get and I wish we 
had some for CRUSADER. However, they will be all the more valuable 
later on and I grudge our having to surrender some of our allotment 
to the Russians, but we all realise the necessity for this. What we need 
are units containing a judicious mixture of American light and medium 
tanks in a proportion of about two to one.
The complete relief of the Australians in Tobruk is reaching its final 
stages and so far, I am glad to say, has been carried out without casualties. 
The Navy have been magnificent in the way they carried out this difficult 
and hazardous operation. General Morshead of the Australian Forces 
who has conducted the defence from the beginning, hands over his 
charge to General Scobie, the commander of the 70th Division, which 
has relieved the Australians, tomorrow.
I am sure you would like to express your appreciation of General 
Morshead’s fine work, but for the time being, we must not, for reasons 
of secrecy which will be obvious to you, make any public announcement 
concerning the change over of the troops composing the garrison.
I shall in due course recomment General Morshead for an appro-
priate reward.
The final withdrawal of the Australians from Tobruk will enable me 
virtually to complete the concentration of the Australian Imperial Force 
in Syria and Palestine. There may be a few odd and unimportant units 
remaining in Egypt, but that is all. This should please the Australian 
Government, though I have reason to believe that the Australians 
themselves view the Tobruk affair with mixed feelings. We have sent 
the Czech battalion to join the Poles in Tobruk – this meets the wishes 
of both parties and will provide a valuable reinforcement to the garrison.
JRL, AUC 403
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, CIGS, 
24 October 1941
You will have had the cabled views of the Commanders-in-Chief on 
WHIPCORD, to which I naturally have subscribed. All the same, these 
communications are necessarily always in the nature of a compromise 
and I would like to give you my views in my own words.
I am of the opinion that the conception of this operation is sound and 
the advantages likely to accrue from its successful execution are great. 
I do not, however, agree that the conditions laid down as requisite for its 
success are in any way likely to be fulfilled before the date suggested for 
its execution. Moreover I consider that it would be wrong to attempt this 
operation before we have cleared the enemy out of NORTH AFRICA 
and stabilised the situation in ANATOLIA and the CAUCASUS. 
I consider these objects vital to the future successful prosecution of the 
war and that any diversion of effort from them would be most unsound. 
Once these objects have been achieved we may be able to consider the 
undertaking of an offensive against the enemy in Europe, but even then 
not until he is so seriously embarrassed and committed elsewhere as to 
make it impossible for him to use his interior lines to concentrate greatly 
superior forces, and especially air forces, against our attack.
We are now at last coming within sight of the time when we may 
expect to have air and land forces of a quality and quantity which hold 
out a reasonable hope of our being able to strike a really hard blow at 
some vital but weak joint in the enemy’s armour but these forces are 
NOT yet ready neither can we be sure that our bases in the Middle East 
are reasonably secure from enemy attack. The strategic situation in this 
theatre must, I feel, be viewed as a whole and a premature offensive in 
SICILY is sure to affect adversely not only North Africa but also the 
entire Asian front. I consider therefore that to attempt this operation in 
the immediate future would be strategically most unwise and likely to 
undo the steady progress recently made towards the building up of forces 
adequate for the carrying out of long term plans scientifically conceived.
JRL, AUC 406
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal J. C. Smuts, 27 October 1941
Very many thanks for your letter of 17 October which reached me on the 
24th. I am most grateful to you for your explanation of your wishes in 
regard to the allotment of the new eight-wheeler heavy armoured cars 
and I will see that they are observed.
Thank you too for your remarks about the future employment of 
South African forces. I understand the position and I will not let any 
consideration of this nature stand in the way of their training and eventual 
equipment as armoured units: I do not think that any impression to the 
contrary has gained credence and we will be careful to see that it does not.
Moscow still holds out I am glad to say and the news if anything has 
been better from that part of the front for the last few days. I agree with 
you that the steady and rapid German advance towards the Caucasus is a 
matter for grave concern on our part. We are watching this development 
very carefully, and General Wavell recently flew to Tiflis to consult 
with the Russian commander in that region. On his way back to India, 
he came to Cairo to give the Defence Committee here the result of his 
enquiries. I cannot say that they were reassuring. So far as he could 
judge, the Russian forces in the Caucasus are not strong, neither are 
they properly organised for defence. In fact there seems to be a lack of 
organisation and planning. This is a serious state of affairs which was 
reported at once to the Chiefs of Staff.
The Caucasus is not in my sphere of control but in that of Commander-
in-Chief India, as it is inseparable from control in Persia, and Wavell is 
sending his C.G.S. at once to continue conversations with the Russians 
and to try to produce a co-ordinated plan. I on my part, am considering 
ways and means of sending help to the Caucasus. As you so rightly point 
out, the Caucasus front is of supreme importance to us. It is of little 
use holding our ground in Egypt and Syria if we are to be outflanked 
by a movement through Iraq and Persia, which I am convinced is what 
the Germans will try to accomplish. I am fully alive to the danger and 
always have been once I took over the command in India last January. 
You will realise of course the effect on our Western front in Libya of our 
having to detach any substantial forces, air or land, to the east, before the 
next phase is completed. I hope this will not be necessary, for if it does 
happen, our position will be difficult as you point out.
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I am thoroughly impressed with the value of the time factor and 
am working to pretty narrow margins, I assure you, so as to avoid any 
semblance of avoidable delay. I too trust with you that the authorities 
in London realise how much depends on this front, and also that they 
thoroughly understand that it cannot be treated except as one indivisible 
whole, of which all parts are interdependent. There are occasions when 
I wonder if this aspect is always kept in view, and I am very sure that 
anything which you can do to stress the paramount importance of it, will 
be of the utmost value. I am continually stressing it myself.
Theron30 leaves tomorrow for a visit to you and I hope he will take this 
letter with him if I can get it ready in time. He has just come back from 
the Desert and brings a very good account of your divisions. They have 
made a great name for themselves here already, although they have had 
little fighting in this part of the world as yet. Their bearing, behaviour 
and general attitude are most praiseworthy and have created a great 
impression on all those who have come into contact with them. I need 
not tell you how proud I am to have them under my command.
I have it in mind to ask you to send up a senior staff officer, your 
Chief of Staff if you can spare him, and if not, perhaps his deputy, 
so that I can inform him personally concerning future policy and 
the probable course of events. I would have given this information 
to Theron, but the moment has not yet I think arrived. I would like 
the information I wish to give you to be as up to date as possible, so 
that you can yourself have the fullest possible grasp of the situation 
and be able to read between the lines of the official summaries which 
I know you receive but which are necessarily brief and deal with past 
happenings only. If you could hold a responsible officer in readiness to 
leave at short notice on receipt of a private telegram from me, I would 
keep him here for a day or two only.
Alternatively, if this arrangements is not convenient to you, I will 
send one of my own staff officers down to you. If you would prefer this 
will you please let me know.
Every one is in good heart, and, I feel, quietly confident about the 
future. The American tanks are coming in well, and we are overcoming 
the usual crop of obstacles, which never cease to spring up like weeds 
in our path.
30 Major General Frank Theron, the South African senior liaison officer to GHQ , 
Middle East.
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Your letters are a great inspiration and encouragement to me and I 
hope you will find the leisure to continue to write to me from time to time.
JRL, AUC 410
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Letter from Winston Churchill to 
Auchinleck, 30 October 1941
Brigadier Whiteley has been a great help over here and will be able to 
give you a full account of our affairs. I have also to thank you for your 
three interesting letters which were a real pleasure to read and to receive.
Everything seems perfect now and I can only hope and pray that the 
weather will not change in the interval. For us that interval is trying 
as we have nothing to say to Russia, to the United States or to many 
enquirers here. However, it may be that the luck will hold and certainly the 
destruction of the enemy armour will open the door to many possibilities.
At present we have scarcely any military credit and it is little use talking 
to the United States, to Russia, to Spain, to Turkey or to Weygand. Should 
success attend your efforts, I shall try my utmost to win the last-named 
factor by the offer of a substantial force and I am not without hopes of 
obtaining American support. I fully agree with Middle East that the 
acquisition of Bizerta, and all that would imply, would be the best of all. 
But we have no right to count upon it.
I was very sorry to give up WHIPCORD. The Chiefs of Staff were so 
keen upon it and so were the appointed Commanders. It was, however, 
perhaps “a task beyond the compass of our stride”. For the reasons I gave 
in my telegram to you, I do not think the opportunity will remain open.
Whiteley will tell you of my talk with him. You need not worry about 
the last 1,000 Australians in Tobruk or let their relief complicate your 
future plans. They can come out by the front door instead of the back. 
I also think that you ought to make sure of having some refreshment 
from Malta during ACROBAT.31 Whiteley is going into this with Dobbie 
on his return. Even if you look at it as no more than an extra insurance, 
it would be prudent.
31 Acrobat was the codename for an operation designed to exploit ‘Crusader’ by an 
advance into Tripolitania.
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I am going to have an enquiry for my personal information into the 
tragical lack of contact between the War Office and the Ministry of 
Supply on the one hand and Middle East reception on the other about 
the front axles of the 22nd Armoured Brigade. This is not so much for 
the purpose of fixing responsibility as for avoiding a recurrence of such 
break-downs. Considering the many months over which tanks have 
been passing from us to you, it is astonishing that no one at your end 
thought of saying “We distrust all your axles and are fitting our slabs to 
strengthen them thus taking (so many) days”; or that no one from our 
end arrived with the tanks able to answer all your questions and to give a 
good warrant. On such mishaps the fates of battles and of empires turn.
I am greatly cheered by what the Brigadier has told me of the way 
in which you are concentrating all your power upon the destruction of 
the enemy’s armour and of his armed force generally. Here is the true 
principle. “…… seek ye the kingdom of God; and all these things shall 
be added unto you”, or, as Napoleon put it, “Frappez la masse et tout 
le reste vient par surcroit”.
JRL, AUC 415
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, CIGS, 
8 November 1941
1. I am afraid I have not written to you for some time, but things have 
been a bit hectic and I have been going about a good deal. Besides, 
Jock Whiteley will have told you all the news worth hearing!
2. I have just got back from a three days tour in the Western Desert, 
where I found everyone in very good heart. No undue exuberance 
or optimism, but a very cheerful and happy atmosphere, and an air 
of quiet confidence which I found most inspiring. Moreover, the 
general standard of physical fitness is truly remarkable. Everybody 
looks so well and feels so well, quite different to this sink of a city, 
where the air is always dead and the smells are always with one! 
I went forward to the 4th Indian Division which is, as you know, 
in the front line opposite Sollum, and met Frank Messervy and 
some of his commanders and staff officers – also a few of the men 
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of various units. In the forward area, it is virtually impossible to 
see anything of the men, as the distances are so vast and dispersion 
so tremendous. It has to be seen to be believed. In the armoured 
units, it is usual to find the men messing by tank crews, each little 
party cooking their own grub and living always beside their vehicle. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the curve of the Earth’s surface 
prevents you seeing from one edge of a battalion area to another! It 
makes discipline a little hard to maintain sometimes, but it certainly 
develops imitative and self-reliance.
I had a day with Godwin-Austin and spent the night at his 
headquarters in the desert. He is in good form and quite sure of 
himself. I like him and think he is good and sound in his views. I also 
met Gott, who seems quite happy and confident in his brigadiers 
and troops – he gives me tremendous confidence.
3. The next day I had a good look at the railway which really has 
made and is making the most remarkable progress. They are 
laying well over two miles a day, and aiming at three! They can’t 
go much further, however, or they will be through the outposts. 
It is being done by the New Zealand construction companies, 
very ably helped by three Indian labour companies, about whose 
keenness and efficiency the New Zealanders, who are super-efficient 
themselves, cannot say too much. A very happy combination, all 
working like a piece of clockwork. The organisation of the work is 
really very good indeed, and they deserve a great deal of credit. It 
is extraordinary that the enemy air has never tried to interfere with 
the work, as railhead is always a good target, with its construction 
train, strings of lorries and great gangs of labourers. Thank goodness 
they have been left alone. When I was there the rails had reached 
a point due south of Sidi Barrani, and they had only a few miles 
left to do, before beginning to form the railhead lay out.
4. I also on the same morning had the pleasure of turning on the 
water at the head of the pipeline, which is another very creditable 
achievement and one which has had to overcome many obstacles. 
There have been attempts to sabotage it by putting obstructions 
in the newly-laid pipes at night. We suspect Libyan labout gangs, 
but have not caught anyone yet. However, not that it is all joined 
up, it ought to be all right. Everyone in the Desert is down to a 
ration of ¾ gallons of water a day, which isn’t very much. No baths 
or anything of that sort! However, they seem to get along all right, 
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though washing clothes is a difficult problem. They look clean 
enough anyway, and those near the sea can always get a bathe as 
the water is still fairly warm.
5. I lunched with Brink32 and his staff in their dugout at Matruh, and 
it was then that I heard for the first time of his training difficulty. 
As you will realise, I was most upset and my first reaction was a 
flat negative. However, after hearing what Willoughby Norrie and 
Alan Cunningham had to say, I realised that it would not do to give 
Brink a direct order to work to the original date, although he, of 
course, said he would do this if I ordered it. I sensed very strongly 
the psychological side of the matter, which is particularly important 
when dealing with that particular formation, and I became quite 
convinced that that course of action would be unsound, having 
in mind the tremendous issue that hang on the success or failure 
of the 30th Corps in what may be one short battle. So I then told 
Cunningham to explore at once the possibility of substituting the 
4th Indian Division or the New Zealand Division for the South 
Africans. The 8th Army Staff worked all night at this, and said that 
the substitution of the 4th Division was a possibility. I rejected the 
idea of the New Zealanders, as they are all trained and set with the 
“I” tanks for their own particular job. Substituting the Indians had 
many disadvantages, apart from the inevitable dislocation it would 
cause in arrangements already made. Chief of them would have been 
the loss of extra fire power and, particularly, of the armoured cars 
which are such a striking feature of the South Africans’ organisation. 
It was for these very characteristics that I originally cast them for 
the role they are to play.
After much and very anxious thought I agreed to let Brink 
have three days extra in which to carry out divisional exercises in 
desert movement. There is no doubt that this is a most complicated 
business for large formations over long distances, and he, like 
everyone else, has been working against time. The trouble is that 
these movements cannot be practised seriously unless all vehicles 
are at full strength, and may of his, through no fault of anyone’s, 
were late in reaching him. I told Cunningham to find out if he 
was prepared to give an assurance that the extra days would allay 
his doubts, and he has said in writing that they would. I know that 
32 Major General G. L. Brink, GOC 1st South African Division.
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the first criticism that springs to one’s mind is why was not this 
discovered earlier. The only reason I can give is that with an ordinary 
formation it certainly would have been, but these South Africans are 
curiously reticent and secretive. I gather they work very much by 
committees and everything is turned over and discussed at length 
before being brought into the open. It is a most disconcerting trait, 
but I do not see what can be done about it. I know from experience 
of trying to get down to hard facts on their future organisation and 
man-power potentialities, how difficult it is to get anything definite 
out of them. Don’t think I am decrying them, for they are grand 
chaps and all out to co-operate, but their ways are not our ways. 
However, both Alan Cunningham and Norrie both wanted to keep 
the South Africans where they are, even at the expense of the extra 
time, and I agreed, after explaining the matter fully to the Defence 
Committee on my return to Cairo. I know how distasteful my 
decision will be to Whitehall generally and to the Prime Minister 
in particular, but I weighed all these things before making it, and 
am sure that I was right, all things considered.
6. During my stay in the Desert, I saw a lot of the New Zealanders and 
Freyberg. They and he are in tremendous form, and extraordinarily 
fit. Freyberg has taken an immense amount of trouble with their 
training, and his methods are very thorough – safety precautions do 
not deter him from realism in training and he is quite right. One or 
two men blown up during training may save the loss of hundreds 
later on. The whole formation is most throoughly organised and 
prepared, and I doubt if you could find a better trained or finer 
division anywhere. They have masses of reinforcements too. The 
other day at Maadi, their base camp, I inspected 5,000 men on 
parade, all reinforcements. I wish I could say the same for our own 
units!
7. The rubber tracks of the American tanks are not so bad as we thought 
they were going to be. When they first began to go, they looked 
awful, and I was very anxious about them. Since then, however, 
we have found that they have a tremendous lot of life left in them, 
even though great chunks of rubber have come off them. I gather 
that you have found the same at home.
The axle arm controversy still rages, and I still think that we 
were right to take no chances, particularly as we did not really get 
a clear line from the Ministry of Supply people at home. We have 
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not got so many tanks that we can take chances on some of them 
being all right while others may not. I hope it will be possible to 
clear the matter up now once and for all. The Prime Minister 
seems to think that we were slow in getting them off the ships, 
but I have been into this and it is not so. I was rubbing it in to all 
concerned for weeks before they arrived that everything must be 
done to get them on shore quickly. Tanks stowed with all sorts of 
other cargo above and around them must wait their turn before 
they can even be got at.
By the way, these new little cars – “Bantams” I think they call 
them – are absolutely first-class: they are exactly what we want 
and have the motor cycle beaten into a frazzle! We can do with as 
many as you can give us.
8. I am sending home Macleod33 from our Combined Training Centre 
to explain our urgent requirements in craft and equipment. I know 
we shall want all we can get some time, and I hope, next year. We 
have not got nearly enough yet, not enough for really thorough 
training. I have, I hope, at last put a stopper on the use of landing 
craft as lighters for taking stores to Tobruk, or unloading ships, 
and our new Directorate of Opposed Landings will, I trust, see 
that our equipment is not misused in future. An Admiral – Baillie-
Grohman34 – is chairman of the Directorate, and Macleod is on it. 
They are a strong combination. If you can find time to see Macleod 
I would be grateful, as he knows the business from A to Z – no one 
better.
9. Marshall-Cornwall35 is not too pleased, I fear, at his translation from 
here. I shall be sorry to lose him in many ways, and he certainly 
knows all about Egypt. I sent you a wire suggesting that Holmes36 
might replace him. Riddell-Webster, who would have to work very 
closely with him, would like Holmes, and I would welcome him too. 
I cannot see much prospect of his having a corps to command in 
the near future, though he is doing useful work at present, planning 
33 Probably Colonel Roderick MacLeod.
34 Vice Admiral Harold Baillie-Grohman who was attached to the Staff of GOC 
Middle East, 1941.
35 Lieutenant General J. H. Marshal-Cornwall was removed as GOC in C Egypt on 
12 November 1941.
36 Lieutenant General William Holmes, then commanding 10 Corps. He replaced 
Marshall-Cornwall as GOC British Troops, Egypt on 13 November 1941.
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defences in Syria. I realise there may be reasons for not appointing 
him, but it would suit if you could see your way to letting me have 
him.
10. I shall be sorry to lose the 50th Division, but realise that it is 
badly needed where it is going. I hope you will bear in mind the 
replacement of it before the Spring, because in certain eventualities, 
such as the non-completion of “Acrobat”, I may find myself a bit 
short, should Anatolia come into the picture, as it very well may. 
It does not look to me as if the Free French “divisions”, which are 
really only brigade groups, are going to be of very great value.
The Navy and our “Q” people did very well, I think, to effect 
the change over of the 50th and 5th Indian Divisions so rapidly. 
The onward move of the 50th depends entirely on the availability 
of mechanical transport, which you will realise is not too easy to 
provide, having in mind the needs of “Crusader”. We will do our 
level best, however, to accelerate the movement.
11. Some people are making what I think is heavy weather over the 
question of command on the northern front. I can not see myself 
that there is likely to be any difficulty, if the proposals put forward 
in our J.P.S. paper are accepted. There must be an inter-command 
boundary somewhere. The more I study it the more convinced I am 
that it would be wrong to try and make this headquarters control 
operations in Iraq, Persia and Caucasia. The converse also holds 
good – that is, India cannot control operations in Syria and Anatolia. 
I know that there are quite a number who think otherwise, but I 
have thought a lot about this matter as you know, even so long ago 
as March when I was in India, and I feel that I am right. Given 
commonsense and the will to co-operate, I can see no difficulty 
about it. Troops can be moved quite freely from one command to 
the other on your instructions, as been been proved several times 
already. The move of the 5th Division to Persia, and now of the 
50th Division are good enough examples. I do not think there was 
any stickiness about them – nor will there be in the future, provided 
your operations staff at Home are completely in the picture and 
can balance the essential needs of each front.
12. I am glad you are sending Watson out to look into staffs out here. 
We haven’t really got the time to do it ourselves.
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13. I must stop now, and I don’t think I’ve got very much more of 
interest to tell you. I have had a foul cold for the last four or five 
days but it is going now I hope. Sikorski37 has arrived; I didn’t go 
to meet him because of my cold, and haven’t seen him yet, but he 
is dining with me tonight. I don’t think we shall be able to put him 
into Tobruk unless he prolongs his stay. He has arrived here at just 
the wrong phase of the moon, and our services are suspended for 
the time being!
P.S. I enclose a statement which I think will interest you. It shows 
conclusively that, so far as actual numbers are concerned, “British” 
troops, i.e. troops from the U.K., exceeded troops from the Dominions 
in Greece and Crete, and suffered much more heavily than they did. 
I realise that a good many of these “British troops” may have belonged 
to administrative units, but I do not think that is really material. In view 
of the ideas so often expressed about the “sacrifice” of Dominion troops 
in these operations, you may like to use these figures.
While I am on this subject, I saw a criticism in the Press recently 
regarding our use of the term “British” troops. The argument was that 
all our troops are drawn from the British Empire or Commonwealth, 
whichever you prefer, and that the proper term to denote what we have 
always called “British” troops is “United Kingdom troops”, or, if you 




Letter from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 8 November 1941
Very many thanks for your letter of the 30th October, which reached me 
by the hand of Brigadier Whiteley when he arrived here on the 5th of 
this month. I am indeed glad that he was able to be of some help to you; 
I look on him as a most able officer.
37 General Władysław Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile 
and C in C of the Free Polish Forces.
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I am afraid that this further postponement of Crusader must have 
been a blow to you, and I can only say that I am deeply grieved to have 
had to add this further anxiety to your already heavy burden. I ask you 
to believe me when I say that I do realise what this delay of three days 
means to you, and that I would not have inflicted it on you had I not been 
certain in my own mind that it was necessary and, in the circumstances, 
unavoidable. I am very much upset myself, chiefly because I feel that I 
must have caused you bitter disappointment.
I became aware of General Brink’s doubt as to the readiness of his 
division – the 1st. South African – for its task on Monday, when I was 
visiting the troops in the Western Desert. His fears were based on what 
he considered to be the insufficient training of the division, and one of 
its brigades in particular, in mechanised movement in open formation 
in the desert. This insufficiency of training was said to be due to the 
fact the the full scale of vehicles for the division had not been issued to 
it by the date on which they had been promised. He was quite honest 
about it, and said that he was prepared to go into battle on the assigned 
date if I ordered him to do so, but that he would not feel confident in 
himself or his division.
The first question I asked myself was why was this lack of confidence 
[was] not disclosed before, and the only answer I can find is that General 
Brink, in common with many of his fellow countrymen, is secretive 
and reserved by nature. Their disinclination to commit themselves to a 
definite statement is very marked, as I have found out for myself in my 
dealings with them on other matters. They are magnificent men, but 
they have their own peculiar traits. The Corps Commander, General 
Willoughby Norrie, might have found out the state of affairs, but, as 
you know, he has only recently been appointed and has been very fully 
occupied in organising his headquarters and in supervising the training 
of the armoured brigades of his division, with the result that the South 
Africans have been left rather to themselves.
As you may imagine, this disclosure of unreadiness or alleged unread-
iness gave me a great shock, and I investigated [it] at once on the spot 
with Generals Cunningham, Brink and Willoughby Norrie. I came to 
the conclusion that the psychological effect of forcing General Brink 
to go into battle without his having full confidence in himself or his 
division might be disastrous. As you know, everything hangs on the 
action of the Armoured Corps, of which the 1st. South African Division 
is an integral and important part with a difficult role to play. So much 
depends on the result of this action, which may be decided one way or 
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   210 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
211
another in the course of a few hours, that I felt could not risk any grave 
weakness in the machinery. I told General Cunningham, therefore, to 
investigate at once the possibility of substituting the 4th Indian Division, 
which is in the front line facing the enemy at Halfaya and Sollum, for 
the South Africans. His staff worked all night at this and reported next 
morning that it was possible, at the cost of much dislocation of existing 
plans and arrangements. The 4th Indian Division is very well trained 
and ably commanded, and I considered this alternative very carefully, 
but eventually discarded it.
My reasons for discarding it were chiefly because the 1st South African 
Division has always been a fully motorised division with its own armoured 
car regiment and a quota of armoured cars in each individual battalion 
as well. It is also much more heavily armed with mortars and machine 
guns than the Indian Division. Generals Cunningham and Norrie both 
pressed for the retention of the South Africans in their original role for 
the reasons I have given.
I also considered the substitution of the New Zealand Division for 
the South Africans, but rejected this because the New Zealanders have 
an important role of their own to play, for which they, and the heavy 
tanks which are to work with them, have been very well and intensively 
trained by General Freyberg.
In the end, with the greatest reluctance and with bitter feelings, I agreed 
to a three days’ postponement, which General Brink assured General 
Cunningham would just give him time to carry out the extra full scale 
exercise he wished to do to complete his training. He originally wanted 
six days. That is the whole story, a most unsatisfactory one I feel, and 
one that has affected me deeply.
As soon as I got back to Cairo – the next day – I explained the whole 
affair to the Minister of State, who was most helpful, though I failed to 
convince him that I had done the right thing. However, the responsibility 
was mine and no one else’s, though I naturally had to obtain the concur-
rence of the Admiral38 and Air Marshal39 before giving the final order.
I fear you had another disappointment over Whipcord. We here gave 
the project our most careful consideration, although we were only junior 
partners, so to speak, in the enterprise. I am quite sure myself that the 
scheme is a perfectly sound one, and I have had it in mind as a future 
possibility for some time. I am distressed to see that in your opinion the 
38 Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, C in C, Mediterranean.
39 Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, AOC in C, Middle East.
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opportunity is not likely to remain open. I venture to hope that it will. 
We are continuing to plan for it at any rate, as we feel that it might have 
great possibility in certain eventualities. We understand that Bizerta can 
not be counted upon.
We are going thoroughly into the matter of refreshment from Malta 
during Acrobat, but it looks to us at the moment as if we can do anything 
which Malta might be able to do rather better than they can. We are not 
being ungrateful or conceited, but the factors affecting such an operation 
seem to favour it being done by us. We are examining all the possibilities 
– the unreliability of the weather in that region at this season is the most 
disturbing feature, but we will leave no avenue unexplored.
General Sikorski has arrived. I am much taken with him, and we 
have had an interesting talk. We will help him as much as we can. He 
is anxious to visit his Poles in Tobruk, but this is a bright half of the 
moon, and we are not running any ships into Tobruk at present. I think 
it will be possible to get the remaining Australians out of Tobruk without 
prejud[g]ing Crusader in any way. In fact it might be a valuable piece 
of “cover”.
I have had a cordial telegram from the Prime Minister of New Zealand 
thanking me for some information I was able to send him.
The controversy about the axle arms of the Cruiser tanks of the 22nd 
Armoured Brigade is a most unsatisfactory one, and I am glad you are 
going to hold an enquiry into the affair. I have made all the enquiries 
I can here, and, though we may not be altogether free from blame in 
that we did not represent the matter as urgently as we might have done 
perhaps, I am satisfied that our people here acted in good faith and were 
genuinely convinced that the strengthening was necessary. We have not 
so many tanks as yet that we can afford to take risks with them. As I have 
mentioned before, the matter was represented from here some months 
ago, but possibly through the wrong channel. However, they are all done 
now and in service.
I spent three days with Cunningham and his Eighth Army and saw a 
great deal. I am glad to be able to report to you that everywhere I went 
I found an excellent spirit and no sign of doubt. Commanders and men 
were alike in their cheerfulness and quiet confidence. The vast majority, 
of course, do not know when or where they will be required to fight, but, 
unless my knowledge of men is very much at fault, they are ready to go 
anywhere and do anything. I feel great confidence too in the Commanders 
– Generals Cunningham, Godwin Austen, Freyberg, Brink, Messervy, 
Willoughby Norrie and Gott, who leads the 7th Armoured Division. It 
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is on these last two, and their tactical ability on the day of battle, that 
everything hangs. It is a solemn thought, which is always with me, that 
this should be so. It is, I think, a unique condition which could only 
obtain, to a such preponderating degree, in this particular theatre. It is 
much more a condition of pertaining to sea warfare than to land warfare 
as known to us hitherto. It is, I suppose, a revival of the days when the 
issue was decided by the clash of the armoured knights, but it is very 
much a matter of all the eggs being in one basket! However, as I have 
said, I have full confidence in the commanders and their troops.
While in the Desert I had the good fortune to be able to see seven 
battalions of the New Zealand Division, as they are still in the rearward 
area. They are a magnificent lot of men and I was much impressed by 
them and their officers. They have been finely trained and organised 
by General Freyberg. It gave me great pleasure to present the ribbon 
of the Victoria Cross to one of their officers who gained it in Crete. We 
have now had a stock of ribboned brooches made up, and as soon after 
an award is made possible, the recipient is presented with the ribbon on 
parade. The moral effect of this ought to be good for every one.
In the forward area I was immensely struck by the very high standard 
of concealment and camouflage generally – the 4th Indian Division are 
particularly good in this respect. The degree of dispersion of men and 
vehicles is really astonishing: one never sees more than two vehicles 
together and the next pair will be hundreds of yards away. A group of 
more than six men is a rarity. These results betoken a high standard of 
intelligence, discipline and training, which is most gratifying.
I saw the railway being pushed forward at a great pace – two and a 
half miles a day, which is, I understand, a remarkable performance. The 
work was being done by New Zealand engineers and Indian Labour 
Companies, commanded for the most part by old Indian officers and 
non-commissioned officers, brought back to service from pension. The 
whole outfit were working together in the most perfect harmony and in 
the most cheerful spirits. The organisation of the work was remarkable, 
and most inspiring.
I also had the privilege of turning on the tap at the head of the pipeline 
which stretches back for over 300 miles. They are severely rationed for 
water in the Desert, the daily allowance being three-quarters of a gallon 
a man a day for everything. Those who live by the sea are lucky as they 
get a bathe now and again. Those inland have to very careful in their 
ablutions! However, they are all of them in excellent health and wonderful 
spirits. To meet them is a tonic in itself.
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The organisation of the staffs and headquarters is, so far as I could 
judge in a brief visit, very good, and the liaison between the Army and 
the Air Force is excellent. The Intelligence Service is, I think, most 
efficient, and, I believe, considerably superior to the enemy’s, judging 
by what we can deduce from the results of his efforts.
We believe that the main part of his armoured force, the two German 
divisions, is still between Tobruk and Bardia, but we have had no positive 
information of them for some little time now. He is lying very close. We 
think we know pretty accurately the dispositions of the Italian troops, 
including their one armoured and two motorised divisions.
Our air force has been doing excellent work lately, not only at sea and 
in Italy against his ships and harbours, but also against the enemy depots 
and ports in Cyrenaica. I am quite sure that every available aircraft is 
being employed to the best advantage.
The weather has been extremely warm for the time of year, quite 
unpleasantly so, but this can not last long.
JRL, AUC 428
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Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 16 November 1941
I have it in command from the King to express to all ranks of the Army 
and R.A.F. in WESTERN DESERT, and to the MEDITERRANEAN 
Fleet, His Majesty’s confidence that they will do their duty with exemplary 
devotion in the supremely important battle which lies before them.
For the first time British and Empire troops will meet the Germans 
with an ample equipment in modern weapons of all kinds. The battle 
itself will affect the whole course of the war. Now is the time to strik[e] 
the hardest blow yet for final victory, Home and Freedom. The Desert 
Army may add a page to history which will rank with BLENHEIM and 
with WATERLOO.
The eyes of all Nations are upon you. All our hearts are with you. 
May God uphold the right.
Ends.
You should use this message [if and] when and as you think fit.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   214 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
215
I gave a copy to AOC in C who will take to Coningham + inform 




Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 23 November 1941
MOST IMMEDIATE.
One. Most grateful for your appreciation which I realise is given 
under necessary reserve. Personally I like the look of things and share 
your confidence. Prolongation of battle must wear down enemy with 
his limited resources. I shall not broadcast Sunday night as decision is 
not immediately in sight. I have sent an epitome of your last message to 
President.40 Remember I am waiting moment to appeal to President to 
tell VICHY FRANCE it is now or never and to make boldest offer for 
aid in FRENCH NORTH AFRICA from U.S.A. and BRITAIN. I hope 
this moment may come within next week.
Two. [I?] think [I will?] tell troops “Enthusiasm for magnificent fighting 
and manoeuvres of Desert Army rising high here at home and throughout 
Empire. Your Countrymen and comrades in British Army, R.A.F. and 
Royal Navy are watching from hour to hour. We are sure you will shake 
the life out of the enemy in this famous battle!”
JRL, AUC 449
40 F. D. Roosevelt, President of the USA.
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Gist of Conversation between C-in-C 
[Auchinleck] and GOC-in-C Eighth Army 
[Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham] on 
evening 23 November 1941 (Brigadier Galloway, 
BGS Eighth Army, also present)
G.O.C.-in-C. 8th Army told C-in-C that as a result of our losses in 
Cruisers and American tanks during the past five days, the enemy was 
now probably superior to us in fast tanks which enabled him to attack 
and over-run our infantry without interference from our tanks.
This gave rise to a situation in which it might be possible to turn the 
southern flank of our forces in the SIDI REZEGH area and cut them 
off from their base. As the Army Comdr had by this time practically 
nothing in reserve, this meant that there might be nothing to oppose an 
enemy advance into EGYPT.
In these circumstances General CUNNINGHAM had thought it 
his duty to ask the C-in-C to visit his H.Q. so that he might learn the 
situation at first hand, and decide whether it was necessary to break 
off the battle and adopt a defensive attitude or continue the offensive 
with the object of destroying the German armoured forces. The Army 
Commander pointed out that a continuation of the offensive might result 
in our having no fast tanks left at all.
The C-in-C replied that he had no doubt whatever that our only 
course was to continue our offensive with every means at our disposal 
and that he wished the Army Commander to act accordingly.
JRL, AUC 454
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Auchinleck to Lieutenant General 
Sir Alan Cunningham, 24 November 1941
1. Having discussed the situation with you and learned from you the 
weak state to which 7 Armd Div has been reduced by the past five 
days fighting, I fully realise that to continue our offensive may result 
in the immobilisation, temporarily at any rate, of all our Cruiser 
and American M.3 tanks.
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2. I realise also that should as a result of our continued offensive, the 
enemy be left with a superiority of fast moving tanks, there is a risk 
that he may try to outflank our advanced formations in the SIDI 
REZEGH – GAMBUT area and cut them off from their bases in 
EGYPT. I realise also that in this event, there would remain only 
very weak forces to oppose an enemy advance into EGYPT. On the 
other hand, it is clear to me that after the fighting of the last few 
days, it is most improbably that the enemy will be able to stage a 
major advance for some time to come.
3. There are only two courses open to us:
(ii) To break off the battle and stand on the defensive either on 
the line GAMBUT, GABR – SALEM or on the frontier. 
This is a possible solution as it is unlikely that the enemy 
would be able to mount a strong offensive against us for many 
weeks and would enable us to retain much of the ground we 
have gained, including valuable forward landing grounds. On 
the other hand it would be counted as an Axis triumph and 
would entail abandoning for an indefinite time the relief of 
TOBRUK.
(ii) The second course is to continue to press our offensive with 
every means in our power.
There is no possible doubt that the second is the right and only 
course. The risks involved in it must be accepted.
4. You will therefore:-
(i) Continue to attack the enemy relentlessly using all your 
resources even to the last tank.
(ii) Your main immediate object will be as always to destroy the 
enemy tank forces.
(iii) Your ultimate object remains the conquest of CYRENAICA 
and then an advance on TRIPOLI.
5. To achieve the objects set out in para 4 it seems essential that you 
should:-
(i) Recapture the SIDI REZEGH – LUDA ridge at the earliest 
possible moment and join hands with TOBRUK garrison. It 
is to my mind essential that the TOBRUK garrison should 
co-operate to the utmost limit of their resources in this 
operation.
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(ii) Direct the OASIS Force at the earliest possible moment 
against the coast road to stop all traffic on it and if possible 
capture JEDBAYA or BENINA neither of which are strongly 
held apparently.
(iii) Use the Long Range Desert Group patrols offensively to 
the limit of their endurance against every possible objective 
on the enemy lines of communication from MIDOHILI 
to BENGHASI, JEDBAYA and beyond to the WEST. All 
available Armd cars should be used with the utmost boldness 
to take part in this offensive. The advantage to be gained by a 
determined effort against the enemy lines of communication 
are worth immense risks which will be taken.
JRL, AUC 456
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Letter from Auchinleck to Lieutenant General 
Sir Alan Cunningham, 25 November 1941
1. With the greatest regret I have to tell you that, after the most 
anxious consideration, I have decided that I must relieve you of 
the command of the 8th Army.
2. During my recent visit to your Advanced Headquarters, you asked 
me to give a decision as to whether we should continue an offensive 
against the enemy in Libya, or abandon it. After due consideration 
of the reasons for and against each course, I gave my decision that 
an offensive must be pressed relentlessly, regardless of loss.
3. You loyally accepted this decision and at once gave orders to give 
effect to it.
4. I have formed the opinion, however, that you are now thinking in 
terms of defence rather than of offence, and I have lost confidence 
in your ability to press to the bitter end the offensive which I have 
ordered to continue.
5. I have decided, therefore, to replace you as Commander of the 8th 
Army by Acting/Lieut. General N. M. Ritchie. I request you to 
hand over your command to him on receipt of this letter.
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6. You will realise, I hope, that this is an extremely painful decision 
for me to make. It is all the more painful because I realise that I 




Letter from Auchinleck to Lieutenant General 
Sir Alan Cunningham, 25 November 1941
My dear Alan,
This letter accompanies my official letter to you telling you that I have 
decided to relieve you of your command.
It is no use, I am afraid, my telling you how I hate to have had to do 
this thing, but I must act according to my belief and I have done so. It is 
most painful to me because I like and respect you a very great deal, and 
I never thought that I should have to act in this way towards you. I can 
only assure you that I do so because I honestly feel that it is necessary 
to ensure the total defeat of the enemy in the shortest possible time.
As I have said in my official letter, I have nothing but admiration 
and gratitude for the way in which you have planned and conducted 
the operations up to date.
You will realise, I am sure, that it is most important for the success 
of the campaign in Libya and for the winning of the war as a whole, that 
it should not become public property that you have superseded in your 
command. I realise that this is supersession must be a most bitter blow 
to you, and that I am not entitled to ask favours of you. In the public 
interest, however, I do ask you to agree to being placed on the sick list 
and go into hospital for a period. I know that this will be against all your 
instincts, and that you will hate doing it. All the same, I think you should 
agree to this suggestion of mine, and if I may say so, I think the strain 
under which you have been working for the last three months, and the 
last few days in particular, does provide justification for a rest.
You may not believe me when I tell you that I have nothing but 
sympathy for you, but it is true all the same. I feel my responsibility 
very deeply.
JRL, AUC 459
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Letter from Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Charles Portal, CAS to Auchinleck, 
25 November 1941
I am writing this for your eye alone in the hope that by the time you get 
it the troops will have won the victory they so well deserve and you will 
have the time to consider a problem that affects all of us very closely.
It is about Tedder.41 First of all I would like to thank you very much for 
the support you gave Freeman42 and me in our efforts to avoid Tedder’s 
supersession last month. Your help was decisive and prevented a really 
dreadful mistake being made.
The question is whether, after the battle, we should make a change, 
and I feel that your advice on this will be valuable even if other influences 
prevent my following it.
The first reason in favour of a change is that, as you know, the P.M. 
does not think Tedder is a big enough man for the job. However much 
one disagrees, one must concede that the Prime Minister, with all his 
tremendous cares, ought not to be pressed to retain in a key position 
someone in whom he has not full confidence. This is quite apart from 
the desirability of reducing avoidable friction here which is inevitability 
generated every time the question of Tedder’s “adequacy” comes up.
The second reason in favour of a change is that by sending out Peirse43 
I believe we could affect several improvements in our higher posts. In case 
you do not know Peirse, he is very steady and sound, has much experience, 
both of Command also of the Whitehall machinery in war, knows the 
Prime Minister well and is very good in Council. I could replace him in 
Bomber Command by an even better man for that job and this would 
leave an opening for yet another very advantageous change, and so on!
The only reason I know against a change is that it would be a change 
that might affect you, as I believe you think a lot of Tedder and get on 
well with him. I know he reciprocates such a feeling.
41 Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, AOC in C, Middle East. Winston Churchill 
had been keen to have Tedder removed as AOC in C, Middle East due to a 
dispute about air strength on the eve of Operation Crusader.
42 Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, Vice Chief of the Air Staff.
43 Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, who was then AOC in C, Bomber 
Command. Auchinleck’s wife, Jessie, was to leave him to marry Peirse.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   220 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
221
If he were to be relieved by Peirse, Tedder would get an Air Council 
post (Training) in which he could use his recent experience to very great 
advantage.
I hope he will get a “K” in the new year, which would also help to 
soften the blow that he would fell on leaving his Command, with however 
much glory and for however good a post.
I should like to take action as soon as possible after Crusader because 
of the large number of moves involved and the time they would take to 
affect. I hope you will give me your candid opinion, though as I said 
before, I cannot promise to do what you would like.
Finally, I think Tedder realises that he does not really enjoy the P.M’s 
confidence and he might secretly welcome a change “with full honours”.
If you think that there would be great advantage in your discussing 
this subject with the Minister of State I would have no objection, but I 
am sure you will understand that it would be better that Tedder himself 
should not know that I have written to you about it.
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, CIGS, 
25 November 1941
I got back this afternoon from Advanced HQ 8th Army (.) As result 
my two days visit am convinced CUNNINGHAM no longer fit to 
conduct intensive offensive required (.) In consequence after exhaustive 
consideration have ordered him hand over command to RITCHIE from 
26 Nov (.) Am making RITCHIE LOCAL LIEUT.GENERAL for this 
purpose (.) Request your approval (.) This decision does not r[e]p[ea]t 
not mean that operations have been mishandled up to date or that their 
successful issue has been in any way prejudiced (.) CUNNINGHAM 
most loyal but in my opinion has lost spirit of offensive and consequently 
I have lost confidence in him (.) Would have referred matter to you first 
but every hour counts at the moment.
JRL, AUC 463
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 25 November 1941
1 (.) Thank you most sincerely for your telegram 132 (132) which I 
appreciate greatly (.)
2 (.) Have just returned from HQ 8th Army (.) Issue of battle is still in 
balance but I am convinced that we have only to persist to win (.) 
Enemy is thrusting here there and everywhere in desperate attempt 
to throw us off our balance disorganise our command and cause 
chaos in our ranks (.) He is showing great skill and determination (.) 
All the same he has little behind his effort and so far from all I 
have seen and heard has failed completely to shake the morale of 
our commands and troops who are fighting magnificently (.)
3 (.) The enemy is trying desperately to regain the initiative (.) In this 
he has succeeded in part but locally and temporarily only (.) So 
long as we can maintain our pressure towards TOBRUK the real 
initiative is ours and we can disregard diversion towards SOLLUM 
or MADDALENA or even further east temporarily inconvenient 
and unpleasant as these may be (.) Every effort is being devoted 
to the forwarding of the offensive by the New Zealand Division 
and other troops of 13th Corps towards TOBRUK and I believe 
it is going well (.) While in the forward area I heard of no one who 
was not r[e]p[ea]t not sure that we are going to win (.) There may 
be disquieting episodes but the general situation should remain 
greatly in our favour (.)
4 (.) I have telegraphed to CIGS to say that I have decided to replace 
General CUNNINGHAM temporarily by General RITCHIE 
my present DCGS (.) This is not r[e]p[ea]t not on account of any 
misgiving as to present situation in my mind but because I have 
reluctantly concluded that CUNNINGHAM admirable as he 
has been up to date has now begun to think defensively instead of 
offensively mainly because of our large tank losses (.) Before taking 
this drastic step I gave matter prolonged and anxious consideration 
and consulted Minister of State on my return this afternoon (.) I am 
convinced I am right though I realise undesirability of such a step 
at present moment on general grounds (.) I will try and minimise 
publicity as much as possible (.)
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5 (.) Meanwhile we are making every effort to replace losses of tanks 
and armoured cars and 8th Army are organising defences against 
enemy raids in our back areas such as SIDI OMAR MADDALENA 
and Railhead (.)
6 (.) At same time our light forces to southward have been ordered to 
press forward relentlessly towards enemy L of C MECHILI – 
BENGHAZI – EL AGHEILA and interrupt traffic thereon (.)
7 (.) Have made certain personally that every possible precaution is 
being taken in regard to your special stuff importance of which is 
fully realised by all concerned.
8 (.) Am very much alive to importance of early employment of 1st 
Armoured Division and this is receiving my urgent personal 
attention will cable details later (.)
9 (.) Everyone overjoyed by exploits of AURORA and PENELOPE (.)
JRL, AUC 464
99
Cipher message, Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 25 November 1941
Before leaving 8th Army HQ I issued following message to General 
CUNNINGHAM (,) for wide distribution of troops (.) It may interest 
you (.) Begins (.) During three days at Advance HQ I have seen and 
heard enough to convince me though I did not need convincing that the 
determination to beat the enemy of your commanders and troops could 
NOT repeat NOT be greater and I have no doubt whatever that he will 
be beaten (.) His position is desperate and he is trying by lashing out 
in all directions to distract us from our object which is to destroy him 
utterly (.) You have got your teeth into him (.) Hang on and bite deeper 
and deeper and hang on till he is finished (.) Give him no rest (.) The 
general situation in NORTH AFRICA is excellent (.) There is only one 
order ATTACK AND PURSUE (.) All out everyone (.) Ends.
JRL, AUC 466
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Cipher message, Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, CIGS, 
27 November 1941
Cunningham took blow very well and consented to go to hospital 
ALEXANDRIA where he is now incognito (.) He is NOT repeat NOT 
really ill but his eyes have troubled him and he admits being tired (.) 
Because of eye trouble he recently suddenly gave up smoking which may 
have had something to do with it (.) He can NOT repeat NOT remain 
indefinitely in hospital incognito and I shall be grateful if you will order 
him home (.) Am asking him how he would like to travel (.) I hope he 
may be fit for further employment later.
JRL, AUC 476
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Letter from Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 25 November 1941
My Dear Chief,
1. Arthur Smith44 will have told you of our safe arrival here45 last 
night, and that he was able to get away fairly quickly. Since then I 
have heard that he got back to Alexandria without difficulty.
2. I wish I could discuss the situation with you because writing it is so 
much more difficult to explain ones feelings and repercussions. As 
I see it the major situation in CYRENAICA as a whole is excellent 
from our point of view and all indications are that the enemy is 
getting more and more hard put to it.
3. As regards the local battle field of the Eighth Army; this appears 
to me now to have developed itself into two battle areas:
44 Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle East.
45 HQ Eighth Army.
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a) South-East of TOBRUK, where we are effecting a junction 
with the Garrison.
b) The other is the area MENISTIR – HALFAYA – OMAR 
AZIZ.
Of these two, the former is the chief to us. We must get on there 
for it is essential that we should ease our administrative situation by 
starting to run supplies from TOBRUK. Progress appears to be slow 
but a junction has, I hear now (1000 hrs) been effected between the 
New Zealanders and the TOBRUK garrison at EL DUDA. This, 
I hope, is the beginning of our real success there. In the second 
area the situation is still very confused but I cannot afford to spend 
my time looking backwards towards there to the detriment of our 
operations forward, and this is the line I have decided to pursue.
4. To this end I am putting both the 5th Ind and 11th Ind Bdes under 
command of the 4th Ind Div once more, relieving them at once of 
their present roles by the 2 S.A. Div and any other oddments I can 
find. By thus strengthening up Frank Messervey and handing to 
him the complete responsibility for dealing with the enemy in the 
area MENISTER – HALFAYA – OMAR, I get on with the job 
ahead. (In this connection I send you a copy of a D.O. [Divisional 
Order?] from Frank Messervey which has reached me. Though 
confused, the situation seems to me thoroughly satisfactory.)
5. Godwin Austen is charged, as you know, with the operation to 
effect a junction with TOBRUK and roll up all enemy now facing 
the TOBRUK perimeter. At the moment I am concentrating the 
7th Armd Div to his south flank to ensure that no action by the 
Germans from the East, the South or South-West can interfere with 
the operations to relieve TOBRUK. As soon as I see the situation 
sufficiently stabilised there I propose moving the 7th Armd Div 
wide round to the ACROMA area, where I do not think there is at 
present very much enemy armour; there to round up and disor-
ganize and disrupt, so far as is possible, the Italian forces facing 
the South-West and Western faces of the perimeter.
6. Once this is accomplished, which I hope should not take more than 
48 hours, I intend to form a mobile force of all the American tanks 
and the equivalent of a motorised Gp to move under Strafer Gott 
direct on BENGHASI straight across the desert. Coningham is 
playing on this and proposes to step up approximately five fighter 
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squadrons behind this force. This will then leave me with the N.Z. 
Div and one Armd Bde and one S.A. Bde to continue the advance 
towards DERNA, while Gott’s force is moving on BENGHASI. 
If successful I feel that the enemy may then find himself without 
a base port and that such forces as he had left shut in amongst the 
GEBEL AKBAR.
7. Meanwhile I cannot help feeling that the enemy’s effort in the 
MENISTER – HALFAYA – OMAR area can be successfully dealt 
with by Frank Messervey for the indications are that the enemy’s 
radius of actions from that part of the world is very limited, and I 
feel that we must not allow our eyes to be tied down to this battle 
to the detriment of the major task of destroying the whole of the 
enemy’s forces in CYRENAICA. I have just come back, by air, from 
H.Q. 30 Corps, who are with H.Q. 7 Armd Div near Pt. 172 (4534). 
Everyone in splendid fettle there and the strength of tanks in the 
Div improving hourly. The Div now consists in effect, of the 4th 
Armd Bde with 77 American Tanks, and the 22nd Armd Bde with 
45 Cruisers, but as each hour passes this number of A.F.Vs increases. 
The Armd cars are doing very well and I do not think they have lost 
unduly heavy casualties. I send you copies of two messages given 
me by Willoughby Norrie46 in which I think you will be interested.
8. Finally, everyone’s spirits are at the top here, and I myself feel 
complete confidence in the ultimate issue. I am afraid this is 
somewhat confused as there is little time before the ‘plane leaves 
for Cairo and I have had to dictate it straight off.
JRL, AUC 478
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Cipher message Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 28 November 1941
When I realised CUNNINGHAM was not fit I considered very carefully 
whether I myself should take his place in command Eighth Army (.) 
After much thought I decided against this and appointed RITCHIE (.) 
46 Lieutenant General Willoughby Norrie, commanding 30 Corps. The messages 
mentioned here do not survive.
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I realise well what hangs on this battle but concluded that I was more 
useful at GHQ where I could see whole picture and retain proper sense 
of proportion (.) RITCHIE is completely in my mind and his plans for 
future are exactly what I would do myself in his place (.) As you know I 
am at your service but my honest opinion is that for me to go now and 
supersede RITCHIE might have BAD not GOOD effect (.) I shall go 
forward to visit of course as required.
JRL, AUC 482
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Letter from Auchinleck to Lieutenant General 
Sir Alan Cunningham, 29 November 1941
My dear Cunningham,
I have the longer of your two letters of 28 November which 
reached me this morning. I appreciate very much your desire not 
to embarrass me at this time. I hope you will believe me, however, 
when I say that I am most anxious to help you in any way I can, 
and to give you any information you may require. I will now try 
and answer your queries.
2. I must ask you to believe that in taking so drastic a step as removing 
an officer of your standing and reputation from his command in the 
middle of a most important battle, I did not act hastily or without 
the most prolonged and anxious consideration. The gravity of my 
action and its possible repercussions hereafter were and are fully 
realised by me.
3. As I told you when I was with you at your Advanced Headquarters, 
you did quite right to send for me to visit you, so that you might 
acquaint me with your apprehensions regarding the possible outcome 
of the battle, as a consequence of our heavy losses in tanks. Since 
you had this feeling, it was your duty to tell me of it, and you did.
4. I acknowledged in my letter (No. BM/GO/214/24) that you loyally 
accepted my decision to continue to prosecute the offensive with 
the utmost vigour, and at once gave orders to give effect to it. 
I do not wish to alter this acknowledgement in any way, and I am 
grateful to you for the loyal way in which you accepted my decision. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that you had even considered the possibility 
of breaking off the offensive and standing on the defensive seriously 
perturbed me.
5. I realise to the full the great responsibility imposed on you, and I 
hoped by talking personally to you, and by the issue to you of my 
directive of 24 November, to relieve you of part of the burden of 
that responsibility and to remove the fears you felt as to the results 
which might accrue from the continuation of the offensive.
6. I prolonged my stay at your headquarters in order to give myself 
an opportunity of seeing whether my hopes would be justified. As I 
have already told you, I gave the matter my deepest and most anxious 
consideration, and it was not until I had returned to Cairo on the 
evening of 25 November that I finally decided that I could no longer 
have confidence in you to prosecute the offensive as single-heartedly 
as I wished to see it prosecuted. Having reached this decision I had 
no alternative but to ask you to relinquish your command.
7. Whether I was right or wrong is, and must remain, a matter of 
opinion. If I had not been quite certain that I was right, I would 
never have taken so drastic a step, realising as I did all its implica-
tions and possible consequences.
8. As to the future, I can only say that I sincerely hope and desire that 
you will be re-employed in a position which will give the fullest 
scope for the development of your undoubted talents as a soldier.
9. You express some anxiety that if, unhappily, the battle inaugurated 
by you should not go well, your removal might indicate that the 
sole responsibility was of failure was yours. I can only tell you that 
I alone can bear that responsibility and I shall not hesitate to admit 
it. You may like to know that in my cable to the C.I.G.S. announcing 
my decision, I said “This decision does not mean that operations 
have been mishandled up to date, or that successful issue has been 
in any way prejudiced.”
10. May I thank you once again for the loyal and uncomplaining way 
in which you accepted a decision which must have been a great 
shock to you, and also again express my gratitude for all you did 
to make this offensive of ours possible at all, and for your conduct 
of it in its initial stages.
JRL, AUC 493
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Situation report by 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 
09.30 hours,47 29 November 1941
1. GENERAL
The situation still seems somewhat confused but it appears to 
me quite definite from what happened yesterday that the enemy 
have concentrated all their Armd forces in a desperate effort to 
interfere with the TOBRUK battle and our operations there. So 
far we have successfully managed to frustrate this and inflicted 
considerable casualties on the enemy, though a final decision has 
not yet been reached.
2. TOBRUK BATTLE
This still remains the chief issue on the present battle field and 
we were much hampered yesterday from hereby failure to keep 
communications with 13 Corps and to find out what plan they had. 
It seems now that the N.Z. Div was very short of arty ammunition 
and water and that our attempt to drop arty ammunition from the 
air on the night 27th/28th failed. The reasons I do not yet know. 
As a result of this no major operation was undertaken, by the 
13 Corps yesterday. The necessary convoy to get through water 
and ammunition was laid on in the F.S.D. area south of GABR 
SALEH but owing to the tank battle which continued practically 
all day without cessation in between this place and the 13 Corps 
it was not possible to attempt to run the gauntlet with this convoy 
until after dark. I have still not heard that it is safely through but 
believe that it must be. Early yesterday morning Godwin Austen 
asked for another Bde, and as I think I told you I decided to send 
up the 1st S.A. For the same reason that caused the delay in getting 
the convoy through this party did not leave until dark last night 
and it was halted on the way by order of Godwin, in the vicinity 
of HAGFET-EN-NADURA (4338). Why this halt was ordered 
I do not know, as I will explain to you later we were ourselves 
out of touch with 13 Corps H.Q. However, at about 2200 hrs 
47 Times given are by Greenwich Mean Time.
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last night I made the decision to order it on myself and I believe 
it has now joined hands with 13 Corps to the North. During 
the course of the night the corridor through to TOBRUK was 
enlarged sufficiently to allow of, anyhow, a portion of the 13 Corps 
being supplied from TOBRUK and I know for certain that this 
portion is not less than one Bde group. It was also sufficient to 
permit of the H.Q. 13 Corps moving through into the TOBRUK 
Fortress where it is now established and in touch with us once 
more. So this is good.
3. TANK BATTLE.
Continuing from where I left off yesterday. A further battle 
commenced somewhere about 3 o’clock in the afternoon when it 
was reported that 70 tanks were attacking the Armd Divv, then in 
position about BIR EL-HALEZIN (4439), while a further force 
of 37 enemy tanks was making North West from that place down 
the escarpment apparently with the object of taking the 13 Corps 
in rear. The battle continued in two portions:-
(a) Our 7 Armd Div fighting a party of 70 tanks, against which 
they were successful and inflicted casualties.
(b) A party of 37 tanks attacking the rear of 13 Corps, where they 
were held.
At nightfall the enemy tanks drew off again but I have just heard 
that a further attack was made on the 4th Armd Bde last night, when 
they held their ground successfully and knocked out, at any rate, 5 
more German tanks. Personally I feel that the numbers of German 
tanks reported are exaggerated, for they are now obviously mixing 
up dummy tanks with the real ones. In my estimation there were 
probably not more than some 40 enemy A.F.Vs actually engaged 
in this battle yesterday evening. Last night the strength of running 
tanks in the 7 Armd Div was reported as 45. But I feel that more 
will have been collected in during the night, especially as I have just 
heard that the 4th Bde have 35 runners this morning. In addition 
I have 15 more American M3s on their way up to join this Bde. 
I have not yet been able to discover the fighting strength of the 
22nd Armd Bde this morning. It is quite clear to me now that the 
whole of the maintenance and supply of the enemy Armd forces 
is now being carried out from BARDIA, and Frank Messervey’s 
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best contribution to the main TOBRUK battle will be to stop this 
supply. I issued him orders to this effect.
4. MENISTER – SOLLUM – HALFAYA – OMAR, AREA.
I have now got full details of Frank Messervey’s dispositions here 
and this will be explained by the L.Q. by who this letter goes. The 
main point is, that contrary entirely to our previous supposition, 
the New Zealanders were not masking BARDIA at all. In the fact 
this enemy supply area is completely open and free for the supply 
of enemy armed forces operating further West. The next point 
is that I think Frank Messervey has successfully cleared up and 
opened the area SIDI SULEIMAN (5135) Conference (5233) BIR 
SHEFERZEN (4934), SIDI OMAR, with his mobile forces out of 
this area, and put it in the stop the process of supplying the Armd 
forces from BARDIA, and this I hope he has already done. The 
5th Ind Inf Bde rejoined him yesterday and with those I feel that 
he should be able to cope with the situation. For, other than Armd 
forces of which his area is now apparently clear, the other Italian 
and German troops are to all intents and purposes static and can 
be left to be mopped up later. As I think I told you yesterday, I am 
taking his 11th Inf. Bde into Armd Reserve positioning it in the 
neighbourhood of L.G. 132 on the wire between SHEFERZEN 
and MADDALENA. I am making it one hundred per cent mobile 
as that it can be moved over to reinforce the TOBRUK battle 
concerned or to rejoin Frank Messervey quickly should necessity 
arise. On the whole I am pretty satisfied with the position in his 
area, but everything here really depends on his being able to stop 
the supplies reaching the Armd forces to the West.
5. FORCE “E”
A Liaison Officer arrived in from REID48 yesterday. I send you 
on copies of the reports he brought me. What an excellent show. 
I find it will be of no value to pass his petrol by air because I will 
get it there just as quickly by the convoy which left here yesterday 
morning.
48 Brigadier D. W. Reid who commanded Oasis Force which captured Aujila on 
22 November and Jalo on 24 November. Reid faced serious logistical problems 
as he found little at Jalo. His force remained at Jalo with little petrol and on 
half rations until the 20 December able only to send out light patrols towards 
Agedabia.
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6. I will be leaving for TOBRUK in about an hour’s time and do not 
anticipate being back here until this evening. My chief trouble is 
communications which are far from right in this Army of ours, 
but once I have seen Godwin and got his plan and been able to 
co-ordinate this with 13 Corps I hope for great results. You will, 
of course realise that this armed battle is not yet over, but I have 
managed to send up a few extra tanks and I have great confidence 
in Strafer doing two things:-
(a) Preventing the enemy getting out West.
(b) Completely neutralising the usefulness of their armour to 
the enemy for the future.
JRL, AUC 494
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Medical report on Lieutenant General 
Sir Alan Cunningham by Colonel W. D. D. Small, 
Consultant Physician, 30 November 1941
I examined General Cunningham on 29th November at No.64 General 
Hospital, and ascertained all medical facts relevant to his case.
I was informed that when he was admitted to hospital, on the evening 
of November 26th, he was exceedingly tired and showed signs of strain. 
His long and heavy responsibilities had culminated in a period of about 
a week with practically no sleep. His voice was weakened. When speaking 
he tended to break off in the middle of sentences. He showed a marked 
tremor of the hands.
It appears that about a month ago he consulted an ophthalmologist 
who found a scotoma affecting the right eye. He was advised to stop 
smoking, and did so. It is to be noted that sudden cessation of tobacco 
in a heavy smoker often produces marked irritability and unrest.
Since admission to hospital he has slept soundly each night. At the 
time of my examination, he looked rested, and all signs of strain had 
disappeared except a slight general increase of his deep reflexes. His 
general physical state is good. His voice is normal. The tremor has disap-
peared. He is composed, and very alert and mentally active. There is no 
evidence of any “nervous breakdown”.
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On admission to hospital, General Cunningham was suffering from 
severe physical exhaustion. Fortunately he is making a rapid recovery. 
I consider that he requires a further period of rest, of at least a month, 
before he returns to duty.
JRL, AUC 497
106
Cipher message, Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 30 November 1941
1. Although I have no news from the Front later than your no.1626, 
I cannot help feeling that we are forging steadily ahead against a 
resourceful and determined foe. Thank you so much for your full 
accounts and for your kind good wishes.
2. I may have to make a statement to the House on Tuesday on infor-
mation received to that date, especially if events continue to take a 
favourable turn.
I think it would then be proper, unless you object [?], to disclose the 
change in Command which will by then be more than a week old, and 
the reason.
Statement would be laconic and something like the following. 
“On November 23rd General AUCHINLECK repaired to General 
CUNNINGHAM Advance H.Qs where he remained for three days. On 
November 26th, he became convinced that General CUNNINGHAM’s 
proposed dispositions were not in accord with the principle of relentless 
offensive at all risks and at all costs on which General AUCHINLECK’s 
conception of the battle was founded. General AUCHINLECK therefore 
removed General CUNNINGHAM from the Command of 8th Army 
and replaced him by Major-General RITCHIE.
This decision was immediately approved and confirmed by the 
Minister of State and by me.
Since November 26th therefore, General RITCHIE has conducted the 
battle with skill and resolution under the general supervision of C in C.”
Ends.
JRL, AUC 501
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Situation report by 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 
07.00 hours, 30 November 1941
1. I will not be writing you at great length today as Jock is up here 
and has full particulars of all details that have gone on since I wrote 
to you yesterday morning and he will be able to explain far better 
than I can on paper. Thank you very much for your wire telling 
me that you appreciate these letters and that they are of some use.
2. TOBRUK BATTLE
At present it is difficult to divorce the Armd battle from the 
TOBRUK battle as all are one by virtue of the fact that the whole 
of the enemy’s armour was, last night, thrown into the TOBRUK 
battle while ours naturally enough was there in attendance. I flew 
into TOBRUK yesterday morning where I saw Godwin Austen, all 
in great heart. The N.Z. Div has had a hardish time and suffered 
probably some 1500 casualties in all and as a result of this, it will 
be necessary to pass fresh troops through it to finish off TOBRUK 
and to carry on beyond. I have, therefore, decided to relieve the 
4th Ind Div of its present role and move it forward preparatory to 
undertaking the relief of the N.Z. Div. I will return to this question 
later on. The German wireless was working in clear a good deal 
yesterday, and by virtue of this Godwin was able to get a clear 
picture of the German plan of attack on TOBRUK, which took 
the form of a concentrated offensive with all the armour he had in 
hand. Jock will explain this and how last night, at any rate, the 21st 
Armd Div and AERITE Div was squealing for help. Last night, 
as on the previous one, I did all I could to try and ensure that no 
supplies got through to the German armed forces but of course the 
results of this I have not yet been able to get this morning. I hope, 
however seriously to have disrupted his administrative arrange-
ments. I think there little doubt now that he is maintaining himself 
from BARDIA as this has been borne out by statements of prisoners 
captured yesterday. It was the most tremendous relief to find that 
the convoy of ammunition, water and food had safely got through 
to TOBRUK, replenished the N.Z. Div and freshened them up 
for the battle they had yesterday. It was a great effort running the 
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gauntlet in this way and the credit is due to Colonel CLIFTEN, 
late C.R.E. of the N.Z. Div who is now Deputy Chief Engineer of 
the 30 Corps. A first-class effort. I heard while in TOBRUK that the 
Commander of the 21st Armd Div had been captured and with his 
command car and documents. Before Jock leaves I hope I say get 
more details of the situation as it exists in the TOBRUK area this 
morning. In the night we heard that the New Zealanders had been 
attacked at EL DUDA, ostensibly by an enemy force reported at a 
strength of 55 tanks and one inf bn. Personally I consider that the 
tank strength is much exaggerated. However, the New Zealanders 
had, temporarily, to give up their position on EL DUDA but I 
understand that they retook it again later in the night.
3. BARDIA – HALFAYA – OMAR Area.
The situation here has remained quiet and yesterday, as far as I can 
gather it was clear of enemy A.F.Vs. The enemy troops remaining 
at the moment are static and consist of those in BARDIA, at 
HALFAYA, in the Couveau position and in a small keep about 
Pt.201 in square 4936. They have little t[rans]p[or]t so far as I can 
gather, and I do not think it will be a long time before we collect 
them in. In these circumstances I am taking the risk of moving up 
de Villers’ 2 S.A. Div to relieve 4th Ind Div, thus releasing it to 
move forward to rejoin Godwin for the settlement of TOBRUK 
and the advance beyond. I know it is a risk but it had got to be taken 
as I must get more troops forward to the main battle.
JRL, AUC 503
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Letter from Auchinleck at Advanced HQ , Eighth 
Army to Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, 
CGS, Middle East, 3 December 1941
Yesterday was uneventful, a bad day for the air; low cloud and heavy 
rain made reconnaissance very difficult so we had little or no news of 
the enemy. What news we had showed that he had possibly thrown 
out a screen of small columns – tanks, guns and M.T. – covering his 
troops round SIDI REZEGH from the EAST and N.E. – probably to 
let him clear the battlefield. There were also indications of a move by a 
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strongish column on EL GUBI, but this was not confirmed by our Armd 
cars, which are supposed to be watching this place. I hope he does not 
succeed in re-establishing himself in a point d’appaui there as it would 
be a nuisance. We shall probably hear today.
Freyberg came in to lunch yesterday, looking exactly the same as ever. 
The N.Z. Div (less 5 Bde) fought magnificently, but were over-run by 
the enemy tanks in spite of the fact that they had their own “I” tanks. 
Truth is, I think, that they had become very weak in numbers after their 
own attacks on SIDI REZEGH etc., which were all done at night with 
the bayonet. Freyberg estimates their losses at 4,000 – 5,000, but there 
are no means whatever at present of confirming this – nor did he know, 
I think, how many he actually brought out with him. Quite a number are 
in TOBRUK, including most of the 2nd Line Transport. One battalion 
is still holding BEL HAMED and in touch with the TOBRUK garrison, 
which is holding fast.
The N.Z. M.DS [Medical Dressing Station?] with all their wounded 
was overrun and I suppose all in it (a lot) captured. The Div has lost 
24 guns, but we can replace these at once I imagine? If the 1st S.A. Bde 
could have got to the N.Z. a bit quicker they might very well be there 
now, but this is another story, not to be told now. Neil [Ritchie] is sending 
Freyberg and his remnants back to BAGUSH to reform, and I expect 
A. is already arranging to send up drafts from MAADI. As you know, 
I hope eventually to send the Div to SYRIA, so it is not likely, I hope, to 
have to come back into the line here, but it may as well stay at BAGUSH 
for the time being until we can get the elements of it now in TOBRUK 
out and back. It can help to look after the L. of C.
I enclose a telegram drafted by Freyberg to be sent to New Zealand. 
I presume they have been prepared in some degree already by our 
omnibus telegrams to Dominions? Perhaps you had better show the 
draft to the Minister49 in case he wants to send one to the N.Z. P.M. 
himself. I enclose a draft which I think we ought to send to Puttick50 if 
you agree. It is a pity, but it can’t be helped – its war.
They fought magnificently and inflicted heavy casualties on Germans, 
who Freyberg thinks have had their belly full. He says the carnage on 
SIDI REZEGH is worse than anything he has seen. The Germans 
49 Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of State and Member of the War Cabinet, resident in 
Cairo, June 1941 to Feb 1942.
50 Lieutenant General Edward Pittick, Chief of General Staff, New Zealand, 
1941–45.
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turned their anti-tank guns on to our fellows and literally blew them to 
pieces, while the New Zealanders made a terrible mess of the Germans 
with the bayonet. Freyberg and the remnants of the Div – about 4,000 
– spent the night on the wire some miles NORTH of here – all in good 
heart I believe. They made a most orderly and masterly withdrawal 
from the battle.
Neil [Ritchie] flew into TOBRUK yesterday and cleared up future 
plans with Godwin51 very satisfactorily, I think; I do not want to discuss 
them, even with you, on paper. Godwin is quite confident he can hold 
the “appendix” without undue risk of its being pinched out, which is 
good news. He says it is very strongly held, and they have wire and mines, 
besides quite a number of “I” tanks. In fact, he is starting at once to work 
forward from its WESTERN face towards EL ADEM, which is good. 
He is relieving some of the more tried troops in the salient by the Poles. 
I hope he has sent back von Ravenstein52 to you by this time. Guard him 
well! I gather he told Godwin that they had not been up against fighting 
of this kind before. They haven’t done with it yet!
Neil is handling the affair very well indeed, I think. He is completely 
confident and knows exactly what he wants. I feel myself that the whole 
picture is much more purposeful and much tidier than it has ever been 
before. We have learned a lot and we are going to profit by it.
The situation round BARDIA and HALFAYA is not altogether 
satisfactory, but I am afraid we cannot yet afford the time or the troops 
to clear it up completely. 2 S.A. Div are taking over in this area with 5 
N.Z. Inf Bde under command, and will gradually deal with the enemy 
here, who cannot be very comfortable. I am afraid the enemy still has 
dumps in BARDIA and GAMBUT area from which he can draw, but 
Neil hopes his “Jock” Columns, of which a lot are being organised, will 
deal with this nuisance pretty well, even if they cannot stop it altogether. 
A real cordon is impossible – distances are so vast.
Meanwhile 4 Ind Div, 22 Gds Bde, 1 S.A. Inf Bde, 7 Armd Div, plus 
Armd Cars etc. are concentrating under 30 Corps in area GABR SALEH, 
covered by “Jock” columns and Armd Cars with very definite orders to 
keep in close touch with the enemy all along the front. It looks as is the 
enemy had got all he has in the front window round TOBRUK. There 
is little or no movement in rear of ACROMA.
51 Lieutenant General Alfred Godwin-Austen, commanding 13 Corps.
52 Major General Johann von Ravenstein, commander of 21st Panzer Division, 
captured November 1941.
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Force E (Oasis) should be making its presence felt again soon. I saw in 
the paper that the march of the German prisoners had proved a “flop”. 
Was this so, and, if so, who gets the sack? If it was so, please make them 
do it again at once. I look on this as important as now the Egyptians will 
disbelieve that there ever were any prisoners!
I enclose a draft wire for the P.M., which you can edit or expand if 
you have later information. Please go on sending full telegrams to the 
Dominions.
The tank situation is improving rapidly – 100 with 4 Armd Bde and 
now I believe 50 cruisers with 22 Armd Bde. Trouble is enemy tanks 
won’t close now, but try to draw us on their anti-tank guns.
I have decided, after hearing views of Neil [Ritchie], Willoughby 
Norrie, Gott, that 2 Armd Bde is to come up regiment by regiment 
as ready, manning their own tanks, and train in desert as directed by 
8 Army. This is best, I think, as they could not be in time for the next 
push anyway, and may make all the difference in the following stage. So 
please keep them and all the other units hurrying. You have done wonders 
in sending troops up so quickly and I am most grateful – so is Neil.
Willoughby Norrie and Gott are said to be weary but full of spirit. 
They had a rest (?) yesterday, and may be refreshed now. Anyway, Neil 
wants to keep them and not send them away to rest.
Everybody is in fine heart, no sign of any despondency. I hear nothing 
but praise for 4 Ind Div, which is looked on as a really well-trained 
and experienced div. The S. Africans are not trained and are much too 
unwieldly. Neil has ordered them to reduce their sections and cut down 
their transport. For the present, they are to be used for semi-static 
duties. There is nothing wrong with their fighting qualities – they are 
magnificent in battle – and their armoured cars are first-class – but they 
don’t know yet. They are learning fast.
I shall probably stay here till the 5th at any rate.
The protracted nature of the fighting is a nuisance, of course, but I 
am quite happy and so is Neil. We will get this stinker down where he 
belongs before long I hope.
JRL, AUC 509
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Letter from Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, 
CGS, Middle East to Auchinleck, 3 December 1941
Thank you for your letter written this morning. I have sent off the 
various telegrams – yours to the Prime Minister and the C.G.S. 
New Zealand53 and Bernard Freyberg’s to the Prime Minister New 
Zealand. I showed these telegrams to the Minister of State54 and he 
does not feel that he should cable the New Zealand Prime Minister 
himself as this might cut across a telegram from Winston. We had 
already told the New Zealand C.G.S. that the New Zealand Division 
had had big casualties, and I have kept in close touch with Stevens 
(the New Zealand Brigadier in charge of their Maadi Base) on the 
subject. I got him to go up to Bagush to-day to find out exactly 
what type of reinforcements they want. They are all teed up ready 
to go directly we get information as to units.
2. Delighted to hear that New Zealanders fought so well and that 
their withdrawal was conducted in an orderly fashion. I am not 
surprised to hear this for they were indeed well trained.
3. Twenty-eight guns are already on their way up to the forward area, 
and Maxwell55 is collecting all he can and is in close touch with 8th 
Army regarding their reinforcements. I have impressed on the Staff 
here that we must try and anticipate demands for reinforcements 
and equipment and get them on the way up where possible before 
we get the official request.
4. We have had a request for 2,300 reinforcements for TOBRUK and 
I have just discussed it with the D.A.G. The fact is that there are 
no reinforcements in the Infantry Base Depot for the 70th Division 
and I cannot see any way of producing them. They simply don’t 
exist. You will remember that some 800 infantry soldiers had to 
be taken to drive lorries. If TOBRUK must be reinforced the only 
way would be to send up fresh units, but we are quite unable to 
say where these are to come from. The 2/5 Essex Regiment are at 
53 Lieutenant General Edward Pittick.
54 Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of State and Member of the War Cabinet, resident in 
Cairo.
55 Major General Aymer Maxwell, CRA, Middle East.
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SUEZ earmarked to go to IRAQ in the middle of this month. I feel 
it would be breaking faith with IRAQ if we did not send them as 
we have already had an Indian Battalion from IRAQ in their place. 
We have already had to keep the 150th Infantry Brigade from going 
to IRAQ.
5. Von Ravenstein56 has not yet arrived from TOBRUK. I was interested 
to hear that he stated that he had not been up against fighting of 
this kind before.
6. Delighted to hear you are so pleased with Neil [Ritchie]. He is a 
grand fellow.
7. I am not surprised that the 1st South African Division proved to be 
untrained and inexperienced. I agree with you that they are learning 
fast, but it is rather an expensive lesson. I have had a feeling all 
along that the 1st South African Bde was a bit sticky in getting up 
to the support of the New Zealanders and I shall be interested to 
learn the reason why.
8. I am sorry there was a slip up about the German prisoners. Holmes57 
laid it all on and then one of his Staff officers rang up “A” Branch 
here and was told that marching German prisoners through CAIRO 
was not in accordance with your wishes. He did this on some 
previous ruling when the matter had been raised, and I am afraid 
“A” Branch had not been told what your real views were. I have 
seen Holmes and the D.A.G. and arrangements are being made 
for the next batch of German prisoners to be marched through 
CAIRO next Friday.
P.S. Have just this minute sent a letter from Bill Ramsden.58 He wrote 
from IRAQ –
“Now that you have pinched my 150 Bde Gp, my div[isiona]l recce 
B[attalio]n & long ago my 65 AT regt, I hope you will take the rest 
of us for ‘The War in the West’.
56 Major General Johann von Ravenstein, commander of 21st Panzer Division, 
captured November 1941.
57 Lieutenant General William Holmes, GOC British Troops, Egypt.
58 Major General William Ramsden, GOC 50th Division, 1940–42. Commanded 
30 Corps, July to September 1942.
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“There appears to be no immediate need for us here … I shall 
be most grateful for anything you can do to get this division a show. 
The prospects of a long winter in the plains of IRAQ with no real 
incentive is a dismal outlook”.
JRL, AUC 510
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal J. C. Smuts, 4 December 1941
1 (.) Experience in this battle shows that organization [of] your divisions 
is too overloaded with transport to make it possible for brigades 
adequately to protect themselves against A.F.V. attack at halt or 
on move in desert warfare (.) This leads to undue concentration 
of vehicles which affords favourable bombing target to enemy (.)
2 (.) Commander 8th Army has discussed this with divisional commander 
who agrees and has with my approval directed that both divisions 
shall be reduced as a temporary repeat temporary measure to British 
war establishments in respect of transport and number of men in 
the infantry section (.)
3 (.) Would not have taken this step even as temporary repeat temporary 
measure without asking you were I not repeat not convinced of 
urgent necessity (.) Hope you will agree (.)
4 (.) Your troops are fighting magnificently and your armoured cars in 
rear of enemy round ACROMA are doing most useful work (.) Saw 
DE VILLIERS59 yesterday who is in great form (.) Enemy is still 
fighting but has suffered severely and situation is well in hand (.) 
Am confident of result.
JRL, AUC 513
59 Major General Issac de Villers, GOC 2nd South African Division.
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, 
Middle East, 4 December 1941
Many thanks yesterday for your letter of the 2nd, which reached 
me yesterday.
2. Am keeping John Shearer here for present to act “Rommel” for us.
3. You ask about the “I” tanks. They took part in all the SIDI REZEGH 
fighting, and suffered heavily though they did their job, except 
perhaps in the final show, but why is not apparent. Probably there 
were too few of them by then. They also suffered heavily in the attacks 
on the OMARS, being knocked out at close range by the German 
“88” guns. These are final dual (AA and A/Tk) weapons. I saw four 
of them at LIBYAN OMAR yesterday, captured by 4 Ind Div. 4 Ind 
Div took 59 guns of all calibres in the OMARS. I think this should 
be made known. At the moment the “I” tank position is said to be:-
In TOBRUK 30 odd
In the OMARS 30 odd with 2 S A Div.
Also 24 Valentines60 with 30 Corps at GABR SALEH.
4. I am most grateful for the wonderful way in which you are hastening 
the sending up of reinforcements. Please thank all concerned. It is 
very much appreciated here.
5. I have decided after seeing Neil [Ritchie] and Lumsden61 that 
2 Armd Bde is to come up manning its own tanks. We are all agreed 
in this, and 8 Army are arranging details of move with Lumsden. 
I am sure this is the right course. Please keep P.M. informed of 
progress. Attachment of desert experienced officers and men is 
being arranged. As soon as this phase is over Neil has decided 
to put in Lumsden and 1 Armd Div HQ instead of 7 Armd Div 
HQ , who are getting a bit worn, though full of fight and vigour 
still. Thank you for sending up Lumsden and Lloyd [?]. Lumsden 
knows about Briggs coming up and is going back to Cairo today.
60 The Valentine Tank had armour up to 65 mm thick and a cross country speed of 
8 mph. It carried a 2 pdr gun.
61 Major General Herbert Lumsden, commanding 1st Armoured Division.
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6. Thank you for writing to Alan Cunningham.
7. I enclose a telegram for the P.M. and one for Smuts. I think 
your communique was admirable in view of the very difficult 
circumstances.
8. I saw Freyberg again yesterday at SIDI OMAR, where I went by 
car. He is all right and full of fight. I am hoping that his losses 
may prove less severe than first anticipated, but they are heavy I 
am afraid. Practically all the divisional medical equipment is lost, 
and will have to be replaced somehow. Maybe we will get some 
from the Bosche before long. The 5 N Z Inf Bde at MENASTIR 
is doing well and put it properly across a Bosche column yesterday, 
I am delighted to hear. Forty more Bosche dead! The N Z Div is 
moving back to BAGUSH (less 5 Inf Bde).
9. It is clear that Rommel is concentrating his forces between EL 
ADEM – SIDI REZEGH – ZAAFRAN between the two escarp-
ments, both of which are strongly held and form good positions 
against tank attack. He can move along this corridor and come out 
either EAST or WEST. At same time he seems to be reopening a 
repair and, possibly, a supply area NORTH WEST of GAMBUT. 
Yesterday he pushed mixed columns, including tanks, towards SIDI 
AZEIZ and MENASTIR, but was roughly handled by our “Jock” 
columns and went back apparently.
My own opinion is that he may think we have shot our bolt. 
He has hammered the South Africans and hammered the New 
Zealanders, and cannot think we have much left. He may under-
estimate our tank strength (160 cruisers and M.3s this morning) as 
we have not done much for two days. If he does think this, I think 
he will go for BARDIA – CAPUZZO – SIDI OMAR with a view 
to joining up with the Germans in HALFAYA and establishing 
himself on the flank of the l of c of our main concentration at 
GABR SALEH. He may think that by doing this he can cause us 
to withdraw hurriedly to SIDI BARRANI – Railhead or administer 
the coup de grace. He can then turn and finish TOBRUK at his 
leisure. Against this is the fact that he must have suffered very 
heavily indeed – especially the German troops and Freyberg says 
they destroyed quantities of their equipment in the SIDI REZEGH 
battles. Also he can not have a great number of running tanks.
The R.E. (Kisch) have destroyed a total of 64 enemy tanks to 
date, and this excludes any round EL GUBI or SIDI REZEGH, 
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   243 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
244
where we know he had casualties. However, I still think he may have 
a crack at it as it must look most tempting to him IF he thinks we 
are down and out as he may well do. If he does this it should suit 
us very well, and I do not think he will get very far. At the moment, 
2 S A Div is taking over from 4 Ind Div in the SIDI OMAR – 
CAPUZZO – SOLLUM area. Only one S A Bde (less one bn) 
has got up so far and the delay in getting the second Bde of this 
div is causing Neil (and me) a little anxiety, as it is most important 
that 5 Ind Bde should be released at once to join the remainder of 
the 4 Ind Div under 30 Corps at GABR SALEH. 7 Ind Bde was 
moving from SIDI OMAR yesterday while I was there.
Neil is withdrawing 5 N Z Bde from MENASTIR – BARDIA 
to CAPUZZO – SOLLUM, partly because, though it was in strong 
positions, he felt it was rather exposed and might be a nuisance if it 
had to divert troops to its support, and also in order to release 5 Ind 
Bde in view of late arrival of second Bde of 2 S A Div in that area.
His idea is to hold the CAPUZZO – SOLLUM – SIDI OMAR 
with 2 S A Div having its own two Bdes and 5 N Z Bde plus two 
sqns of “I” tanks. This div will organise as many “Jock” columns as 
possible with the view to maintaining control of country to NORTH 
and NORTH WEST. This strong pivot will remove anxiety as to 
security of L of C and NORTH flank of 30 Corps. If the enemy 
tries any nonsense in that direction, he should get a bloody nose. 
I sincerely hope he will.
Meanwhile 30 Corps is concentrating round GABR SALEH – 
7 Armd Div, 22 Gds Bde (plus Worcesters from JALO), 4 Ind Div, 
1 S A Inf Bde which is to be used in static role guarding concen-
tration area and landing grounds, F.S.Ds [Fixed Static Defences?] 
etc., and to form “Jock” columns using all its armoured cars and 
some of its artillery. The Bde is not really sufficiently trained to 
undertake mobile operations as a formation on its present unwieldly 
organisation. It was a liability rather than an asset in the recent 
fighting. As you know, we are changing the organisation and it will 
rapidly find its feet in this “Jock” column fighting. It is full of guts 
and only needs to learn the job.
Our mixed columns on the whole front MENASTIR – EL 
GUBI are very offensive and will, I am sure, give the enemy no 
rest until we can have at him again.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   244 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
245
10. Tank futures: Within next few days we should have:-
Complete Armd Bde (4th) of Americans
 " Armd Regt (22 Bde) of A.1362 and A.1563
1 ½ sqn of Valentines already in hand to be made up to complete regt.
1 complete regt Matildas64 exclusive those in TOBRUK.
Not so dusty!?
11. TOBRUK is in great form and worrying the enemy’s rear.
I feel we are a little short perhaps of good infantry on the ground 
to confirm and exploit success, but I think we can make do.
12. Last night air force fairly got into the enemy vehicle concentra-
tions round SIDI REZEGH. The Abbacores came along, dropped 
flares, found such wonderful targets that they went back on their 
own and got more bombs! Great stuff! This morning they are at 
it again, bombing and low flying attacks at SIDI REZEGH and 
along the coastal area NORTH of the road BARDIA – TOBRUK. 
They have just intercepted an enemy bomber attack on 1 S A Bde 
and destroyed six Stukas and damaged six more. They really are 
magnificent.
13. I am staying on here for a bit. Its d—d cold but most refreshing 
after Cairo.
14. I enclose a note from Freyberg on the lessons of his battles. I think 
they should go out at once – properly edited of course. Give my 
love (or my respectful greetings) to the Minister.65
15. Telegram for P.M. enclosed
It’s a great life if you don’t weaken!
JRL, AUC 516
62 The A 13 Cruiser Tank had a maximum of 30 mm of armour and a cross country 
speed of 12 mph. It was armed with a 2 pdr gun.
63 The A 15 Tank, more commonly known as the Crusader had a maximum of 
49 mm of armour and a cross country speed of 12 mph. It was armed with a 2 
pdr gun.
64 The Matilda Tank was comparatively heavily armoured, with up to 78 mm of 
armour. However, its slow speed of 6 mph cross country and 2-pdr gun soon saw 
it outclassed in the Western Desert campaigns.
65 Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of State and Member of the War Cabinet, resident in 
Cairo.
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Letter from Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, 
CGS, Middle East, to Auchinleck, 4 December 1941
I have just come back from an extraordinarily awkward interview with 
Alan Cunningham. I think it best to record it at once.
Alan opened by saying “You know, I am not going to take this lying 
down. It may mean the end of my career but I don’t care”.
Thinking he might be going to tell me fully of his intentions I at once 
reminded him that I should have to report our conversation to yourself, 
but he replied that he had no objection.
He then added that he considered, after due reflection, that he had 
been very badly treated. He had never been given an adequate reason 
for his removal, except the state of his mind – “but I ought to know the 
state of my mind better than anyone”. He was emphatic that he was not 
ill, and stated that he had discussed the matter with the doctors who he 
was sure in their heart of hearts knew he was not ill. He said that Small 
(I think he is the specialist) obviously realized he was not ill, but he had 
backed up the junior MOs and would not let them down after they had 
said he was ill.
He complained (perhaps that is too strong a word) that you had never 
given him an inkling that you doubted his ability to carry on efficiently in 
command when you were at Adv HQ 8 Army. He had shown the amber 
light, and in view of the subsequent events of the battle he had obviously 
been right. He had realized the importance of relieving Tobruk, but had 
urged the danger to his L of C etc.
He asked me strongly to represent the impossible position he was 
in while this secrecy about the change of command lasted. He asked 
the reason, and I explained it. He asked when the secrecy ban would 
be lifted, and I said that you would ask the PM to lift it at the earliest 
possible moment that you felt safe in the public interest. He asked the 
terms of the announcement and I told him that the PM had telegraphed 
to say he would consult you first. I added that in view of the difficulty 
of secrecy once he reached the War Office, I hope it would be soon be 
made public. He asked that the date of the change should be announced.
He remarked on more than once occasion that he was only too willing 
to play as regards a secrecy and anything in the “public interest” but 
from other remarks it is clear that he is going to appeal for the case to 
be investigated, presumably to the Army Council.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   246 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
247
He also said that examination by a doctor was thrust upon him and 
had he refused to go to hospital he would never have been classified 
as sick. He went voluntarily at your request, but obviously feels that a 
medical overhaul was not part of the bargain.
So much for our talk.
Now my reactions. I suggest the first thing is to convince him that your 
decision was right. On this point (I forgot to mention it before) I told 
him that I myself could see he was suffering from strain, and that in my 
opinion there was ample reason for you to have had lack of confidence in 
his being able to carry out efficiently the duties of an Army Commander. 
He agreed that if you lacked confidence in him, you were right to remove 
him “but it was done in the wrong way”.
I know you want no outside support to prove you were right, for the sole 
responsibility rests with you. On the other hand if Alan is not convinced, 
then he will talk and it must do harm. Therefore would it be wise to tell 
him that your misapprehensions were shared by five officers of the rank 
of Brigadier and upwards Conyngham,66 Sandy,67 Neil [Ritchie], Nares 
and myself – without mentioning names? Also John Shearer – six.
Next point is the announcement. Is it time to fix up with the PM the 
exact wording? I enclose your suggestion and the PM’s. Also I remind 
you of your statement to the CIGS, for I feel it is important that the PM 
does not say anything contrary to this, of which Alan is aware.
I am sorry you should be bothered about all this just now, specially 
as I KNOW your decision was right.
P.S. I am sending your letters & enclosures to CIGS about Alan back 
with him (by his hand) in flying boat today.
JRL, AUC 518
66 Air Vice Marshal Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham, commanding Desert Air Force.
67 Brigadier Alexander Galloway, BGS, 8th Army, 1941–42.
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, 
Middle East, 5 December 1941
Your letter hasn’t arrived yet, so I am starting this in anticipation.
I enclose draft telegram for P.M. which gives situation as known to 
me here, so I will not repeat in here. If you want to, you can use the 
telegram at your evening conference. You will have heard most of it 
from Sitreps already.
I do not to look too hopefully into the future, as you know, but there 
are signs that he is at least feeling the effect of our continual hammering, 
and as if our sudden and vigorous renewal of the offensive on the whole 
front from BARDIA to EL ADEM and beyond to ACROMA may have 
come as a bit of a shock to him. Anyway, his thrusts towards CAPUZZO 
seem to have been half-hearted and to have petered out under the attacks 
of our “Jock” columns. Of course they may never have been meant for 
anything more than feints. In any event, they represented energy and 
oil expended and he can’t afford to waste these.
The fact that our columns were yesterday within a few miles of EL 
ADEM and SIDI REZEGH and shelling enemy on the roads to the 
NORTH is first-class news and must have made him think a lot. The 
4 Ind Div (11 Ind Inf Bde) and the 4 Armd Bde seem to have done a 
first-class job with the remainds of ARIETE at BIR EL GUBI – a good 
bag. TOBRUK’s repulse of the attack on the salient is great news too, 
particularly as they claim heavy enemy casualties – which are I hope 
mainly German. (Don’t be too optimistic!) It looks as if Rommel may 
after all have thought we were down and out and incapable of further 
offensive action.
These “Jock” columns of which more and more are being organised 
are just what we want, they piquet his movements and give him no rest, 
and are I hope, giving us command of that enormous no man’s land in 
the quadrilateral GAMBUT – BARDIA – OMAR – REZEGH. They 
seem to suit our peculiar genius for fighting, and are certainly going at 
the enemy with the greatest relish and vigour. I can quite understand why 
they suit our chaps. No red tabs! No written orders!! No ruddy principles 
of war!!! (Except hit and have after him). No generals!!!! (Except pretty 
far back). Of course they need close and careful co-ordination if the best 
is to be got out of them, and this means very good W/T communication. 
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This is all being organised and is, I hope, going well. If and when we 
really get the enemy on the run (Don’t be too optimistic!) they will be 
invaluable biting him on his flanks and rear and cutting in in front of 
him. Some armoured cars, a few guns (field and A/Tk) and some lorried 
infantry. I think the Hun finds them somewhat unorthodox.
Neil [Ritchie] flew up to 30 Corps at 8 o’clock this morning, and is, 
I know, ready to take immediate advantage of any change in the situation 
in our favour. The JALO column still had not got its petrol yesterday 
– no one’s fault, apparently, but the going is atrocious. I hope they get 
it today and get a move on. Neil does NOT want this drawn attention 
to just now. As you know he has other plans in hand for BENGHAZI.
I felt yesterday, for the first time since the end of the first abortive 
armoured battle, that the situation was really in hand. We know now more 
or less where we are, and have a very definitive offensive plan. Moreover, 
our reconnaissance and protective arrangements are, I feel, on a sound 
basis and should enable us to keep a proper tab on enemy movement.
As I said in my telegram to the Prime Minister, I am pretty sure 
Rommel will use the last of his armour in an attempt to throw us off our 
balance. He tried before, you remember, and very nearly succeeded. If 
he tries again he will find us very much on our toes I think, and not up 
against the ropes. Neil is very wisely keeping the bulk of our armour 
centrally placed ready to counter-attack NORTH, N.W., or N.E.. It is 
not being tied to the infantry.
I am very glad that the 4th Indian Div is now leading the offensive. 
Everyone seems to think that they are a most competent crowd, and 
yesterday’s show seems to go to prove this.
I enclose a personal telegram to the Dominions which states the 
situation fairly, I think.
P.S. You may expect me when you see me! Meanwhile, I am sure you 
are coping with the various Committees!
I sent you a wire about the Free French brigade. The sooner they can 
come up the better.
JRL, AUC 520
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Cipher message from Auchinleck, 
at Advanced HQ , Eighth Army to 
Winston Churchill, 6 December 1941
1 (.) Most grateful for your 141 (141) 4/12 received here afternoon 
5/12 (.) Am deeply touched and much encouraged by your continued 
confidence and unfailing support (.) I feel situation is well in hand 
and better than it has been for many days (.) We have always had 
strategical initiative and are now in fair way to regain permanently 
tactical initiative which we lost temporarily at SIDI REZEGH (.)
2 (.) Have discussed thoroughly with Gen RITCHIE question of further 
reinforcements (.) Am very grateful for your offer to get Australian 
Government to allow their troops to go to CYPRUS in relief 5 (5) 
Ind Div and for placing whole of 50 (50) Div unreservedly at my 
disposal (.)
3 (.) Reinforcement situation is as follows (.) One fresh Armd car 
regiment arrives at front today from SYRIA and second belonging 
1st Armd Div expected in a few days (.) These should more than 
restore losses suffered in fighting so far and maintain our already 
great preponderance in this weapon (.)
4 (.) 150 (150) Infantry Bde and 50 (50) Divisional Recce Bn already 
concentrated at BAGUSH and at Gen RITCHIE’s entire disposal (.) 
Nearly formed 138 (138) Ind Inf Bde at MATRUH also at Gen 
RITCHIE’s disposal (.)
5 (.) NOT (R) NOT possible at the moment to maintain more infantry 
forward of railhead but this will change when TOBRUK is opened 
as advanced supply base (.) Stocking of TOBRUK by sea in progress 
now (.)
6 (.) Details regarding 1st Armd Div were sent in my SUSAN [cipher 
message] 1636 (1636) (.)
7 (.) Have arranged for Free French Bde from SYRIA to concentrate 
EGYPT soon as possible with view to being used in CYRENAICA (.)
8 (.) New Zealand Div less one inf Bde group in forward area is reforming 
at BAGUSH (.)
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9 (.) 2 S A Div which is NOT (R) NOT fully mobile yet has relieved 
4 Ind Div in area CAPUZZO SIDI OMAR thus releasing latter 
for offensive action further WEST (.)
10 (.) 22 Gds Bde is being strengthened by Worcester Regt brought up 
from SIWA (.)
11 (.) Am making available other odd units from CYPRUS and EGYPT 
to take over duties on lines of communication thus relieving mobile 
units for forward area (.) Am also trying to get Egyptian Army to 
take over protection of eastern portion of our lines of communi-
cation (.)
12 (.) Arrival of 18th Div will materially ease situation and give me 
something in GHQ reserve which I lack at present (.)
13 (.) 50 Div less the Bde and recce unit at BAGUSH is already in IRAQ 
and if brought back is unlikely to reach EGYPT much before 18th 
Div (.)
14 (.) As you realise maintenance capacity our lines of communication 
governs absolutely number of troops which can be employed forward 
but apart from this I am satisfied and Gen RITCHIE agrees that 
number of troops at his disposal should suffice for the achievement 
of the object which as always is the destruction of the German 
forces and then ACROBAT (.)
15 (.) Plans are laid ahead but would rather NOT (R) NOT discuss them 
on paper (.) I do not think therefore we need bring 50 (50) Div 
back from IRAQ or send Australians to CYPRUS particularly as 
I am most anxious NOT (R) NOT to retard defence work now in 
progress in SYRIA (.) If Germans are foiled or delayed in attempt to 
reach CAUCASUS they may be more likely to try ANATOLIA (.)
16 (.) Please do NOT (R) NOT think I am rejecting your advice or that 
I fail to appreciate your offers to help (.) Nothing could be further 
from my thoughts and I am most grateful for everything.
JRL, AUC 522
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, 
Middle East, 6 December 1941
I am afraid my letters and telegrams of yesterday only got off this 
morning which is a nuisance.
2. I enclose two telegrams for Prime Minister which please check and 
edit in light of later information if necessary. The reinforcement 
telegram may require amendment as I wrote it from memory, but 
the sense should not be altered. I shall be glad to know if you agree 
with it. I enclose also a telegram for Alan Brooke which I will be 
grateful if you will send for me.
3. I enclose a slip for my new temporary A.D.C. if Noel could give it 
to him for me and tell him to get the things sent up tomorrow.
4. My telegrams to the P.M. explains I think the battle situation as 
Neil [Ritchie] and I see it. We diagnosed Rommel’s state of mind 
correctly I think. I believe he did think we had shot our bolt and 
that he had won the battle. Our renewed activity and our threat 
to El ADEM has, I feel, caused him to change his mind and take 
thought for his own future. Neil is very quick to diagnose the 
changing situations and he and I are very much in step. Having 
John68 here as an independent interpreter of Von Rommel’s mind 
helps a lot. I feel very confident that we have the situation very 
much in hand though he will do all he can to throw us out of step. 
In fact he is at it now with his armour. If by good luck Gatehouse69 
can give him a real smashing blow to-day and do in his remaining 
tanks we should have a clear run through. It is all teed up. But I am 
not hoping for too much and it may take a little time yet. However, 
the P.M. seems happy. Isn’t he grand? A wonderful chap. All well 
here and everyone fighting like hell. The Air Force is magnificent 
and our Jock columns have been doing awfully well.
JRL, AUC 523
68 Brigadier John Harding.
69 Brigadier Alexander Gatehouse, commanding 4th Armoured Brigade.
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Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 7 December 1941
One. Your 1640. Glad indeed to receive all your news which certainly 
gives me impression we are wearing them down. Do whatever you 
please about reinforcements. Meanwhile I will not address Australian 
Government. I am telling DE GAULLE you will use the Free French 
Brigade which will relieve a somewhat tense situation.
Two. Your SUSAN [cipher message] 1636 puzzled us a good deal 
especially paragraph 5, but this is now explained. The War Office are 
replying about defective wireless sets and FORDSON trucks service 
contend their case is good.
Three. Please give me best estimate possible losses South African and 
New Zealand troops as if they are very heavy, I ought to send telegrams 
to their respective Governments.
Four. MOST SECRET for yourself alone. President has now definitely 
said U.S.A. will regard it as hostile act if Japanese invade SIAM, 
MALAYA, BURMA or EAST INDIES and he is warning JAPAN this 
week, probably Wednesday. We and Dutch are conforming. This is an 
immense relief as I had long dreaded being at war with JAPAN without 
or before U.S.A. Now I think it is all right.
Five. Also for yourself alone. Russian news continues to be good and a 
Russian success north of BLACK SEA will react favourably on TURKEY 
as will a victory in LIBYA. There is a good deal of evidence of rising 
anti-German feeling in FRENCH NORTH AFRICA resulting from 
WEYGAND’s dismissal. So we may still have hope of GYMNAST 
which remains all set.
Six. Although General CUNNINGHAM is arriving home almost 
immediately and there will certainly be much talk behind the scenes I 
do NOT intend making any announcement until your news is decidedly 
good. Let me know the moment when you feel the tide has definitely 
turned. I should find it difficult to make out that he was superseded 
on health grounds because that was NOT the reason which you gave 
me in your original telegram which I imparted to Cabinet. I could 
however when time comes say something like this – begins “General 
AUCHINLECK proceeded to Battle H.Q. on November 24th and on 
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26th he decided to relieve General CUNNINGHAM and appointment 
Major General RITCHIE to command 8th Army in his place. This action 
was immediately endorsed by Minister of State70 and by me. General 
CUNNINGHAM has rendered brilliant service in ABYSSINIA and 
is also responsible for planning and organisation of present offensive in 
LIBYA which began with surprise and success and is steadily progressing. 
He has since been reported by the medical authorities to be suffering 
from serious over-strain and has been granted sick leave.” Ends.
SECRET No. 142 Folio No. 88766 Page 2.
The above seems to me wrong in interests of Army that classical severity 
of your action, which was greatly admired here, should be marred by 
explanations which many people knew would NOT square with actual 
facts.
Seven. I hope progress of your operations will enable statement to be 
made some time this week. Let me know your views.
JRL, AUC 527
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, 
Middle East, 7 December 1941
I enclose a telegram for the Prime Minister which will give you the latest 
information available here, and my reading of the situation. You may use 
this for your evening meeting if you like.
As I have so often said, I am very much afraid of being too optimistic, 
but I do feel this morning as if the turning point may be near. I say “may”, 
as the enemy has shown his wonderful powers of recovery more than 
once, and he may as well do so again before we finish him off.
As you will see, the news is encouraging. He has apparently withdrawn 
from the EAST of TOBRUK, except the pockets in the BARDIA 
– HALFAYA area, and the 2nd S A Div with the 5th New Zealand 
Brigade, I am told, patrols from TOBRUK, are combing the whole area 
GAMBUT – SIDI AZEIZ – SIDI REZEGH, and may, I think, pick 
70 Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of State and Member of the War Cabinet.
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up quite a lot one way and another. Once this area is clear, the air force 
will take the landing grounds in it into use, and the South Africans and 
New Zealanders will turn their attention to BARDIA, “COVO” and 
HALFAYA – at least, that is Neil Ritchie’s present intention.
As for the southern flank, it remains to be seen what degree of resistance 
he will put up on the EL ADEM EL GUBI line, or whether he will 
attempt a desperate counter-stroke against our left or centre. It would 
be like him to stage a sudden transfer of what tanks he has lefy71 from 
SOUTH to NORTH and erupt once more towards SIDI OMAR or 
GABR SALEH. If he does he will find these excellent “Jock” columns 
hanging on to his flanks and rear, giving him no rest. He isn’t getting 
any rest and he must be damned tired. The Air Force are giving him a 
terrible pasting and our artillery is doing grand work.
I am not announcing the relief of TOBRUK yet, though it is possible 
that the P.M. may use the news. I do not mind if he does. When EL 
ADEM is securely in our hands then I will admit that TOBRUK is 
relieved – not before. Anyway, until we do get EL ADEM we can not 
really make full use of TOBRUK as an advanced base of supply, which 
it is most urgent that we should be able to do.
The Air Force last night had a most wonderful target and took full 
advantage of it. It is grand to see Neil [Ritchie] and “Mary”72 working 
in the fullest possible accord, thinking out where the targets will be, and 
what is more wonderful – finding them!
It is great news about the New Zealand wounded having been recovered 
at SIDI REZEGH. I have no details yet, but we hope there are a lot of 
them. Neil has all his plans ready for immediate pursuit. In fact, pursuit 
has already started, not only in the air but on the ground, as our “Jock” 
columns and armoured cars are working well round behind him to the 
SOUTH. We must expect some setbacks yet, and may strike a major 
snag, but we are looking well ahead and I know very well that there will 
be no relaxation of the pressure while Neil – Conyingham are running 
this show. Everyone is in grand form – I have never met so few people 
with livers! I haven’t met any!!
I can’t come back yet, but I will as soon as I can. Meanwhile I know 
you are doing fine, as they say in the States!! I am very grateful to you.
Stop Press:  Enemy 40 tanks and quantity M.T. on defensive WEST 
of EL GUBI being shelled by our artillery, on which M.T. or some of it 
71 ‘left’.
72 Air Vice Marshal Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham, commanding Desert Air Force.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   255 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
256
went NORTH. Our Armd Bde standing off ready to go in if opportunity 
offers. “Jock” columns working round SOUTH flank.
P.P.S.  Just got your letter. By all means mention names British units 
such as 11th Hussars, Gds Bde, R. Sussex (SIDI OMAR).




Letter from Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, 
CGS, Middle East, to Auchinleck, 8 December 1941
The Egyptian Minister of Defence has agreed to sending an 
Egyptian Light Car Regiment and one Egyptian Battalion to assist 
the defence of the L. of C. The Light Car Regiment should be in 
position to-day and the Egyptian Battalion moves up tomorrow: 
they are taking on duty between BAGUSH and HAMMAM.
2. McCandlish73 will be going back to the War Office in about a 
week’s time. He will, of course, be primarily concerned with the 
reinforcement problem but he will also take other papers from the 
various Branches here.
3. The Singapore cable has been cut from this morning – presumably 
as a result of the Japanese war – and that means practically all our 
telegrams to the War Office will now have to go by wireless. This 
will throw a terrific strain on our wireless, but I think we can cope 
with it. It does mean, however, that we must make a further effort 
to reduce the number of cables and their length. There is one cable 
route via South Africa but it is in rather a wonky condition and not 
to be relied on. [Annotation: 2000 hrs now mended.]
4. I have seen Peter Drummond and emphasized that this break in 
communications once again shows the necessity for an improved 
air letter service to England.
73 Colonel J. E. C. McCandish, Assistant to Deputy Adjutant General.
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5. I forgot when I wrote yesterday to tell you that on the 6th December 
we despatched 17 “I” tanks to the forward area. We sent up 6 more 
yesterday.
6. I enclose a note about Laycock74 which is the latest information 
we have.
7. I have now got the M.T. statement from D.Q.M.G. It wants some 
studying. I won’t say more just now beyond the fact that I fear this 
Japanese war may interfere with shipping of vehicles from U.S.A. 
and therefore we must not be too confident that the inflow will be 
sufficient for our needs.
8. 1700 hrs, and your letter of this morning just received. Sorry that 
yesterday was rather a disappointment; although we apparently did 
not get a move on it is obvious that we have maintained pressure 
and been of considerable nuisance value to the enemy.
9. I have had at the back of my mind the feeling that somewhere in 
the armoured corps there is a little lack of drive. This impression 
was confirmed by a talk I had with Bernard Freyberg. It may be 
that W.N.75 has not quite got that Cavalry dash which should be, in 
my opinion, a characteristic of the R.A.C. But I agree that people 
like myself sitting comfortably back in G.H.Q. must not criticize, 
though it is sometimes our painful duty to apply whip and spurs.
10. I enclose a telegram about the Free French and a note from me on the 
subject which I wrote before I got your letter. I will see that everything 
is teed up for the CHAD people to move when the word is given.
11. No further news of VON RAVENSTEIN,76 but we believed he 
was salvaged. Perhaps it would have been better if he had been 
drowned!
74 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Laycock, who was then hiding out in the Libyan 
Desert following a failed Commando raid against General Erwin Rommel’s 
Headquarters.
75 Lieutenant General Willoughby Norrie, GOC 30 Corps. A strange comment 
given that Norrie’s background was as a Cavalry officer; he had been first 
commissioned into the 11th (Prince Albert’s Own) Hussars and had commanded 
the 10th Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales’s Own), 1931–35 and 1st Cavalry 
Brigade, 1936–38.
76 Major General Johann von Ravenstein, commander of 21st Panzer Division, 
captured November 1941.
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12. The M[inister] of S[tate]77 would be delighted to stay a night 
or two up at Advance HQ 8th Army, and will come directly you 
give the word. He has only one engagement this week, and that is 
on Thursday afternoon, so if other things are equal he proposes 
flying up on Friday. But he wants me to make it clear that he will 
certainly come before if that is more convenient, and will have 
no difficulty in putting off his engagement. He hopes you will be 
up forward when he pays his visit, and indeed rather stresses this 
point. [Annotation: Please cable date as soon as possible.].
13. I have told the A.D.C. to send up sweets and fruit, but apparently 
tomorrow he is sending up 500 eggs by L[iaison]. O[fficer]. He tells 
me you like fruit, especially oranges, so I have told him to send up 
one from me to you for which he – the A.D.C. – will pay.
14. I have had a letter from Chink78 asking for a copy of any orders 
that you have been issued with regard to Crusader. I don’t want to 
bother 8th Army, but if there are any operation orders or instruc-
tions or conference notes that would be of value for instructional 
purposes, the sooner we get them to the Staff School the better, 
so that Chink can make use of them before the present course 
disperses on 28 Dec.
15. Riddell is just back from SYRIA where he had quite a successful 
trip. The most important point is the question of the 60-day 
reserves that we have ordered to be put in the defended localities. 
After discussion with General Wilson he is convinced that these 
will lead to a great deal of waste if our instructions are carried out 
in the manner proposed by 9th Army. Riddell has got another plan 
with which Jumbo Wilson has agreed, and I will get on to it when 
I get details.
Has 8 Army sent the LRDG W/t set to CHAD. The F[ree]. F[rench]. 
will want this before they start.
JRL, AUC 531
77 Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of State and Member of the War Cabinet, resident in 
Cairo.
78 Brigadier Eric Dorman-Smith, who was then Commandant of the Staff College 
in Haifa.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   258 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
259
119
Letter from General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 
to Auchinleck, 10 December 1941
I am taking this opportunity of despatching you a line by Martel.79
It was very kind of you to send that telegram of congratulations, and 
I very much appreciated receiving it.
I am delighted that your operations are turning out so successfully 
and I feel certain that you must have had some anxious moments. 
I consider that at present, more than ever, successes in northern Africa 
are of primary importance. The more we can clear this northern coast 
the better from every point of view.
The turn of events in the Far East is bound to have fairly serious 
repercussions in most theatres and it is at present hard to estimate the 
full extent of our new commitments. At any rate America’s entry into 
the war is certain to reduce the flow of equipment from that country, 
and make it harder than ever to complete new armoured formations and 
replace casualties in A.F.Vs.
I have told Martel to bring back from you your complete situation as 
regards armoured forces, what your deficiencies are, what your proposals 
are, and details of any difficulties you may be experiencing. I have also told 
him to ask you whether you would like to carry out any more exchanges 
with officers from Home Forces armoured formations or units.
Cunningham is expected home shortly, and I hope that the P.M. will 
have made the necessary announcement about him to-morrow.
I sent a telegram this morning to stop Pownall,80 as, with the new 
situation in the Far East, a change of commander is no longer desirable. 
I am not certain at present where we may use him. Would he be any use 
to you to replace Jumbo Wilson if the latter is beginning to be a bit old? 
Or for any other purpose? Such as chief of your C.G.S. if necessary.
I do not like very much the present boundary between your Command 
and the Indian Command. In the event of a German advance through 
Turkey and the Caucasus it would mean divided control of the force 
opposed to the Germans. From my study of the problem up to date, I am 
inclined to think that your Command should extend to include Iraq and 
Western Persia. From an administrative point of view this sub-division 
79 Lieutenant General Giffard Martel, Commander of the Royal Armoured Corps.
80 Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall.
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certainly seems the best. What are your feelings about it, will your hands 
be too full? We should of course, visualise the possibility of operations in 
Tripoli being satisfactorily completed and a defensive front established. 
I should very much like to know what your feelings are on this point, 
as I believe you consider you might be over-loaded. On the other hand, 
Archie Wavell had the Western Desert, Abyssinia, and Greek fronts all 
at the same time; this may have been too much.
I sent you a wire as regards your private telegrams to the Prime 
Minister. It is, of course, very desirable that you should send private 
telegrams direct to the Prime Minister in reply to his and to keep him 
informed as to the general course of events, yet I do not think that this 
should in any way affect the normal channel which should exist between 
you and the War Office. The extensive use of private telegrams has caused 
confusion here at times owing to important messages never reaching either 
D.M.O., D.M.I., or myself. In addition, the flow of Military information 
and instructions connected with the use of reserves, etc. direct between 
you and the P.M. is apt to make my position difficult at times.
I therefore hope that whilst maintaining the necessary flow of infor-
mation by direct messages to the P.M., you will ensure that such a 
procedure does not affect the normal channel of communication to me 
which should exist between us.
12.12.41.
Since writing above. Events have been moving and we have drafted 
another wire coming from P.M. with reference to withdrawal of 18th 
Bde for India. Also suggesting relief of Arthur Smith81 by Pownall if you 
thought fit. There is still however just a possibility that Pownall might 
be required to go on to the Far East.
JRL, AUC 539
81 Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle East.
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, 10 December 1941
1 (.) Am most anxious to meet your wishes (.) Only difficulty is that Prime 
Minister sends me PRIVATE telegrams dealing with operations 
and presumably my replies should also be PRIVATE (.) Would it 
be possible for you to ask Prime Minister to allow me (a) either to 
address telegrams dealing with operations private to him repeated 
C.I.G.S. or (b) personal to him so that you at once get a copy (.)
2 (.) Meanwhile have tentatively adopted procedure suggested in your 
para three (.)
3 (.) You realise I am sure that my telegrams to Prime Minister are 
nearly always advanced copies of our sitreps but not detailed and 
differently worded (.)
4 (.) Reference your para four I hope that you have had all information 
in one form or another but if you are doubtful I can send you a 
personal telegram daily (.) Have so far refrained from this owing 
to enormous volume of traffic already existing.
JRL, AUC 540
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Special Order of the Day 
by Auchinleck, 10 December 1941
To: Lieut.-General N.M. RITCHIE, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.
Commanding Eighth Army, M.E.F.
After ten days at your Advanced Headquarters, where I have been able 
closely to follow progress of operations directed by you, I wish to tell 
you how greatly impressed I am by the skill and vigour with which they 
have been conducted, and by the great success achieved by them. Such 
success would never have been achieved without the whole-hearted 
and unceasing co-operation of our Air Force, whose work has been 
magnificent throughout.
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During this period the enemy has been out-manoeuvred and out-fought 
at all points, and has been driven back over sixty miles and forced to 
abandon the siege of TOBRUK.
I cannot tell you how much I admire the way in which your subordinate 
commanders, Lieut.-Generals NORRIE and GODWIN AUSTEN, 
commanding 30th and 13th Corps, and Major-General SCOBIE, 
commanding the TOBRUK garrison, have carried out your orders 
and maintained a relentless pressure on the enemy. As for the officers 
and men under these Commanders, whether British, New Zealand, 
Indian, South African, Australian, Polish or Czech, no praise can be 
too high for their splendid spirit and unshaken determination to win 
in the face of danger, hardship and more than one setback. They have 
shown that when it comes to sticking it they can outlast the Germans 
every time.
The enemy is not yet destroyed, and must be given no rest. I leave 
this task to you with the greatest confidence.
Good luck to the Eighth Army and all in it.
JRL, AUC 541
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, 11 December 1941
You will have had papers connected with change of command 8th Army. 
The reason I gave CUNNINGHAM, namely, loss of confidence in him, 
is of course adequate and I did not enlarge on this because I wished to 
spare his feelings as much as possible.
Think you should know, however, that before making decision I made 
sure my conviction that he was taking counsel of his fears was shared 
by TEDDER and CONYNGHAM AOC Western Desert as well as by 
ARTHUR SMITH and others competent to observe.
Instead of concentrating on the prosecution of the offensive and 
nothing else he allowed himself to be distracted and perturbed by 
enemy threats against his rear areas, and lines of communication, and 
displayed considerable anxiety as to development of battle in light of 
these enemy activities. Am absolutely sure my decision was right and 
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taken only just in time, but as CUNNINGHAM apparently intends 
to appeal to Army Council I send you this fuller information. Sorry to 
have landed you with this.
JRL, AUC 542
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Letter from Auchinleck to Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Charles Portal, CAS, 11 December 1941
Your letter of the 25th November reached me yesterday. I am sorry 
we have not yet put paid to Rommel’s account, but we are getting on 
with it and I think that at last we have him rattled. But he is a tough 
customer and full of resource. I feel we are tougher and can beat him 
at his own game.
I am glad to think that I was of some help to you last month when 
Tedder’s fate was in the balance. As you say, it would have been a dreadful 
mistake. I am quite sure about that.
You ask me for my advice as to whether a change should be made 
after the battle. From my own point of view I can tell you at once that 
I should be very sorry indeed to see Tedder go. He has been absolutely 
splendid in this show, full of resolution and courage, and most helpful 
with suggestions. The co-operation has, I think, been almost perfect. 
Anyway, the Army thinks it has been wonderful and so do I.
In a very difficult moment when we had our first setback and I had 
to make a change in the Army Command, he was a real help in time of 
trouble, and it was largely due to his courageous outlook and complete 
straightforwardness that I was able to make the decision I did, which 
I am absolutely certain was the right one. I owe him a deep debt of 
gratitude for that.
As I say, I shall be most distressed if he does go, and I am left, and 
for my own selfish reasons I hope he will not. Also for the good of the 
Army I hope he will be left here. He knows the whole immense problem 
backwards, and that is saying a lot.
If it is necessary to change him for the reasons you mention, which 
are really beyond my ken, then it can’t be helped I suppose.
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I know Peirse quite well and I like him. We were at the I.D.C. together 
with Sholto Douglas,82 and I am sure we could work together if it should 
be necessary to change Tedder. I feel that with the prospect of the war 
spreading to Anatolia and Syria and Iraq in the New Year, it would be 




Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 11 December 1941
1. We have arrived at the usual phase in the evening after dinner 
when we are waiting for situation reports to come in, when we 
lack information and are as usual anxious as to what the results 
of the day have really been. You will know what it means. On the 
whole I would say that today has been good but I have the feeling 
that the enemy’s withdrawal is not over disorganized and that he 
succeeded in getting out a good deal; certainly more that I had 
hoped he might be able to do.
2. EXPLOITATION WESTWARDS FROM TOBRUK AND THE 
SOUTH.
As I think you realised before leaving here today, the movement 
of the 30 corps round the South flank was developing well. It got 
on rapidly until the early afternoon, since when it has met with 
considerable opposition about 10 miles South of GAZALA. But 
despite this, Willoughby reports that they are getting on, have 
had good targets, have captured 12 guns at least and some 350 
prisoners up to date. They have been up against, so far as I can 
make out, a mixture of German armour, some of ARIETE and some 
of TRIESTE as well. In addition there have been identifications 
of Brescia and Trento which to me implies either a considerable 
mix-up on the part of the Italian formations or possibly that all 
82 Air Marshal (William) Sholto Douglas was then AOC in C, Fighter Command, 
UK. He was to replace Tedder as AOC in C, Middle East in December 1942.
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formations left behind strong rear-parties, which are now somewhat 
mixed together. By noon TOBRUK had sallied forth and occupied 
ACROMA. Godwin83 tells me that there was not a great deal of 
opposition nor does he think that a great many prisoners were taken. 
On the other hand, he believes that the Poles killed everything that 
they saw, which is a fact that may account for the lack of prisoners!! 
At 1600 hrs today 4 Ind Div came under command of 13 Corps 
who had orders from me then to push on, as hard as they could, 
astride the TOBRUK – GAZALA road and to the South of the 
escarpment at that place. My hope is that I might be able to mask 
GAZALA if serious opposition there is met and cut round in the 
first instance to TMIMI. So far as I have heard this is proceeding 
fairly well but there are signs that the enemy intend to dispute our 
occupation of GAZALA. From various sources we gather that 
much of the Italian fuel oil is stored in this neighbourhood which 
may give credence to the supposition that they will not give up the 
place while there is still any chance of evacuating any of it. The 
two Corps (13 and 30) have now converged and I am, therefore, 
transferring the command of 7 Armd Div to the 13 Corps and 
will, as opportunity offers, withdraw the 30 Corps to its new role 
of sorting up the rearward areas.
3. After much thought and examination of the problem I have come 
reluctantly to the conclusion that the time to use MARRIOTT84 on 
the BENGHASI enterprise is passed. Things are going well in the 
northern battle, but I find I cannot maintain the impetus there and 
at the same time provide the necessary transport for MARRIOTT 
to proceed right across the desert. Furthermore, there are indica-
tions I think now, that the enemy has had sufficient time to provide 
a garrison in the BENGHASI area large enough to prevent a force 
of MARRIOTT’s size being able, effectively, to take the place at 
the moment. Lastly, such as is left of the enemy’s armour may 
well go round there. I do not feel that we would be justified in 
undertaking the operation planned for MARRIOTT unless I am 
reasonably certain that he can actually capture BENGHASI. In 
these circumstances, I am going to continue to use REID with “E” 
FORCE, strengthening it as I consider necessary for the role it has 
in hand. This role will continue the same as at present; to harass 
83 Lieutenant General Alfred Godwin-Austen, commanding 13 Corps.
84 Brigadier J. C. O. Marriott, 22nd Guards Brigade.
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the enemy’s L of C between BENGHASI and AGHEILA. Later, 
when I see the enemy’s future plans and when I have armour to 
spare, I hope to undertake a similar operation across the desert, 
starting from HACHEIM and moving via good going on the route 
EL AGENASC Z67 at DARAER BU IUEIGH Y87, ANTELAT 
X47. Meanwhile, I am going on hampering the enemy in the North.
4. We were unfortunate in regard to air operations today for the weather 
has been much against us and there has been a great deal of enemy 
activity in the form of single fighters flying about low and attacking 
targets they may find. Today has been good for them for this, for they 
have been able to nip in and out of the low clouds with little chance 
of them themselves getting into trouble. In fact, they have been on 
the whole, rather impertinent but I doubt whether he will achieve 
much by this policy which savours very much of the disruptive 
tactics that he employed against us on the ground in the earlier 
phases of the battles. As a result of this we lost two Lysanders today 
at 30 Corps headquarters, both, I believe, shot up and demolished 
on the ground though in one case the pilot was killed. Both Packard 
and Bovill, who were the passengers, are safe. As a result of this, the 
A.O.C. asked me not to fly into TOBRUK today but I should go by 
road. This I found to be out of the question as it was not possible for 
me to be absent and out of touch with the Corps for some six hours 
which must have resulted had I gone by road. In these circumstances, 
I decided to remain here for today where at any rate I have been in 
good communication with both Corps.
5. It is too early, I think, to try and forecast what the enemy is going 
to do but I think he will first try and hold us at GAZALA to gain 
time. He may then try and stand with his left flank south of TMIMI 
or just North of it while he holds his right flank out in the desert 
either at GADD EL AHAMAR U66 or MECHILI. When kicked 
or manoeuvred out of this he is likely to go and stand at DERNA.
6. I leave here 0730 hrs tomorrow morning for TOBRUK to move 
to my new Headquarters so will not be able to write you tomorrow 
morning. This will go down by HUTCH or the GHQ Liaison 
Officer who proceeds to CAIRO tomorrow.
P.S. Reports during the night confirm enemy holding positions covers 
GAZALA from the East.
JRL, AUC 545
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Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 12 December 1941
1. The great change in world situation during last four days requires 
a review of our affairs. I must ask you to spare 18th DIV now 
rounding the CAPE for diversion to BOMBAY. This seems justified 
by improved prospects of your battle and even more by the very 
decided RUSSIAN successes which relieve our immediate anxieties 
in CAUCASUS and South of CASPIAN. It is essential that we help 
grievous needs strengthening long starved INDIA and enabling 
a stronger resistance to be made to JAPANESE advance against 
BURMA and down MALAY PENINSULA. The easement in 
PERSIA and IRAQ makes you freer to use remainder 50 DIV 
from BAGHDAD or 5th IND DIV in CYPRUS if you need them. 
Nothing must of course prejudice CRUSADER and I hope even 
with this diversion you will be able to pursue ACROBAT and keep 
GYMNAST in mind dependent on VICHY FRENCH NORTH 
AFRICAN reaction to a LIBYAN victory.
2. It is proposed that your Command should be extended Eastwards 
to cover IRAQ and PERSIA thus giving local unity command in the 
event of TURKS and CAUCASUS danger reviving. The change 
will only be effected as convenient between you and WAVELL.
3. WAVELL must now look EAST. He will be given command of 
BURMA front. He will be reinforced by 18th DIV which he can 
work eastwards to best advantage as he chooses and will keep 
17th IND DIV. Four aircraft squadrons now rounding CAPE for 
CAUCASUS will go INDIA. We are also sending WAVELL special 
hamper antiaircraft and A/tk guns some motor lorries 30cwt which 
are already en route.
4. JAPANESE war having broken out and AMERICAN and BRITISH 
battleship strength being so gravely reduced HONGKONG is 
isolated and must fight to the end. We cannot tell how AMERICA will 
fare at MANILA observing JAPANESE have battle fleet command 
these waters. BROOKE-POPHAM’s command is therefore reduced 
to MALAY PENINSULA–SINGAPORE–BORNEO.
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5. POWNALL is with you in CAIRO. We think in view impending 
extension considered necessary command he may relieve Gen 
ARTHUR SMITH.85
6. Disclosure of CUNNINGHAM’s supercession passed off very well 
here in fact being submerged b[y] larger events. Please continue 
refer your (one group corrupt) appreciations which I greatly value. 
I am so glad things are going desirably in your campaign. Try 
increasingly to mention names of Regts about which enemy is 
already informed. It gives so much satisfaction here.
JRL, AUC 549
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 13 December 1941
1. Jock brought your letter with him today, since when I have gone once 
more most anxiously over the whole problem of John MARRIOTT’s 
force.
2. Since writing you on the night of the 10th things have, to some 
extent altered, chiefly I think in respect to the enemy’s unenviable 
condition in CYRENAICA; special sources show this clearly.
3. No-one realises better than I, unless it is you, that BENGHASI is 
the key to the whole of the enemy’s power to resist. To him it is even 
more important than TOBRUK is to me. It is well worth taking 
great risk to capture the port, but such an operation, limited in size 
as it must be on account of maintenance can I believe only achieve 
the capture of BENGHASI itself if the enemy’s fighting forces are 
very materially reduced in their fighting value. Since writing on 
the 10th I have had some chance of appreciating the extent of his 
losses, for having a look at the main battle fields gives one a pretty 
fair line on this matter. As a result I believe I can say that he has 
had a good deal harder knock than I previously thought possible. 
Yet he is still fighting a strong rear-guard action, and our advance 
in the past 24 hours has not been considerable. On the other hand, 
85 Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle East.
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the whole of his remaining formations still retaining any semblance 
of fighting value are ranged opposite us now. Tonight we are pretty 
clear that 15 and 21 PANZER, ARIETE and TRIESTE Divisions 
are all concerned in the rearguard action he is fighting South and 
S.W. of GAZALA. Whatever he may have behind this is NOT, 
I believe, worth a great deal.
THIS all points towards making the risk of the BENGHASI 
enterprise worth the taking.
4. The administration aspect has been reviewed anew and by cutting 
down the size of the force of two Bns of infantry (REID can provide 
the third) and adding a squadron of M3 Tanks, I can just, with the 
additional Reserve M.T. Coy you generously promise, find the 
requisite lift for the force plus the needs of the R.A.F. The risk will 
be reasonable provided there is NOT serious interference with the 
working of TOBRUK harbour due to enemy interference.
But to provide for MARRIOTT’s needs I must withdraw the 
troop carrying M.T. now allotted to 13 Corps, which must inevitably 
seriously affect the speed of advance on MACHILI – DERNA, 
and the close following up of the enemy should he withdraw on 
BENGHASI when MARRIOTT appears there. With various 
adjustments, calling on the late TOBRUK garrison resources and 
other economies, I think I may still be able to provide sufficient 
troop carrying vehicles to suffice for the “JOCK COLUMNS” of 
4 Ind Div. In passing I might add that 11 Ind Inf Bde had pretty 
heavy casualties in personnel and vehicles in the GUBI affair and 
this formation have not been able to accompany 4 Ind Div in the 
advance Westwards from TOBRUK.
Everything is being done to get them ready.
5. I will not write at greater length for Jock was present at my conference 
and has heard the pros and cons at length.
You will not, I know, assume that BENGHASI can readily be 
captured by MARRIOTT’s Force, nor, should it be captured, that 
he will be capable of holding it against a serious enemy concen-
tration. But I believe, that he can undoubtedly do a lot of damage, 
materially and certainly mentally, to the enemy. So it is worth the 
risk and I have decided in view of all the facts to take it on.
6. Today has been disappointing for I feel we should have made 
more progress to the WEST. Tomorrow first thing I am off to see 
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GODWIN86 for more risks MUST be taken in regard to moving 
wide and getting at the back-side of the enemy.
7. De Villiers87 has done well and reduced CUVO, which is a great 
relief. Have not heard details yet, but he reports the capture of 
much enemy equipment. He says no opposition, which seems 
strange. The next thing is BARDIA. I believe strong fighting 
patrols could capture the place by night. I feel the enemy’s main 
effort in the Frontier Area will be HALFAYAH. The Italian Div 
Comd removed itself from CUVO into HALFAYAH today!
8. We got about 500 prisoners yesterday – half and half Italian and 
German – in the GAZALA area, today at least 150 more there. East 
of TOBRUK today we must have got quite 100 excluding CUVO, 
including 1 German officer, 39 O.Rs and 1 Italian O.R. captured 
by Army Headquarters. We have the most bloodthirsty looking 
South African commanding our defence platoon. A combination 
of his looks, starvation and thirst, and no resistance was offered!
9. The move went pretty well on the whole, except for my staff car 
which was blown up on a land mine. Car smashed to pieces, but 
both ANGUS and the driver unscathed, which is a mercy.
JRL, AUC 551
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 
15 December 1941
As you know, Watson88 has just left here after spending some time in 
examining our organisation of command, and enquiring into the size and 
composition of our staffs, about which he has produced a most valuable 
report, in my opinion.
While he was here I was able to discuss with him many matters, 
including the question of the status of the principal General Staff Officer 
86 Lieutenant General Alfred Godwin-Austen, commanding 13 Corps.
87 Major General Issac de Villers, GOC 2nd South African Division.
88 Major General Daril Watson, Director of Staff Duties, War Office.
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on the headquarters of an Army. Watson explained to me why your 
predecessor had decided against making this into a Major-General’s 
appointment, and I quite appreciate his reasons. All the same, I still 
think that in the field, at any rate, whatever may be done at home, there 
is a very strong case for having a M.G.G.S. at the headquarters of an 
Army, and I am quite sure that, in the case of the 8th Army in Libya, it 
would have helped a good deal if Galloway had been a Major-General 
instead of a mere Brigadier!
I know the arguments, I think, and I agree that, in theory, it shouldn’t 
matter whether a man is a major or a major-general, so long as he has the 
ability and personality to impress his will on those with whom he has to 
deal. Human nature being what it is, however, and unalterable, I feel that 
from the practical and human point of view it does matter a great deal.
In the absences of his commander, which nowadays are likely to be 
frequent and often prolonged, the senior General Staff officer of an Army 
has a very great responsibility to bear, and very senior commanders and 
staff officers to deal with. He becomes virtually second-in-command 
on many occasions. The labourer is worthy of his hire, and there is no 
doubt at all in my mind that the psychological effect of receiving a step 
in rank on promotion to such an important post is a very real one, and 
not to be lightly disregarded.
Many of our best men, being what they are, dislike instinctively these 
higher staff appointments, and much prefer to be in command of troops. 
I feel that some recompense is due to them. We are not all idealists!
I trust you will not mind my re-opening this matter, but I feel so 
strongly about it that I hope you may consent to reconsider it.
JRL, AUC 554
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Letter from Auchinleck to L. S. Amery, 
Secretary of State for India, 15 December 1941
Thank you very much for your letter of the 1st November, which reached 
me on the 10th December.
I am very glad that the supply of cadets to India did not come to an 
untimely end, as that would have been a catastrophe. We will do all we 
can to help here, and I have said so officially in reply to an appeal from 
Wavell on the subject.
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Australians and New Zealanders are perfectly all right and get on very 
well with Indians, generally speaking. So would South Africans, I think, 
so far as they individually are concerned, but the difficulty comes from 
India. The Government of India was, and I expect still is, loath to give 
commissions in the Indian Army to South Africans for very obvious 
reasons. However, there are not many South Africans to spare, as their 
military man-power (white) situation is most unsatisfactory.
I still think that the really important problem is how to get more 
senior and experienced officers to fill the middle-piece post in Indian 
units. I do not think that there is going to be much difficulty in finding 
subaltern officers – British or Indian – but they are not enough. I believe 
some scheme on the lines advocated by me in my letter of 17 September 
to you should be initiated. I am quite sure that before this war is over, 
we shall have to accept dilution of British units by Indians on a large 
scale – at any rate, in Eastern theatres.
The Libyan offensive is going well, but there are and must be pauses; 
these are inevitable for maintenance reasons. The distances covered in 
our advance, and the amount of transport needed to maintain our forward 
troops so far in advance of railhead, are fantastic when measured by 
pre-war standards. The enemy has fought very well, and is still fighting, 
but there is accumulative evidence (and it is still coming in) to show that 
he has had a series of really hard knocks, to which he is unaccustomed 
and doesn’t like at all. We have counted over 7,000 prisoners through 
Alexandria to date, and there are many still to come from the forward 
areas. We have also captured a lot of equipment, as yet unlisted.
Prisoners are a nuisance really, as they greatly complicate the mainte-
nance problem. However, we want all the Boxches we can get – the Italians 
don’t matter so much. The troops have been magnificent, and the Air 
Force really superb. We have plenty of hard fighting still ahead of us, 
and we are not slackening our efforts in any way.
We are doing all we can to help the Yugo-Slav patriots, and have in fact 
done quite a lot, in view of the very restricted facilities at our disposal. 
It is as you say, entirely a matter of transportation, and we simply have 
not got the aircraft or the submarines to enable us to do anything on a 
big scale at present, but we are constantly reviewing the matter.
Julian89 is looking very well and is absorbed in his job. He has decided 
not to go to the Staff School as he thinks he will be of more use where he is.
89 Captain Julian Amery, Leopold’s son, then engaged in various special service 
work in the Eastern Mediterranean.
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Quentin Hogg90 has just taken up a new job with “Jumbo” Wilson, 
who had specially asked for him.
India is now right in the war zone, and I see that Burma has come 
under Wavell. I have always thought that this should be, but there was a 
very great reluctance, even up to months ago, to entrust India with any 
operational responsibility, as you know. This was, one can only suppose, 
a result of the Mesopotamian campaigns of 1914–1916.
The result of the Japanese attack on Malaya, and of the threat to 
Burma, must inevitably be to divert forces from Iraq and my command. 
This is not a serious matter at the moment, but is causing me some 
misgivings in relation to what may happen four or five months hence. 
We are therefore taking very careful stock of our future position.
JRL, AUC 555
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 22 December 1941
I did not write yesterday; first because I hoped to get through by 
telephone, which failed and secondly because we were moving 
this H.Q. and I had to get up and get down to future plans with 
Godwin Austen.
2. GENERAL.
The main issue still remains the same, in my opinion to 
destroy everything of the Germans before they can escape into 
TRIPOLITANIA. I feel myself that with the forces he has available, 
he will do all he can today, as it appears to me he did yesterday, 
to cover the withdrawal Southwards of all he can save from the 
BENGHAZI area by holding us off on the general line of the 
escarpment from REGIMA to ANTELAT, X.74. It is extremely 
difficult, because of the long distances, to maintain communica-
tions with the forward troops and on this account I find myself 
often lacking in knowledge as to what exactly they are doing and 
where they have got to. I was able, however, yesterday, to get a very 
90 Major Quintin Hogg, MP. Later to become Lord Chancellor as Lord Hailsham.
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clear picture of what happened on the 20th, which clearly shows 
that the enemy retreat from MECHILI was in great disorder, and 
that he abandoned much material, much equipment, and that the 
7 Armd Div over-ran many prisoners. We cannot be bothered with 
them just now. In general, therefore, the situation appears to be 
good so long as the Panzer Group carries out the orders that it 
has received to cover BENGHAZI and the Fleiderkorp, in which 
case I have great hopes of destroying the lot. So today seems to 
be a critical day once more; critical because it will produce either 
complete destruction of the Germans or will show me that they 
have succeeded once again in getting out of the box. I pray the 
latter may not occur again.
3. GEBEL FRONT.
You will have heard that APOLLONIA and CIRENE were both 
occupied by us on the night 20/21, and yesterday’s TAC/R indicated 
few enemy between those places and BARCE. So I hope that Frank91 
may have been able to get on a good bit yesterday with his columns. 
The main body of the Division can move by ferrying only as I have 
taken every bit of his transport possible to maintain troops for the 
main issue South of BENGHAZI. Frank Messervy is anxious for 
the 3/1st to be taken out for a while to reform and retrain and I 
have, therefore, ordered them to go to the 38th Ind Inf Bde and the 
1/1/ Punjabs to replace them in the 5th Ind Brigade. I feel sure 
you will be glad of this. It is satisfactory that we got back a 100 or 
so of our wounded prisoners from DERNA. Also it was reported 
to me yesterday that the grave of NEUMAN, late commander of 
the 15th Panzer Div, who had been wounded, was discovered near 
DERNA. So we have captured one of their Panzer Div Commanders 
and killed the other.
4. BENGHAZI – AGEDABIA.
The 7 Armd Div have made good progress as you will have seen 
from the Situation Reports. It is difficult exactly to find out 
what they have done, but so far as I can estimate, two columns, 
(CURRY and HUGO) with the 3rd RTR in support may get 
through the escarpment shortly and on to the BENGHAZI 
plain. The 12th Lancers operating from MSUS reported last 
91 Major General Frank Messervy, commanding 4th Indian Division.
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night that SCELEIDMA was clear and that they are making for 
SOLLUCH. This I hope is true, but I am inclined to doubt it 
from the intercepts we have had. Air recce yesterday showed that 
BENCOL was progressing well and I dropped on MARRIOTT 
yesterday afternoon about 3 o’clock, orders that he was to push on 
with the utmost speed for MAGRUM, from which place practically 
the whole of the G.A.F. [German Air Force?] are operating. At the 
same time I gave orders that he is to come under 13 Corps as the 
whole of this battle-front has now become one entity, and supplies 
for it will be reached by MECHILI–MSUS line.
5. ADVANCE INTO TRIPOLITANIA.
By tonight, Mary92 and I will have our plans fixed for this. So far 
as I am concerned, the intention is to continue with the largest 
force possible in the circumstances, dictated by maintenance. In 
the first instance, this will not be much more than large columns 
operating as hard as one can against the enemy’s retreating forces, 
their flanks and rear. Maintenance, of course, will be a difficulty, 
but I hope very much that we may be able to keep them going by 
running small vessels along the coast and add to this by the use of 
air transport. The next step in the advance will be by the 1 Armd 
Div, based on one Armd Bde and a motorised Bde (Gds Bde), but 
this cannot move far Westwards into TRIPOLITANIA until we 
can arrange supplies for it. On present calculations my “Q” think 
that this may mean a pause of 10 to 14 days, but I feel they may 
certainly have to think again!
6. The L.R.D.G. I am going to base on AGEDABIA, from which 
place they will operate wide Southwards in their minor offensive 
role that has been so successful up to date. Their operations will, 
generally speaking, be West of SIRTE and as far as TRIPOLI.
7. S.A. DIVISIONS
I think you might like to hear that BRINK tells me he is quite 
convinced that the man-power does not permit of maintaining two 
S.A. Divs in this theatre of war, and I was left with the impression 
that he feels the force here should be reduced to one. It surprises 
me somewhat as we have been saying this at G.H.Q., for the last 
five months!
92 Air Vice Marshal Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham, commanding Desert Air Force.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   275 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
276
8. Everybody is cursing everybody else at the moment, and I am 
doing so louder than anyone. These very big advances are the devil 
in respect of maintaining any communications. M.T. has made a 
withdrawal a great deal easier operation than it was in the past and 
the advance following up a retreat, a harder task than ever. F.S.R. 
will have to be revised considerably in regard to this!
JRL, AUC 570
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, 25 December 1941
1 (.) Have refrained from comment hitherto in view of Gen WAVELL’s 
21059/G 16/12 to you giving you his views (.) When myself C in C 
INDIA I always urged that operational responsibility for IRAQ 
should rest with INDIA (.) RUSSIA and PERSIA had not then 
come into picture but I have always held that PERSIA too should 
be under INDIA’s operational control as it is so closely connected 
with the immediate defence of the WESTERN frontiers of that 
country (.) I have little doubt that were I still C IN C INDIA I 
would have answered generally as Gen WAVELL has now (.)
2 (.) Although I have previously refused consistently to agree to recom-
mendation that MIDEAST should take over IRAQ and PERSIA 
I think that with the inclusion of PERSIA in the war zone and the 
emergence of a definite threat of a German offensive through the 
CAUCASUS the strategic position has so changed as to make a 
unified command over the whole front desirable (.) The prospect 
of there being comparatively strong armoured forces available by 
next Spring which will be capable of being used in SYRIA IRAQ 
or PERSIA as circumstances may demand increases the desir-
ability (.)
3 (.) From point of view of operational control there is NO (R) NO 
doubt that a unified higher command embracing SYRIA IRAQ 
and PERSIA would make for speedier planning for stronger and 
quicker direction of campaign in event of German offensive either 
through ANATOLIA or through CAUCASUS or both simulta-
neously (.) The fact that the Forces in IRAQ and SYRIA have 
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divergent lines of operations is inconvenient and if we should have 
to withdraw this divergence is likely in theory to nullify to some 
extent the advantages of a unified command whether exercised 
by INDIA or MIDEAST but I doubt whether this would be true 
in practice as the higher commander could still influence the 
campaign as a whole by using his reserves in the intervening area 
to the benefit of both fronts (.) In any event this disadvantage is 
outweighed operationally by the advantage likely to accrue from 
a unified command in the initial stages of the battle (.) Moreover 
the case for a unified control of the land forces is strengthened by 
the fact that the air forces in the whole area will and indeed must in 
any case be under a unified command (.) Operationally unification 
seems to have no disadvantage other than increasing the load on 
the higher commander (.)
4 (.) Administratively there could be no question of divorcing admin-
istrative from operational control in the theatre of war itself (.) 
SYRIA IRAQ and PERSIA would have to be completely under 
the administrative control of the unified command as are all the 
various fronts of MIDEAST now though the task would be heavy 
and one entailing a high degree of decentralisation in both fields (.)
5 (.) It seems clear that INDIA could not (R) NOT control SYRIA opera-
tionally or administratively unless she also controlled PALESTINE 
and EGYPT as the connection between the three is too intimate to 
be severed therefore a unified command could not be exercised by 
C IN C INDIA (.) On the other hand C IN C MIDEAST could 
control IRAQ and PERSIA operationally and administratively (.) 
In these circumstances INDIA while still remaining the main base 
and source of supply for IRAQ would no longer have a say in the 
disposal of reinforcements and material once these had reached 
BASRA (.) No other arrangement would work (.)
6 (.) Am fully aware of feeling in INDIA regarding need for IRAQ and 
PERSIA being under her control and that this has played no small 
part in making INDIA so generous with troops and materials for 
the defence of IRAQ (.) If IRAQ and PERSIA are removed from 
INDIA’s control probability is that she will naturally tend to be 
less ready to use her resources there instead of devoting them to 
her own immediate defensive needs (.)
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7 (.) Aid to RUSSIA via IRAQ and PERSIA (,) WHEELER Mission (,) 
and evacuation of POLES would all have to be taken over by 
MIDEAST but this would not be impossible (.) Divided control 
in these spheres would NOT (R) NOT be practicable (.) Change 
in financial control now exercised by INDIA might cause difficulty 
but presumably this would NOT be insuperable though likely to 
be most inconvenient (.)
8 (.) I disagree with Gen WAVELL that a temporary ad hoc unification 
to meet a particular situation would suffice and I am NOT (R) NOT 
prepared to accept such a proposition which is likely in my opinion 
to lead to confusion and improvisation when the time comes (.) If 
it is decided to make the change it should be made at once so that 
MIDEAST’s responsibility for planning and arranging for the 
future may be clearly defined one way or the other (.) Otherwise 
uncertainty and delay which are already affecting thought and 
action will be intensified (.)
9 (.) To sum up (.) First I believe the operational reasons for placing IRAQ 
and PERSIA under MIDEAST are weighty and urgent (.) Second 
the difficulty and inconvenience of adjusting the administrative 
and financial complications caused by a transfer to MIDEAST 
will be great but NOT insuperable (.) Third the government of 
INDIA and INDIAN public opinion generally are likely to oppose 
the change strenuously and the feeling thus created may affect 
INDIA’s willingness to provide troops and material not only for 
IRAQ and PERSIA (,) but also for the MIDDLE EAST on the 
same generous scale as heretofore (.)
10 (.) Present uncertainty is harmful and I shall be very grateful for an 
early decision (.)
11 (.) A telegram on this subject giving reasons for and against is also 
being sent to WAR CABINET by MIDEAST DEFENCE 
COMMITTEE.
JRL, AUC 580
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 
25 December 1941
Thank you very much for your letter of the 10th December which 
Martel brought with him. I am glad you are pleased with the result 
of our operations so far and I hope we shall be able to show further 
results before long. I entirely agree with you about the desirability 
of clearing as much of the North African coast as we possibly can. 
In this connection we are sending you by the hand of our delegation 
a paper expressing our considered opinion on the possible trend of 
future operations in this theatre. You may not agree with us regarding 
the possibility of carrying the war into GERMANY from AFRICA, 
but all three of us and Lyttelton feel that there is a good deal to be 
said for our proposals, great as the difficulties may seem to be at the 
moment. The Germans have more than once achieved the seemingly 
impossible and I, for one, feel that we can do at least as much, if not 
more, than they have done. I shall be very interested to hear what 
you think about it at home. I hope our paper will give you all the 
information you need about our present situation and future needs.
2. I realize very thoroughly that the Far Eastern situation is likely to 
affect us in this theatre to a considerable extent, and you can rely 
on us to help to the greatest extent possible. All the same, there is 
a minimum below which we should not go in view of the likelihood 
of our being heavily attacked through TURKEY in the Spring. We 
are even now working to narrow margins, particularly in respect 
of time for preparation, and equipment and transport for troops 
destined for the Northern Front. We are now definitely focussing 
our thoughts and energies on SYRIA and ANATOLIA, though 
we naturally still have to be able to send you my latest instruction 
regarding the conduct of the campaign on the Northern Front, and 
I hope it will meet with your approval. With the Turkish attitude 
still as uncertain as it is, it is not too easy to make very definite 
plans, but we are doing what we can.
It will be a great assistance to me and my Staff when we know 
definitely whether we are to take over IRAQ and PERSIA or not, 
and I hope it will be possible to let us know soon. As you will 
have seen from my telegrams to the Prime Minister which passed 
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through you, I feel that from the operational point of view, it is 
desirable that we should control the whole front, because of the 
changed situation brought about by RUSSIA’s entry into the War 
and events in PERSIA. On the other hand, the political, sentimental 
and administrative difficulties are considerable. I can not agree 
that any ad hoc change of control can be made on the spur of the 
moment as suggested by Wavell. This would be quite useless in my 
opinion and most difficult and dangerous to implement.
You will know, I am sure, that I am not out for aggrandisement! 
In fact I have up to now consistently opposed any proposal to 
amalgamate the commands, as John Kennedy93 will tell you. If 
you decide to put IRAQ and PERSIA into this command, I shall 
probably have to ask for a second D.C.G.S. to help me to deal with 
the additional work on the operational side. I hope that you would 
see your way to agree to this.
The work on the Syrian defensive is going on steadily but not as 
quickly as I would wish. I am most anxious to get more troops up 
there to help in the work, and asked INDIA to let me have the 50th 
Division back, temporarily at any rate. Hutton,94 in the absence of 
Wavell, demurred, not on very firm grounds I thought. However, 
I have returned to the charge. I gather from what I hear from IRAQ 
that the Division is not doing anything very particular at the moment.
3. Martel has been staying with me and is now on the Libyan front. 
I shall see him again when he gets back and before he leaves for 
ENGLAND. I hope he is not trying too hard to make the Royal 
Armoured Corps into a separate and private army. I admit to 
feeling a little uneasy about one or two of his ideas. Everything we 
have learned from our operations in LIBYA goes to show that the 
association between armoured units, infantry and artillery must 
be far closer than it has ever been before, and that any attempt 
at segregation is wrong and most dangerous. I have definitely 
come to the conclusion, and so has everyone else in a position 
of responsibility here, that the Armoured Brigade Group as a 
permanent organization is a necessity and I am not prepared to 
put armoured troops into battle in any other form. We are working 
hard at this now and will send you our considered opinion as soon 
as possible. I feel also that our divisional headquarters must not 
93 Major General John Kennedy, Director of Military Operations.
94 Lieutenant General Thomas Hutton, Chief of General Staff, India.
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be classified as “armoured” or “infantry”, but must be prepared 
to control a collection of brigades of varying composition as the 
occasion demands. This is even more true of Corps Headquarters; 
for example our 13th (Infantry) Corps is now controlling the 
forward armoured formations, while the 30th (Armoured) Corps 
is controlling the operations for the reduction of BARDIA and 
HALFAYA. We have abolished the label “armoured” so far as 30th 
Corps Headquarters is concerned and will not resuscitate it.
4. I hope you are getting all you want in the way of telegraphic 
information from me. I realize very clearly the awkwardness of 
the present system, but it was not of my devising, and I can see no 
way of altering it. I daresay that, awkward as it may be at times, 
it has certain advantages when one considers the personalities 
involved. I send the periodical telegrams dealing with the progress 
of operations to the military heads of the various parts of the Empire 
which have troops in this Command. There are quite a lot of them! 
I am told we speak thirty-seven different languages or dialects!!
On all big questions of policy, we try to put matters on a local 
Defence Committee basis, or else on Cs.-in-C. basis, and this seems 
to me to be getting more and more necessary and desirable. It does 
not of course affect direct communication from G.H.Q. to the War 
Office on matters of purely Army concern, but the three Services 
out here tend to grow more and more interdependent which is all 
to the good I think.
5. As to the future, I hope that within the next few days Neil Ritchie will 
have cleared up the situation round AGEDABIA and AGHEILA 
one way or another. As you will realize without my having to tell you, 
his difficulties are 90% administrative. The distances are enormous 
and it is a physical impossibility to maintain more troops in contact 
with the enemy than he has at present. We both hope that we may 
be able to surround the remaining Germans and destroy them or 
capture them, but our troops are terribly thin on the ground and 
the German has not by any means thrown up the sponge, though 
we believe his losses to have been very heavy indeed. It looks at 
the moment as if Rommel (we think he is still with the remnants of 
his Panzer-Gruppe) really intends to make a stand at AGEDABIA 
and force us to attack him there with our relatively weak forces. 
He is, however, still very nervous of his Southern flank. He has 
all along, right from the start, been inclined to exaggerate the risk 
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from our JIALO force, which as you know is very small and devoid 
of hitting power. He must be getting very little information of our 
movements, and we think he was unaware of the move of 22nd 
Armoured Brigade round his Southern flank up to yesterday.
Anyway, whatever happens, plans are laid for the next stage, though 
I am afraid there is bound to be a pause for maintenance reasons. 
The problem really is tremendous, but everyone is doing their best to 
solve it, and we will solve it somehow. The enemy submarines are very 
active off TOBRUK and have seriously interfered with the supply 
of M.T. fuel into TOBRUK. This is causing me some anxiety as it 
is a long haul from railhead to AGEDABIA, and the first part of the 
journey is cross country, because the enemy hold HALFAYA still, 
and the wastage in petrol caused by jolting and bumping is very great. 
We are tightening up our measures for the reduction of BARDIA 
and HALFAYA, but I do not want to incur a lot of casualties in 
the process, particularly as the South Africans, who are somewhat 
casualty minded, are running that part of the show.
I had hoped to get up to the Front on Monday last, but there 
has been so much to do and think about on the higher strategic 
level that I could not manage it.
I hope to be able to go up about the 3rd. Neil has done magnifi-
cently; no one could have done better, and he started in none too 
easy circumstances either. “Mary” Coningham, the airman, too 
has been absolutely first-class.
6. We are now getting back the troops no longer required in the Western 
Desert as fast as we can. 70th Division are nearly concentrated 
in the Delta already and the New Zealanders are coming back to 
KABRIT on the Bitter Lakes to re-equip and start training again. 
I propose to keep them and the 4th Indian Division (which has been 
fighting continuously for a year almost) in G.H.Q. Reserve. I hope 
to fill up the 10th Corps with the 50th Division (if and when I get 
it!) and the 5th Indian from CYPRUS. I propose to put the 70th 
into CYPRUS for a spell to rest and train for mobile warfare again 
after TOBRUK. I would much rather have an “ad hoc” garrison for 
CYPRUS, but I can not find the troops, particularly the artillery, 
without breaking up divisions. However, I am going on exploring 
ways and means. I feel the threat of an attack on CYPRUS is 
becoming more likely, especially in view of the situation at sea, and 
I can not afford to take too many risks there. I’d like your opinion 
on this.
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7. I have accepted a Free French Brigade for service in LIBYA and it 
is now arriving in EGYPT. The problem will be how to maintain 
it at the front. I feel that having accepted it I must try and give it 
a show.
8. As to the future of headquarters and commanders, my ideas are 
as follows. To give Neil Ritchie command of the G.H.Q. Reserve 
which I hope to form and which will contain one or more armoured 
divisions and two infantry divisions, plus perhaps an independent 
brigade group or two. I propose to give him a staff formed from the 
present 8th Army staff and to use the rest of this staff to fill up the 
10th Corps staff which is now only skeleton as you know. I want 
to leave Godwin Austen with his 13th Corps H.Q. to run LIBYA 
which he ought to do very well. I must have a good man and a good 
staff there in case the Bosche tries to stage a come-back. Willoughby 
Norrie and the 30th Corps H.Q. I propose to keep on ice but to 
use them very actively as a training team to tour the command, set 
exercises and help generally. I feel there is plenty of room for this 
and it would be a pity to break up a team which has been trained 
under stress of battle. We may easily need another Corps H.Q. in 
IRAQ or elsewhere before long. I hope you will approve generally 
of these tentative ideas. General Reserve H.Q. would be of Corps 
status of course – not “Army”.
9. I am anxious to put Holmes95 back as 10th Corps Commander 
now that there is a chance of it becoming a “Corps in being” and 
not merely an Headquarters. He is very keen on this himself and 
Jumbo96 would welcome him. I think he is good and takes a long, 
broad view. I am suggesting that Stone97 should take his place in 
EGYPT. He should, I think, be very good at that, both the Egyptians, 
which is important, and on the Base of L. of C. side of it.
10. I must not write any more or this will never be typed in time! I will 
try and write more regularly in the future, but I really have not had 
much time this last month to think of anything else but LIBYA.
JRL, AUC 581
95 Lieutenant General William Holmes, GOC British Troops, Egypt, who was, 
indeed, to take command of 10th Corps in February 1942.
96 General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, then commanding Ninth Army.
97 Lieutenant General R. G. W. H. Stone, who became GOC British Troops, Egypt, 
1 February 1942.
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 25 December 1941
First of all, thank you for several things. Your wire of congratula-
tions about BENGHAZI which we all appreciate very much, then 
the most welcome present of a bottle of Rum, which arrived safely 
tonight. It is very kind of you to have thought of this and the Mess 
will appreciate very much the Turkey and Lettuce. I will pass on 
your present to “Mary”.98
I find now that the Liaison Officer departs for the DELTA 
usually in the middle of the night so in future I will try and dictate 
my daily letters to you in the evening. The arrangement is not very 
satisfactory because, as you know, the evening is the worst time for 
news before people collect themselves for the night and find out 
what their various elements have done during the previous day.
2. WESTERN CYRENAICA.
This has been to me the worst grievous disappointment, for the 
22 Armd Bde, which was to have started last evening with the 
object of getting round the enemy’s flank and rear was prevented 
from doing this and was still, at noon today, in the same position 
as yesterday. This is caused by the fact that their patrol echelons 
got completely bogged in the soft going while on the way to join 
them yesterday and did not reach them until this morning. It is a 
terribly bad business for I now feel that once more the enemy will 
have succeeded in extricating what remains of his Armd forces. 
A quite miserable business. But one never can be quite certain of 
these things and possibly the fact the enemy has not appreciated 
that there is any real threat to his Southern flank may entice him 
to hold on even long enough yet for us to get him in the bag.
The Gds Bde has continued operating against the enemy’s 
armour today, but I feel that their progress has been somewhat slow. 
One of their columns, at any rate, with their Sqn of M3 tanks, was 
21 miles South-West of ANTELAT at 1100 hrs this morning, on 
the road to AGEDABIA. The 12th Lancers have been given a wide 
mission of operating right through to MARADA, securing the road 
98 Air Vice Marshal Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham, commanding Desert Air Force.
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centre there and discovering whether or not there is, in fact, any 
dangerous enemy force based on that place. There has been very 
little news of REID’s movements, but I still hope that some of his 
force has succeeded in getting round the enemy’s flank, for we got 
an intercept today in the morning in which GAK ordered the 15th 
PANZER DIV to clear the enemy off the escarpment. This, I feel, 
must be the escarpment South-West of AGEDABIA, and might 
possibly be REID’s columns in that neighbourhood.
Tac/R and Stret/R this evening both report 5 merchant vessels, 
estimated at 4,000 tons each (an exaggeration I think), lying of the 
coast opposite RAZ EL-AALI, which is about 25 miles west of 
AGHEILA. If this report is correct, it is difficult to imagine what 
they are unless it is an attempt to provide more fuel oil by throwing 
it into the sea in order to enable them to get away their M.T., and 
possibly to operate more actively with their aircraft. Anyhow, 
MALTA have been asked to take this in hand, as I understand from 
“Mary”99 that they have suitable torpedo-carrying aircraft for this 
purpose, and I have also asked C-in-C MED whether Naval action 
can be taken there too.
On the whole my information from this area today has been 
meagre.
There are undoubtedly indications from air reconnaissance that 
the enemy from the AGEDABIA area is making a move Westwards 
but so far this move has not been on any particularly large scale, 
as far as I can see.
3. GEBEL AREA.
TOCRA is reported clear of enemy today and the 4th Ind Div 
are pressing on with the object of taking over from the 7th Armd 
Div in BENINA and BENGHAZI. They found a considerable 
amount of abandoned M.T., in the BARCE area, 3 M.13 Italian 
tanks and some German light tanks. They are continuing mopping 
up operations in the GAZALA area.
4. BENGHAZI.
A first preliminary report has reached me about the harbour there. 
The north and centre Moles appear to be out of action for the 
moment. The former has been blown in many places and the latter is 
99 Air Vice Marshal Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham, commanding Desert Air Force.
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blocked with a sunken ship alongside. The Southern Mole appears 
apparently intact, though the bridge between it and BENGHAZI 
itself has been destroyed. It is reported, however, that there are 
available at BENGHAZI, pontoons which should assist materially 
in rapidly bridging this gap.
5. I visited TOBRUK again today and find a decided improvement 
there since last I saw it over a week ago. There is still a lot to be 
done, but the Port is now able to deal with up to 900 tons a day, 
and by today week should be able to handle 1400 tons. The petrol 
situation, however, causes me considerable anxiety, as a petrol ship 
turned turtle yesterday. We can however, to some extent, bridge this 
gap by the use of road transport from R[ail]. H[ead]., where our 
resources of P.O.L. [Petrol, Oil and Lubricants?] are reasonably 
satisfactory. But this is a very expensive matter of our slender M.T. 
resources. The hospital situation is far better. An Indian C.C.S. is 
established and working and we have been able to evacuate a large 
number of cases from the General Hospital there, which has much 
eased the situation. Recovery and salvage is going apace and on the 
whole is working quite well.
6. POLISH BRIGADE.
I visited the Polish Brigade today and thought theirs a good show. 
They have really done very well and, I am glad to say, have only 
suffered a little over 100 casualties. During the course of their 
operations they captured something in the region of 1,800 prisoners. 
KOPANSKI spoke to me about their future and feels that in view of 
the expected arrival of reinforcements from RUSSIA which would 
be available to complete a division, that it might be better for the 
Brigade Group to return to the DELTA Area in order to prepare 
for the reception and training of the reinforcements when they 
do get here. Personally, I do not see any urgent reason for keeping 
him here and I think it was your intention to get this Brigade into 
G.H.Q. reserve.
7. GENERAL.
From all we hear it seems that maintenance is still a very serious 
matter with the AXIS forces opposing us and this is chiefly due 
to fuel for aircraft and M.T. I still hope that this lack of fuel may 
yet delay the German armoured forces sufficiently for us to deal 
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them a smashing blow, but this possibility, I fear, does not look 
half so good as it did 24 hours ago, when I thought the 22 Armd 




Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 27 December 1941
My heartiest congratulations to you RITCHIE and the Army and Air 
Force of the Nile on re-entry of BENGHAZI and on great victory won 
by so much hard fighting and skill chiefly now manifesting itself in 
CYRENAICA.
I have a hard request to make to you. We concentrated everything 
on your battle with results that we are now desperately short in new 
theatre which Japanese attack has opened. I think without compro-
mising ACROBAT you should be able to spare at once for MALAYA 
and SINGAPORE:
(a) A force of American tanks even if its full strength only amounted 
to 100.
(b) Apart from Blenheims etc. already on way 4 squadrons of Hurricanes 
are needed urgently in SINGAPORE. Our ability to bring further 
reinforcements depends on our getting a sufficient air force there 
in good time to protect sea approaches. At present our old-quality 
aircraft are knocked about by Japanese sea-borne (fighters). Only 
air power at SINGAPORE and JOHORE can keep door open and 
if door is shut fortress will fall and this would take the bloom off 
our Libyan successes.
We are examining sending INDOMITABLE to pick up these 4 squadrons 
at KILINDINI by which means they could be flown off her deck to 
SINGAPORE before end of January. Pray ask Air Marshal TEDDER 
from me to study this most earnestly.
It has occurred to me that you might send some of your damaged 
tanks to INDIA for repair, thus relieving your workshops which must be 
congested and could not in any case cure these tanks for some months. 
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(In INDIA?) however when repaired they will form training nucleus for 




Letter from Auchinleck to General 
Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 15 January 1942
1. I have just had your wire in answer to the one I sent you trying 
to explain why I want a Major-General for D.M.T., instead of a 
Major-General A.F.V.! You will have had by now my long letter, in 
which I give you, for what they are worth, my views on the future 
of the Royal Armoured Corps in general, and in this theatre of war 
in particular. I do not think I have anything to add to them, and 
I do hope I have convinced you of their soundness. The fact that 
they are supported by all my senior commanders and staff officers 
out here should, I think, count for something.
We are very near realities here, and while I may not have had a 
tremendous amount of experience, those whom I have consulted 
have. Even I can claim to have been studying and considering 
these matters deeply and continuously, even before the war, and 
in a good many different sets of circumstances.
2. To put it briefly, I want a Major-General as D.M.T who will have 
as his main job the training of the three arms to work together in 
the closest possible association. It will be his chief concern to see 
that the infantry and the artillery, and especially their commanders, 
are trained to work with the R.A.C., so as to enable the latter to 
function to the best possible advantage. It will be his job to tie the 
infantry and gunners to the R.A.C., and not the converse. Equally 
he will have to teach the R.A.C. how to get the best value out of 
their equipment when properly supported by the infantry and 
artillery.
He would have under him a Brigadier A.F.V., whose job it 
would be to advise him on technical matters, and to supervise the 
corps training of the R.A.C., that is, the training within armoured 
brigades and units.
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Questions of promotion and appointment in the R.A.C. within 
the command would, as now, be dealt with by the advisory board 
of senior R.A.C. officers, which submits recommendation to my 
Selection Board, which then reports to me. This is working well 
in practice.
3. I have discussed this question, as well as my reorganisation proposals, 
very fully with Martel, who has had every opportunity of meeting 
people and seeing all relevant documents while he has been here.
I have at times been a little perturbed by his outlook, and this 
feeling has been shared by my senior staff officers and others. He 
has been most helpful to us, and given us much food for thought by 
his constructive criticism. I do feel, however, that he may be a little 
over-impressed by the idea that the R.A.C. has to be a super-body 
on a plane above that of the rest of the army, and that no one who 
does not belong to it can understand the mysteries of handling 
armoured formations in battle. I am sure he would deny this, but 
all the same I think that his mind is working on these lines, quite 
unconsciously perhaps.
I think, too, he may be inclined to be a little complacent about the 
training and leadership of the armoured formations in the recent 
fighting out here. They fought magnificently, and their courage 
and endurance are worthy of the highest praise. All the same, it 
would be foolish to assume that the leadership was all that it might 
have been on every occasion. I have already mentioned to you the 
feeling that exists in the other arms on this point.
I hope, therefore, that you will believe me when I tell you, after 
very careful consideration and the fullest possible consultation 
with those who are in a position to know, having been in the closest 
touch with the recent fighting, that the R.A.C. has a lot to learn 
still, and that one of its most urgent problems is to find leaders 
of the highest standard – possessing originality and a very quick 
intelligence. As I said before, the material Is excellent, but it must 
have leaders capable of getting the best out of it.
4. At the risk of boring you I would like to say once again that the 
R.A.C. must, in my opinion, be more and more closely associated 
with the other arms, and must not be allowed to grow in a Corps 
d’elite, with separatist tendencies. I do not say that it has done so, 
but there are disturbing indications that it might do so.
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5. I have not yet had an answer from you about the command of the 
10th Corps, and I am sure there are good reasons for this, but I 
must point out that it is a matter of some urgency, as there are 
plenty of jobs to be got on with, and a Corps Commander to replace 
Lavarack100 in Syria is an urgent necessity.
6. As you know, I am hoping to form a G.H.Q. Reserve before the end 
of the winter, and If I can get him back from Libya, I want Neil 
Ritchie to command, train and lead it. He would do this admirably, 
and I hope you will agree to this. I propose to leave Godwin Austen 
in Libya when the situation there stabilises. When this will be, it 
is at present impossible to foresee, but we are actively planning to 
bring it about.
7. We have managed to get off some of the reinforcements for Malta, 
but shipping for the remainder can not be found, so the Admiral101 
tells me. As you know, the notice we were given was very short. 
I realise fully, of course, the value of Malta, and the need for 
maintaining it. Its fall would affect us vitally, apart from any other 
repercussions it might have, All the same, I was surprised to 
receive Dobbie’s102 appeal for aid, as when I was there in July he 
told me he was then perfectly happy, as he had received all he had 
asked for. I know that his need is more pressing than ours at the 
moment, but I confess I view with some alarm the way in which 
this command is being drained of troops and material. It is not as 
if we had inexhaustible supply of either, especially of things like 
anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery.
I am not grumbling, but there is, I feel, a limit beyond which is 
it not safe to go, and I shall have to say so if the need arises. I know 
understand this very well.
8. The matter of Blamey’s position here will need revising almost at 
once, in view of recent developments. The reasons which led to his 
present appointment will soon have largely ceased to exist, and he 
will not have a full time job to do.
His position as Deputy C.-in-C is not too easy at any time, for, 
as you know, it is not by any means a military necessity, and I fancy 
100 Lieutenant General J. D. Lavarack, commanding 1st Australian Corps.
101 Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, C in C, Mediterranean.
102 Lieutenant General Sir William Dobbie, Governor and C in C, Malta.
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that Blamey feels this himself. I should have thought that better use 
could be of his [time] in the Far East, or, possibly, in Australia itself.
JRL, AUC 640
135
Letter from Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 18 January 1942
I am just off to 30 Corps to fix up with them the necessary details for 
the re-adjustment of troops resulting from the Frontier Area now 
having been cleared up. The adjustments I propose I will explain 
when I come down on the 20th. What a nuisance these Germans 
are giving way like this and so interfering with our arrangements 
for the Free French and to test them out as a fighting formation!
2. 13 Corps.
I visited 13 Corps for two days and got back, as I told you, yesterday 
morning. They were all in very good form and I was able to see 
FRANK MESSERVY,103 JOCK CAMPBELL104 and JOHN 
MARRIOTT.105 The trouble of course is the enormous area over 
which the Corps is spread and the extremely bad going which 
makes ones movement by car very slow. From Corps Headquarters 
it took me a day to visit JOHN MARRIOTT and a second one to 
visit FRANK MESSERVY. I discussed the plans for the future 
at great length with GODWIN,106 and adjusted it where necessary 
to come within scope of our administrative resources. I think it is 
now a good one and, provided the enemy does not withdraw again, 
may, I sincerely hope, give us a reasonable chance of liquidating 
him altogether. I am very relieved to know that you were prepared 
for the dates I suggested. All details of it will bring with me on 
the 20th, and will of course be particularly anxious to discuss with 
JOHN the “cover” for it.
103 Major General Frank Messervy, in temporary command of 1st Armoured 
Division having given up command of 4th Indian Division on 2 January 1942.
104 Brigadier John ‘Jock’ Campbell, VC.
105 Brigadier J. C. O. Marriott, commanding 22nd Guards Brigade.
106 Lieutenant General Alfred Godwin-Austen, commanding 13 Corps.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   291 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
292
3. MESSERVY.
I need hardly say that both GODWIN and I are most anxious that 
FRANK MESSERVY should stay in command of the 1st Armd 
Div for this operation. In view of the considerable re-organisation 
that you have decided upon I wonder whether you would permit 
this? One thing in particular makes it desirable that, if possible, he 
should stay. Ground is going to play a very important part in these 
operations and it is I suggest most important that the Commander 
of the Armour should know the ground and should have had a good 
chance of studying it beforehand. It is by far the most difficult 
country that we have so far experienced and everyone is hard at 
work carrying out the most careful reconnaissances.
4. DISPOSITIONS OF TROOPS.
In your letter of the 15th January you raise the question of a reserve 
brigade behind the 4th Div. I apologise. An alteration was made in 
my letter after I had signed it and after I had myself left here, and 
I was not available to be asked. It was my intention that a Reserve 
Brigade for the Corps should be stationed behind the 4th Ind. 
Div. In the initial stages this will provide the local security for the 
R.A.F. operation landing grounds in the area and for the safety 
of the L of C generally in that neighbourhood. It is my intention 
at the moment to move up the 1st S. A. Inf Bde Gp for this task, 
and in the circumstances I still feel that we would be justified in 
releasing for you the 150th Inf Bde Gp. now.
5. THE POLES
I have in mind to relieve the POLES as early as possible and make 
them available to return to the DELTA. Incidentally I see that 
General ZAJAC has written to you on this subject. The FREE 
FRENCH are a problem. I know nothing of their fighting value 
and I do not feel justified in maintaining them in the forward area 
for our next operation. In these circumstances, I [hope] you will 
agree to the FREE FRENCH reliving the POLES in the DERNA 
neighbourhood of the GEBEL. To complete the picture there 
I hope to move the 1st S.A. Div (less one Bde Gp) up in to the 
Western portion of the GEBEL to replace the 4th Ind Div there 
as the latter move down to assume their battle position in the 
AGEDABIA neighbourhood.
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6. 7 SUPPORT GROUP.
I feel sure that this party should be relieved as early as possible and 
this is being done. They are weary and very thoroughly deserve a 
rest. Their relief by the 1st Support Group should be completed 
tomorrow and they will then start on their way back. to the DELTA.
7. 38 INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
I propose to put one Bde Group of the 2nd S.A. Div into the 
TOBRUK area to relieve the 38th Ind. Inf Bde there and this will 
be completed by the end of the month. They will then be released 
and return to EGYPT. I hope this will be suitable?
8. JOHN MARRIOTT
I attach a letter from FRANK MESSERVY in reply to mine 
concerning the suitability of MARRIOTT as a Divisional 
Commander. This note of MESSERVY’s is a result of a conversation 
we had on the matter. I have discussed it with GODWIN who agrees. 
There is nothing against JOHN MARRIOTT except, if one can put 
it like this, he is too nice to be really forceful and I think that FRANK 
MESSERVY sums up the situation very adequately. Quite decidedly 
I do not consider that he is fit for the command of an Armd Div.
9. Thank you so much for your wire asking me stay on the 20th, which 
I will be delighted to do. ANGUS is coming with me and will send 
TONY a message later about the time of our arrival.
JRL, AUC 643
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General Charles Willoughby Norrie 
(Commander 30th Corps), 18 January 1942
Very many thanks for your letter of the 16th and the enclosures. 
I have had a talk with Pienaar107 and realize the truth of your remarks. 
I agree that his military knowledge is good, and I think his ideas on 
107 Major General D. H. Pienaar, GOC 1st South African Division.
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organization and minor tactics are sound enough. For instance, his 
system of moving and leaguering a brigade group seems on the face 
of it sensible and effective. I wonder if you agree with me in this.
2. I am going to ask you to come in here for a day or two next week as 
I want you and your staff to take on at once the job of organizing 
the SALUM–MADDALENA–GIARABUB line as a rear line 
of defence. This is an insurance which we must have, and I want 
plans made and work started at the earliest possible moment after 
you have been here and discussed it with Neil Ritchie and me.
3. I am sending an official instruction to 8th Army.
4. My best congratulations on HALFAYA. Taken with BARDIA it 
forms a great achievement at very small cost. More power to you!
JRL, AUC 644
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Letter from General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS 
to Auchinleck, 21 January 1942
Very many thanks for your letter of December 28th. I am taking the 
opportunity of Porter’s return to answer it.
I was very interested in your paper on the future strategy of the war 
and your suggestion of carrying the war into Germany from Africa. 
There is a great deal to say for such a plan from many aspects, but I am 
afraid that it does not take into account the shipping situation. Shipping 
is exercising a stranglehold on strategy which is likely to be increased 
by recent events.
To attempt to supply large forces by sea to North Africa and from 
there through the Mediterranean may well present insoluble problems 
from a shipping point of view. There is, in addition, the exposure of sea 
communications through the Mediterranean, to air and under-water 
attack, which would require taking into account.
What I am certain of is that North Africa would provide an excellent 
base of attack on Italy through the action of air and naval forces.
At any rate, the first stage must be to secure North Africa, and we 
have got an awkward problem in front of us in the shape of Acrobat. 
The failure to destroy Rommel’s force, the time gained by his rearguard 
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actions, the unavoidable delays necessary to stage Acrobat, and the 
reduced strength of naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean, all affect 
the situation seriously.
The restrictions which the administrative situation imposes on the 
strength of the force which we can maintain for offensive operations 
in Tripoli is also a very serious handicap. Against Italians all would be 
well, but against Germans and with some 6 weeks to obtain reinforce-
ments, the odds may well be heavily weighted against us when you are 
in a position to resume the offensive.
From the above I do not suggest that we should not carry out Acrobat 
as long as there is a reasonable chance of success. On the contrary, 
I attach the greatest importance to it and all it entails. We should, during 
the next few weeks, be able to form a fairly accurate estimate as to what 
reinforcements have got through and what the enemy forces opposed 
to us consist of.
The Far East is likely to exercise a very serious drain on our resources 
for some time to come. There is no idea of offensive action in the 
immediate future as one of your wires suggested we were contemplating; 
on the contrary, the difficulty is to find adequate resources to cork up the 
holes. I agree with you that there is a minimum below which we should 
not draw on the Middle East, owning to our North Eastern commitments; 
unfortunately we have already been forced to go below the minimum in 
my opinion. The withdrawals contemplated amount to some 5 Divisions, 
namely: two Australian, 18 Div., 17th and 14th Indian Divisions, and even 
the possibility of a third Australian Div! At present I do not see much 
hope, owing to shipping difficulties of replacing more than two of these 
Divisions from Home Forces before June! And even this programme 
may be upset owing to necessity for shipping reinforcements. And yet, if 
we don’t withdraw from Middle East to reinforce Far East, we may well 
lose control of communications in the Indian Ocean to such an extent as 
to seriously endanger our communications with the Middle East, thus 
rendering it difficult to reinforce you at all. I can assure you that I have 
the security of your North Eastern Front at heart and shall do all I can 
to maintain and raise it to the required strength. Luckily, the Russian 
situation gives us a little more breathing space than we originally hoped 
for, and we should not have much to fear before July.
I am glad that we have now got Iraq and Persia definitely handed over 
to you; I did not like the other arrangement.
I entirely agree with you that Martel’s tendency is to try and make a 
separate private Army of the Armoured Corps – I have spoken to him 
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repeatedly about it, and am determined to have nothing of the kind. 
I had already given out at home that all Corps H.Q. must be capable of 
controlling either Armoured or Infantry Divisions, and that a Corps 
Commander incapable of handling Armoured Forces is not fit to hold 
his command. I had not yet gone as far as you suggest, namely that Div. 
H.Q. be regarded in the same way. You may be right, but I should like 
to consider this point further before expressing a definite opinion.
What is lamentable, and must be remedied, is the lack of knowledge 
in most senior officers of the handling of armoured forces.
I was interested to hear that you propose to return Holmes108 to his 
Corps and to send him up to Jumbo Wilson. He is a rum bird and not 
one I have ever had a very high opinion of. He may be all right when it 
comes to fighting, but he is extraordinarily ignorant in the handling of 
the various arms other than infantry.
I see from one of your telegrams you think Holmes might eventually 
take over from Jumbo Wilson – I should have doubted it. The retention 
of Jumbo is, of course, producing a good deal of talk from those who have 
been moved on for age; it would therefore be inadvisable to retain him 
any longer if you feel that he is beginning to show signs of age.
Can we do more to help you from here by sending you out anybody? 
If you feel you want some fresh blood, let me know who you would like: 
we could work some exchanges. There is, unfortunately, not a great to 
deal to pick from here, but there are a few good young Div. Commanders 
coming on, and I feel certain exchanges are desirable. I was afraid that 
you might not have much use for Nosworthy,109 but had to suggest him 
as he is at present spare and waiting for employment.
What I am worried about is that you have not got a first-class A.F.V. 
adviser on your staff. I do consider that you want someone on the same 
lines as your Chief Gunner, or Chief Sapper. There is a colossal amount 
of work for him in the re-equipping and re-forming of your Armoured 
Divisions and Army Tank Bde., and in the provision of general advice 
on Armoured matters.
As you express such a definite wish to raise your D.M.T. to the rank 
of Major-General I cannot but agree, and am getting Finance to accept. 
But I consider that an organization which retains the Brig. A.F.Vs. under 
the D.M.T. is definitely wrong. The Brig. A.F.Vs. must also deal with 
108 Lieutenant General William Holmes, GOC British Troops, Egypt.
109 Lieutenant General Sir Francis Nosworthy. He was to be appointed C in C West 
Africa in 1943.
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matters other than training, such as organization, equipment, personnel, 
etc. With a Force such as yours when the Chief Artillery representative 
is a Major-General, the Chief A.F.V. representative should be of similar 
rank. I attach a table of what I consider the organization should be. I feel 
that with such a system you would be in a much better position to tackle 
the large reorganization scheme which faces you.
It is essential that your four Armoured Divisions should be re-equipped 
and reorganised as quickly as possible to meet any threat that may develop 
through Turkey or Caucasus later on. I am examining the possibilities of 
sparing one more Armoured Division from Home Forces for you, which, 
together with the Indian one, would bring you up to 6. This could in any 
case only be done in lieu of an infantry div., owing to shipping restrictions.
I should very much have liked to be able to assist you by sending you 
Bond as you requested, but unfortunately he is one of the key men on 
the A.F.V. aide in the War Office whom I could not spare at present.
The telegrams are working better now, but I still feel that too free a 
use is made of “Private and Personal” ones to the P.M. For instance, 
the one concerning inadequate packing of Churchill tanks might well 
be in the first place have been sent personal to the Q.M.G.; as it was, it 
caused a good deal of unnecessary bad blood.
I also feel that it would be desirable to impress on Shearer that highly 
coloured optimistic reports which are not borne out by subsequent facts 
have been too frequent lately. There has been a continual tendency to 
over-estimate the destruction of the enemy’s armoured forces and to 
convey a picture of completely surrounded hostile forces. These reports 
are apt to create a spirit of unwarranted optimism amongst politicians, 
which is followed by one of doubt as the veracity of our statements!
It has been very good value bringing Porter and the others back, they 
have been a great help to us. I have had a good talk with Porter so that 
he can let you know what is in my mind.
I have just received a letter from Dobbie110 who is very grateful for 
the assistance which you so readily provided for him. I should not be 
surprised to see the Germans carry out some form of operation in that 
direction.
I am so sorry to be inflicting such a long letter on you, but miss the 
possibility of an occasional talk with you which would be so useful.
JRL, AUC 649
110 Lieutenant General Sir William Dobbie, Governor and C in C, Malta.
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Cipher message from the Commanders-in-Chief 
Middle East to Churchill, 24 January 1942
1 (.) Army strengths at beginning CRUSADER (.) (A) German (,) 
two Armd Divs one Light Div (.) Italian (,) one Armd Div two 
Motorized Divs four Inf Divs (.) Total Axis divs ten (.) (B) Ours (,) 
equivalent two Armd Divs six Inf Divs (.) Total eight Divs (.)
2 (.) During period 18 Nov to 22 Jan the following losses were inflicted 
on the enemy by the Med Fleet and F.A.A. (.) One battleship 
damaged two cruisers sunk and two damaged one destroyer sunk 
and three damaged seven submarines sunk and one probably 
sunk (.) Twenty seven merchant ships totalling 92000 (92000) 
tons sunk and fourteen M/Vs damaged (.) Med Fleet and F.A.A. 
casualties during the same period were 2560 (2560) killed and 170 
(170) wounded (.)
3 (.) Accurate figures are not yet available of enemy Army and Air 
losses in men and material (.) From visual observation captured 
documents and prisoners of war statements following estimate of 
losses are believed accurate (.) Enemy losses (.) Percentage figures 
represent loss in relation to original strength as now known from 
capture documents (.) (A) Personnel (.) Killed and wounded (.) 
German 11500 (11500) 27 per cent (,) Italian 13000 (13000) 23 per 
cent (.) Prisoners (.) German 10500 (10500) 25 per cent (,) Italian 
26000 (26000) 46 per cent (.) Total Axis losses 61000 (61000) out of 
original strength 40000 (40000) Germans 60000 (60000) Italians (.) 
(B) Aircraft captured or destroyed (.) German 479 (479) Italian 373 
(373) (.) (C) Equipment captured or destroyed (.) Medium tanks 
German 216 (216) 85 per cent (,) Italian 120 (120) 93 per cent (.) 
Field and medium guns German 125 (125) 82 per cent (,) Italian 
290 (290) 69 per cent (.) A.Tk and other light guns (.) German 
134 (134) 62 per cent (,) Italian 157 (157) 71 per cent (.) Heavy 
A.A, and dual purpose guns (.) German 40 (40) 33 per cent Italian 
34 (34) 50 per cent (.) Ammunition 100,000 (100,000) tons (.)
4 (.) Our Army losses (,) 18,000 (18,000) men (.)
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5 (.) Suggest following special points (.)
(a) As result of continuous pressure prior to land operations we 
started attack with marked degree of air superiority which 
was maintained and increased (.)
(b) Surprise of date/direction of attack due largely to our R.A.F. 
gaining before the battle air superiority which was never lost 
and also to good approach march by Army [.]
(c) Enemy shortage of supply due primarily to our continuous 
Naval and Air operations against his L of C prior to and 
during land operations (.)
(d) Co-operation of all three Services which was largely outcome 
of Army and Air H.Q. living and working together and to 
pressure at H.Q. of Naval Liaison Officer (.) Result was that 
Army and R.A.F. worked as one team (.)
(e) Assistance of land operations by Naval bombardment (.)
(f) Maintenance of TOBRUK by Navy for seven months (.)
(g) Offensive spirit of TOBRUK garrison and their command 
of No Man’s Land (.)
(h) Morale of fighting services and determination has never 
been higher and has not been affected by sand storms and 
bad weather or desperate resistance by enemy (.)
(i) Excellent work by our Intelligence Staffs [.]
JRL, AUC 651
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Cipher Message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 25 January 1942
I am much disturbed my number 10005 B/23 from N[aval]. L[iaison]. 
O[fficer]. 8th Army which speaks of evacuation of BENGHAZI and 
DERNA. I had certainly never been led to believe that such a situation 
could arise. All this movement of non-fighting personnel EASTWARDS, 
and statement that demolition work at BENGHAZI has NOT (repeat 
NOT) been ordered yet, places the campaign on a very different level 
from any we had considered. Have you really been unable to compete 
with the RESUSCITATED GERMAN Tanks. It seems to me this is a 
serious crisis and one to me quite unexpected. Why should they all be off 
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so quick, why should not the 4th INDIAN DIV hold out at BENGHAZI 
like the HUNS at HALFAYA. The kind of retirement now evidently 
envisaged by subordinate officers implies the failure of CRUSADER 
and the ruin of ACROBAT.
JRL, AUC 653
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Letter from Auchinleck111 to Lieutenant General 
Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle East, 26 January 1942
We had a good fly up yesterday, though we did not get here till 
1 p.m., having had to come down at EL ADEM to get news of 
conditions forward. What with one thing and another, we did not 
get off from HELIOPOLIS till 9 a.m., so it was not too bad – no 
wind and no dust. Today is foul, easterly gale and clouds of dust.
2. The situation is not satisfactory to my mind, chiefly because of 
the apparent inability of the 1st Armoured Division to hold the 
enemy for any length of time. I do not say they are not fighting hard, 
because they are, from all accounts, but the fact remains that they 
were pushed out of MSUS yesterday, though they had columns 
still East of that place engaged with the enemy yesterday evening. 
The latest reports are 1 Armd Div is South of CHARRUBA, on 
which place it is presumably concentrating. Some of the Guards 
Bde columns are said to be missing, “cut off” is one expression 
used, and it may be that some troops are short of petrol, which is, 
to my mind, the most serious possibility. However, we shall see, 
and I think the enemy must be pretty well stretched, though, true 
to form, he will push on to the utmost limit of his resources, even 
with the weakest forces, unless we can stabilise the situation.
Godwin Austen112 had yesterday made up his mind that BENGASI 
could no longer be held, and that the 4th Indian Division must be 
withdrawn via DERNA. All heavy installations have been evacuated 
from BENGASI, and the Naval establishments should have got out 
last night. These are, I think, wise precautions, but I am very averse 
111 Auchinleck was present at 8th Army HQ at this time.
112 Lieutenant General Alfred Godwin-Austen, commanding 13 Corps.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   300 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
301
to abandoning the place unless it is absolutely necessary, as you know. 
I discussed the whole situation with Neil Ritchie yesterday evening, 
by which time 13th Corps HQ were on the move towards MECHILI 
from CHARRUBA and out of touch, and he has issued orders 
direct to Tuker113 that the 4th Ind Div are to arrange to protect their 
own Eastward flank as far as EL ABIAR, and to push as strongly as 
possible with small mobile columns with artillery against the enemy’s 
Western flank and communications in the direction of ANTELAT, 
while 1st Armd Div are to do all they can to prevent an enemy advance 
Northwards towards CHARRUBA and MECHILI. The Polish Bde 
Gp are moving on MECHILI, and should be concentrated there this 
afternoon – with luck. Some of them are there already. 150th Bde 
(Haydon114 was here yesterday getting his orders) are to reach BIR 
HACEIM today, and to move on as quickly as possible to BUERAT – 
EL HALES and TENGEDER and secure the Southern approaches. 
They are to operate offensively Westwards with mobile columns.
3. Neil Ritchie spent a long time last night on the “Blower” talking 
to Godwin Austen and telling of this change of plan. G[odwin]-
A[usten] is very much against any change and without hesitation 
dissociated himself from it, as he considered that to change now 
would be most difficult, and that the new plan was impracticable. 
Neil took full responsibility and ordered him to put it in effect at 
once. The necessary orders are being issued. Neil has taken 4th 
Ind Div under his direct command, as he has a better means of 
communication with it than 13th Corps, and is determined to stage 
this counter-offensive. So far there has been no sign of any enemy 
activity towards BENGASI, and we know that all his maintenance 
transport is strung out along the JEDABYA – ANTELAT track, 
and should be very sensitive to determined attack.
I realise that we are taking a big risk, but so is the enemy, and I 
think his risk is bigger than ours. We must recover the initiative as 
soon as we can, and it seems to me that this is the only immediately 
possible way of doing. I only wish it had been possible to it earlier. 
I gather that Tuker has been urging it for some time now, but I 
daresay Godwin Austen had good reasons for not resorting to it. It 
is difficult to say without knowing what the local situation is. It is 
possible that nothing may come of it, but I refuse to believe that 
113 Major General Francis Tuker, GOC 4th Indian Division.
114 Brigadier C. W. Haydon.
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the enemy’s supply situation, or indeed his tactical situation, is all 
that he could wish it to be. I am ready to bet that he must be very 
surprised by the extent of the success he has achieved.
3. I am staying up here today, and so is Tedder. Neil goes over to 
MECHILI this afternoon by air to meet G-A, who expects to arrive 
there by 4 p.m. Further action may be necessary in this direction, 
but I hope it will be necessary to do anything drastic, though I am 
quite ready for it.
4. Neil intends to move this H.Q. to SIDI REZEIZ which will be 
much better in my opinion from every point of view. I have never 
really liked TMIMI as an 8th Army HQ. It was intended originally 
to be a temporary halt only, and is, to my mind, too much to one 
flank of the general axis of operations. His advanced parties are 
there already, and I think Neil will move as soon as communica-
tions are satisfactorily established, but his decision will of course 
be governed by the course of events.
Neil is laying plans for the future and the resumption of the 
offensive when the enemy has been held.
5. I want the 3 Indian Motor Brigade placed at short notice to move 
in case it is needed here to replace losses in mobile troops. It would 
move by regiments if it does come, so one regiment with some fd 
guns and anti-tank guns should have first priority. Ninth Army 
will grumble probably about their internal security, but they will 
have to do the best they can.
6. Also please find out the state of readiness of the New Zealanders, in 
case they too should be wanted again. Don’t interrupt the KABRIT 
training in combined operations if it can be avoided, but it might 
be as well to warn Freyberg that it is just possible he may be called 
on to help if things go badly awry.
7. I enclose a telegram for the Prime Minister. If you can, please 
repeat it to the Minister of State.115 Keep the Ambassador as happy 
as you can!
P.S I have asked John Shearer to stay here for tonight at any rate.
JRL, AUC 654
115 Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of State and Member of the War Cabinet, resident in 
Cairo.
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Letter from Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, 
CGS, Middle East, to Auchinleck, 26 January 1942
I was very glad to get your telegram this afternoon, despatched this 
morning, giving the news. It did not quite agree with a situation 
report as sent shortly afterwards by 8th Army, but in order to avoid 
a muddle, we are ensuring that our Sitrep to the War Office agrees 
with your report to the Prime Minister.
2. I sent a telegram this afternoon to ask if you could give us a line as to 
the communiques. So far I have put very little in the communiques, 
but something more lengthy would, no doubt, be appreciated by 
the public as soon as possible. Walter Monckton116 comes in to 
see me morning and evening, and is having a special meeting with 
the accredited press representatives, which seems to be a success. 
He tells them nothing but keeps them sweet. One or two items in 
the local press lately have rather annoyed me, and I have told the 
people responsible to take them up, and have mentioned them to 
Walter Monckton.
3. I enclose a statement showing the tank situation, which I hope may 
be of use.
4. The question arose as to whether the 7th Armoured Bde should be 
stopped sailing for the Far East. They are due to start tomorrow. 
General Blamey has decided they shall sail as arranged, and I am 
sure you will agree that he is right.
5. I have given written instructions to Frank Theron117 to take with 
him to South Africa. He leaves tomorrow. I have had a final talk 
with him, and hope and believe he really understands the problem. 
He takes with him a personal letter from me to van Ryneveld,118 
stressing the more important points, and I have told van Ryneveld 
that this letter is a substitute for one which you undoubtedly would 
116 Walter Monckton, Head of propaganda and information services in Cairo and 
member of the Middle East war council.
117 Major General Frank Theron, the senior South African liaison officer to GHQ , 
Middle East.
118 General Sir Hesperus Andrias van Ryneveld, CGS, Union Defence Forces, 
South Africa.
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have written to Field Marshal Smuts had you been able to. I will 
show you a copy when you return to Cairo.
6. I did not repeat your telegram to the Minister of State,119 because 
his office did not know where he was, and there is a temporary 
break in communications with BAGHDAD. Tomorrow morning, 
if security permits, I shall send him a brief resume of what has 
taken place if I can trace him.
7. You probably heard that Hutch and Sandy Galloway are not able 
to reach Rear 8th Army HQ today, owning to weather conditions. 
They were going up in connection with the vehicle census. Perhaps 
now is not a particularly opportune moment for their visit.
P.S As I see it, the chap who sticks it longest and has the best guts is 
going to win this battle.
JRL, AUC 655
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Letter from Auchinleck to Lieutenant General 
Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle East, 27 January 1942
The aircraft could not leave yesterday owing to the weather, which was 
foul – high wind and much dust – so my yesterday’s letter will go with 
this one. Thank you for sending on the Prime Minister’s SUSAN 161 
of Jan. 25th, and for getting Blamey to send an answer, which I think 
suited the circumstances. Please send on any other wires from the same 
source and send an interim answer if it seems imperative to do so, 
otherwise better not I think, as the situation here changes so rapidly. 
Yesterday was a quiet day apparently, and Neil flew over to MECHILI 
in the afternoon, where he met Godwin Austen, who is now established 
13th Corps HQ some five miles East of MECHILI. The Poles are at 
and round MECHILI, while the 150th Inf Bde should move today to 
a point South of TENGEDER to block any attempt on the part of the 
enemy to send fast moving columns by that route against our L of C.
119 Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of State and Member of the War Cabinet, resident in 
Cairo.
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The crux of the whole matter is the condition of the 1st Armd Div, 
which G-A told Neil can no longer be counted on as a fighting force. 
Its losses are said to be 40 guns and I suppose about 100 or more tanks, 
and there is much doubt as to whether it was able to inflict any appre-
ciable loss on the enemy. G-A is apparently very pessimistic about it, 
and says it can not possibly be counted on to cover the flank of 4 Ind 
Div if the latter remains in BENGASI. However, Neil told G-A that he 
was to issue orders to it to do this, and to remain at CHARRUBA and 
take the offensive against the enemy at once. These orders were issued 
yesterday afternoon.
Meanwhile, Tuker120 has been ordered to take the offensive with his 
division against the enemy western flank from MSUS to ANTELAT: If, 
however, the 1st Armd Div is not capable of protecting the Southern flank 
of the L of C to BENGASI, we may have to come out, though this is the 
last thing I want to do. Neil has told G-A to give him an immediate report 
on the fighting condition of 1 Armd Div, but this has not arrived yet.
Meanwhile, the latest report is that 1 Armd Div with the Guards Bde 
is organising a defence round CHARRUBA with Armd car patrols on a 
wide arc, 35 to 40 miles out, from WEST through SOUTH to EAST. 
There is apparently a detachment of Royals with some A/TK guns 
on the TRIGH EL ABD watching that line. Orders have been issued 
to 1 Armd Div again to form offensive columns and move against the 
enemy. 4 Ind Div were active yesterday, and their fighting patrols were 
almost in ANTELAT and thence WEST to the coast about RAS BEN 
HAGEN through BEDA FOMM, and found no enemy. ANTELAT is 
said to be empty. 4 Ind Div hold SCLEIDIMA and SIDI BRAMM on 
the escarpment to the North of it, or did yesterday afternoon. They are 
also in SOLUCH.
Neil is just off with “Mary” Conningham121 to see Tuker at BENGASI. 
It was lovely early this morning, but this damned wind has started again, 
and the dust is getting up.
The Navy were most precipitate in starting their destructive work 
at BENGASI, and the man in charge anticipated his orders apparently. 
So far as I can make out no other demolitions were carried out, except 
of a few enemy stores, and the R.A.F. burnt some petrol unfortunately.
It is early to say yet what may happen, as so much depends on the 
state of 1 Armd Div. However, the situation seems better than it has been 
120 Major General Francis Tuker, GOC 4th Indian Division.
121 Air Vice Marshal Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham, commanding Desert Air Force.
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for some days, and to be coming to hand. The Poles and 150 Inf Bde are 
being told to be as aggressive as possible with mixed columns, and I hope 
Tuker will be able really to worry the enemy. He has the offensive spirit 
all right, and the right ideas. I have great hopes of being able to hold 
BENGASI and restore the situation, perhaps to the enemy’s ultimate 
detriment. However, as I say, things are delicately balanced still.
As I think I told you, this HQ is in process of establishing itself at SIDI 
REZEIZ, but the transfer is being effected deliberately and carefully to 
give no impression of undue haste. There was a possibility of our moving 
back today but this has been postponed.
I enclose a telegram for the Prime Minister, also a draft communique.
The R.A.F. yesterday gave the enemy hell all along the road MSUS 
– ANTELAT. The fighters have got their blood up, and reports are 
still coming in of burning lorries and vehicles all over the place. More 
power to them!
Please concoct a telegram to C.I.G.S. and Dominions etc. from me, 
and me a copy. Please send me back copies of all my telegrams and letters 
if you can. No liaison officer arrived this morning, though a Lockhead 
came in. Please show copy of my enclosed telegram to Prime Minister 
to Admiral,122 as it mentions the Navy.
JRL, AUC 656
143
Letter from Auchinleck to Lieutenant General 
Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle East, 28 January 1942
The Liaison aircraft isn’t in yet, but I hope it will be here soon 
with John Shearer on board.
2. I enclose my telegram for the Prime Minister which I hope will give 
you a clear picture of the situation as it is known here. While on this 
subject, I wonder whether it would not really be better and more 
informative to the recipients if we worked our own Cositreps more 
in this style – that is, in narrative form instead of in the very jerky, 
disjointed, “G[eneral]. S[taff].” style we use at present. They are 
very difficult to read, and, instead of giving form at a glance as they 
122 Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, C in C, Mediterranean.
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should, they nearly always entail much meticulous map-reading and 
intricate calculations of time and space on the part of the reader. 
In fact, they contain much too much unimportant and ephemeral 
detail in my opinion. Think it over!
3. Yesterday started quietly, and Neil and “Mary” Conningham flew 
over to BENGASI to see “Gertie” Tuker, with whom they had a 
satisfactory interview apparently. Neil says he is in cracking form 
and full of fight and, what is much more important, of original 
ideas for beating the enemy. This is most refreshing and again 
emphasises, if emphasis were needed, the importance of not leaving 
commanders too long in the same place or the same job! I feel the 
wanderlust myself !!!
4. The enemy started moving again before lunch yesterday as you 
know, and true to form has taken the bold stroke of dividing his 
forces in diametrically opposite directions from a base which can 
not hold any real reserve of supplies. At least, that is how it looks. 
Without being too optimistic, it seems as if he may have once 
again underestimated our capacity to recover and hit back after a 
reverse – for we have had a reverse – there is no getting away from 
it. However, I feel that Neil has situation very well in hand. In fact, 
it looks as if the enemy is doing the very thing Neil was hoping he 
would do, except that he did not anticipate his splitting his force 
as he has done. This again, may give us an even better opportunity 
of hitting him. It looks as if the majority of the enemy armour is 
in his eastern thrust, though he has apparently got some tanks in 
the force moving on EL ABIAR.
Neil has just heard from Godwin Austen that Messervy says 
that 1 Armd Div is reorganised and ready for offensive action. It 
has been ordered by Godwin in anticipation of orders from Neil to 
strike south-eastwards against the enemy moving on MECHILI. 
Tuker and the 4 Div are to hold EL ABIAR and strike East, and 
South against the flank and rear of the enemy moving on EL ABIAR, 
which would seem to offer good chance of success, though a report 
just in indicating movement of small columns of enemy tanks and 
M.T. Northwards from AGEDABIA West of the escarpment may 
hamper this move. There is no doubt that today may be critical, 
and much will depend on the skill and boldness with which the 1st 
Armd Div is handled, and the ability of 4 Ind Div to hold off the 
threat from the South while striking East. Both sides are taking 
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   307 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
308
big risks, and I hope we can play that game as well as Rommel. He 
is running absolutely true to form, and putting everything in the 
shop window. So are we I hope. The difference is, I think, that our 
supply situation ought to be better than his, and our air is, for the 
moment, having everything its own way.
As I told you, this H.Q. is moving slowly and by sections to 
SIDI AZEIZ, and it is possible we may go there today, but that is 
not yet certain.
5. I send you back Jennings’ paper on future organisation and distri-
bution with my pencilled comments in the margin.
I suppose S.D. [?] has been consulted regarding the proposals. 
It looks as if we shall have to defer the relief of CYPRUS for a bit, 
but I want the problem kept constantly before the Navy, as it will 
have to be faced some time.
6. You will have had my telegram about the reformation of 4 Armd 
Bde.
It should get up here as soon as it possibly can. Will you try 
and form an armoured car unit – regt or squadron – for inclusion 
in the group as soon as you can, as I feel this will strengthen it 
considerably. I absolutely agree that the Bde should be reformed 
on the new organisation, which is, I am certain, an urgent necessity. 
I should not be at all surprised to learn that the apparent failure of 
1 Armd Div to deal with the enemy in the present operations was 
due largely to the divorcement of the armour from the infantry. 
Anyway, go right ahead with it as fast as you can. You will have to find 
another commander instead of Gatehouse, I think. Don’t hesitate 
to suggest anyone, however junior he may be, and irrespective of 
his arm of the service. What about Jock Campbell? But let me know 
as soon as you, M[ilitary]. S[ecretary]., Lloyd and anyone else you 
are to consult, have come to any conclusion.
8th Army will tell you about the transport for 4 Armd Bde.
7. Please send up the 25 armoured cars now available at once to 8 Army, 
as some of their units are pretty weak. Try and keep enough to form 
at least a squadron for 4 Armd Bde, but needs of 8 Army must come 
first, and they would like all the Marmon-Harringtons123 you can 
send them as well as the 25 mentioned above. I am anticipating that 
123 Armoured cars manufactured in South Africa and based on Ford 3 ton lorries.
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if things go well, the armoured car may become a most important 
weapon.
8. [X] I shall stay on here for a bit, I think, and I fancy A.O.C.-in-C. 
will stay too. The R.A.F. have been grand – morale sky high and 
full of hate.
9. Lloyd’s BM/AFV/2/10 of 26 Jan 42 about the tank situation 
mentions “Stepsister”. I am afraid I don’t know what this is! Should 
I?!
10. Free French are on the move again now. Larminat124 has just been 
in.




Letter from Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, 
CGS, Middle East, to Auchinleck, 28 January 1942
With regard to the reinforcement of the 4th Armd Bde Group, 
I have wired to you today on the subject. I have discussed all this 
with Strafer,125 and the dates given in the telegram are in fact the 
earliest to which we can work if the units are to give any satisfaction 
on arrival at the front. Being equipped with Grants and M 3s is, 
of course, new, and a certain amount of training is quite essential 
if satisfactory results are to be achieved at all.
2. As regards command, I attach pencilled note by Strafer [see 
document 145 below] on the subject of Gatehouse.126 If Gatehouse 
is unacceptable for command, the following are recommended in 
the order given:
124 General Edgard Larminat, commanding 1st Free French Brigade.
125 Major General W. H. E. Gott.
126 Brigadier Alexander Gatehouse, then commanding 4th Armoured Brigade.
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Of these three, Carr is the least experience[d] but the fittest, probably 
the least excitable, and in Strafer’s opinion likely to produce the 
best results.
3. With regard to the question of A.F.V. Directorate, Sandy130 considers 
that it will be quite safe to have Gatehouse serve in that capacity 
with himself and John Harding as D.C.G.S. and D.M.T. respec-
tively. Now that the D.M.T. is settled, what is required in the A.F.V. 
Directorate is technical knowledge and experience provided particu-
larly, if possible, by a Royal Tanks Corps man. Gatehouse fills this 
requirement exactly, and there is nobody else in this country with the 
same qualifications. If you decide against having him as Commander 
4th Armd Bde when that formation goes up to the desert, I suggest 
that he should get on with the training of it now, as he is doing, and 
that when it leaves under its new commander he could then go to 
the A.F.V. Directorate and take over. I think that is the best solution, 




Brigadier Alexander Gatehouse131 written by 
Major General W. H. E. Gott, commanding 
7th Armoured Division, 27 January 1942
Brigadier Gatehouse trained the 4 Armd Bde Group with the American 
Light Tank in October 1941 & evolved a very sound system of support & 
co-operation between all arms in the Bde. Gp. & especially between the 
127 Brigadier W. G. Carr.
128 Brigadier G. M. O. Davy.
129 Brigadier G. W. Richards.
130 Brigadier Alexander Galloway, BGS, 8th Army, 1941–42.
131 This was to no avail, Auchinleck was to note, ‘Am afraid GATEHOUSE will not 
do as Bg. A.F.V. He should go home as arranged with MARTEL’. JRL, AUC 
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guns of 2 RHA & the Armd Regts. His methods were almost identical 
with those described in the recent VIII Army directive for A.F.V. training. 
In my opinion his Bde was most successful. He fought it for over 30 days 
without any appreciable pause during which time the enemy were driven 
back from position to position always with heavy loss & frequently as 
a direct result of the action of his Bde. On the other hand the losses of 
the 4 A.B. though heavy were not such as to immobilise the Bde. This 
was because of his skillful handling & sound administration but instead 
of receiving credit for this the Bde was often accused of being slow and 
over-cautious. This unjust opinion was never supported by me & is 
without foundation. To judge by results he was the most successful of 
the Armd Bde Commanders in either 1st or 7th Armd Div. There are 
two things against him
(a) I consider he becomes tired sooner than some commanders & that 
he then definitely loses fighting efficiency. In these circumstances 
I have found him a difficult subordinate in a long battle.
(b) He is believed to have kept alive the feeling between Cavalry & 
R. Tank Regt. I think there are some grounds for this view but I 
know that he realises that such an attitude can only do harm to the 
war effort & to himself. I do not think it will recur.
Finally I consider him to be personally brave & loyal & to possess 
the best all round knowledge of AFVs & their technical & tactical 
handling of any officer in the Middle East.
For the reason given in (a) I do not recommend him for command of a 
Division.
I recommend him to continue in command of a Brigade, to command 
a School or to be Director A.F.V.s.
JRL, AUC 659
667, Letter from Auchinleck to Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle 
East, 29 January 1942. Demonstrating the limits of Auchinleck’s authority, 
Gatehouse was to be promoted Major General serving as GOC of the 1st and 
10th Armoured Divisions.
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146
Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 30 January 1942
Adv HQ 8 Army 0830 hrs GMT 30 Jan (.)
1 (.) Thank you for your telegram of 28 Jan received yesterday 
afternoon (.) Very sorry we had to let BENGHASI go but hope 
loss is temporary only (.)
2 (.) Regarding action 1 Armd Div (.) Am NOT (R[epeat]) NOT 
certain that enemy tanks were appreciably less in number than ours 
actually in running order on any one day though it is likely our 
strength in tanks in the battle area was superior to theirs (.) I have 
given you in my SUSAN 1712 of 27 Jan some reasons for defeat 
of our Armd force and I think these still hold good (.) Other and 
at present irremediable causes which I have already mentioned 
in a letter to you are short range and inferior performance our 
two pounder guns compared with German guns and mechanical 
unreliability our cruiser tanks compared to German tanks (.) In 
addition I am NOT (R) NOT satisfied that tactical leadership our 
armoured units is of sufficiently high standard to offset German 
material advantages (.) This is in hand but can NOT (R[epeat]) 
NOT be improved in a day unfortunately.
3 (.) I am reluctantly compelled to conclusion that to meet German 
armoured forces with any reasonable hope of decisive success our 
armoured forces as at present equipped organised and led must 
have at least two to one superiority (.) Even then they must rely for 
success on working in the very closest cooperation with infantry and 
artillery which except perhaps for their weakness in anti tank guns 
are fully competent to take on their German opposite numbers (.) 
These principles are being worked to here as closely as circumstances 
will permit but I am afraid there are signs that personnel of Royal 
Armoured Corps are in some instances losing confidence in their 
equipment (.) Everything possible will be done to rectify this (.)
4 (.) General RITCHIE and I are fully alive to ROMMELS probable 
intentions but whatever these may be he will certainly try to exploit 
success by use of even smallest columns until he meets resistance (.) 
Plans are in train to counter such action (.)
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5 (.) It seems possible that some at least of 7 Ind[ian] Inf[antry] Bde Gp 
may have broken through to EAST of BENGHASI and are now 
on way to CHARRUBA and MECHILI (.) No details available 
but fear that their losses must have been severe (.)
6 (.) 4 Ind Div are holding line BARCE MARAUA to join up with 
CHARRUBA which is held still by 1 Armd Div (.) Yesterday 
columns from 1 Armd Div operated SOUTH and SOUTHWEST 
from CHARRUBA and engaged small columns of enemy NORTH 
of MSUS (.) Only slight enemy movement observed yesterday he 
is probably reorganising and recuperating (.) Our air force failed 
to find favourable targets but fighters were most active in support 
of our forward troops over whole battle area (.)
7 (.) Polish and Free French Bde Gps round MECHILI tempo-
rarily under command General DE LARMINAT directly under 
control 13 Corps which also controls 50 (50) Inf Bde Gp round 
TENGEDER (.)
8 (.) Our mobile columns are operating vigorously to WEST and 
SOUTHWEST from MECHILI and TENGEDER (.) 4 Ind Div 
is being reinforced by Force E (JALO FORCE) from CHARRUBA 
and by other units (.) South African Div less one Bde is moving to 
MECHILI (.) Intention is to reform 1 Armd Div behind MECHILI 




Letter from Auchinleck to Lieutenant General 
Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle East, 30 January 1942
We moved here yesterday afternoon, a much more suitable, and 
incidentally a more pleasant spot, than TMIMI. 13th Corps H.Q. 
arrived at TMIMI before Neil [Ritchie] and I left, and I had a 
few minutes with Godwin Austen, who looks very fit and was in 
good form, very unperturbed, I thought, which is all to the good. 
They did make a very stupid mistake at 13 Corps H.Q. before they 
left MECHILI, in that the B.G.S. apparently told the fighters to 
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clear out their landing grounds as they could not guarantee their 
safety against being raided by small columns. This was, I am sure, 
quite unnecessary, and made me, and Neil [Ritchie] too, very 
angry indeed. They were ordered back at once, but will, I am 
afraid, have lost two whole days of operating from forward landing 
grounds. A.O.C.-in-C. is naturally very upset, and so was “Mary” 
Conningham, who, by the way, is really magnificent. He goes from 
strength to strength, I think!
2. I flew from TMIMI to GAZALA 3, which is now our nearest 
bus stop; it took only ten minutes in a Blenheim. Neil and I then 
drove on to MRASSAS, where we found H.Q. 30 Corps and 
saw Willoughby Norrie, Davy,132 Lysaght Griffin,133 Steward the 
signaller, Aikenhead the gunner, and others. They were all in good 
form, and very cheered at the prospect of being more actively 
employed in the near future, in spite of having selected one of the 
most God-forsaken spots I have ever seen in Africa or Asia as their 
present headquarters.
3. You know Neil has decided to give 13th Corps the whole front from 
JEBEL to TENGEDER, both inclusive to 13th Corps, who take 
over today. This is quite right I think. Army should only control 
front line troops direct in dire emergency, of which BENGHASI 
was an instance.
4. Behind 13th Corps he intends to build up his striking force for a 
renewed offensive. The base of this force will be a reconstituted 
1 Armd Div of one Armd Bde Gp and a motorised Bde Gp (G[uar]ds 
Bde Gp) which might have four battalions in it, i.e. an extra one 
from Support Gp of 1 Armd Div, the other battalion of the Gp 
being put in the Armd Bde Gp. I hope to add to this another Armd 
Bde Gp (4th) and possibly the reconstituted 7th Armd Div of 4th 
Armd Bde Gp and one motorised brigade group. I would also add 
150th Inf Bde Gp and, if maintenance resources permit, perhaps 
the Free French Bde Gp too. I am afraid that our tank situation 
vis-à-vis that of the enemy has seriously deteriorated as a result of 
the fighting in which 22nd and 2nd Armd Bdes have suffered so 
severely. I have not yet had figures of our total tank losses, but they 
132 Brigadier G. M. O. Davy.
133 Brigadier E. H. Lysaght-Griffin.
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must be large, and all I fear have been abandoned to the enemy, 
who will certainly put some into running order, thus augmenting 
his own strength.
5. We have got to face the fact that, unless we can achieve superiority 
on the battlefield by better co-operation between the arms and more 
original leadership of our armoured forces than is apparently being 
exercised at present, we may have to forego any idea of mounting 
a strategical offensive, because our armoured forces are tactically 
incapable of meeting the enemy in the open, even when superior 
to him in number. Another very serious aspect which is obtruding 
itself more and more is the growth of an inferiority complex amongst 
our armoured forces, owing to their failure to compete with the 
enemy tanks which they consider (and rightly so) superior to their 
own in certain aspects. This is very dangerous, and will be most 
difficult to eradicate once it takes root, as I am afraid it is doing 
now. It becomes, therefore, all the more important to weld the three 
arms together as closely as possible.
As you will see from the draft telegram enclosed with this letter, 
I have put this matter very plainly to the Prime Minister, as the 
military authorities at Home, including Martel, must realise what 
they are up against, and that it is no good just counting tanks or 
regiments and pretending that ours are individually as good as the 
Germans, because they are not. Before we can really do anything 
against the Germans on land, they have got to be made as good 
and better both in equipment, organisation and training.
As you know, I am not inclined to pessimism, but I view our 
present situation with some misgiving, so far as our power to take 
the offensive on a large scale is concerned. However, we must go all 
out now to get things right. If you like, get Gott in and Lumsden 
too, and thrash the matter out with them as frankly and as brutally 
as you like. No time now for politeness!
6. I am afraid that 7 Ind Inf Bde must have lost very heavily at 
BENGHASI, and it is unfortunate that the majority of the artillery 
of 4th Indian Division was with this brigade. Its loss would be 
really serious. There are signs this morning that at least part of the 
Bde Gp may have broken out to the east and south east, as several 
columns of unknown composition and strength are reported to be 
nearing CHARRUBA and MECHILI. If they have managed to get 
away anything substantial in this way, it is a creditable performance. 
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The rest of the 4th Ind Div has withdrawn, according to orders, to 
the BARCE – MARAUA line, leaving, I hope, rearguards covering 
the TOCRA defile, which was blown yesterday, and other delaying 
positions. Force E is to leave CHARRUBA today, and join 4 Ind 
Div at MARAUA.
The division is now very weak, as 5th and 11th Bdes have only 
two bns each. Neil [Ritchie] has sent up 3/1 Punjab to rejoin it, 
and 1/6 Rajputana Rifles, having collected 2 ½ coys who are going 
up from TMIMI to join their Bde. (They were taken away by 
13 Corps to guard aerodromes and H.Q. at ANTELAT apparently, 
and were not fully mobile when the Bosche bundled 13 Corps out 
of the place). I want you to do all you can to equip Worcesters and 
the other battalion (3/7 Baluch?) of the 29th Inf Bde and send 
them up as quick as you can to rejoin their H.Q. I am speaking to 
Sandy134 about it today if he turns up. Also I want to know if any 
Indian mountain batteries can be made available for the 4th Ind 
Div in the JEBEL and, if so, how many and how soon? I believe 
one of them has been mechanised or partially mechanised and I 
would like this up at once. I do not think it is much good sending 
up mule batteries as they are too expensive to maintain, but I am 
going to discuss this with Neil and Sandy.
I would like the possibility of mechanising these batteries also 
gone into at once, in case we need them up here.
7. You will have seen from my draft telegram of yesterday to the 
C.I.G.S what Neil Ritchie’s general intentions are, so I will not 
repeat them here.
8. I am sorry Lyttelton had to interrupt his tour, but I am glad it 
was for political not military reasons. I did not hear what really 
happened in the crisis between the King and the Cabinet, though 
I know how it started.
The liaison officer is not in yet, so I will end. I enclose draft telegram 
to Prime Minister, and draft communique which John has had some 
difficulty in writing.
JRL, AUC 671
134 Brigadier Alexander Galloway, BGS, 8th Army, 1941–42.
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Telegram from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, 4 February 1942
FIRST (.) GODWIN-AUSTEN has asked to be relieved of command 
13 (13) Corps because he finds it difficult to work under RITCHIE (.) 
Have made enquiries and am sure he can NOT (NOT) be left where he 
is (.) Have accordingly appointed GOTT to replace him as temporary 
measure with rank local Lieutenant-General (.) RITCHIE wants him 
and good commander is essential at once (.)
SECOND (.) Have ordered GODWIN-AUSTEN return CAIRO at 
once and will then demand his reasons in writing as am NOT (NOT) 
satisfied regarding his request for relief during critical operations (.) 
Will let you know result (.)
THIRD (.) Am putting J.C. CAMPBELL from 7 (7) Support Gp 
temporarily in command 7 (7) Armd Div now reforming in DELTA 
with the local rank Major-General (.)
FOURTH (.) Hope you will approve these arrangements and request 
authority for acting ranks [.]
JRL, AUC 681
149
Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 6 February 1942
I am sending you herewith three sketches135 which show in outline 




This will give you an idea of what the aim is at the moment, and I 
feel that the final dispositions, while being sound for a defensive if 
135 These do not survive in the Auchinleck papers in the JRL.
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we have to fight a main battle against the enemy on the GAZALA – 
HACHEIM, also lend themselves to preparations for the offensive. 
The 30th Corps can be built up as a striking force for further 
operations in CYRENAICA. I would, however, like to make it quite 
clear that the dispositions envisaged are in fact merely ‘back bone’ 
for the fighting of a defensive battle, but that I have no intention of 
remaining on my heels on the GAZALA – BIR HACHEIM line, 
but on the contrary to carry out minor offensive operations to drive 
the enemy as far North and West of this as possible, to re-establish 
our columns on the general line DERNA – CHARRUBA and deny 
the enemy the use of the landing grounds at DERNA, MARTUBA 
and MECHILI.
2. I cannot but help feeling that the enemy must be very weak in front 
of us now and all the information I have points to the possibility 
of his having jammed into the Eastern end of the JEBEL a force 
which I estimate consists approximately of two German Bn Gps 
with arty and possibly some tanks and a proportion of the TRIESTE 
Div in rear of this. This “block” of enemy is concentrated roughly 
in the triangle DERNA – TMIMI – CARMUSA, and from air 
reconnaissance it seems very doubtful if he has anything within 
supporting distance of it. I doubt whether in fact he has anything 
in the JEBEL East of about BARCE. If this is correct I feel that 
the enemy is starting already to stick out his neck and I have, 
therefore, told STRAFER to investigate immediately the possi-
bilities of undertaking a minor offensive into the JEBEL directed 
towards CARMUSA, with the object of cutting off as much as 
possible of the enemy’s elements South of DERNA, where they 
appear to me to be strung out in a narrow line more or less astride 
the main road to GAZALA. He is getting down to this at once. 
This would be the first step towards re-establishing our control in 
the JEBEL as far as DERNA exclusive. The enemy’s maintenance 
difficulties must be of extreme difficulty so long as he is unable to 
use BENGHAZI. Comparable, I think, to our operating ourselves 
in the SIRTE neighbourhood based on TOBRUK, and I know 
what these difficulties present.
3. I can only say that I am extremely worried about the withdrawal of 
the 4th Indian Division through the JEBEL. I am making full inves-
tigations now but have the impression that they have lost nothing, 
and that the main concern in the mind of their Commander was to 
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get away as quickly as possible, leaving no thought to the value of 
delay, of striking the enemy, or of holding him as far North and West 
as possible. I must not prejudice the case until I am in possession 
of all the facts, but I feel that I should let you know that I have 
every grave doubts as to TUKER’s capacity as a commander in a 
tight situation. I have put STRAFER136 fully into the picture. As 
you know, I asked GODWIN AUSTEN whether he was satisfied, 
and he told me that he was. If my fears prove well-founded, there 
will be no alternative I think than to remove TUKER from the 
command. I think he gets terribly tired and in these conditions is 
inclined to view things in the most depressing light.
4. I cannot tell you what a relief it has been to feel that I have got 
GOTT with me now. GODWIN AUSTEN proceeds by road to 
ALEXANDRIA to pick up his kit before going to CAIRO. I do 
not imagine that he will reach CAIRO for two or three days yet.
JRL, AUC 683
150
Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 
6 February 1942
Sent by Sandy Galloway. Please return it by Sandy as copies are limited
I enclose a copy of a note DC (42) 20 I put up to the Defence 
Committee on 4 Feb. They approved of it generally and a telegram 
based on it is about to go home to the Chiefs of Staff. I thought it 
would interest you. I do not think it differs in any way from what 
we have agreed upon already.
2. I hope to send you a comprehensive instruction containing all 
those points we have recently decided together. I am sending up 
the draft of this by Sandy for you to read and criticise if you wish 
before it is finally issued. So analyse it carefully and say what you 
like about it.
136 Major General W. H. E. Gott.
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3. I am so glad Gott is in the saddle, and I hope he will be able to set 
about any enemy advanced detachments who may put themselves 
within his reach. A success now, even a minor one, would be 
invaluable. I won’t labour the point as I know you are just as anxious 
to do this as I am.
4. The plans for reinforcing you are going ahead well I think. Sandy 
will explain them to you, and also tell you what I would like to 
happen about the return of troops to the Delta. But my wishes 
in this matter come second to your tactical needs. Nothing must 
happen which might endanger our hold on the present line or the 
security of TOBRUK.
5. I note you have split 1st. South African Division and have put some 
of them on to work on the frontier defences. This is, I suppose, 
because in the last resort this division might have to hold that 
particular locality? I agree this is highly desirable. I know, however, 
you will watch closely the inevitable tendency in operations of this 
sort for formations to split up and disintegrate. You will remember 
the trouble we had last Summer trying to get the bits and pieces 
together!
6. As Sandy will tell you, I am very willing to leave you the 4th Indian 
Division to be in reserve and to work on the frontier defences. 
They know the game very well – better than anyone probably, 
and are good workers, as you know. I do not want them split up 
if it can possible be avoided, as after their recent experience, it is 
very necessary that they should retain their divisional and brigade 
entities. So far as is possible, too, their divisional troops (gunners, 
sappers and ancillary troops) should be left with them, though I 
realise you may want some of their artillery forward, and also that 
you may have to immobilise them to a great extent to find transport 
for the New Zealanders.
I am very anxious to have your views on the withdrawal from 
BENGHASI and particularly on Tuker’s handling of it, also on 
the present condition of the 4th division as a whole.
7. I have had a very good wire from the C.I.G.S. about the 13th Corps, 
approving of all the action taken, so that is all right! What a life!!
8. If you have time, tell Sandy your final proposals for GIARABUB. 
Some day I hope to reconstitute the 38th Ind Inf Bde, as I have 
uses for it. You will bear this in mind, I know.
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9. I know you are frightfully busy, but I would like when you can give 
it to me a brief official account of the recent operations, as I feel I 
am likely to be asked for one myself before long. I would like you to 
add your opinion on the conduct of them without any reservations.
10. Your letter HQ/DO/70/6/G(O) (what a portentous number! Are 
all these really needed?!!) just received. I have just had time to look 
at your three layout sketches. We had a discussion yesterday on 
what we could leave with you and what we wanted out if we could 
get them, without weakening you too much.
The results of this discussion Sandy is taking up to you. They 
differ to some extent from your picture, but I am sure we can 
adjust this. I do not feel that 3 Ind Motor Gp is altogether suited 
to a defensive role in GIARABUB, but perhaps you intend to use 
it offensively?




Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 6 February 1942
Thank you very much for your letter of the 21st January, which reached 
me two or three days ago. I have just heard that there is a fast air bag 
going today, so I have not time to write you a long letter, but I hope to 
send you one at the weekend.
You will be getting in a day or two a long telegram from the Defence 
Committee out here, giving my views, as accepted by them, on the possi-
bility of our resuming the offensive at an early date. I hope this telegram 
will be quite clear, and speak for itself, but in it I purposely refrained 
from giving the detailed calculations of our prospective tank strength on 
which we have reached our conclusions, as set out in the telegram. I have 
done this because I have learnt from previous experience the impossibility 
of reconciling such figures with those arrived at by calculations carried 
out at home, and particularly by the Defence Minister. I have, however, 
sent you under separate cover a note I wrote for the Defence Committee 
on which the telegram was based. In this note our calculations are given 
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in full, as I thought you would like to have them for your own personal 
information, and that of your advisers.
I have had your telegram about the change of command in 13th Corps, 
and I am most grateful to you for your generous and very ready support. 
As soon as I have got some more information on the subject I will let 
you know the situation at once.
Thank you very much for your comments about the command of the 
9th Army;137 I am giving them the most careful consideration, and hope 
to write to you again on the subject very shortly.
JRL, AUC 687
152
Letter from General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS 
to Auchinleck, 6 February 1942
My dear Auk,
Very many thanks for a series of long and interesting letters of yours.
I have been through all the points you raised carefully and propose 
to answer some of them now.
But first and foremost I should like to offer my deep sympathy at 
the setback that your forces have suffered. I can so well imagine what a 
deep disappointment this must be to you, and am so very sorry for you.
Looking at Rommel’s counter-stroke from the more detached point 
of view, I cannot help feeling that Shearer’s over optimistic intelligence 
played a large part in accounting for your troubles. You may remember 
that we doubted his figures here and queried them, and also that in a 
previous letter I had referred to the danger of his over optimistic reports, 
which were consistently being proved as under-estimates of the enemy’s 
power of recuperation, resistance, or evasion. I am afraid that it is in his 
nature to always under-estimate his opponent’s strength, a dangerous 
failing. He suffered, from all accounts, from the same failing when working 
for Wavell. It is now my own impression but one that I have gathered 
from all quarters and I do hope you will consider seriously the danger 
of retaining him as your D.M.I.
137 This references discussions as to whether General Sir Maitland Wilson, GOC 
9th Army, should be posted to another command. It was to be 21 August 1942 
before he was replaced by Lieutenant General William Holmes.
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I have read through your proposals for your reorganization with the 
greatest interest and see that they conform closely to the views you 
expressed to the Chatfield Committee. I am having your proposals 
carefully examined with a view to deciding to what extend they are 
applicable to all theatres of war.
I see all the advantages of such an organization when using small 
forces as in Libya or in the North-West Frontier of India, and when 
circumstances necessitate supplying small columns. When operating 
in European theatres with large forces, large-scale attacks still remain 
necessary, and the power of delivering such attacks must be retained. In 
the recent large-scale exercise we carried out last Autumn with some nine 
divisions and three armoured divisions, one of the outstanding defects 
was the inability of commanders to stage even a divisional attack, owing 
to the universal custom of operating by brigade groups.
Meanwhile, I fully appreciate that for the conditions of warfare in which 
you are engaged, small columns in a brigade group are desirable. I have 
therefore wired approving your proposed reorganization within your 
theatre of operations with the stipulation that any transfer of formations 
from your theatre to another must be on a War Establishment basis.
As soon as we have had our discussion on your organization I shall 
let you know the results.
I am afraid that Hobart’s138 tour in the Middle East left such an 
unpleasant taste behind that all the Armoured Corps are still looked 
upon with suspicion! I can assure you that they have moved a long way 
since Hobo preached his doctrine. The close co-operation of Infantry, 
Artillery and tanks in armoured divisions has been an accepted fact at 
home for the last year and a half.
I am in full agreement with you that all Corps Commanders must be 
capable of commanding either motorised or armoured divisions, but the 
commander must be trained for this role, must have a good knowledge of 
the characteristics of all these arms. Furthermore, and the most important 
factor of all, the communication must be developed to the highest standard 
of wireless efficiency to admit of full advantage being taken.
I have approved the promotion of your D.M.T. to Major-General, 
since you considered it necessary. I do, however, still consider that your 
organization is wrong as it fails to provide you with the necessary A.F.V. 
advice on operational, organization and equipment matters in addition 
to those connected with training. The distribution and general state of 
138 Major General Percy Hobart, a controversial exponent of armoured warfare.
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readiness of your armoured forces at the time of Rommel’s counter-
stroke is, I feel, an example of the lack of advice on important matters 
connected with the handling of armoured forces. I do hope you will 
re-consider the advisability of appointing an A.F.V. Major-General on 
similar lines to your Chief Gunner and Sapper. There is no reason why 
such an appointment should lead to a tendency to the formation of a 
separate “armoured army” such as Hobo was always seeking for.
There are a multitude of important technical points connected with 
equipment, wireless, armament, etc., which require control from some 
central head. I do not consider that Rosy Lloyd is the calibre for such a 
task. If you felt you wanted someone from home for such a job, I should 
be prepared to pick you the very best we could find.
One of the fundamental defects that requires remedying is the lack 
of gun power of our tanks. We are doing all we can to get the 6-pr. in as 
quickly as possible in some form or another. Meanwhile, we have just 
despatched 150 of the 6-pr. A/T guns; these should assist in replacing 
2-prs. and rendering the latter available for arming infantry as you suggest. 
I can promise you we shall do all we can to press on with the 6-prs.
Turning to Syria, Iraq and Persia, I fully realise the result of the 
withdrawal of Australian Divisions and of intercepting 18th British 
Division and 17th and 14th Indian Divisions. It was inevitable to meet 
Far East threats. Luckily, Russian situation has decreased danger. Recent 
J.I.C. survey points to the fact that German thrust through Caucasus 
or Turkey could not materialise much before middle or end of July. But 
even by that time we shall be lucky if we succeed in getting more than 
two divisions out to you, plus all reinforcements, A.A. guns, Air, etc.
Shipping is the complete bottle-neck. W.S. convoys139 won’t take more 
than one division per month at the maximum, and the March convoy, 
at your request, takes reinforcements etc. so that first division can only 
start by April convoy (arriving June), and the next May (arriving July)!
We are examining every possible way of improving on this, but 
prospects are poor. I am still counting on getting some divisions out of 
India to the Middle East, provided Burma and Far East don’t deteriorate 
further.
I quite agree as regards necessity for better Air Service to the Middle 
East, we are at present taking this up, but are up against shortage of 
aircraft.
139 ‘Winston Special’ convoys consisted of fast ships which transported troops to 
Egypt via the Cape of Good Hope.
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As regards officers – I am glad you have given Gott a Corps and 
Campbell140 an Armoured Division. They ought to do well.
I agree that Freyberg is not really fit for a Corps. I can provide you 
with an extra Corps H.Q. liberated by U.S.A. relief of Ireland. It is 
commanded by Anderson141 and I would sooner that he went with his 
Corps H.Q. He is not much to look at, but there are few sounder than him.
As regards Blamey, I presume that he will vanish with the bulk of the 
Australians and shall press for him to do so.
Lavarack,142 of course, goes with his Corps. Holmes143 and Stone144 
you have now got fixed up as you wanted.
Jumbo Wilson – I shall await your final verdict.
What about Arthur Smith, ought he to remain on much longer as 
C.G.S.?
I hear rumours that he is getting rather weary. Have you got anyone 
in your eye to replace him? Would Neil Ritchie do, or would you want 
anyone from home if you do think of replacing him.
I still feel that a series of exchanges between Middle East and home 
would be good value from both sides and am quite ready to fall in with 
any suggestions you may make.
I am afraid that I have inflicted a long letter on you. I really wish I 
could have a chance of a talk with you.
JRL, AUC 688
140 When Gott was promoted to command 13 Corps, Brigadier John ‘Jock’ Campbell 
was promoted Major General to take over 7th Armoured Division. However, 
Campbell was killed in a road accident on 26 February 1942.
141 Lieutenant General Desmond Anderson commanding 3 Corps.
142 Lieutenant General J. D. Lavarack, commanding 1st Australian Corps.
143 Lieutenant General William Holmes, who had recently been posted to command 
Ninth Army.
144 Lieutenant General Robert Stone, who had recently replaced Holmes as GOC 
British Troops, Egypt.
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 11 February 1942
Yesterday after many troubles in getting there by air, I spent a 
long time with the 13th Corps, where I saw TUKER, BRINK,145 
DE LARMINAT146 and KOPANSKI.147 The first thing that struck 
me was the tremendously high morale that exists and the complete 
confidence amongst them all that they are ready for the enemy 
should he deign to attack, and that they will give him a thorough 
thrashing. I must say that it was most refreshing. The POLES 
are a little bit down on account of the high sick rate and their 
strengths are a good deal below establishments. I will do all I can, 
and STRAFER148 has this in hand, to get them out of the most 
forward positions as soon as this is feasible.
2. COLUMNS.
We are all very disappointed with the results of the Columns so 
far and STRAFER left me to go and see CURRIE149 to discuss 
how the tactics are to be altered, and the composition of Columns 
varied, so that they have more punch and can hit harder than in 
the past. The answer here comes I think in the use of tanks with 
columns. We had a squadron of Honeys150 out with CURRIE, but 
no opportunity for using them occurred. This I attribute to the fact 
that they were not directed wide enough and were sent into country 
which was not altogether suitable for their use. This appreciation 
of suitable country for tanks is, I feel quite convinced, a most 
important factor in the directions that are issued to commanders 
of Columns before they commence operations; this will be done. 
There are more encouraging reports on columns yesterday in the 
MECHILI area. They gave the enemy a bit of a knock there.
145 Major General G. L. Brink, GOC 1st South African Division.
146 General Edgard Larminat, commanding 1st Free French Brigade.
147 General Stanislaw Kopański, commanding Independent Polish Brigade in the 
Middle East.
148 Lieutenant General W. H. E. Gott, then commanding 13th Corps.
149 Probably Lieutenant Colonel John Currie, then commanding 4th Regiment RHA 
and soon to take command of 9th Armoured Brigade.
150 The M3 Stuart Light Tank.
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3. THE SITUATION GENERALLY.
On my return last night I found JOHN SHEARER’s appreciation 
that he had submitted to you and passed on to me for information. 
Personally I agree that the enemy’s moves indicate only one thing 
and that is to resume offensive operations at the earliest possible 
moment when he anticipates that we will not be strong and will 
not be ready for him. I admit that we will not be particular flush 
in Armour but, nevertheless, I think we can take him on quite 
well. I would, of course, prefer that he should attack us in about 
a month’s time because then I feel that we would not only give 
him a knock but might well be able completely to defeat all the 
forces he employs against us. Due to our lack of armour I doubt 
whether anything so complete as this will be possible within the 
next week.
4. INFANTRY BRIGADE GROUPS. REQUIRED FOR FWD 
POSNS.
I have discussed this at great length with STRAFER now that he 
has had a chance of really appreciating the ground, the enemy’s 
strength and the dispositions that they have taken up. As a result 
I am quite satisfied that for security we require the equivalent of 
eight Inf Bde Gps for the defence of the position GAZALA – 
HACHEIM, and I attach at Appendix “A” a statement showing 
how these should be disposed. I am quite sure that TOBRUK, 
which after all is the main supply centre for any dispositions we 
may assume on this position, must be adequately safe-guarded 
against long-ranging enemy columns. The way to ensure this is to 
have the entrances to TOBRUK via ACROMA and the West and 
EL ADEM and the South adequately secured. This will require 
an Inf Bde Gp at each of these places.
5. AIR SITUATION.
The enemy is becoming a great deal more active in the air and this 
situation will, I understand, continue for at least the next ten days 
until the re-equipping of additional squadrons is completed. The 
troops do not mind this particularly as the enemy efforts so far 
have been extraordinarily feeble. On the other hand, I think it is 
important that we should speed up the re-establishment of our air 
superiority as early as this can be reasonably done, and I know that 
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“Mary”151 has raised this matter with the A.O.C.-in-C during his 
visit to CAIRO. The South Africans shot down two dive-bombers 
yesterday, which has put up their tails a lot. At the moment the 
Poles, in the centre of the GAZALA Position, seem to be viewing 
the greatest [?] in from enemy dive bombers, and they have lost a 
few in casualties.
6. TUKER.
I had a good talk with TUKER today and as a result I do not 
consider that his removal from command of the 4th In Div is 
necessary. There were two occasions during the withdrawal when 
his attitude worried me a good deal and when I felt he had, to 
some extent, lost control of the situation. Actually I think that on 
these two occasions he had to some extent lost his grip but I am 
satisfied after talking to him, that the reasons for this are his lack of 
experience of War up to the present and letting himself be worried 
when information about what is happening ahead does not reach 
him. He has bought his experience now. He is a deep thinker and 
has many theories and this last operation through the GEBEL 
will, I am sure, have brought his theories more into the line with 
what practice makes possible. In the circumstances I am satisfied 
to leave him in command. I had a good talk with him about his 
health, as I wondered whether the synas152 trouble he had suffered 
from before was causing him trouble once more. He assures me 
however that this is not the case.
7. RELIEFS.
I am sending you at Appendix “B” a statement showing how I 
think reliefs may go up to about the end of this month. It is of 
course frightfully hard to forecast but as you have always told me, 
the tactical situation must dictate primarily what can be released. 
I think the critical period may be up to the end of this month. 
As already explained, I feel that eight Inf Bde Gps are necessary 
for the securing of this position and it is on this basis that I have 
calculated what formations can be released and when this release 
can take place.
151 Air Vice Marshal Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham, commanding Desert Air Force.
152 ‘sinus’.
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8. BATTLE HQ.
Today I am quite satisfied that I am too far back, as I had two 
mishaps getting to 13 Corps by air, finally having to make a forced 
landing at GAMBUT. So I am immediately establishing a Battle 
HQ Centre, forward, which I can occupy at short notice. A recon-
naissance for it is being carried out today and I think that it will be 
somewhere in the GAMBUT neighbourhood. I have no intention 
of moving the whole of the ordinary Adv Army HQ with me. All 
I want, and all I need, is a small HQ like the one we had at SIDI 
DAUD. If I am in that area at any rate I can reach both the Corps 
in reasonable time by car.
9. FRONTIER DEFENCES.
I am visiting 30 Corps today and going round the SOLLUM 
defended area. If possible we will get down to MADDELENA as 
well and see the nature of the proposals for that part of the world.
P.S. I think it may be difficult to withdraw the 5 N.Z. Bde as kept in 
Corps reserve, but I hope that this can be arranged.
JRL, AUC 699
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 
11 February 1942
1. You will have various appreciations and ideas put forward by John 
Shearer as to possible future enemy action. I have also seen an 
excellent appreciation put up by Bob Priest, a copy of which was 
sent here. This appreciation was written before the enemy’s recent 
moves forward to GIOVANNI BERTA and MECHILI but is none 
the less valuable for that.
2. You have, I know, thought out all the possibilities. In fact, I imagine 
you think of little else! It is, therefore, perhaps wasting your time 
to task you to read my ideas on the subject. We, too, are thinking 
hard, and, being in less intimate association with the battle, may 
perhaps sometimes get a different angle on things. This is my 
excuse for inflicting these thoughts on you!
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3. The enemy has been saying loudly and often in the last few days 
that he has got us on the run and implying that he is about to stage 
a major offensive. This may be bluff, or he may really think that 
we were so heavily defeated in Western Cyrenaica as to make us 
incapable of offering any real resistance to a further enemy offensive. 
I don’t know which is right, but John Shearer inclines strongly to 
the second alternative.
4. It seems to me that the enemy has three courses open to him:-
(i) To hold his main forces back in Western Cyrenaica, keeping 
only light forces forward in touch with our troops.
(ii) To gradually build up his forces in Eastern Cyrenaica until he 
has sufficient troops and an adequate supply organization to 
justify him in trying to mount a deliberate offensive against 
EGYPT.
(iii) To mount a “blitz” attack with limited forces as soon as he can 
against out forward forces in the hope of throwing them into 
confusion and getting TOBRUK. His recent move seems to 
show that he is not thinking of (i), unless the forces involved 
are much weaker than would appear from the information at 
present available to us. It might, however, be equally a prelude 
to (ii) or (iii).
The next two or three weeks are critical for us, as during them 
we shall be building up our strength in the forward area, both 
in tanks and infantry, to an extent which should make it risky for 
him to attempt a “blitz” attack on us. Course (iii) is, therefore, the 
most dangerous and all our immediate effort should be directed 
to meeting this threat.
5. It looks to me as if the enemy has formed two groups, one consisting 
of his German tanks and lorried infantry at present in the JEBEL 
AIDAR, and the other now at MECHILI comprising his Italian 
tanks and motorised troops. His tanks may be in full strength in 
these areas but he would seem to be weak in infantry. This look 
as if he had decided on a “blitz” attack if he has decided to attack 
at all, as if he were preparing for a deliberate attack he would 
probably build up his consolidating troops, that is his infantry, 
before concentrating all his tank force so far forward.
It is just possible of course that his forward move was due to the 
fear that we might be thinking of trying to regain the line DERNA 
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– MECHILI, but this is unlikely I think. We will assume then that 
he intends to make a “blitz” attack.
6. In a “blitz” attack the enemy tanks must play the major part so it 
is essential to consider intensively how he is likely to use them.
At the moment they seem to be split, but, by using the road 
LAMLUDA – MECHILI, he can concentrate them either in 
the JEBEL or in the Desert. That is he can mount a strong tank 
attack from TMIMI or from MECHILI. In addition he can, if 
he wishes, side step his forces, tanks and infantry from DERNA 
through MECHILI to TENGEDER and attack from there, while 
containing us on the rest of the front.
7. The direction of his attack may be governed by his immediate 
objective. If, as seems likely, his object is to disorganise our system 
of command and supply by a sudden attack on a narrow front, his 
best objective would be TOBRUK, and he is likely, therefore, to 
aim at ACROMA – EL ADEM in the first instance. To succeed, 
his advance must be swift and continuous. Any wide outflanking 
movement is likely to give us time to change our dispositions to 
meet it and must complicate his always difficult supply problem.
8. Assuming that he is aiming at ACROMA, how can he best get to 
it? An attack along the escarpment from TMIMI would have the 
advantage of giving him the use of the main road for supply purposes 
and of cutting off our forces to the SOUTH from their main axis 
of supply. It would, however, open his flank and communications to 
attack by us from the SOUTH should his attack not go according 
to plan. It would also be directed against that part of our position 
which he must assume to be strongly defended and heavily mined 
in comparison with sectors further to the SOUTH.
9. If he decides against attack on our NORTHERN flank, he may 
try to envelop or crush our SOUTHERN flank with the object of 
reaching the area TOBRUK – EL ADEM – ACROMA and cutting 
off our forces in the GAZALA area. This would entail probably a 
preliminary concentration at TENGEDER, the building up of at 
least some reserves of fuel and water in that area, and then a march 
of 70 odd miles to BIR HACHEIM, which is not weakly held, or if 
he wishes to avoid attacking it, a still longer detour to the SOUTH, 
during which time his line of supply will be open to attack by us 
from the NORTH EAST and NORTH. This movement would 
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undoubtedly be combined with feint attacks, carried out with vigour 
and supported probably be some tanks, against our NORTHERN 
sector to induce us to concentrate our armoured forces in that 
area. Though the possibility of his adopting this course can not 
be altogether discounted, it seems unlikely that he will adopt it.
10. The third and last course open to him seems to be to go straight 
for his presumed objective – the area TOBRUK – EL ADEM – 
ACROMA. If he believes us to be weak and disorganised, as seems 
probable, he may think that he can afford to penetrate instead of 
relying on envelopment. His thrust to the Frontier during the battle 
of last November will provide him with a precedent, though on 
that occasion penetration tactics failed.
Should he decide to adopt this course, which I think is most 
likely, he will undoubtedly try to conceal his real object from us. 
Deception is likely to take the form of trying to make us believe –
(a) that the centre of gravity of his attack will be along the coast 
road, or
(b) that he is going to envelop our SOUTHERN flank and move 
NORTH EAST on TOBRUK.
Of the two the second is possibly the more likely as it should draw 
our armour away from the decisive point and put it in a position 
where it may be cut off from its supplies by the enemy thrust.
It is, of course, possible that a diversion by our SOUTHERN 
flank would, if unopposed, be developed by the enemy into a 
subsidiary attack so as to give the whole movement a pincer effect 
so far as the forces on our SOUTHERN flank are concerned.
If he adopts this course, it seems possible that he will side step his 
German tanks from the JEBEL to MECHILI, sending some of the 
Italian tanks with motorized units to the TENGEDER area, while 
everything possible is done to give us the idea that the main weight 
is on the SOUTH with only holding forces in the NORTH and 
centre. He will make his NORTHERN sector as strong as he can 
by field works, etc., in order to prevent us trying to disorganize his 
preparations and hamper his movements by taking offensive action 
in this area. In fact this process has already begun. He would then 
make a very rapid and concentrated advance in the greatest possible 
strength from the MECHILI area straight on ACROMA, hoping 
to over run any of our infantry who may be in the way and trusting 
that they will be unsupported by tanks. He may not even think it 
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necessary or possible to draw off our 2nd Armoured Brigade to the 
SOUTH by the diversionary movement suggested, but judging 
by recent experience, may be satisfied that he can overcome any 
resistance it can offer should it be in his path.
There is a possibility that this operation might be aided by a 
parachute attack on TOBRUK itself or EL ADEM or on formation 
H.Q., with a view to causing disorganisation and confusion in our 
rear. The possibility of small diversionary sea-borne attacks against 
our communications or aerodromes can not be disregarded. The 
move of enemy naval personnel to DERNA might conceivably be 
connected with some such project.
11. These are signs that Rommel, running true on form, may be 
seriously underestimating our strength and capacity to resist further 
attacks by him. If this is so it should be possible to turn it to our 
advantage. To do this we must be able to mislead and surprise him 
and, if he attacks us, to counterattack him when he gives us the 
opening. This all needs intense and continuous planning which I 
am sure is going on all the time.
12. At the risk of being thought to be interfering, I would offer the 
following remarks which are probably of no value whatever, as you 
will have thought of them all long ago!
If the enemy attacks in the centre, as I think likely,
(a) We must guard against being led into sending our mobile 
hitting force – our tanks – away from the centre of gravity; 
that is we must keep them concentrated behind the centre.
(b) We must make the best possible use of our “infantry” tanks 
which have been proved to be most valuable in defence. The 
best use for these might be to strengthen key localities, the loss 
of which might hamper the mobility and counter-offensive 
power of our striking force.
(c) We should have a “stop” in the shape of minefields and 
entrenched positions held by reserve troops behind our centre, 
preferably WEST and SOUTH WEST of ACROMA, to 
check any enemy who may break through and force them to 
diverge to the SOUTH towards EL ADEM which should 
also be defended if troops are available.
13. We must be ready to strike in flank any enemy force attempting to 
pass through the twenty mile gap between the flank of the position 
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held by the infantry of the 1st Armoured Division and the 150th 
Infantry Brigade Group at BIR HACHEIM.
14. We must hold on at all costs to BIR HACHEIM which should be 
made as strong as possible, and perhaps be reinforced by some 
infantry tanks if they can be spared, but I doubt the possibility of 
this, so long as 1st Army Tank Brigade remains under strength. 
The stretch of excellent going which lies in this gap might tempt 
the enemy to use it as a supplementary line of advance, though it 
is perhaps too far to the SOUTH for his main axis of attack.
15. We must do everything possible to ensure that forward divisional 
and corps Headquarters are not over-run early in the battle as we 
cannot afford to have our command and intelligence information 
disorganized.
16. To sum up. If we are to take advantage of the enemy’s apparent 
underestimation of our strength, and his possible consequent 
decision to attack us with inadequate forces, we must achieve 
surprise.
Surprise can only be achieved first by hiding from him our 
strength in tanks, and secondly by stationing them where they can 
be used to best effect, which implies keeping them concentrated.
To give of their best, our tanks must have the maximum support 
of our artillery and infantry firmly established in positions from 
which the enemy cannot shift them without risking heavy casualties, 
which he cannot afford if our information is correct.
We must not be led away by feints and movements designed to 
mislead us at which the enemy is very good. If we are to avoid this, 
we must have continuous and intensive ground and air reconnais-
sances of the most offensive kind. Above all we must try and keep 
track of his main tank concentrations.
P.S. I signed the Operation Instruction this morning and sent it up 
to you. Hope it is all right. I am afraid you may be disappointed at the 
availability dates of reinforcements but I think these are on the safe side, 
at least I hope so. If you want the regiments of 4th Armoured Brigade 
sent up independently before the whole Brigade is ready, let me know 
at once and I’ll do what I can. We will do all we can to hasten everyone. 
Meanwhile, don’t send back any troops if you think you need them.
JRL, AUC 700
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 
12 February 1942
Many thanks for yours of the 11th, which reached me the same 
evening.
2. I am very glad to hear that morale is so high, and the credit must 
go to you and your Commanders. I am sorry that the Poles are a 
little hipped.
3. You are right about the work of the columns. Much depends on 
their ability to chase the enemy about and prevent him settling 
down. I was very glad to hear of the good show put up by one of 
them at MECHILI on the 10th.
That is what is wanted. Don’t hesitate to put in any column 
leader who brings off a good show for an award, if you think he 
is worth one. While on this subject, I wonder if you thought of 
BRIGGS153 of 7 IND INF BDE in this connection?
4. I entirely agree with you that the next three weeks are critical, and 
that we must strain every nerve to strengthen ourselves forward. 
I am sending you up all I can. I have heard some talk, not from you, 
of “tired troops”. Well we have no time to be tired I am afraid – any 
more than the Bosche has, and he has been through worse times 
in LIBYA than we have!!
What do you think?! Withdrawal for ease of re-equipment is a 
different matter.
5. Your estimate of forces needed is most interesting, and I agree with 
it. It fits in pretty closely with a somewhat half-baked appreciation 
I had the temerity to send you to-day. I hope you do not think I am 
trying to butt in!
I hope the 5 N.Z. BDE GP will be with you by the 13th, and 
that this will give you a reasonable margin of strength. As I told you 
before, you are to keep them as long as you need them, but when 
the 50 DIVISION begins to arrive, try if you can to keep the New 
Zealanders in Corps Reserve, but if this can’t be done, it doesn’t 
153 Brigadier Harold Briggs.
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matter. I wonder if you will be able to get all three Brigades of 50 
DIVISION together? Probably not, as this would seem to entail 
relieving HAYDON’S Brigade154 at HACHEIM?
I entirely agree with you about ACROMA and EL ADEM being 
necessary as “back stops” against a “blitz” raid.
6. JOCK spoke to me this evening about WILLOUGHBY NORRIE’S 
ideas of the areas to be held in the SALUM – MADDALENA 
sector. He has always disliked the idea of a defended area “in the 
blue” to the SOUTH, and always wanted to close up the whole 
system to the NORTH. I do not think he has grasped the idea 
underlying my conception of the defence, and I am quite certain 
he is wrong. I believe you agree with me, and I am not going to 
alter my decision. I hope they are pushing on with the work. I am 
sure they are. It has the makings of a tremendously strong position, 
I think.
7. I am very intrigued by what you say about TUKER, and I am glad 
you have decided as you have about him.
All the same, I should watch him very closely. He is, as you say, 
a great thinker and theorist, and as such, most valuable. These 
qualities do not, however, necessarily make a good commander 
in the field.
8. I am sure you are right to have a Battle H.Q. further forward, but 
if you go to GAMBUT have it properly dug in, preferably on the 
escarpment. No sense in running needless risks!
9. I shall be very interested to hear of your visit to the Frontier defences. 
Where would you put your mobile striking force in this position?
I think the “Playground” minefield can be made to play a very 
important part in the battle with reference to the use of our reserves.
10. I am sending JOCK up to you tomorrow with conundrums from 
all Branches. With your agreement, I propose to systematize these 
visits by senior Staff Officers of all Branches every few days.
The Junior Liaison Officers are not really of much value – no 
fault of theirs, but they are not big enough!
JRL, AUC 703
154 Brigadier C. W. Haydon, commanding 150th Infantry Brigade.
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Letter from L. S. Amery, Secretary of State 
for India, to Auchinleck, 13 February 1942
I am very much concerned about the inadequacy, both in numbers 
and still more in quality, of the officers whom we are sending out 
for the expansion of the Indian Army. Latterly the War Office has 
been simply drafting them, with the result that a considerable 
proportion of them have been found really not in the least the type 
that could effectively command Indian troops. Then there are all 
the difficulties of shipping – I need say nothing about the tiresome 
question of pay, which I hope to get settled in the immediate future.
2. What I cannot help feeling is that the army in the Middle East 
must contain any number of men in the ranks who have shown the 
qualities that would fit them for a commission, but for all of whom 
commissions obviously cannot be found within the cadres of the 
Middle East. Surely these would make admirable officers in India, 
bringing real war experience, with the authority that confers, as 
well as their personal qualities, to the task. In other cases it might 
be possible to spare men who have already got their commissions 
to go to India, letting them be replaced in your units by promotion 
from the ranks. I understand that the War Office some time ago 
lifted the ban on more than 30 commissions a year being given 
from the Middle East to India, but I wonder very much whether 
the business of exchange between Middle East and India has yet 
been taken up on anything like an adequate scale for the kind of 
danger that is going to confront India in the next six months. It 
may well be that we may find ourselves actually fighting a Japanese 
army of invasion with half-trained and hopelessly under-equipped 
troops. But even with these, great things can be done if they have 
the right men to lead them.
3. I know it is hard to suggest to you, with the tremendous tasks 
immediately before you, to spare anything from your own forces. 
All I can say is that treating the war as a whole these men will pull 
far more weight training and leading 50 times their number in India 
than they would in the ranks of the Middle East, striving gallantly 
for the next opportunity of earning a commission. Incidentally, 
from the point of view of shipping – the most serious of all our 
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bottlenecks – sending them from the Middle East would also be a 
help.
4. I am afraid you have had to give up a good deal lately anyhow, on 
the larger scale, to meet the immediate danger in the Far East, 
and some of it, like the troops sent to Singapore, without saving 
the situation. I don’t know whether the Japanese mean to turn 
to Burma next, or whether as would be in line with their general 
strategy of depriving us of the naval approaches – they may send 
an expedition to seize Ceylon. That would be a very serious thing, 
for your reinforcements as well as for India.
5. As for your own front, we live from day to day in hopes that, having 
got Rommel to advance far enough, and having repaired your tanks, 
you may give him a real knock and send what is left of him flying 
all the way to Tripoli. But we don’t know your difficulties here, and 
may well be hoping for the impossible. But we badly need a victory 
somewhere at this hour.
JRL, AUC 705
157
Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 14 February 1942
Thank you very much for your letter of the 21st January and the 6th 
February which reached me on the 11th, and for your manuscript 
letter of the 21st January which came the same day.
2. I have sent you a telegram about the Major General A.F.V., and I 
think you will see that we do not really disagree on the subject. 
I think it must be quite clear, however, that so far as general training 
is concerned, the D.M.T. must be responsible to me and that the 
Major General A.F.V. is his advisor in this matter as well as mine. 
This is on all fours with the position of the Major General R.A. 
and E.-in-C. Moreover the Major General A.F.V. must not think 
that he “owns” the R.A.C. any more than the Major General R.A. 
“owns” the Gunners! All appointments, promotions, etc., must 
go through the M.S. to me in the same way as for the other arms. 
M.S. and I and the Selection Boards will, of course, freely consult 
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   338 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
339
the Major General A.F.V. I feel that there should be no difficulty 
about this.
We have, I think, been a little at cross purposes over the whole 
affair due to this cursed necessity for having to argue at the end 
of a telegraph wire or wireless mast! As you know, we have been 
trying for months, almost years, to get Major Generals for our 
R.A., A.A., Ordnance and S. & T. heads and I am afraid I did not 
think there was any hope of getting two more Major Generals – 
one for D.M.T. and the other for A.F.V. Thinking I was likely to 
get one only, if I got any, I plumped for the D.M.T. as being the 
most needed in my opinion! I am sorry if we have worried you and 
wasted your time over this. I know you have got many more and 
much bigger things to think about.
If you can spare us a Major General A.F.V. please send him along.
3. I have had Godwin-Austen’s report and have sent it to Neil Ritchie 
for his remarks, which have not yet reached me. I feel the whole 
affair may have been rather unnecessary but all concerned were 
under strain and at high pressure. I will let you know more when 
I next write.
4. As you know, my original intention was to reinforce 8th Army with 
the New Zealand Division, and orders were issued for this. I did 
not want to use it again so soon, particularly as it was training for 
amphibious operations on the Canal, but on the information then 
available, it seemed that it could be on the spot in LIBYA much 
sooner than the 50th Division, which was still on its way from 
IRAQ to SYRIA. However, owing to the difficulties of finding 
transport with which to re-equip it, it became evident that the 50th 
Division (of which as you know one brigade group is already with 
the 8th Army) could be there just as soon, if not sooner, than the 
New Zealanders. At the time Bernard Freyberg produced a cable 
from his Government deploring the need for putting the New 
Zealand Division into the line again so soon after its recent heavy 
casualties. They did not refuse their consent but were obviously 
very reluctant to agree. As I myself was also reluctant to use it, 
I was glad to be able to make the change even at the risk of some 
confusion occurring. This is not an easy Army to arrange! I am 
very far from being able to apply to all my soldiers “Do this and 
he doeth it”. They generally do it in the end (not always) but it 
all takes time and diverts energy from the real business! The New 
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Zealand Government has been so wonderfully good all through that 
I was glad to be able to meet their wishes. I am now going to send 
the New Zealanders to SYRIA which will be a welcome change 
for them and also, I hope, give them a quiet month or two, though 
they will have to dig like moles!
5. About John Shearer. If there is any blame it is mine! I really 
think, if you don’t mind my saying so, that you are not quite fair 
to him. I agree that at the outset of the present campaign some of 
our early communiques were too rosy, but then so were my own 
situation reviews to the Prime Minister and the C.I.G.S., and these 
I write myself and not at Shearer’s dictation! We were misled by 
optimistic reports from the battle front of enemy tanks destroyed 
and driven off. I think these reports were genuine enough and that 
their inaccuracy was due to inexperience. I do not think you can say 
that the great majority of our communiques or reports have been 
over-optimistic. I “vet” the communiques myself, and Arthur Smith 
does it for me if I am away. The Press and B.B.C. reports at home 
were exaggerated and highly coloured but we are not responsible 
for these nor for high hopes expressed in public by members of 
the Government. I was optimistic and I am optimistic and I hope 
I shall stay so! When all is said and done, Rommel suffered a major 
defeat and I hope he will suffer another before we have done with 
him! I am sure you share my wishes!
I have found John Shearer’s estimates of the enemy strength and 
intentions consistently good and with a high degree of accuracy. 
His figures and forecasts have been verified time and again by 
captured documents and prisoners’ estimates.
Your own Intelligence people have challenged his opinions 
frequently and generally have had to own that he was right and 
they were wrong. The same applies to the R.N. and R.A.F. here.
I criticize and heckle him mercilessly myself and his optimism 
does not get past me I think. He is certainly optimistic rather than 
pessimistic, but a really pessimistic D.M.I. would not be welcome to 
me I’m afraid. He certainly makes mistakes, but fewer than any other 
Intelligence officer I have known. His organization is absolutely 
first-class and his originality, energy and drive are outstanding.
His advice as to cover plans and deception generally have been 
most valuable – in fact, invaluable.
He has made many enemies here and, I fancy, at home and it is 
largely his own fault that he is a controversial figure. If your people 
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   340 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
341
at the War Office can produce concrete proof of his dangerous 
over-optimism, I would be very grateful to have it. I do not want 
to part with him on any account at present, as his knowledge of 
this theatre and of the enemy is unique in my opinion. I feel that 
Middle East and the War Office too owe him a lot.
6. I am writing to you separately on the subject of reorganization which 
is as you say a very big one, but it must be tackled and urgently in 
my opinion. We have now got our light armoured divisions forming. 
Composition –
one armoured car regiment
one armoured brigade group
one motor brigade group.
The armoured brigade group has three tank regiments, one artillery 
regiment of three eight gun 25-pdr batteries and one sixteen gun 
anti-tank battery as an integral part of it, and one motor battalion 
which includes one anti-tank company of sixteen 2-pdrs and three 
motor companies instead of four as previously.
Have got the Army Commanders here (less Neil) for our monthly 




Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 15 February 1942
I have just received your DO/ADC/11 dated 14th February. 
The situation is boiling up here. As you know, it started doing so 
yesterday, and the enemy is definitely closing up on to us today. 
I will be sending you an appreciation of how I see the situation, by 
signal later this evening, as I did this morning, and will not enlarge 
on the situation in this letter, for it will doubtless completely have 
changed by the time this reaches you.
The arrival of the Valentines will certainly help a great deal but 
it is a thousand pities that we have not a few more days in which 
to prepare for this.
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2. JOCK told me that it was your intention, in future, to place “I” tanks 
more or less permanently under command of Infantry Divisions. 
I think this an excellent idea. For one reason, if for no other, it will 
teach our people how to handle them, and this is one of the things 
they sadly lack at the moment.
There is only one difficulty that I foresee in this proposal and 
this is that the “I” tanks cannot keep up with the speed with which 
motorised or lorry-borne troops move. They would certainly have 
to be transporter-borne for any long moves, and this is a slow and 
laboursome process. On the other hand, I am quite sure that “I” 
tanks within the division will strengthen the offensive powers of 
divisions tremendously.
3. About SIWA and GIARABUB. Since writing you I have discussed 
the matter at considerable length with REID who, of course, knows 
the country well. He advises me most strongly against dividing the 
forces and feels convinced that GIARABUB only need be held. 
I am taking up the matter with WILLOUGHBY NORRIE.
GRAHAM, who runs the MIDDLE EAST COMMANDO now 
has written me suggesting that GIARABUB might be a very suitable 
centre from which he might operate the COMMANDOS offen-
sively against the enemy’s L of C in WESTERN CYRENAICA. 
I am going to go into this matter further because I think there are 
great possibilities in it.
4. I replied to your wire of yesterday about the possibility of a change 
in the situation. I was not sure when I got your message what was 
the information on which you based your appreciation. Personally, 
I can see no indications of the Axis Forces withdrawing at the 
moment and I think that possibly the way in which his covering 
forces gave way before us on the 12th and 13th was an effort on his 
part, as you too think possible, to draw us out from our prepared 
defensive positions. If that was his idea he has, at any rate, failed 
to that extent. As I wired to you yesterday, I have no hesitation in 
saying that I am convinced the way to follow him up is with strong 
columns, and in this STRAFER agrees. I am also equally certain 
that we must hold the GAZALA position as a secure base from 
which to operate.
5. I had not meant that the 1st Armoured Division should be taken 
right out, but only feel that should the situation remain as it is now 
it would be preferable if the 7th Armoured Division took over the 
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forward role from the 1st Armoured Division, thus enabling the 
latter to shake down a bit while still remaining close up.
6. I am delighted to hear that the General Grant Tanks155 are creating 




Notes of an interview between Auchinleck 
and Major General I. P. de Villiers156 
(with the CGS157 present) to discuss the future 
organization of the South African forces 
in the Middle East, 16 February 1942
1. Agreed that manpower limits total fighting troops to equivalent 
of four brigade groups, plus sufficient personnel for two or three 
additional units.
2. Agreed that 20% reinforcements is the figure on which calculations 
must be based.
3. Agreed that future organization of S.A. Forces could be either –
(a) One Division of three Brigade Groups plus one Independent 
Brigade group,
or
(b) Two Divisions each of two Brigade Groups.
Decision as to (a) or (b) to be left to the Field Marshal.158 (Note: 
(a) is more economical in manpower, and is strongly preferred 
155 The Grant Tank was designed and manufactured in the USA and served in the 
US Army as the Lee Tank. Its armour was up to 57 mm thick and it had a cross 
country speed of 10 mph. It had a 75 mm gun in sponson and a 37 mm gun in 
turret and was therefore able to equal the firepower of the heaviest German tanks 
then serving in the Middle East.
156 Major General Isaac de Villiers, GOC 2nd South African Division.
157 Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle East.
158 Field Marshal J. C. Smuts.
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by Commanders 1 and 2 S.A. Divisions and is acceptable to the 
Commander-in-Chief.)
4. Agreed that any surplus personnel should be used to form units 
in the following order:-
(a) Additional Field Artillery Regiment for the Division (or per 
Division).
(b) M.G. Battalion for the Division (or per Div.)
or
Reconnaissance Battalion for the Division (or per Div.) 
organized on an A.C. basis.
5. No change to be made in present organization until the tactical 
situation stabilizes. Re-organization then to be carried out on 
a “permanent long term” basis. Possibility of forming a Tank 
formation to be borne in mind but NOT to prejudice general 
principles of re-organization outlined above.
JRL, AUC 714
160
Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
H. D. R. Margesson,159 Secretary of State 
for War, 17 February 1942
Understand from A.O.C.-in-C. that Press campaign in full blast at Home 
attributes our recent reverse in CYRENAICA and fact that we have NOT 
repeat NOT already reached TRIPOLI to lack of air support and failure 
to exploit the air superiority gained by R.A.F. after strenuous effort and 
most skilful handling (.) As you know nothing could be further from 
the truth (.) Our recent reverse I put down to our having tried to bluff 
enemy with weak forces in forward area while we strained every nerve to 
build up reverses in BENGHASI to enable us to bring stronger forces 
forward (.) Enemy called our bluff and gained tactical success which is 
always possible contingency in fairly equally matched forces which he 
159 Margesson was to resign as Secretary of State for War in February 1942. He 
is generally portrayed as a scapegoat, being held responsible for the fall of 
Singapore on 15 February.
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then exploited with undoubted skill (.) Once he gained command of 
the Desert by virtue his superior strength in tanks resulting from our 
relatively heavy losses it became strategically impossible for us to stay in 
BENGHASI or anywhere in the CYRENAICAN bulge owing to certainty 
of communications being cut (.) Hence choice of GAZALA position 
for stabilization this being most WESTERLY line on which stand can 
be made without grave risk of being easily outflanked or cut off from 
base in TOBRUK (.) Throughout recent fighting as from beginning of 
campaign R.A.F. have been magnificent in their aid to the Army which 
has nothing but praise for them and their commanders (.) I view with 
greatest anxiety any attempt to revive the controversy between Army and 
Air Force which has been successfully buried at any rate in the Middle 




Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 27 February 1942
Review of situation.
First. We now have strong defensive position thirty six miles square 
well mined and organised in depth in area GAZALA TOBRUK EL 
GUBI BIR HACHEIM and designed to meet enemy break through to 
rear areas with Armd forces in attempt disorganise our system command 
and supply. Am satisfied that enemy attack on this position should be 
repulsed with loss and it is too extensive to be enveloped or ignored. 
Real value of this position is that it provides security for TOBRUK and 
therefore forms admirable base for future offensive.
Second. General GOTT Comd 13 Corps holds this position with 
1 S A Div (two Bde Gps) 50 Div complete, Polish Bde Gp (three bns, 
arty etc), Free French Bde Gp (four bns, arty etc.), 29 Ind Inf Bde 
Gp (four bns), one bn heavy tanks (MATILDAS) and 1 Armd Div 
comprising 2 Armd Bde (90 Crusaders and 70 Stuarts), 200 Gds Bde 
Gp and one bn 1 Army Tank Bde with 50 Valentines under command. 
In addition 5 N Z Inf Bde is at EL ADEM under comd 13 Corps, but 
is due to go to SYRIA help fill gap left by 70 Div soon as 8 Army can 
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spare it. General GOTT has also following Armd C Regts ROYALS 
and 4 S A Armd Car Regt.
Third. 30 Corps General NORRIE has 2 S A Div (three Bdes) in 
SALUM CAPUZZO are and 4 Ind Div (less 7 Ind Inf Bde returning to 
DELTA to refit) in EL HAMRA area NORTH EAST of MADDALENA, 
both working on defensive localities. These two localities with extensive 
minefields and entrenched positions made last autumn and lying to East 
of them make very strong coordinated position on which to fall back 
should things go really wrong (.) I look on it as a wise insurance but my 
intention is to hold firmly the GAZALA TOBRUK position (.) JARABUB 
already largely prepared for defence before November offensive held 
by detachment to prevent enemy using it and SIWA as base for raids 
against our communications and also to keep enemy guessing as to our 
future intentions (.)
Fourth (.) Enemy dispositions as deduced by me (.) German AFRIKA 
CORPS of 15 (15) and 21 (21) Armd Divs and all or part of 90 (90) Lt 
Div Area DERNA TMIMI MARTUBA with possibly 160 (160) medium 
tanks and 20 (20) light personnel estimated about 15000 (15000) with 110 
(110) fd and med guns and 3000 (3000) vehicles (.) BURCKHARDT 
attachment of parachute and commando troops strength about 800 (800) 
may also be in this area (.) Italian mobile Corps of ARIETE Armd Div 
and TRIESTE (,) reinforced by some personnel of TRENTO Div (,) 
Motor Div round MECHILI with possibly 100 (100) medium and 
25 (25) light tanks (.) Personnel estimated about 9000 (9000) with 72 (72) 
fd and med guns and 600 (600) vehicles (.) Remainder Italian forces 
comprising SABRATA (,) PAVIA (,) BRESI [?] (,) BOLOGNA and 
TRENTO divs echeloned along coast from BELAS to EL AGHEILA 
and beyond strength estimated at 13000 (13000) with 54 (54) guns and 
very few vehicles (.) Italian LITTORIO Armd Div believed arrived 
TRIPOLI with possibly 138 (138) medium tanks but almost complete 
lack of confirmatory evidence (.) All above estimates of personnel (,) 
guns and tanks may have to be revised when we know something of 
contents of convoy which reached TRIPOLI on 23 (23) Feb (.) Enemy 
believed to have weak det in JALO and to be forming long range desert 
patrols on our pattern (.)
Fifth (.) Enemy recent movements on GAZALA front appear to have 
been either demonstration to cover some other movement or impress us 
with their strength or reconnaissances in force (.) As recces they were 
practically complete failure as they did not draw our fire or approach 
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closely our main position (.) As demonstration they certainly gave us 
valuable information of enemy strength but had NO other effect (.) Our 
patrols and mobile columns control NO MANS LAND at the moment 
and enemy patrols generally withdraw on contact (.) One possibility is that 
the enemy hoped to entice us to attack Italians in MECHILI and then 
strike SOUTH with his tanks against our flank and communications but 
there are signs on other hand that he is NOT anxious to be attacked at 
present (.) Convoy seven ships reached TRIPOLI 23 (23) Feb and almost 
certainly brought considerable number tanks (.) Most secret sources show 
that one ship reaching TRIPOLI on 23 Feb carried 71 (71) tanks which 
if German would bring tank strength of 15 and 21 Armd Divs up to an 
estimated total strength of about 233 (233) without reserves (.) This is 
our present worst case estimate but we do not know if other ships into 
TRIPOLI on 23 Feb also carried tanks (.) Reinforcements of personnel 
German and Italian must also be expected to have reached TRIPOLI (.) 
Some small ships have reached BENGHASI so that henceforward enemys 
supply problem will be eased somewhat though it must remain difficult 
owing to his relative shortage of MT (.)
Sixth (.) Enemy action against our shipping in out of TOBRUK is 
causing us some anxiety but generally our maintenance situation is 
strong now that railway has reached SALUM and will grow stronger 
as railway extends further East towards EL ADEM which is next 
objective (.) Shortening of our communication has naturally eased 
transport situation (.) Roads to SIWA and JARABUB being improved 
and water pipeline being laid to EL HAMRA defended locality.
SEVENTH (.) Critical nature MALTA maintenance situation thor-
oughly understood here (.) I fully realise need for recovering landing 
grounds in CYRENAICA soon as possible irrespective of desirability 
resumption offensive on wider grounds (.)
EIGHTH (.) Situation as I see it is that if enemy can keep his main 
German tank force round DERNA MARTUBA and also maintain 
Italian mobile corps comprising possibly ARIETE and LITTORIO with 
strength up to 270 (270) medium tanks round MECHILI we can NOT 
afford to try to oust him from these positions unless we have enough 
medium tanks both to defeat Italians round MECHILI and hold off 
German armour from the NORTH (.) Inferiority of our tanks to German 
and possibly new Italian tanks in mechanical reliability and gunpower 
is being slowly rectified but must still be reckoned as decisive factor 
when computing relative strengths (.) Undoubted excellence German 
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training and leadership compared with ours is also potent factor in this 
connection (.) Possible by 1 (1) Mar that enemy may have in LIBYA 475 
(475) medium tanks and by 1 (1) Apr 630 (630) (.) He MAY not be able 
to maintain all these in forward area but we must NOT count on this (.)
NINTH (.) By 1 (1) Apr we on other hand should have ready for battle 
in forward area two Armd Bdes with total 330 (330) medium tanks and 
100 (100) Valentines in addition (.) By 1 (1) May we should have three 
armoured Bdes with 500 (500) medium also 150 (150) Valentines (.) By 
1 (1) June our strength should be four armoured Bdes with 650 (650) 
medium and maximum 150 (150) Valentines PROVIDED we have NOT 
had to begin to hold armoured units in readiness for operations on our 
NORTHERN Front (.) These figures allow for no reserves but balance 
of tanks in MIDEAST will be largely accounted for by those under 
repair which will be earmarked for (a) reserves (b) replacement of battle 
wastage (c) replacement of tanks due for major overhaul (d) issues to 
units reforming (.) A factor needing consideration is that MAY is worst 
month for operations owing intense heat causing great expenditure water 
for radiators all water cooled engines which though it does NOT affect 
American tanks DOES affect all transport vehicles (.)
TENTH (.) Assuming possibility of enemy building up tank strength 
as estimated above and maintaining all these tanks in forward area it is 
clear that we can NOT have reasonable numerical superiority before 
1 (1) June and that to launch major offensive before then would be to 
risk defeat in detail and possibly endanger safety of EGYPT (.)
ELEVENTH (.) In infantry a maximum of four divisions should suffice 
for a major offensive aimed at retaking CYRENAICA (.) Assuming that 
owing to diversions to INDIA etc my infantry divisions are reduced to 
eight, it should be just possible to produce these four divisions accepting 
a considerable reduction in the present garrison of CYPRUS which I 
am prepared to risk for time being (.) Any threat to NORTHERN Front 
would probably entail immediate reduction Eighth Army to three infantry 
divisions plus odd brigade group or two (.) Requisite infantry should 
therefore be forthcoming (.)
TWELTH (.) By 1 (1) June railway should reach EL ADEM which 
would further ease supply of striking force (.) Heat of summer is handicap 
but enemy would probably feel it more (.)
THIRTEENTH (.) These are facts affecting possibility major offensive 
assuming everything favourable to enemy (.) On the other hand enemy 
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may NOT get all tanks credited to him NOR may he be able to keep them 
forward area (.) I have therefore made plans with General RITCHIE 
to seize any reasonable chance to make limited offensive with object of 
regaining general line DERNA MECHILI and consolidating it in prepa-
ration for further offensive (.) But even this advance entails our being able 
to fortify MECHILI strongly and hold it against enemy forces operating 
from MSUS and possibly BENGHASI (.) This would entail our having 
enough tanks to defeat in the open any enemy armoured forces which 
might try to over run garrison of MECHILI or cut its communications (.) 
It is NOT possible to forecast a date for this operation as its feasibility 
depends almost entirely on strength and dispositions of enemy tanks (.)
FOURTEENTH (.) To sum up my intentions for WESTERN Front 
are:
ONE (.) To continue to build up armoured striking force in 
EIGHTH ARMY forward areas as rapidly as possible
TWO (.) Meanwhile to make GAZALA – TOBRUK and SALUM 
– MADDALENA positions strong as possible and push railway 
forward towards EL ADEM
Three (.) To build up in forward area reserves of supplies for 
renewal of offensive
FOUR (.) To seize first chance of staging limited offensive to 
regain landing grounds in area DERNA – MECHILI provided 
this can be done without prejudicing chances of launching major 
offensive to recapture CYRENAICA or safety of TOBRUK base 
area (.)
FIFTEENTH (.) NORTHERN Front intentions already given in 
telegram CS/747 (CS/747) of 20/2 (20/2) from M.E. Defence Committee 
to Defence Minister (.)
SIXTEENTH (.) Am exploring all possibilities of releasing troops of 
all categories for duty in forward areas (.) Hope secure services brigade 
Sudanese troops and am pushing on with formation garrison companies 
for guards and duties from labour units (.) Every use too will be made 
of local levies in NINTH and TENTH ARMY areas.
MOST IMMEDIATE – CLEAR THE LINE
JRL, AUC 729
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Cipher message from the Chiefs of Staff 
to Auchinleck, 27 February 1942
MOST IMMEDIATE – CLEAR THE LINE.
Reference DOBBIES160 telegrams No. AOA/0762 to War Office and 
No. 80 to Colonial Office both rep[ea]t[e]d to C in C Mediterranean only.
One. Our view is that MALTA is of such importance both as air staging 
point and as impediment to enemy reinforcement route that the most 
drastic steps are justifiable to sustain it. Even if Axis maintain their 
present scale of attack on MALTA thus reducing value it will continue 
to be of great importance to war as a whole by containing important 
enemy air forces during critical months.
Two. We are unable to supply MALTA from the West. Your chances 
of doing so from the East depend on an advance in CYRENAICA. The 
situation in MALTA will be dangerous by early MAY if no convoys 
have got through.
Three. We agree with your CS/747 of 20th. February that prevention 
of enemy reinforcements for LIBYA and probably also ultimate fate of 
MALTA depends on recapture of air bases in WESTERN CYRENAICA. 
We appreciate that the timing of another offensive will depend on 
building up adequate tank superiority and that its launching may neces-
sitate taking considerable risks in other parts of MIDEAST Command. 
Nevertheless we feel that we must aim to be so placed in CYRENAICA 
by April dark period that we can pass substantial convoy to MALTA. It 
will then be essential not rpt not only to send maintenance necessities 
but to build up stocks well above present critical level. Please let us have 
your views on above.
Four Meanwhile every effort must be made to keep stocks at least at 
present level. We suggest the foll[owing]. methods
(A) A further attempt to pass a convoy in March dark period. 
No consideration of risk to ships themselves need deter you from 
this. During the progress of this operation it should be regarded 
as your primary military commitment.
160 Lieutenant General Sir William Dobbie, Governor of Malta.
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(B) Assembling substantial convoy ready to despatch immediately 
favourable opportunity arises.
(C) Using Cruiser in connection with complete air reconnaissance 
of Eastern and Central Mediterranean for fast regular service to 
MALTA with its own stores and fuel cut down to bare necessities 
for each trip to make room for reasonable loads.
Five. ADMIRALTY are considering certain unorthodox methods.
Six. In view of difficult supply situation we consider that reinforcement 
of MALTA with Army Units should be discontinued. Details urgently 
required by C in C MALTA should be sent as opportunity offers.
Please pass to A O C in C as from Air Ministry.
JRL, AUC 730
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Letter from Auchinleck to Sir James Grigg, 
Secretary of State for War, 2 March 1942
Everyone here got a good jerk when your appointment as Secretary 
of State was announced. A real good jerk is an excellent tonic, and 
I think this was the general effect produced in this burg. Much 
interest and much speculation on all sides, as you can well imagine, 
knowing as you do what your reputation is!!
For myself, I am very glad, and only hope that you will be able 
to do all that I feel you want to do.
2. I hope I may write to you now and then, but not to bother you with 
small things.
3. There are, however, three things I would like to bring to your notice 
before you get too caught up in the whirlpool.
4. First is this matter of I.A. Officers coming into appointments in 
so-called “British” formations and dropping pay by doing so, or if 
they do not drop pay, failing to benefit financially by being advanced 
professionally. I know that this should not weigh with individuals, 
whose sole thought should be to win the war, even if their families 
starve, but human nature being what it is, it does weigh with them, 
and therefore must affect their efficiency.
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In the Middle East today I have about 190,000 Indians against 
about 270,000 British from the U.K., so that, in any event, I must 
dilute all my staffs from G.H.Q. downwards with Indian Army 
staff officers, and this is now going on. It is essential to do this. 
This means that these officers may have a substantial grievance, 
or think they have, and efficiency without a reasonable degree of 
contentment is hard to attain. We have, I feel, enough external 
threats to contend with without adding to them internal discord. 
One of my main tasks here, if not the main one, is to study the 
psychology of this very mixed array we call an Army, and I spend 
most of my time doing this in the hope that it will not disintegrate 
altogether!
5. Secondly, there is the matter of giving adequate rank to officers 
bearing certain responsibilities. I fully realise the objections to 
inflated staffs and hordes of generals, but you can not get away from 
the fact that in any Army rank does count, and will always count, 
however much people may say that it is only the man who should 
count, and that the rank does not matter. It does matter, and I feel 
that if a C-in-C. says that he honestly thinks a Major-General is 
needed instead of a Brigadier, his wishes should be met. I assure 
you that I do not ask for such things unless I have convinced myself 
they are needed.
A case in point is a Major-General General Staff on the staff 
of an “Army”, instead of a Brigadier as at present. I am sure this 
is needed, and that failure to provide it is dangerous and likely to 
lead to inefficiency and disaster. I won’t go into all the reasons, but 
they are most cogent.
6. Thirdly, I feel that your Military Secretary either fails to realise 
the meaning of psychology, or that if he does, he lacks the courage 
of his convictions. He refuses to allow me to publish in the local 
press lists of immediate awards until the King has approved them 
for publication at Home. I am allowed to announce them to the 
individuals concerned, and put them in orders, but this is not nearly 
enough. The whole value of these awards is psychological, and this 
depends entirely on immediate and widespread publication. I am 
sure you realise this, and I feel that His Majesty would realise it 
too if it were put to him properly.
It may not be in accordance with “usual practice”, but this is 
an “unusual” war, and it will have an “unusual” end if we do not 
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get a move on and sweep aside cobwebs and precedents and “usual 
practices”. I feel that if anyone can do the sweeping, you will.
7. Finally, I feel that we must move with the times, and move ahead 
of the Bosche. It is folly to think that we can end this war and the 
Bosche with an army organised as it was in 1939. We have moved 
far from the days of rigid organisations which are supposed to be 
suitable for every part of the world. We must get flexibility and 
the power to improvise quickly and without disorganisation right 
down to the smallest formations. The German does it every day.
I feel this is supremely important, and I am trying to do it here, 
but I feel I am a voice crying in the wilderness, though the great 
majority here are with me.
This is for your eye alone.
JRL, AUC 732
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Cipher telegram from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, 4 March 1942
1 (.) Draft reply from Cs in C to COS 240 (24) [27 February] covering 
whole subject already prepared and will be finally approved today 
at Cs in Cs Conference (.) Conclusions reached unlikely to differ 
greatly from those in my telegram of Feb 29 to Prime Minister 
this for your private information (.)
2 (.) I find it hard to believe in view of your telegram of 17/2 that COS 
241 (241) had your approval as it seems to fail so signally either 
to appreciate FACTS as presented from here or to realise that we 
are fully aware of the situation as regards MALTA in particular 
to the MIDDLE EAST in general (.) We here are trying to face 
realities and to present to you situation as it appears to us NOT as 
we or you would LIKE it to be (.) Para two is particular uncalled 
for and implies that I and my officers are incompetent (.) For your 
information FACTS are as follows (.)
3 (.) Tanks received in January GRANTS 48 (48) STUARTS 76 (76) 
MATILDAS nil CRUSADERS 2 (2) VALENTINES nil total 
126 (126) (.) Of these issued to units and schools GRANTS 
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43 (43) STUARTS 75 (75) CRUSADERS 2 (2) VALENTINES 
nil MATILDAS nil total 120 (120) Not issued GRANTS 5 (5) 
STUARTS 1 (1) (.) Reasons undergoing preparation for issue (.) 
Facts ref tanks now in this Command (.) Repairable in 8 Army area 
and awaiting transfer to Base Workshops 220 (220) (.) Awaiting 
repair at base 35 (35) (.) Under repair 273 (273) (.) Total repairable 
or under repair 528 (528) (.)
Total tanks received from UK or USA under preparation for 
issue 148 (148) (.) Total with units 591 (591) (.) Serviceable in 
reserve with RAOC 48 (48) (.) Grand total 1315 (1315) (.)
4 (.) You know that many other factors besides the mere ISSUE of 
tanks to units govern the readiness of formations for battle and I 
will be grateful if you will explain this to the Chiefs of Staff and 
the Defence Minister (.) This applies particular when new types 
of tanks are received such as GENERAL GRANTS with more 
powerful weapons necessitating change in tactical procedure (.) We 
must have time to think how to get full value out of our material (.)
JRL, AUC 734
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Cipher message from General Sir Alan Brooke 
to Auchinleck, 6 March 1942
Your appreciation had met with considerable disapproval on part 
of Defence Minister and resulted in a draft of a telegram which 
he wished sent to you.
The CHIEFS OF STAFF succeeded in getting his approval to 
the despatch of C.O.S. 241 (241) in substitution for his. I am quite 
sure that your feeling would have been much more hurt had the 
Defence Minister’s telegram been despatched instead of ours. You 
may be sure that I have always made a special point of representing 
the factors mentioned in first sentence of your para 4 (4).
2. The situation has changed considerably since my telegram of 17/2 
was sent. At that time the full gravity of the situation in MALTA 
was not rpt not apparent, also decision not rpt not to withdraw 
further forces from the MIDDLE EAST and to leave the Indian 
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Division which it was previously the intention to withdraw had 
not rpt not then been taken.
3. The greatest difficulty I had here was in reconciling your figures 
of tank strengths. In your statement dated 23/2 (23/2) you showed 
(660) serviceable tanks, yet in your appreciation CS 773 (CS 773) 
of Feb 27th you have allowed only for 430 (430) tanks on 1/4 (1/4) 
which seemed to represent the strength of but two brigades and 
two Army Tank Battalions in the forward area.
JRL, AUC 739
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 6 March 1942
I have sent you a telegram (No. SD/67939) giving you details of 
the reorganisation I propose to effect to make the Army in this 
theatre fit for its task.
2. The main changes affect the armoured formations, and are meant 
to bring the three arms much closer together on the battlefield and 
off it than they have been hitherto. I know that in theory this close 
association exists, but my experience is that in practice it does not. 
Moreover, the present organisation is, in the opinion of those out 
here who have seen the machines working in battle, unbalanced 
in that there is too much armour and too little infantry. We have, 
therefore, introduced the armoured brigade group, which contains, 
besides the three armoured regiments, a motor battalion and a field 
artillery regiment as permanent components.
The armoured division will include as a permanent part of its 
organisation a motor brigade group of three battalions and a field 
regiment. Both groups have their signals, sappers and self-contained 
transport units, and can if necessary be transferred complete to 
another formation at any moment.
One feature of this re-organisation – an outcome of our recent 
experiences – is that each Corps H.Q. must be so organised as to 
be capable of commanding Armoured and/or Infantry formations. 
This is now being examined to see what is required in the way of 
alterations to a standard H.Q. It is also a matter of training, and 
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affects commanders. The same principle applies to Divisional 
Headquarters. These must also be capable of controlling a varying 
number of subordinate formations of differing types. This is also 
being provided for.
The other changes which affect the units of the armoured 
division are that each of the four motor battalions will contain an 
anti-tank company of 16 two-pounder (six-pounder in the future, 
I hope) guns, and each of the two field regiments will include a 
fourth battery of 16 anti-tank guns.
We shall have also a pool of three “independent” armoured 
brigade groups organised similarly to those included in the 
armoured divisions and capable of attachment to any division 
as circumstances may dictate. In fact, it will be usual for these 
“independent” brigade groups to be attached to a division for 
training, administration and battle, but they are equally available 
for detached duty away from a division. An instance of the way in 
which they might be used is afforded by the despatch of the 7th 
Armoured Brigade Group to Burma. In our new organisation, the 
despatch of such a group can be easily effected without disturbing 
the basic divisional organisation.
As to the inclusion of the anti-tank weapon in the Motor battalion 
and the artillery regiment, this is the unanimous recommendation 
of commanders of all grades and services. The need for this change 
is not to be challenged, in my opinion.
3. As regards the infantry division, the basic composition remains the 
same. The formation of permanent brigade groups only recognises 
what is already a universal practice and does not in any way preclude 
the massing of the divisional artillery or the collection under one 
direction for a particular operations of the divisional engineers. The 
divisional reconnaissance battalions (of which I have one only now 
remaining) or, in the case of the Indian Divisions (now 50% of my 
available infantry) the divisional Cavalry (motorised) regiments will 
be formed into Motor brigade groups for work with the armoured 
divisions, thus supplying the very much needed additional infantry 
element. There is no other way of providing this that I can see, 
and the role of these reconnaissance units will be performed by 
the armoured car regiments which, except for those incorporated 
in the armoured divisions, will be “Army” or “Corps” Troops as 
they are now.
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4. The incorporation of anti-tank guns in the ordinary (as opposed 
to motor) infantry battalions is also a necessity in modern war. 
I am convinced of this, and opinion here is practically unanimous 
about it also. It may be uneconomical in theory but it is essential 
in practice.
The attached diagram shows, in outline, a method of incorpo-
rating eight Anti-Tank guns – all we can afford for the present – in 
each Infantry Battalion without upsetting the four Rifle Company 
organisation. This has been done without loss of fire power or 
increasing the establishment, and we want fewer men these days 
and more fire power. This establishment is still under detailed 
examination.
5. The artillery regiments of the infantry division will also have an 
anti-tank battery incorporated permanently in them. The handling 
over of anti-tanks to the infantry will go some way to providing 
artillerymen, which we so sorely need to fill the gaps in our existing 
units, due to failure to keep us us to strength. The anti-tank gun 
was never really an artillery weapon.
6. I think this covers all the main points. As you will see, the changes 
proposed are not very drastic, but they are, in my opinion, essential 
if we are to achieve the flexibility and co-operation of all arms 
demanded by modern war conditions.
JRL, AUC 740
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 7 March 1942
1 (.) Result my experience so far this war and especially of last three 
months have reached conclusion that standard of leadership in war 
our brigade and divisional leaders not nearly high enough (.) This 
due almost complete absence systematic and continuous instruction 
in simple principles in peace time (.) Staff College training did not 
fill and is not filling this gap (.) Am convinced that we must act at 
once to remedy this want if we are to get best results from excellent 
material in our armies and to have chance of meeting enemy equal 
terms (.)
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2 (.) INDIA has recognised this some months ago and has a higher war 
course (.) Consider MIDEAST should start same immediately (.) 
Need amply borne out of recent LIBYAN operations and present 
difficulty finding scientifically trained leaders for formations and 
higher planning appointments (.) GERMANS seem to have good 
supply competent leaders probably owing systematic pre war 
training and adherence to simple well tried principles which our 
Army seems to have mostly forgotten (.)
3 (.) Propose therefore with your approval constitution higher war course 
as follows (.) Staff one Major General four first grade instructors 
one operations one maintenance one organisation one air and in 
addition if available Naval adviser (.) Instructional staff must have 
highest qualifications (.) Students between fifteen and twenty 
including if available and willing three or four RAF (.) Course four 
weeks followed by four weeks tour by syndicates of the fronts of 
my three armies to study practical application principles learned (.) 
Four or five courses in the year allowing necessary breaks (.)
4 (.) This theatre offers great variety of terrain and it might well be 
desirable send students from UK INDIA and elsewhere (.) Am 
convinced of need for this training on systematic and scientific 
lines to enable us to make full use our resources now often wasted 
through uninstructed leadership (.)
5 (.) Seems possible that best location might well be in the Union where 
facilities ground and climate all excellent and work could be done 
away from parochial influences (.) Have little doubt that SMUTS 
would agree (.)
6 (.) Consider essential to start this instruction very earliest possible 
and not later than April (.) If established in Union course might 
develop on Empire basis which would immensely increase value (.) 
Hope you will give this project your blessing [.]
JRL, AUC 742
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 7 March 1942
In the stress of other matters, I never answered your letter of the 
30th January. Thank you very much for it, and for suggesting possible 
successors to Jumbo Wilson. As to Jumbo himself, he is carrying on well 
at present, and what with all these changes I think he had better stay 
where he is for a bit until things have settled down if they ever do! You 
see, he is well in on all this Free French political racket, and believe me 
it is a racket!
He also knows all about the internal security problems in Syria, and 
the Lebanon, and is of course well up in the strategical problems affecting 
that front. While I would be happier with a younger man, I think it would 
be better to mark time for the present, unless you feel that he ought to 
go on principle. If you do, then I would not feel justified in protesting.
As to his successor, I know Franklyn161 – you will remember perhaps 
that he had 8th Corps under me in Southern Command. I like him 
and I think he is sound enough, but I should be inclined to agree with 
you when you wonder if he is not going off. I rather thought the same 
when I last knew him – over a year ago now. Kenneth Anderson162 or 
Irwin163 would, I am sure, be first class and I would welcome either, but 
not James Gammel164 please! I know him too well and I do not believe 
in him I am afraid I would not have made him a Corps Commander 
myself – opinions differ however!!
I would much like to know what your intentions are in regard to 
Holmes. Opinions differ greatly about him. I have found him always 
sound and forceful; at the same time I always have a small doubt at the 
back of my mind! Some people say he is a mountebank! I am sure he has 
161 Lieutenant General Harold Franklyn, GOC Northern Ireland 1941–43.
162 Major General Kenneth Anderson, who commanded 1st Division, 8 Corps and 
2 Corps in 1942.
163 Lieutenant General Sir Noel Irwin.
164 Lieutenant General Sir James Gammel commanded 3rd Infantry Division, 
1940–41 and Eastern Command, 1942–43. Auchinleck knew him as he had been 
BGS of 4 Corps in 1940. Gammel was not sent to the Middle East but his career 
prospered despite Auchinleck’s misgivings. He was appointed Chief of Staff to 
the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean in 1944 and was head of the 
British Military Mission in Moscow in 1945.
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ability but I am doubtful of his stability – a little. Point is that he is very 
senior as you know, and if you put juniors over his head, he is bound to 
get disgruntled and therefore less efficient. Personally, I would not mind 
trying him out as an Army Commander. He certainly gets a move on.
I am grateful to you for your advice about Arthur Smith165 and John 
Shearer. I am sure it is right that he should have a change, as has been 
here a long time. Thank you very much for taking so much trouble to 
get him suitably placed. He has served me so well and done so much for 
this headquarters, that I should hate to think that he was leaving with a 
bad taste in his mouth. Corbett is settling in well and here again I owe 
you thanks for letting me have him. He will do well here I am sure, and 
blow away a lot of cobwebs. De Guingand is, I think, going to make a 
first-class DMI and he will have Shearer’s organisation at his disposal.
Blamey went off this morning. We parted great friends. He is a tough 
old boy with plenty of commonsense.
I hope to leave for a tour of 10th Army area tomorrow by air at 7.30 a.m. 
I am not quite happy about Quinan yet. He seems to have separatist 
tendencies, but I think he will be all right!!
I hope you are very well. P.J.’s166 appointment certainly gave us 
something to talk about.
JRL, AUC 745
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 7 March 1942
I am sorry I have not written before, but things have been rather 
hectic as you know from Arthur Smith. Tom Corbett hopes to go 
up to you on Monday, and I hope you will discuss everything very 
freely with him. I know you will. I am sure he is going to be of 
great assistance to us all.
2. As you know, we are under much pressure from the usual quarter 
to do the usual thing. You realise the urgency behind this pressure 
165 Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle East. He was to be posted as 
GOC London District and Major General Commanding the Brigade of Guards.
166 P. J. Grigg, appointed Secretary of State for War in March 1942.
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as well as I do, but I am determined not to be forced into action 
which would, in my opinion, be most dangerous at present. All the 
same, we must be thinking hard all day and every day how we can 
attack again and how soon. I think of little else, and I am sure you 
are doing the same.
3. I gather you are getting on with the mobile base organisation for 
brigade groups. This is very urgent. The whole thing should be 
worked out scientifically on an area basis. What area will the group 
require to cover? How many mines and how much wire will it want 
for this? What tools of all sorts will be wanted? How much water 
and what supplies? etc. etc. You know it all. As I see it, speed is 
the essence of the affair, and the whole thing must be a drill, and 
brigades must be drilled in it, using all the stuff (dummy mines) 
they would have to use. The ground will vary, of course, in each 
case, but generally a stereotyped lay out should be capable of being 
fitted in on most types of ground met with on your front. Do you 
agree? I look on these mobile base organisations as the foundation 
of any future offensive operation. I will be very grateful for your 
views on the subject, and for any conclusions you have reached.
4. We here have been trying to think out various courses of action 
which we might be able to take, and I will let you have our conclu-
sions shortly. You know I am not trying to intrude, but only to help, 
and the more brains we bring to bear on the problem the better. 
I know you agree with this. You will find Tom Corbett very alert 
and suggestive when it comes to plans.
5. I have been thinking for some days now that it might help you 
if you had a more experienced Chief of Staff, and one perhaps a 
little better qualified by personality and knowledge to deal with 
the Commanders and staffs of your subordinate formations. I like 
little Redman,167 and I think he is an able soldier with a good quick 
brain, but I am not sure that he is yet fitted for his present job, 
which is really in the nature of a 2nd-in-Command to you. Please 
don’t think I am getting at him, because I’m not, but I do think 
you want a heavier gun to take some of the work off your shoulders. 
I hope you will not think that I am in any way dissatisfied with you! 
Far from it! You know this.
167 Brigadier Harold Redman, BGS, Eighth Army.
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Anyway, I’d like to send you Jock Whiteley. He would love to 
go, I know, and he knows the big picture which is always a help. 
I hope you would welcome him. I have applied very strongly for 
the appointment of a M.G.G.S. on the staff of Armies and I hope 
I will get it. If I do, then Jock would be well worth promoting. Let 
me know what you think.
6. As you know, I will never press you to disgorge troops if you say 
you can’t. But I do very much want to get the Poles and New 
Zealanders out of Libya and back to Egypt and Syria respectively. 
So they must have precedence over 29th and 38th Indian Infantry 
Brigades. I am bringing a brigade group out of Cyprus at once, and 
hope to get 5th Div H.Q. out as well before long. I then propose to 
give you 5 Ind Div, of which 29th Ind Inf Bde forms part. Must 
29 Bde come back to Egypt? Can not they stay where they are?
It looks as if 38 Bde would have to be broken up and the H.Q. 
used to form a motor Bde Gp H.Q.
7. I am most encouraged by the performance of the Grants, and also 
by the excellent shooting of the 4th Armd Bde. The moral effect 
of having these fine tanks on the troops is very great.
We must make quite sure that their first appearance in battle 
comes as a first-class tactical surprise to the enemy, therefore 
they must not be used in small packets, but in as great strength 
as we can muster, and the greatest care and trouble must be taken 
to conceal their presence in the forward area prior to their being 
engaged. The same applies to the new six-pdr anti-tank gun. Its 
performance and presence must not be given away to the enemy 
before it can be given a chance of really doing damage. Everyone 
must realise the supreme importance of secrecy in this matter, and 
that any slackness or stupidity will be severely dealt with. I know 
you will agree with me in this, and that you will see that there is 
no nonsense about it.
8. Frank Messervy should be back with 7th Armd Div by the 13th 
of the month. I am glad Herbert Lumsden is doing well. How is 
Gertie Tuker getting on? I inspected 7th Ind Inf Bde this morning, 
and was most struck with their appearance, turn out and spirit.
9. I shall soon be asking you for Angus to come back, I am afraid, but 
I don’t want to leave you in the lurch.
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10. I am due to leave for Baghdad tomorrow, and to come back on 
the 14th. I hope you will be able to get in for Army Commanders’ 
Conference on 15th, and that you will stay with us.
JRL, AUC 746
170
Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 9 March 1942
Am certain that I cannot repeat NOT leave MIDEAST in present 
circumstances (.) Situation is entirely different to that obtaining last July 
and I am NOT repeat NOT prepared to delegate authority to anyone 
while strategical situation is so fluid and liable to rapid change (.) I can 
give no more information regarding tank situation than I have already 
given nor would my coming home make it more possible to stage an earlier 
offensive (.) I earnestly ask you therefore to reconsider your request (.) 
If you desire it I will gladly send Senior Staff Officer who can explain 
Tank situation in more detail [.]
JRL, AUC 748
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Cipher message from 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS to 
Auchinleck, 9 March 1942
I put your Private No Camp 2 8.3. before C.O.S. this morning for their 
consideration. Many important factors bearing on present situation 
are now being actively considered here such as MALTA LEVANT – 
CASPIAN Front Far Eastern situation, allotment of forces as between 
you and WAVELL relative armoured strengths in CYRENAICA etc. 
Other C.O.S. are in full agreement with me that it is most desirable that 
you should if possible come home for consultation these matters. We wish 
therefore to impress on you the urgency for such a visit provided you 
are not (repeat not) expecting to be engaged in active operations within 
the next week or so. Since I discussed your first message with C.O.S. 
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the Prime Minister has received your reply and has instructed me to 
impress on you the importance of your coming home for consultation. 
Could not (repeat not) WILSON answer for you during the few days 
you would be away?
JRL, AUC 749
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 12 March 1942
1 (.) Reorganisation, redistribution and possibility of active operations 
in this COMMAND make it impossible to leave even for short time 
while retaining responsibility. Could not ask WILSON to answer 
for me in circumstances even for fortnight.
2 (.) Suggest that great value would result from visit by you and if possible 
C.A.S. to CAIRO or BAGHDAD. WAVELL and PEIRSE could 
probably come for conference at which all questions mentioned 
in your cable 75223 could be discussed.
3 (.) Am most anxious to give all help to you and Defence Minister at 
present time. Have explained my situation as fully and frankly as 
I can. Fear have not made it clear owing to limitations of cable 




Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 15 March 1942
1. Your appreciation of February 27th contained in your 1723 continues 
causing deepest anxiety here, both to the Chiefs of Staff and Defence 
Committee. I therefore regret extremely your inability to come 
home for consultation. The delay you have in mind will endanger 
safety of Malta. Moreover there is no certainty that the enemy 
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cannot reinforce faster than you, so that after all your waiting you 
will find yourself in relatively the same or even a worse position. 
Your losses have been far less than the enemy nevertheless chance 
fighting. For instance the 7th Armoured Div was withdrawn to the 
Delta to rest although its losses were far less than those of the 15th 
and 21st German Armd Divs who came back at you with so much 
vigour. A very heavy German counterstroke upon the Russians 
must be expected soon, and it will be thought intolerable that 
the 655,000 men ex Malta on your ration strength should remain 
unengaged preparing for another set-piece battle in July.
2. A limited offensive to Derna of which you hold out some prospect 
would have the advantage at any rate of coming to grips with the 
enemy and forcing him to consume lives, munitions, tanks and 
aircraft. In that case if he beats your armour you would have to 
retire to your defensive zone. But if you beat his armour no one 
here understands why you should not press your advantage and go 
farther.
3. In your 1723 SUSAN [cipher message] Paragraph 8 you estimate 
possible by March 1st that enemy may have in Libya 475 medium 
tanks and by April 1st 630. We now know from special sources CS/
MSS/793/T.4 that on 11th Panzer Army Africa had in forward 
area 159 tanks serviceable and Italians 87, total 246, or barely half 
the number you credited them with by March 1st. Moreover this 
including the German type of light tanks. Against this War Office 
report that on March 2nd you had serviceable in Western Desert: 
Cruisers British Crusader, American M 3 Medium and American 
M 3 Light 174, serviceable in the Delta 197, new arrivals not yet 
issued 167, total 538. And I tanks additional, including 6 being 
unloaded, 252. Total serviceable 790. On your own estimate SUSAN 
1723 para 9 by April 1st you will have ready for battle in forward 
area 330 Medium tanks and 110 Valentines, total 430. This takes 
no account of the large number of serviceable but repairable.
4. I greatly admired your action in throwing out Cunningham and 
I was very glad you got rid of Godwin-Austin.168 I have done 
everything in my power to give you continuous support at heavy 
cost to the whole war. It would give me the greatest pain to feel 
168 Lieutenant General A. R. Godwin-Austen who was removed from command of 
13 Corps.
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that mutual understanding has ceased. In order to avoid this I have 
asked Sir Stafford Cripps to stay for a day in Cairo about 19th 
or 20th on his way to India and put before you view of the War 
Cabinet. He will be joined by General Nye,169 who is proceeding 
separately and is fully possessed of the Chiefs of Staff’s opinions. 
It is impossible for C.I.G.S. to leave the centre at this moment.
5. See also Chiefs of Staff No. 73968 of March 3rd.
JRL, AUC 753
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, 15 March 1942
As a result of recent experience in the Western Desert, I am not 
satisfied with the standard of leadership of the unit commanders 
of the Royal Armoured Corps, nor with that of some of the brigade 
commanders. It is not the first time that this subject has been raised, 
but it has come to a head again. Meanwhile many Cavalry officers of 
the Royal Armoured Corps are coming before the Junior Selection 
Board for appointment to command armoured regiments, who, in 
some cases, are clearly not fitted mentally or by training to take 
command in modern war. The command of an armoured regiment 
in the field to-day is an intricate process requiring first-rate ability 
and quite a reasonable degree of mechanical knowledge, in addition 
to a high general knowledge of soldiering including that of other 
arms’ capabilities and limitations. It is, of course, quite possible for 
suitable officers of armoured car regiments to be given command 
of armoured regiments; and it is also quite sound in my opinion 
– although it is not at present the practice – for selected officers 
in the R.T.R. Branch of the Royal Armoured Corps to be given 
command of Cavalry or Yeomanry Tank Regiments. But even this 
is not sufficient, and since it is now quite apparent that the right 
type of commander for an armoured regiment, medium or heavy, 
can only be an officer who has a complete understanding of all the 
arms which he will have to co-operate in battle, it follows that any 
169 Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Nye, VCIGS.
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highly recommended officer should be eligible for appointment to 
command an armoured regiment, whether he is R.A.C. (Cavalry) 
or R.A.C. (R.T.R.) or Infantry.
2. The same principle applies in the case of brigade commanders, and 
any thoroughly competent officer should be eligible for command 
of a brigade irrespective of whether he be R.A.C., R.A. or Infantry, 
or whether the brigade is an armoured brigade, a motorized brigade 
or an infantry brigade.




Report signed by Auchinleck entitled 
‘Libya, March 1942’, 21 March 1942
THE OBJECT.
1. Our permanent and over-riding object is to secure our bases in 
EGYPT and IRAQ against enemy attack.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECT.
2. Our policy on the Western Front in NORTH AFRICA has been 
hitherto: first, to protect our main base area in the DELTA, secondly, 
to drive the enemy out of NORTH AFRICA so as to increase the 
security of the DELTA base, to open the Mediterranean sea route, 
and to provide a base for operations against SICILY and ITALY.
3. So long as the enemy is able to send convoys freely to TRIPOLI 
and BENGHASI, he is in a better position to build up his forces 
on this front than we are, because the route is much shorter than 
our reinforcement route round the Cape and from INDIA. The 
most effective way, therefore, to secure EGYPT from attack from 
the West is to control the Central Mediterranean.
4. To gain control of the Central Mediterranean, we require:-
(i) To operate strong air forces and light naval forces from 
MALTA. This will not be possible unless we can keep MALTA 
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adequately supplied, and provide it with reasonable protection 
against air attack.
(ii) To operate strong air forces from basis in WESTERN 
CYRENAICA.
(iii) To provide air protection for our fleet operating from 
ALEXANDRIA.
5. If we could establish a high degree of control over the Central 
Mediterranean, the enemy’s strength in NORTH AFRICA must 
gradually decline. Both the capture of TRIPOLITANIA and, alter-
natively, the defence of CYRENAICA would then be easier, thus 
enabling us to release forces for the Northern Front, if required.
It is obvious that the advantages of capturing TRIPOLITANIA 
would be largely discounted if the enemy could establish himself 
in TUNISIA. The only certain way of preventing this is to occupy 
that country ourselves.
6. The carrying out of our policy falls, therefore, into three phases:
(i) The securing of CYRENAICA.
(ii) The building up of our striking forces in CYRENAICA 
and MALTA, with a view to gaining control of the Central 
Mediterranean.
(iii) The occupation of TRIPOLITANIA and, if necessary, of 
TUNISIA.
7. Viewing the war as a whole, we must concede that the enemy will 
have the initiative during the summer of 1942, and that some 
reserves are to be expected. This will influence our operations in 
NORTH AFRICA in the following ways:-
(a) We must not become involved in operations in LIBYA which 
can not be broken off at short notice. To be in a position to 
release forces to meet the enemy elsewhere, we must aim at 
being able to pass quickly to the defensive, and to consolidate 
our gains without delay.
(b) The morale of the public will require sustaining. A successful 
offensive would be beneficial, but another failure would have 
a harmful effect.
8. From the foregoing considerations, the phases of the offensive 
operations in LIBYA can be defined:
(i) To secure CYRENAICA.
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(ii) To gain control of the sea communications in the Central 
Mediterranean.
(iii) To capture or secure TRIPOLITANIA, which may depend 
on whether operations to secure TUNISIA can also be 
undertaken, either from the EAST or from the WEST.
FACTORS AFFECTING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN 
CYRENAICA.
9. Experience has shown that it is more difficult to hold than to capture 
CYRENAICA. Therefore, an essential element in the plan to 
capture CYRENAICA is the destruction of the enemy forces, and 
particularly the most effective part of them, the German armoured 
and infantry formations.
10. The configuration of the coast of the GULF of SIRTE and the 
defensive possibilities of EL AGHEILA area are the governing 
considerations in any plan for the defence of CYRENAICA. A 
much smaller force is needed to defend CYRENAICA in the 
AGHEILA position, than in any other, and since we must be ready 
to secure CYRENAICA with the minimum force, the capture and 
consolidation of the AGHEILA position is essential. This fixes our 
maintenance needs.
11. The supply situation in MALTA is bad and will become worse after 
May. Moreover, MALTA’s effort is waning, so that enemy convoys 
are passing more easily to NORTH AFRICA, and his situation 
there is improving accordingly. We should, therefore, strike as soon 
as we can with a reasonable prospect of success, that is, as soon as 
we have the needed relative superiority over the enemy, and the 
resources to enable us to sustain the momentum of our attack.
12. The relative numerical strength of our and the enemy’s armoured 
forces is shown in the Annexure to this paper. In comparing the 
strength of these forces, the following factors must be borne in 
mind:-
(a) The enemy’s cruiser tanks are better than ours. The leadership 
and training of his armoured formations is probably still 
better than ours. To give a reasonable chance of our offensive 
succeeding, we should have about 50% numerical superiority 
over the German armoured forces, though we can accept 
equality with the Italians.
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(b) Our Valentine tank is too slow to be employed with our Cruiser 
tanks, as it is, for this reason, at grave disadvantage when 
operating against enemy cruiser tanks. It is, however, a most 
valuable asset for counter attack within defensive positions 
held by our infantry, or to support our infantry in attacks on 
enemy defensive positions.
(c) Our infantry formations, supported by Valentine tanks, are 
superior in quality, and at present in quantity also, to enemy 
infantry formations.
13. An examination of the figures in the Annexure shows that we are 
severely handicapped by the lack of reliable information, which may 
result in lost opportunities, or in our attempting the impossible. 
It is clear, however, that we can not pass to the offensive now, but 
that we might be able to attack about 15th May, though 1st June 
is a more likely date.
DERNA – MARTUBA.
14. The maintenance of MALTA would be easier if we could operate 
air forces from landing grounds in the DERNA and MARTUBA 
area, and the possibility of a limited operation to secure these 
aerodromes is being carefully and continuously examined.
To secure these landing grounds we must secure DERNA and 
MECHILI. The enemy has prepared positions on this line, and we 
would be playing into his hands if we attacked him on this ground 
of his own choosing. We would require the same superiority of 
forces to capture this line as we would to capture CYRENAICA, 
because the enemy’s strength is all deployed forward. There is no 
reason for limiting the objective of our offensive to the capture of 
the line DERNA – MECHILI unless for administrative reasons it 
is impossible to advance with adequate forces beyond it. Our losses 
in this limited operation would almost certainly exceed those of the 
enemy, and the launching of the main offensive would be likely to be 
correspondingly delayed. Apart from any considerations of supply, 
should we attempt this operation with inferior armoured forces we 
would jeopardise the security of EGYPT, because the integrity 
of our own defensive positions in the GAZALA – TOBRUK – 
EL HACHEIM and SALUM – MADDALENA areas, strongly 
entrenched and mined as they are, depends entirely on the avail-
ability of a reasonably strong mobile reserve of armoured force with 
which to counter-attack the enemy armoured troops, should they 
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succeed in breaking through or passing round the infantry positions. 
The fronts held in these positions are perforce very extended, and 
the troops available to hold them are relatively few. Consequently, 
the various defended localities comprised in them are situated at 
some distance apart, and there is in no sense a continuous line 
of defence, though the whole may be covered by a more or less 
continuous minefield. Moreover, if forced to halt on the DERNA 
– MECHILI position and then to adopt a strategically defensive 
attitude on our Western Front, we should be much less favourably 
placed tactically in the GAZALA or SALUM positions, because of 
the longer frontage to be held, and the far greater vulnerability of 
our communications, consequent on the configuration of the coast.
CONCLUSIONS.
15. It is evident, therefore:
(i) That our first objective is to secure CYRENAICA.
(ii) That in securing CYRENAICA, we must destroy as much 
as possible of the enemy’s army.
(iii) That to secure CYRENAICA we must be able to maintain 
sufficient forces in the EL AGHEILA neighbourhood to hold 
it against heavy enemy attack.
(iv) That the sooner we can launch an offensive the better.
(v) That to give our offensive a reasonable chance of success we 
should have a numerical superiority in tanks of 50% over the 
Germans, and an equality with the Italians.
(vi) That a limited offensive to secure the landing grounds in the 
DERNA – MARTUBA area is likely to need the same relative 
superiority in tanks as an offensive to recover CYRENAICA, 
and has nothing to recommend it except that it may be 




(i) The enemy figures are based on no new formations being 
sent other than LITTORIO.
(ii) It has been assumed that enemy tanks are available for 
shipment.
(iii) Shipping will not be a limiting factor.
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O U R S E N E M Y
German Italian TOTAL
1 APRIL 1942
Best case for us 300 (a) 260  90 350
Worst case for us 300 (a) 360 140 500
15 May 1942 450 (b) 350 300 650 (c)
1 June 1942 600 (b) 350 300 650 (c)
(a) Infantry tanks numbering 150 have been omitted. These 300 are 
cruiser tanks with approximately 40% Grants.
(b) Infantry tanks numbering 150 have been omitted.
(c) This represents “worst case” for us. It is not possible at this date 
to state a “best case”.
JRL, AUC 764
176
Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 22 March 1942
Many thanks for your letter 70/6/G of 10 March. I was very glad 
to have you here – I always am, as you know.
2. I am glad the 13 Corps exercise went off all right. I hope the need 
to put it into practice will never arise, but it and other similar 
exercises will be useful in connection with another matter about 
which I am writing to you separately.
3. I agree with you that we might make more of our armoured cars 
than we do. I feel we do not always use them in sufficiently large 
numbers for specific operations, and that their action when thus 
used might be better co-ordinated, perhaps. For example, two or 
three armoured car regiments, backed up by and under command 
of a motor brigade group, might be capable of doing great execution 
wide to a flank or far in advance. What do you think?
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4. I entirely agree with your views about flanks and looking over one’s 
shoulder. The German does not mind pushing on into the middle 
of his enemy, and we should not either.
5. I am interested in your distribution of troops, and glad to hear that 
you think your positions are now so much stronger. They should 
be ready to withstand bombardment by medium artillery, and I 
am sure they are.
I agree that the armoured formations must not be tied in any 
way to a holding role, and that they must be placed so as to be able 
to fill their part in the defensive plan which is counter-attack, and 
if successful in this, pursuit beyond the limits of our positions if 
the chance offers. Their location is a matter for you to decide, and 
if El Adem is not too far back it should do well as it will also give 
them a chance to train meanwhile.
6. Your proposed new dispositions for the infantry of 13th Corps 
seem sound enough, though they entail putting all the infantry at 
present available in the front window. I take it, however, that each 
of the 2nd S.A. and 50th Divs would have one brigade in reserve 
in depth behind the forward area? With the increased strength of 
your position this would seem to be feasible and desirable, and I 
expect you mean to do it.
7. I note you mean to put the Free French into Tobruk. This should 
be all right, but please be careful not to allow this Bde to become 
a “guards and duty” formation. They are a temperamental lot, 
and need plenty of exercise and action if they are not to get into 
mischief. I am sure you will bear this in mind. There are of course 
strong political reasons for now allowing them to think they are 
being treated as being other than first-class troops. A propos of 
this, I have had to agree to send a battalion of Senegalese troops 
from Syria to Matruh in an effort to keep them from shooting their 
officers, as happened in another battalion of the same people last 
week in Damascus! However, they should be useful in Matruh. 
Catroux also wants to carry out some reliefs of units in de Larminat’s 
brigade, and I have agreed to this.
8. I am glad you have been able to release the Poles. Many thanks.
9. We have just heard that the Russians refuse to feed the Poles in 
Russian Turkestan any more, and want us to remove about 70,000 
en bloc!! A week ago nothing would induce them to give us any!!! 
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They are a queer crowd with no thought of anything but their own 
convenience and gain. However, I am very glad to have the Poles, if 
we can get the equipment for them. We hope to keep about 40,000, 
which will be a great reinforcement in these hard times.
10. You say you want to be sure that “we are really secure in Tobruk 
and at El Adem” before carrying out the moves you have in mind. 
What scale of attack do you want to be secure against? I thought 
that Acroma, El Adem and the entrances to Tobruk had already 
been put in a state of defence? I should have though that with the 
armour round El Adem and a Bde Gp in Acroma and Tobruk, you 
ought to feel pretty comfortable, but let me know what is in your 
mind. Things may move quicker than we thought at one time, and 
it might be advisable to expedite the readjustments you have in 
mind; this is, however, a matter for you to decide.
I agree that the allotment of an Armd car regt to each inf div has 
advantages so long as “no man’s land” remains relatively narrow 
as it is now. Any really wide flung recces must I think be directed 
and controlled by Army or Corps.
11. I am getting 5 Ind Div out of Cyprus as quickly as I can, and 
will send advance parties up to you to learn the ropes early. The 
re-equipment of this div may be a difficulty.
12. Please show Nye everything and tell him everything. The more he 
learns of conditions as they are now, and likely to be in the future, 
the better.
13. Hope Jock170 is settling down. Am sending you my own new map 
lorry for your personal planning use, and I hope you will like it.
14. Many thanks for releasing Angus.
Good luck,
JRL, AUC 765
170 Brigadier John Whiteley, BGS Eighth Army.
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 26 March 1942
I am afraid that this letter will probably not reach you until after 
your return from Palestine, though possibly it may be sent on to 
you whilst you are away. There has been something of a lag in our 
air communication here these last few days due to the weather, but 
things are better now. I have your two letters, one of the 22nd and 
the other of the 24th to answer.
2. JOCK has arrived and I sent him up for three days to see the 
Commanders forward and get an idea of our dispositions, and he 
is now back here finally taking over. REDMAN will be leaving the 
day after tomorrow.
3. ARMOURED CAR REGIMENTS.
I believe that there are great possibilities of using armoured cars 
in numbers with a motor brigade. I can see this happening during 
an advance when one wants rapidly to get a motor brigade forward 
to hold some vital ground, especially in circumstances where the 
situation permits of them holding the ground in rear of a retreating 
enemy. I am sure this is one of the right ways to use armoured cars, 
and in such circumstances I think it would often be right to add 
some punch to the armoured cars by giving them guns. Further, 
just now when we have no suitable anti-tank guns in our armoured 
cars, one might well add some anti-tank weapons to them and so 
add to their strength. Personally, I do not think that, even in the 
wide frontages of this desert, one would ever employ more than 
two armoured car regiments working together under a Motor 
Brigade. With two squadrons up out of the three each armoured 
car regiment can quite easily cover a frontage of some 30 to 40 
miles, which I think is as large as any single motor brigade could 
adequately control. I foresee that many chances for the use of a force 
like this may occur and that they will not be confined by any means 
to occasions when one may be following up a retreating enemy.
4. RE-ARRANGEMENT OF DISPOSITIONS 13 CORPS.
Though possibly it may appear that we would have a large number 
of our goods in the shop window, I feel that a re-arrangement of our 
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resources on the lines suggested still gives us the requisite depth by 
the positioning of our armoured formations. The changes would 
involve putting up two infantry brigade groups and drawing back 
one motor brigade and the Free French Brigade Groups. I am 
going into the question of possibly getting greater depth on the 
front now that our positions are somewhat strengthened. In the 
case of the 50th Division, this is already to some extent achieved 
by the fact that the 69th Brigade Group is echeloned back behind 
the left flank, with one inf bn Gp and a squadron of “Matildas” in 
divisional reserve further back still. The problem on the frontage of 
the present 1st S.A. Div is somewhat more difficult because of the 
extra commitment here of watching the right flank and the possible 
landing places between GAZALA and the TOBRUK defences. 
There is, however, quite a considerable depth in the position now 
on top of the escarpments, especially in the anti-tank defences 
provided by the siting of the field arty in depth, the location of the 
“Matildas”, and the reserve squadron of the divisional reconnais-
sance battalion. In regard to TOBRUK and its security, I possibly 
used the wrong word, for I am quite satisfied in my own mind 
about its safety against a scale of attack, which in my estimation 
is unlikely to exceed an armoured raiding force of all arms based 
on a strength of about one battalion of tanks. What I really was 
somewhat exercised about is the decisions which might have to be 
made by the Commander in TOBRUK in regard to the evacuation 
of personnel in certain conditions, and particularly the ordering 
of demolitions. But this can be got over, I think, by leaving the 
responsibility for this in the hands of the sub-area commander at 
TOBRUK. I have seen too many demolition schemes in the hands 
of the French ever to feel satisfied again in my own mind that they 
can really be trusted.
I am anxious to fit in, if possible, the dates for this general 
reshuffle with other operations about which you have already written 
to me. To some extent this will hinge on the date by which the 7th 
Armoured Division has completed its training, and this should be 
about mid-April or a little before then.
5. FREE FRENCH.
I am getting a lot of very good reports about the Free French 
operations with their columns and I gather that they are doing 
a great deal better than any of us had anticipated would be the 
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case. I quite understand the difficulties about the Free French 
going into a place like TOBRUK, but I think I can overcome this 
by ensuring that they still continue to find columns in various 
parts of the front and are kept fully employed fighting the enemy 
instead of themselves! No final information has reached me about 
the Senegalese battalion for MATRUH, nor about reliefs by Free 
French units from SYRIA with units now serving here. No doubt 
information about this will reach me shortly.
6. DECEPTION.
I will make quite certain that the deception staff is used to the 
best advantage. GOFF, who is my new G.1 here, is shaping very 
well and has already worked out in outline the general deception 
plan that is to be followed. He was recently a teacher at the Staff 
College and is I think going to be very good. He has been in on 
my plans from the beginning and has been working in conjunction 
with the Operations and Planning side of my staff here. I will see 
that a similar procedure is followed in my subordinate formations.
7. “FULLSIZE”.
(a) The reports received on this operation were, I consider, 
most inaccurate to begin with and I have already issued a 
strong letter on this subject to the Corps, because, if our 
information from the battlefield is to be so inaccurate as this 
it must inevitably endanger the employment of reserves whose 
task will largely be decided as a result of the information 
reaching us from the forward commander. I purposefully 
avoided giving you any appreciation of mine regarding the 
situation on D.2 day because I felt that the reports were not 
sufficiently accurate. Even the next day they still were often 
exaggerated.
(b) The gun captures have now been reported. They were as 
follows:-
4 – 7.62 guns.
1 – 4.7 anti-tank gun.
1 – small anti-tank gun.
(c) Our losses were more than I thought. Full reports are on the 
way to me now but I attach a summary of such information 
as I have got. Without seeing the full reports one hesitates 
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to judge yet as to the causes, but I feel that there were two 
main ones:-
First, there was the considerable scale of air attack launched 
against “B” column in the MARTUBA area on D2 afternoon. 
Communications with this column broke down, I understand, 
on account of the fact that the W/T vehicles were knocked 
out and as a result we did not know about air attacks until it 
was too late to provide air counter measures.
Secondly, I think that “C” column was left out too late on 
the morning of D3. This again was caused through breakdown 
in communications. As a result part of their rear party was 
over-run by enemy tanks.
(d) We have had losses in this show, but nevertheless, I think the 
results have been good. The whole operation has done the 50th 
Div a power of good and has shown them that they can take 
on the Bosche and win on level terms. I think that it caused 
the enemy to shift the majority of his armour and that he 
has shown us his reactions, which are now being summarised 
and will be passed on to G.H.Q. It appears too, that it has 
caused him to shift his aircraft off MARTUBA to DERNA, 
which is again a good business, for DERNA is very prone to 
weather conditions and is nothing like so good as the landing 
grounds in the MARTUBA area. Finally, I think that there 
is little doubt this operation definitely prevented the enemy 
taking any serious air action against the convoy on D2.
8. LOSSES of 25-prs BY 11 R.H.A.
The full report is on the way now. I have already inquired into 
the matter, both with the Corps and Divisional Commanders, 
and it appears that the Free French are not to blame. From all the 
reports it seems that the loss is due to rash action on the part of 
the Troop Commander who was determined to get his own back on 
the Bosche for having captured two of his guns near AGEDABIA. 
The individual is missing.
9. It was very nice having ARCHIE NYE up here. I think he enjoyed 
his visit and perhaps realises better than before some of the diffi-
culties that face us out here. He saw a lot, including a great deal 
of dust, I am afraid, for his second day here was a particularly bad 
one.
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10. Thank you ever so much for saying you are sending me up your 
new map lorry, which will be of the greatest use to me. I was just 
about to pitch a tent for the purpose as I find my present map lorry 
a difficult place in which to work and plan. The arrival of your lorry 
will be very welcome.
11. I saw 102 A.Tk Regt (Northumberland Hussars) who are being 
broken up. I said a few words to the older soldiers. They all fully 
realise the need, but are naturally sad at the thought of losing their 
identity as a regt.
12. JUGO-SLAVS are shaping well under “Gertie’s”171 instruction. 
Haven’t seen them yet myself will do so next Wednesday.
JRL, AUC 769
178
Cipher message from General Sir Alan Brooke 
to Auchinleck, 31 March 1942
I am sure you will realise the importance of starting your offensive as near 
to the accepted date as possible always provided that circumstances when 
the time comes indicates reasonable chance of success. It has not rpt not 
been easy to convince the Prime Minister and Defence Committee as to 
the necessity for delay and I am certain that any further delays will be 
unacceptable unless you produce overwhelming reasons. But everything 
is now clear as a result of our voluminous exchange of cables which I am 
afraid was unavoidable. I often feel how valuable a talk with you would 
be but we are both so tied in these critical days that it is impossible at 
the moment. I hope that NYEs visit has been of assistance to you and 
am looking forward to hearing account of his visit when he returns. All 
good wishes and hoping to be able to come for a visit before long.
JRL, AUC 771
171 Major General Francis Tuker.
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Letter from General Sir Alan Brooke 
to Auchinleck, 31 March 1942
My dear Auk,
I have just been told that there is a chance of sending you a letter 
tomorrow so am rushing off a few lines.
I am sorry that you should have had the difficult times that you have 
been through lately, and I can assure you that it was not owing to lack 
of efforts to save you from it.
Some of the telegrams which you did not like were the results of 
saving you from more unpleasant ones.
We have now got the P.M. to accept your dates and arguments, but 
not in a very pleasant manner. He is accepting the delays only under 
protest, and with little grace!
It was a pity that you could not come home as I believe it would have 
assisted matters.
I do hope that circumstances will work out now so that you can live 
up to your forecasts, otherwise I foresee difficult times ahead of us.
I do not think you realize how difficult he is to handle at times. In that 
aspect Oliver Lyttelton should be a great help in the future as he knows 
your difficulties and troubles and can give first hand evidence and advice.
What crushing bad luck about that Malta convoy; I hope they succeed 
in salvaging some of the stuff.
I hope that your new C.G.S. is now settling down and that he will be 
a great success.
I am having a little difficulty with the King over Arthur Smith172 as 
he wishes to keep on Sergison-Brooke,173 but I think we can get over 
the trouble.
I have noted that you propose to keep Jumbo Wilson on for a bit 
longer. He is getting on in age, but if you want to keep him on a little 
longer, I can fix it up.
172 Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, CGS, Middle East, 1940–42, who Brooke 
wanted to appoint as GOC London District.
173 Lieutenant General Sir Bertram Sergison-Brooke, GOC London District, 
1940–42. Sergison-Brooke’s active army career ended with this appointment.
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Kenneth Anderson is taking over Eastern Command here so would 
no longer be available, and Irwin174 has gone to India. I have made a 
note that in any case you don’t want Gammell.175 As regards Holmes,176 
I think he has reached his zenith as Corps Commander and should not 
go any further unless you have a very high opinion of him. I do not trust 
him over far, and I think he is lazy and unstable. If we put juniors over 
his head and he gets disgruntled, he must go: there is no room for him 
if he is going to put his personal feelings above getting on with the job.
I shall do all I can to make up some of your deficiencies in troops and 
shall try to fill up some of your gaps. The difficulty is ensuring for the 
adequate safety of India at the same time.
Let me know if at any time I can help you in any way, and remember 
that I am doing all I can to assist at this end.
Thank you very much for your Review of the situation in Libya (dated 
26th February, 1942. It has been most useful.
With best of luck
JRL, AUC 772
180
Letter from Auchinleck to Sir Walter Monckton,177 
Office of Minister of State, Cairo, 7 April 1942
Many thanks for your letter of the 6th April, returning General Wilson’s 
letter to me of the 4th April. I shall be very glad to discuss the whole 
question of Spears’178 relations with the Army whenever you like.
174 Lieutenant General Sir Noel Irwin.
175 Lieutenant General Sir James Gammell.
176 Lieutenant General William Holmes. Holmes was to be promoted to be given 
command of Ninth Army in 1942 and promoted to full general before his 
retirement in 1945 which is an interesting comment on the limit of Alan Brooke’s 
powers.
177 Sir Walter Monckton was, effectively, the acting Minister of State in the Middle 
East from March to May 1942. Oliver Lyttelton left in February to become 
Minister of Production and his successor, Richard Casey, the former Australian 
Minister in Washington did not arrive in Cairo until 5 May.
178 Major General Edward Spears, MP.
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I would like, however, to correct any impression that my visit to 
Catroux179 at Damascus was in the nature of an “official conversation”, 
as Spears seems to think. Catroux asked me to stay with him, and I 
accepted with pleasure, as I would in the event of a similar invitation 
being extended to me by any other commander serving under me. I am 
afraid I shall do the same again should he be kind enough to give me 
the opportunity, and I really can not accept the implication that I can 
not talk to Catroux unless Spears is present. I have always made it quite 
clear to Spears that in matters affecting operational and military plans, 
I am free to see Catroux or any other French commander when and how 
I like, and I am afraid I have no intention of receding from this position.
Also, I am afraid I really can not consult Spears every time I wish to 
invite Catroux or de Larminat or any French officer to my house for a 
meal or to sleep, nor do I propose to consult him before accepting similar 
invitations extended to me.
I do not wish to be difficult, but, to be quite frank, I think Spears’ 
attitude is illogical and absurd. I can not admit that the occurrences 
were in any way “unfortunate”, or at all out of order. I reserve the right 
to visit French troops and commanders whenever I consider it advisable 
to do so. They are under my operational command, and it is my duty to 
visit them, so that I can assure myself of their state of efficiency. I think 
you will have no difficulty in seeing that to attempt thus to restrict my 
functions would be ridiculous.
For instance, when next I visit Tobruk, am I to refrain from my 
acquainting myself of the conditions under which de Larminat’s troops are 
serving, until such time as Spears is pleased to grant me his permission?
I must ask that Spears be disabused of these ideas as soon as possible.
You will note that Spears does not go out of his way to keep responsible 
authorities informed of his own movements.
JRL, AUC 781
179 General Georges Catroux, the Free French High Commissioner to the Levant.
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 13 April 1942
1. (a) There are signs, I think, of some re-grouping possibly of the 
enemy forces opposite the GAZALA position. Personally, 
I appreciate from the positions of the various H.Q. so far as we 
know them, that the enemy’s ultimate intention is offensive. 
There is no doubt of this I think. At the same time, his recon-
naissance and ground actions indicate, in my estimation, 
some nervousness on his part about his own right flank and 
the possibility of our undertaking some operation through 
TENGEDER. At any rate, this was I feel in his mind a day or 
two ago. In the last few days he has withdrawn a detachment 
at GARET EL-ASIDA, U42, from which place it moved, we 
believe to SEGNALI. In the SEGNALI area itself during 
the last 24 hours there has been much less ground activity, 
though air and ground reconnaissance by us indicated up to 
last night that there was still there a concentration of M.T. 
On the other hand, he has allowed the 12th Lancers patrols a 
great deal of freedom of action and yesterday afternoon some 
of these were able to bypass SEGNALI to the WEST and 
were up to last light on to the line of the TRIGH ENVER 
BEI in square U.46. In the centre of his position in the area 
TEMRAD – BREGHISC, it seems to me that he has been 
less active and we have identified one or two Italians there. 
This may indicate the possibility of him bringing up Italian 
troops to hold this line. In the Coastal Sector there was more 
activity yesterday and from our patrol reports there appear 
to be Germans in this area and that there are concealed in 
the nullas, south of the main road, considerable numbers of 
them. There have not been any signs so far reported to me 
of any large numbers of enemy A.F.V’s in this area.
There are, I think, some indications that the enemy might 
attempt his main thrust astride the main road to TOBRUK 
from TMIMI. His air reconnaissance, including photography, 
has been very active here over the last few days above the 
escarpment, apparently locating our forward defences there. 
The other most prominent place for air reconnaissance has 
been BIR HACHEIM.
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(b) We have received watchers from the JEBEL back yesterday 
or the day before who have been on the lookout and in touch 
with the Arabs since the beginning of March until four days 
ago. They were not themselves able throughout this whole 
period to keep continuous watch on all the roads leading to 
the East through the JEBEL, and into MECHILI from the 
WEST, but the Arabs say that during this period there has 
been no major movement of tanks into the JEBEL from the 
WEST or through MECHILI. Personally,
I do not believe this, for I feel that the enemy reinforce-
ments in A.F.V’s that we have observed passing MARBLE 
ARCH towards the EAST have not been held back in that 
area. I believe it to be quite possible that these reinforcements 
in their onward journey to join the enemy’s main forces 
may have moved via MSUS and MECHILI or possibly by 
a more Northerly route via BENGHASI – EL ABIAR – 
CHARRUBA – MECHILI, and that this movement may 
have taken place at night in small parties and so got through 
our watchers. So I am of the opinion that the reinforce-
ments spotted moving Eastwards past MARBLE ARCH 
have probably joined the enemy’s main forces.
(c) Three days ago the enemy carried out two air reconnais-
sances over the 7th Armoured Division area, just WEST 
of CAPUZZO, and I think that he has possibly discovered 
them there. Meanwhile, they moved last night and are now 
between EL ADEM and GUBI.
2. SEGNALI OPERATION.
The approach march started last night and I do not think was 
spotted before darkness. We have no news of how it is progressing 
yet because wireless silence is being strictly maintained until it is 
apparent to the Commander that the enemy have picked them up. 
This operation starts with a definite threat towards TENGEDER 
and the WEST. Dummy tanks are being used to stimulate movement 
in this direction and we are taking every possible step to watch the 
enemy’s reactions to this.
3. PLANNING.
We are getting on hard with this. The note that you said would be 
sent has not yet reached me, but as I am well into your mind in 
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regard to this operation we are getting on with our detailed planning 
at once. I hope the note may arrive shortly.
4. IMMEDIATE ACTION.
Our front, as I see it, is now divided into two halves, the circum-
stances in each being different:-
(a) Between the sea and TEMRAD, NO MAN’S LAND is too 
narrow for the proper use of JOCK Columns. [Annotation: 
no matter about this.] Here we have to operate with large 
fighting patrols covering O.P’s and sniping guns well forward, 
and behind this in each brigade a force of all arms ready to 
take offensive action such as that carried out by the NATAL 
CARBINERS, when opportunity presents itself. [Annotation: 
Certainly.]
(b) The other half of the front is difficult because here NO MAN’S 
LAND is a considerable width. [Annotation: Certainly!] But 
here also, the JOCK COLUMN, as we know it, is not really 
suitable because it has not sufficient hitting power. Here I 
hope to hand over the area to a complete brigade, organised 
to suit the conditions, whose task it will be to find and strike 
enemy concentrations. I see this being organised in three 
echelons:-
(i) Armd Cars for reconnaissance.
(ii) A small support group for the Armd cars to provide 
a hitting power in the form of guns, to provide the 
necessary strength to permit the Armd cars to get in 
against light opposition.
(iii) Columns, including at least a squadron of tanks with 
each to do the hitting.
This last to remain concentrated under the brigade 
and to operate in combination under the Commander’s 
direction against any suitable enemy concentrations 
discovered. A system of this sort will ensure that 
the actions of these forces are co-ordinated and will, 
I consider be better than the present system whereby 
each formation runs its own column or columns on its 
own front. Finally, in regard to this matter, speed is 
absolutely essential and, therefore, we must decentralise.
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5. GRANT TANKS.
Sixteen of the GRANT tanks have already developed a very high 
consumption of oil and a loss of power. Of these, three are unser-
viceable and out of action, while the remaining thirteen are “lamish 
ducks”. As far as we can see the trouble is engines, and with a change 
of engine all will be well. We have wired in details to G.H.Q., and 
asked for an expert American Engineer to come up and have also 
sent back one of the three off the road immediately to the DELTA 
for examination. This defect has appeared at an average of 500 mile 
runs. Norrie has written details to MCCREERY.
6. M.T.
I know that you are very worried about the situation and it seems 
to me, from the forecast I have been given, that by about mid-May 
we will be about 2,000 vehicles short in the Army. The wear and 
tear on M.T. is considerable in these mobile operations that have 
recently been undertaken in front of opposition and these will 
continue. At an estimate I should say our wastage will be at least 
150 to 200 vehicles a week.
6. MAP CARAVAN.
I have now got this running and am trying it out for a few days 
to see if I can discover all the defects. There are certain of these 
already apparent, the worst of which is ventilation.
7. ARMY COMMANDERS’ MEETING.
I hope you will forgive me for not attending this as the situation 
here, I think, demands that I should be present for the moment. 
I am moving my Command Post up to 13 Corps H.Q. this afternoon 
so as to be there in case any major decision has to be made by me 
in respect of the use of the 7th Armoured Division, resulting from 
the enemy’s reactions to our operations at SEGNALI.
P.S. The situation regarding A.P. for 75’s in the “Grants” is bad. We 
have only sufficient to fill the echelons of 7 Armd Div and parts only of 
1 Armd Div. I understand there is nothing behind this. I believe there is 
no shortage of S.A.P. in M.E., but its performance, as you know is much 
below A.P. Can anything be done? I expect you already know about this 
and that the matter is currently in hand.
JRL, AUC 802
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 22 April 1942
I had a preliminary conference with Strafer and Willoughby 
yesterday to start them off on their planning for “BUCKSHOT”.180 
The directive for PLANNING was got out before I came to Cairo 
and has since been amended as a result of the decisions reached 
there. A copy of it, and the amendments, has gone to CORBETT 
and an Outline PLAN, putting the intended action briefly, follows 
to you.
A great deal was cleared up yesterday at the conference, which 
is, I am convinced, the only method of settling uncertainties which 
almost invariably result from the written word.
2. There was, I gather, a mistake made about Charles’ aircraft yesterday, 
with the result that he will not have got to Cairo till the early 
afternoon. However, I hope he was there soon enough to see Riddell 
and clear up certain matters with him in regard to the administrative 
aspect.
3. I feel that in our planning we should resist relying on BENGHAZI 
being of any use to us as a port until we have put the enemy out of 
Cyrenaica.
The Navy has sufficient difficulty already in delivery to 
TOBRUK, and I do not believe we can rely on them to get much 
into BENGHAZI.
Therefore I feel ever more convinced that we should apply 
every administrative resource we have to one thing – establishing 
ourselves in the desert. We should avoid dispersing our adminis-
trative effort, which would certainly be the result if we are to put 
A.A., Air forces, and even coast defences into BENGHAZI before 
we have cleared the enemy from CYRENAICA.
4. Though these remarks have not yet been substantiated, I am just 
starting to hear stories which give me the impression that the 
180 An operation designed to recapture Benghazi; it was overtaken by events in the 
face of the renewed Axis offensive.
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Commando personnel are neither hard nor even fit, and that their 
discipline is very indifferent.
These stories reach me through G(R) officers who have been 
leading small parties of the Commando into the GEBEL in order 
that I might have a nucleus of their personnel who know the 
country there.
I have wired WILSON of your Bn181 to give me his private 
estimation of their value and GRAHAM should be here to-day 
or tomorrow and I will have it out with him.
If these stories are true I feel that a further Commando “purge” 
is needed to get rid of useless people, and I feel that a new squadron 
commander will be needed to put the matter right.
Jock182 has written to AIREY about it.
I will put up concrete suggestions later but at the moment I feel 
that there are two alternatives so far as this front is concerned:-
(a) to leave them as they are, purge and introduce new blood,
(b) to purge and then take what is left and form it into a Commando 
element for the L.R.D.G.
Looking at it from my restricted point of view, I prefer the 
latter, but I know it will run across the bigger M.E. organisation 
of Commandos for the whole theatre.
Here in the Western Desert the L.R.D.G. and saboteurs work 
hand in glove. Actions by the latter may seriously interfere with 
the former, so very careful co-ordination is essential. So I would 
like to have both operating under one head, and the best person 
is PRENDERGAST.
Further, the L.R.D.G. has a great reputation and tradition. If 
we added a commando element they would quickly pick this up.
I need hardly say that I would like STIRLING183 to take over 
this commando element if formed but I anticipate this may not 
fit in with your need to have him in connection with parachutist 
training. As a leader of saboteurs and at irregular operations he is 
a master, and I wonder whether his value to our cause might not 
be greater in this line of country than with the parachutists.
181 Presumably the Black Watch.
182 Brigadier John Whiteley.
183 Major David Stirling.
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I will of course be writing officially and this letter is only to give 
you a line on what is in my mind for the moment.
I am so sure that a saboteur and irregular operations will play a 
great part that I feel we should leave no stone unturned to get our 
commando work on a sound basis.
P.S. I am sending back the Map Lorry to the Delta for alterations. 
Particulars of what I consider [may go to] Angus.
JRL, AUC 816
183
Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 27 April 1942
One (.) The special information dated 21 (21) April reached us in 
following form (.) Quote 161 (161) Axis tanks were reported serviceable 
21 (21) April (.) Comment by M.I.14. This appears to be number of 
serviceable German tanks in forward area unquote (.) We have asked 
War Office to elucidate their comment for following reason (.) Every 
German tank strength return so far received by us from whatever source 
has given the number of tanks by types (.) The special information of 
21 (21) April does NOT do so and we suggest the figure quote 161 (161) 
unquote to be Italian tanks or else the reply to a specific question (,) such 
as quote what progress has been made with fitting additional amour 
plate to tanks unquote (.) A very likely question seems to us to be quote 
how many serviceable mark III tanks are there now in CYRENAICA 
unquote (,) since the figure 161 (161) is only about twenty less than we 
believe the total number of Mark III to be and twenty is a reasonable 
number unserviceable (.) Figure 161 (161) might alternatively be strength 
of one German armoured division but this explanation is open to same 
objection that strength is NOT given by types as invariably heretofore (.)
Two (.) Even if 161 (161) be strength in forward area (,) and we have 
asked War Office what they mean by quote forward area unquote (,) 
strength East of JEDABYA certainly and East of BENGHASI probably 
must be higher (.) We know from special information that number of 
serviceable in CYRENAICA as far back as 11 (11) March was 159 (159) 
German and 87 (87) Italian and L R D G have since visually observed 
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moving into CYRENAICA at least 112 (112) German (,) 46 (46) Italian 
and 27 (27) unidentified tanks (.)
Three (.) Fact that special information can NOT be repeated to us 
verbatim is realised but this must and does reduce its value to us owing to 
inevitable difficulty of separating original information from comment and 
of knowing the source of comment (.) This entails very careful weighing 
and cautious application of this information at this end though we do 
NOT question its great value (.)
Hope to be able discuss whole question of handling this information 
with General DAVIDSON184 who is due here this week.
JRL, AUC 826
184
Memorandum entitled, ‘Policy governing 
the employment of our armour’ by 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 1 May 1942, 
with annotation by Auchinleck
1. GENERAL.
It appears to me that for the present we are on the defensive, an 
attitude we must continue to adopt until we feel ourselves strong 
enough to turn to the offensive. There may, however, be an interim 
period during the course of which we may well undertake limited 
offensive action when conditions are such that we see the chance 
to inflict serious loss on the enemy, especially to his armour or at 
all events isolated portions of it.
2. FACTORS GOVERNING OUR ATTITUDE.
In the Western Desert, all other things – such as leadership – being 
equal, there is no doubt that the stronger armoured force dominates 
the battlefield. [Annotation: but leadership and good tactics must 
be our real standby.]
184 Major General Francis Davidson, Director of Military Intelligence.
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Our object is, therefore, to build up an armoured force superior 
in strength, fighting qualities and leadership to that of the enemy 
and to use it concentrated.
At the moment we are the weaker. We are approaching equality 
in numbers and should, assuming the enemy does not receive any 
substantial reinforcements, shortly exceed the estimated number 
of tanks possessed by him.
For adequate superiority to resume the offensive we estimate 
we should have 3:2 against the German Mk III and IV, and 1:1 
against the German Mk II and all types of Italian M.13’s. On our 
estimated present enemy strength we need some 600 tanks of the 
cruiser types to give us this needed superiority, but for the purposes 
of these calculations we can reasonably include 100 Valentines 
which, even if they do nothing else, can at all events be counted 
upon to contain a portion of the enemy armour.
Apart from equality in numbers there is too the question of 
training to be considered. 22 Armd Bde has only just arrived and 
is in some respects backward in training. 2 Armd Bde is only just 
now commencing to convert to the new organisation which includes 
GRANT tanks.
Taking all factors into account I feel that our armour cannot 
be considered to have achieved adequate superiority before 20th 
May at the earliest, and this assumes no material reinforcement 
to the enemy.
The provision of the requisite “B” vehicles is also a factor which 
bears a direct relation to the date when offensive operations should 
start. It does not appear likely that this will be satisfactory until 
the last week in May.
3. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING OUR POLICY IF ENEMY 
IS FURTHER REINFORCED.
This note is based on the assumption that the enemy is NOT 
reinforced in armour. If he is a major problem arises. [Annotation: 
Quite so.]
Are we ever going to achieve the superiority we estimate that we 
need? At any rate we are now probably possessed of more troops 
experienced in the conditions of fighting in the Western Desert 
than he is. Time will give him the chance to get level with us. We 
are certainly superior in infantry. In these circumstances it might 
pay us to adopt a more offensive policy in an attempt to wear the 
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enemy’s armour down and to this end use a proportion of our tanks. 
This situation however has not yet arisen.
4. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING OUR PRESENT 
POLICY.
For the present, while the enemy is superior in armour, it behoves 
us to husband our resources in armour with the aim always of 
building up a force that is ultimately to take the offensive. Moreover, 
we are debarred from using the Grant tank and the 6 pdr gun on 
minor enterprises.
We cannot therefore afford to fritter our tanks away in countering 
the enemy’s present tactics of covering the establishment of defended 
localities with armour unless he offers us a real chance of inflicting 
serious loss on him while we ourselves lose little. In such circum-
stances we would be justified in using Valentines assisted perhaps 
by Stuarts. [Annotation: Yes.]
The following policy will therefore govern our action:
(a) We must conserve our armour to build up for the resumption 
of the offensive.
(b) We must accept the fact that, as the enemy uses portions of 
his armour to cover the establishment of defended posts, we 
cannot prevent this without ourselves using armour.
Our armour will therefore NOT be used to prevent the 
establishment by the enemy of defended localities unless his 
action in doing so definitely endangers the security of the 
GAZALA – HACHEIM position, or offers us a really good 
opportunity of inflicting on him serious loss with little loss 
to ourselves.
As an interim measure when the Grant tank and the 6 pdr gun 
have been absorbed into formations the bar on their use may be 
removed. In this case we may be able to act more offensively even 
though we may not be strong enough to pass to the offensive.
JRL, AUC 832
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 3 May 1942
I must apologise for not having written you a proper letter for so 
long, but, as usual, I find I am kept pretty hard at it. Also, I hope 
Nye took the place of many letters and was able to give you a real 
picture of what we are doing and how we stand.
2. The matter most in my mind at the moment is the threat to India. 
The Chiefs of Staff signal of April 23rd giving your views on the 
situation alarmed me considerably. In fact, for the first time since 
this war started, I began to have serious misgivings as to the outcome 
of it. I brought the matter to the notice of the Defence Committee 
here and they agreed this morning to send a signal to the Chiefs 
of Staff giving our views.
3. I hope you will not think we are being “busy” by meddling in 
matters about which the Chiefs of Staff must know much more than 
we do. As I have said, I am seriously perturbed and can not help 
wondering whether the dependence of the Middle East on India, 
strategically and materially, is fully realised at Home. I feel it must 
be, but, all the same, there are elements in the present situation, 
which do not seem to fit with a logical view of it. For instance India 
is still sending fighting troops to the Middle East, which is very 
nice for us but hardly in keeping with her own apparently very 
urgent need for all the trained soldiers she can muster.
4. There are now 82,000 odd Indian soldiers in formations in this 
country and 133,929 others not in formations – a total of 216,270 
or about a quarter of the whole. Of the 14 divisions now under my 
command, 6 are Indian. There is the equivalent of 8 ½ divisions of 
Indian fighting troops in the Middle East. We are still dependent 
on India for great quantities of munitions of all kinds. For instance, 
we drew from her in March about 90,000 tons, including 49,000 
tons of R.E. stores and 10,000 tons of Ordnance stores. We are 
particularly dependent on India for steel.
How it is proposed to replace India as a source of men and 
munitions should she be invaded by the Japanese, I do not know. 
Moreover, what the attitude of the Indian troops will be if this 
situation arises is doubtful, to say the least of it. Magnificently as 
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they have fought till now, often under great handicaps, they may 
not stand the strain of so hard a test on their loyalty, which is, as 
you know, not to England but largely to their officers. I feel that 
these considerations may not have been presented correctly to the 
Chiefs of Staff or the Defence Minister.
I believe myself that there is no shadow of doubt that we cannot 
afford to lose India nor even to contemplate its loss. This I believe 
quite apart from the great uncertainty of our being able to hold 
on to the Middle East if India goes, because of the threat to our 
communications.
5. Our life line here runs through the Indian Ocean from South Africa 
to Suez and from India to Basra and Suez. With the Japanese at 
Colombo and Bombay I wonder how long we should be able to 
supply ourselves and how long it would be before our oil supplies 
from the Persian Gulf were cut off? I quite realise the value of the 
Middle East as a base for a future offensive designed to reopen the 
Mediterranean and to carry the war against Germany into Europe. 
We put this project clearly to the Chiefs of Staff some months 
ago – before Japan had gained her very startling successes against 
us on the sea, on the land and in the air. The situation now has 
completely changed.
6. I feel very strongly that the time has come when we must decide 
what is vital to our continued existence and what is not. We lost 
Singapore and then Burma chiefly, I feel, because we did not or 
could not decide to concentrate our resources on holding what 
really mattered, while letting less important places go. I am not 
presuming to criticise and I know I am being wise after the event, 
but I do hold very strongly that we can no longer afford to dissipate 
our meagre resources in trying to hold everything irrespective of 
its permanent, as opposed to its temporary, value.
7. I may be wrong, but I feel that India is vital to our existence and 
that, once it goes, our hopes of recovery within a reasonable period 
of years are small indeed.
If I had to choose now between losing India and giving up the 
Middle East, I would not hesitate. I believe that we can still hold 
India without the Middle East, but that we can not for long hold 
the Middle East without India.
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8. Do not mistake me. I am not advocating a withdrawal from the 
Middle East. Far from it, and I see no immediate reason for any 
such drastic step, even if you do decide to weaken us to strengthen 
India. Even if we had to leave Egypt after having thoroughly blocked 
the canal, we might well hold on to Iraq and the oil supplies until 
the tide turned.
I assure you I am not in the least defeatist, but I can not help 
trying to see the situation in its true perspective and that is how 
it looks to me.
9. As to our projected offensive in Libya, I fully realise its desir-
ability from the political and strategical point of view, but it must 
be admitted that the material value to be had from it, so far as it 
may affect the course of the war, is small at present. Had Japan 
not entered the war, its affect might have been much greater and, 
ultimately, possibly decisive.
As I have tried to make clear several times before, the success 
of our offensive in Libya depends on our being able to collect 
sufficient tanks to have a reasonable superiority over the enemy, 
and on our being able to keep sufficient air forces on this front to 
give us a reasonable measure of air superiority.
If these two conditions are not fulfilled, the launching of an 
offensive will be an extremely hazardous operation of war. It is 
even more hazardous because of the possibility, which is almost a 
probability, of our having to call a halt to it while still unfinished, 
owing to the materialisation of the threat to our Northern Front.
I do not think myself that we can reasonably expect our advance 
through Cyrenaica to El Agheila to take less than three months. If 
we do not get to El Agheila we can not be sure of holding Cyrenaica, 
this requires no further proof.
If we have to stop our advance while still short of El Agheila, we 
are almost certain to have no choice but to withdraw to Gazala or 
to the positions I have prepared on the frontier about Salum and 
Maddalena. The moral affect of this could hardly be good.
10. We have now got reliable information that by the end of May the 
enemy is likely to have effective for battle, with formations 350 
German tanks and 160 Italian.
So far we have said that, for an offensive, we need a 2:1 superiority 
over the Germans and equality with the Italians. Now because of 
the Grant tank and the six pounder gun which is just coming into 
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service, we are prepared to accept a 3:2 superiority only over the 
Germans. I must stress that there is a considerable risk in this, as 
we shall be attacking and can not guarantee always to induce the 
enemy to fight us on ground of our choosing.
We shall also have I hope about 250 infantry tanks “Valentines” 
and “Matildas” which, though not suitable to join in the armoured 
battle should be of considerable value, if properly used, in making 
the enemy detach some of his fast tanks to watch them and prevent 
them overrunning his infantry.
This should offset the reduced superiority over the German 
tank strength, which we are proposing to accept.
11. There are many other factors of course besides mere numbers of 
tanks – such as the relative strength in anti-tank guns, the efficiency 
of the field artillery and the handling of the supporting infantry, 
but it is almost impossible to assess these and I do not propose to 
try.
12. Let it suffice to say that to offset 360 German and 160 Italian tanks 
we should have about 700 Cruiser tanks, in addition to our infantry 
tanks.
We have now in the forward area three armoured brigades, one 
of which, the 22nd, will not be fit for battle before the middle of 
the month, as it is still doing its collective training. This gives us 
roughly 450 tanks.
The next formation to be ready is the 1st Armoured Brigade, 
just equipped with tanks, but still very short of transport of all 
kinds, which is extremely scarce.
I do not see how this brigade can be ready for battle before the 
15th June.
This would give us about 600185 Cruiser tanks on that date, and 
although this is 30 short of the total required, I would be prepared 
to accept the added risk and launch an offensive with them, particu-
larly as we hope to have good reserves of tanks while the enemy is 
not likely to be so well off.
13. We have as yet no news as to the state of the Italian Littorio armoured 
division. Units of it and its headquarters are in Libya we know, 
185 The figure of 670 was originally given but crossed out and 600 substituted.
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but whether it has any tanks or not we do not know. We hope it is 
merely feeding the Ariete armoured division.
If it does materialise, another 150 or so tanks must be added to 
the enemy strength and this would completely do away with any 
superiority on our part.
14. In my opinion, it would be extremely risky to launch an offensive 
without the requisite superiority in Cruiser tanks. I feel that such 
an attempt might easily result in a stalemate or even in a definite 
reverse, the effect of either would I think be disastrous.
15. I do not wish you to think that I am trying to avoid attacking the 
enemy. Nothing could be further from my desire. I and, so far as 
I know, all the troops, are desperately anxious to get back at him. 
Nevertheless I feel that with so much at stake elsewhere, it is my 
duty to give you the facts as I see them, and I have little doubt that 
you will wish to put them before the Defence Minister.
JRL, AUC 834
186
Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, 3 May 1942
Thank you very much for your approval to the higher war course. 
I am sure it is badly needed and that it will give good value for the 
effort and time which will be expended on it. I am sorry we have 
lost so much time already and I hope there will be no more delay in 
getting it going. I feel every week counts now, and it is desperately 
important to ensure that for the future we shall have leaders and 
senior planning staff officers who have been scientifically trained. 
There are previous few of them now so far as I can see.
2. I regret deeply your decision about not locating the course in the 
Union instead of Palestine, and if I may say so with due respect, 
I think the reasons you give about the aircraft are not really relevant. 
I tried to tell you in my telegram that there are four services a week 
to South Africa from here, two B O A C and two run by the Union, 
which are at their disposal and can not be touched or reduced by 
us, however much we may wish to do so.
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I do not really think that the transport once a month or so of 
the relatively small number of officers affected would have greatly 
strained these services. Had I thought so I would not have suggested 
it. I do feel that Palestine is not a really good location for a course 
of this kind, first because there it is liable to disturbance any day 
or night by air attack, and this whole area may very well become 
a zone of active land operations before the Autumn, and secondly 
because the atmosphere is bound to be a bit parochial and narrow 
I think. However you have considered this objection and given 
your decision and I am carrying it out at once. The course will be 
located at Sarafand in buildings recently vacated by the Weapon 
Training School, which are quite suitable. The climate is good too.
3. As to Dorman Smith, I am sorry about this too as I feel that he has 
the brains, imagination, originality, and energy to give the course 
a good start. He has it all in his head already. As to experience in 
command I am afraid I do not place such a great premium on it as 
you do, and I dare say I am wrong. All the same it is not too easy to 
find commanders of experience in our Army who have the other 
qualities which I consider essential as well. As I told you in my 
signal I would have liked to have put in Messervy,186 who has had 
unique experience in command and also in teaching at the Staff 
College. I felt however I could not take him at this time from his 
division and so had to ask you for a substitute. John Harding would 
have done it I think but I can’t spare him from D.M.T. which he 
is doing splendidly. I have hopes of great results from him. I hope 
you will be able to give me a first rate man and one of those I have 
suggested. A mediocrity would be worse than useless.
4. The problem of higher command on our Northern front is making 
me think a lot. The Air Force have decided to put in an A.O.C. 
over the two local commanders, A.O.C. Levant and A.O.C. Iraq, to 
coordinate the action of aircraft over the whole front. This is right 
I am sure but it at once raises the question of cooperation with the 
Army. This A.O.C. can not be in two places at once and therefore 
can only concert plans in person with one Army Commander (9th 
or 10th) at a time.
It is, of course, supremely important that the two heads, Army and 
Air Force, should live together and have a combined headquarters.
186 Major General Frank Messervy, then commanding 7th Armoured Division.
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There seem to be three possible solutions –
(a) To create an Army Group
(b) To put one Army under the other
(c) To amalgamate the two Armies and have one Army.
An Army Group in addition to the two Armies is out of the 
question at present as we have neither the staff or signals.
To put one Army Commander under the other is a compromise 
and would not, I am afraid, work well in practice.
I believe the solution is to fuse the two Armies into one and have 
their Corps H.Q. one in Syria and one in Northern Iraq, while 
turning lower Iraq into an L of C area under G.H.Q. The L.G.A. 
(Riddell-Webster) is strongly opposed to this on administration 
grounds, but I am not sure that his arguments are altogether sound. 
Anyhow I am examining them. If I feel we must amalgamate the 
two Armies, I would suggest keeping Jumbo Wilson as the Army 
Commander. He knows the whole problem and has a good grasp 
of it. He is keeping fit and his brain is working well. If this should 
happen, Quinan would be out of a job, as I have nothing to offer 
him here. I dare say India could use him.187
I will let you know the results of my further examination of 
this problem.
5. I am sorry you could not agree to my suggestion about Freyberg 
and Morshead188 being raised to Lieutenant Generals.
I want to make it quite clear to you that the suggestion came 
from me and not from either of them.
I made it because I think it highly desirable for political reasons 
to give them the higher rank to bring them more on a level with 
Army and Corps Commanders. They hold an independent position 
here, communicate direct with their own Governments and can say 
“Boo” to me whenever they like!
187 Lieutenant General Edward Quinan, GOC Tenth Army. Quinan was, indeed, to 
see service in India, as Commander North Western Army, before his retirement 
in 1943.
188 Leslie Morshead was an acting Lieutenant General as of March 1942, when 
Lieutenant General Thomas Blamey left the Middle East and Morshead took 
command of all AIF units in the theatre, while remaining GOC 9th Australian 
Division. Morshead was promoted to the substantive rank of lieutenant general 
in September 1942.
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It is to their credit that they rarely do this! They have much 
greater responsibility than the ordinary divisional commander as 
they have large base establishments and training schools to look after.
Moreover their promotion would help us considerably I think 
in our deception plans. There is the point too, that I do not think 
either of them are really competent to command Corps, though 
both are excellent divisional commanders.
If they are not to have Corps, the promotion would be some 
recompense.
Could you reconsider your decision. I believe it would be worth 
it in the interests of the general war effort.
There is no ramp of any sort about my proposal.
6. Scobie,189 my D.A.G. is off Home tomorrow on a liaison visit. I hope 
you can spare him a few minutes, as I believe it would be of value 
to you.
7. I wish most earnestly you could come back here and see things for 
yourself.




Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 5 May 1942
Thank you so much for your letter of the 2nd which I got on my 
return here on the night of the 3rd. You sound terribly busy, and 
I can well realise how difficult it is for you to escape from Cairo.
2. PLANNING.
I held a conference with both Corps Commanders yesterday to go 
further into details of future action and would like to come down 
to Cairo to visit you as early as you can see me. There are certain 
matters I wish very much to discuss if you can spare the time, so 
189 Major General Ronald Scobie.
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I sent a signal to ask if you can see me on the 6th. (I have now got 
your reply and will come 7th)
The enemy’s frontage is getting very extended and I believe this 
is due in no small measure to anxiety on his part concerning our 
threats on his right flank. I believe we can play on this even more, 
and possibly induce him to push further out into the desert in the 
TENGEDER direction.
I am inclined to believe that he is already starting to offer us the 
chance of cutting off, and with luck crushing, his right wing from 
inclusive SEGNALI Southwards. Anyhow there is a good chance 
of this; if not the whole at any rate that portion of his troops – 
at present not much I believe – from ASIDA to TENGEDER. 
Such a situation might give us a first class opening gambit for 
“BUCKSHOT”.
3. GOBI.
Reconnaisances of this area were carried out before with the object 
of establishing a Bde Gp defensive pivot there, and actually I had 
further ones done last week.
I have told Willoughby Norrie that he is to prepare a position 
there, and this can take the form of a training exercise with a Bde 
Gp of 5 Ind Div including an approach and rapid establishment 
of a defensive position.
All will work in well with training, our defence and our cover plan.
4. TOBRUK – ACROMA – EL ADEM – BIRGUBI LINE.
Personally I have always considered the GAZALA – TOBRUK 
– EL ADEM area as one position, and the above line as the most 
rearward defences within it.
As I see the defensive battle we may well find ourselves in a 
situation where the enemy has succeeded in penetrating with an 
armoured force through a portion of our forward defences, and we 
will then be faced with fighting an armoured battle, possibly the 
major one, within our defensive system. In such circumstances the 
garrisons of our forward systems – GAZALA – ALEM HAMZA 
– HACHEIM – will still be holding out, though doubtless a few 
localities may have been overrun.
Provided we win the armoured battle, and about this I feel pretty 
confident, all will be well; and we can turn to the counter offensive 
or, at worst, re-establish ourselves in the GAZALA Position.
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On the other hand, if we are unsuccessful in the armoured 
battle and assuming the enemy is left with a substantial superi-
ority in armour, I doubt whether we could reasonably hold the 
line TOBRUK – ACROMA – EL ADEM – GUBI, unless the 
division from the Frontier is brought up, and even then I doubt 
the outcome. I repeat that such conditions envisage the enemy 
possessing considerable superiority in armour, which to my mind 
implies that we will be in danger of getting ourselves invested in 
TOBRUK.
To summarise:-
(a) Provided we win the armoured battle we can at the worst 
continue to hold the GAZALA – HACHEIM POSITION. At 
best we turn to the offensive. So the problem of the TOBRUK 
– ACROMA – EL ADEM – GUBI line will not arise.
(b) If we lose the armoured battle and, assuming the enemy to be 
materially superior in armour, I believe it would be dangerous 
to stand on this line.
(c) There may be an intermediate set of circumstances. Both we 
and the enemy may lose heavily in armour and a “stalemate” 
situation results. In this case we could certainly hold the 
TOBRUK – GUBI line, but I hope this would not be necessary 
and that we would be able to continue holding GAZALA 
– HACHEIM.
5. STATIC OUTPOSTS.
I believe that your solution about the enemy’s outposts is the right 
one. The situation is, I feel, very similar to the way he held the 
Frontier last year. But I believe he will do all he can to fight his 
main battle quite close up behind these forward elements of his; 
certainly well in advance of the vital ground.
6. 22 Armd Bde.
No. There is really no reason at all why 22 Armd Bde, if I do 
move it up, should not remain under 30 Corps and its own division.
7. DIAMOND “T” TRANSPORTERS.
Yes. The trouble is that the eight-wheeled axles of the power unit 
dig themselves in. I hope to have more details soon.
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At the moment it looks as though the answer might be to add 
a great deal more weight over the driving wheels – somewhere 
about 3 to 4 tons.
These transporters will get tanks across the desert, but very 
slowly and suffering from constant “boggings”. Too slow for tactical 
movement. But we will get over this yet.
8. GUNS FOR ARMD Cs.
The 75 type is the thing, and should fire portée. Always direct, 
I think. No gunner nonsense!
Both Corps Commanders agree to the desirability of this, and 
I believe we can accept a reduction of one troop of Armd Cs per 
sqn to find the requisite personnel. Scale of guns I suggest is one 
per Armd C troop, which will work out at four guns per sqn.
Best organisation probably:-
[Diagram omitted]




Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 7 May 1942
My dear C.I.G.S.
I am afraid I have never answered your letter of the 31st March. 
Thank you very much for it, and for your effort on our behalf. I know 
how difficult it is for you at that end, and you, I think, realise how hard 
it is for us here, and I am most grateful to you for your support and help.
I must say again, however, how difficult it is for me to do my job, 
when the plainest statements are removed from their context and made 
to mean the exact opposite of what was intended. Once more, at the 
risk of being a frightful bore, I do ask you try and ensure that the 
facts are faced, and that the unpalatable as well as the palatable bits 
are considered!
You will know by this time that we can not live up to our “forecasts” 
as you term them. I think that if you will spare a few minutes to read 
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the telegrams in which these “forecasts” are mentioned, you will see 
that we did all in our power to prevent you or anyone else seizing on 
these as firm dates. We have rubbed this in several times since, but 
without much effect apparently. As I say, this sort of thing gets very 
wearing after a time, and is not exactly encouraging or conducive to 
full efficiency!
However, I know how it is with you too. I fully realise how difficult 
a job you have. I learned my lesson when I was Home last July. I hope 
Oliver Lyttelton really is helping; I have a feeling he may be too absorbed 
in his new job to be able to help much. Nye ought to be able to help, as 
I think he does realise conditions out here. Not many others at Home 
do, I am afraid – through no fault of theirs perhaps.
Corbett is doing very well indeed, and has a realistic and up-to-date 
outlook.
I note what you say about Holmes. He has not grumbled, and is doing 
very well. I have not found him lazy.
As for Jumbo, I think he had better stay where he is a bit longer. I have 
thought this over carefully, and I think this is the right course. He knows 
the problem thoroughly and has a wise head. Also, he is very good with 
the French and understands Spears.
The new Minister of State190 arrived yesterday, and has started in to 
work straight away. He has a great deal to learn, but I like him very much.
I wish you could come out here; you would soon see then how things 
are for yourself. Please do not try to make me go Home, as I really can 
not leave this place for long now, and I can add nothing more to what 
I have said already. There is a tremendous amount to be thought over 
and done here, and I find it hard to get time to do it all, even though I 
try to avoid tackling anything but the big jobs.
I hope you are very well.
JRL, AUC 839
190 Richard Casey, who had been Australian Minister to Washington immediately 
prior to taking up the post of Minister of State, resident in Cairo.
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 11 May 1942
I have, since getting back here, been continuing deeply to consider 
the plan for “BUCKSHOT”, and I must confess that there is one 
particular aspect about it which troubles me. I know it will be difficult 
for you to spare the time, but it would help me a very great deal if 
you could give me a short period to discuss this matter when I am 
down for the Army Commanders’ Conference on the 15th or 16th.
2. Personally I have no doubt whatever that the ultimate course the 
plan is to follow, i.e. to cut across CYRENAICA avoiding the 
JEBEL, is the correct one. Also that we must avoid precipitating 
the armoured battle on ground prepared by the enemy and of his 
choice. All will be well, of course, if the enemy reacts rapidly and 
does this before we have to establish our fourth defended locality. 
Once we have to establish the fourth and subsequent localities, 
I have to start weakening the GAZALA – TOBRUK – HACHEIM 
position; before this juncture I can provide garrisons for the localities 
without reducing our strength there.
One point, therefore, about which I am unhappy is that in my 
opinion the GAZALA Position is at rock bottom now and cannot 
be reduced without a grave risk of it not being possible to stop, or 
seriously delay, a determined enemy attack upon it. If the enemy 
attacks in strength, for which we must cater, an appreciable number 
of his tanks will get through. The situation has altered a lot since 
this plan was first mooted. The enemy is much closer up to us now, 
and can therefore put on a “blitz” attack with much less warning 
than before. If we weaken the GAZALA Position there is a risk that 
the enemy’s armour might penetrate to our vitals at TOBRUK and 
No. 4 Fwd Base before our main armoured force could engage.
3. The strength of the GAZALA Position now, and even at the stage 
of establishing defended localities, is the presence of our main 
armoured force ready to crush the enemy’s armour. One may 
hope to position our armour so that it can, while still being able to 
support the most Westerly of the new defended localities, still be 
able to support the GAZALA Position.
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But I believe that there is one very serious weakness in this. 
The enemy will hold the tactical initiative and I consider it will be 
a most dreadfully difficult thing for me to avoid being led up the 
garden path by the enemy if he divides his armour. He will have 
time on his side, and speed of armour too.
A possible picture I see is us, in progress of establishing a 
defended locality at GANIA, while the enemy up to this point 
has not re-acted at all. Then he starts something that gives me 
the impression that he is moving an armoured force S.W. via 
MECHILI and West of the bad-going area on our GANIA post. 
In desert conditions of visibility our Armd Cs in touch with this 
force will be unable to see more than the leading elements. From 
this I certainly will not discover if it is his main force or not. Air 
reconnaissances may give us some indication, but with the dust 
and often poor visibility, one cannot be confident of this. So I feel 
I may well find my self uncertain of what the enemy is doing for 
[some?] 12 hours, possibly as much as 24 hours. He will have got that 
start. On top of this the introduction of the GRANTS inevitably 
materially slows down the moves of our armour.
What I feel is that, if I do find myself in this predicament, 
I am offering the enemy a chance of drawing off my armour to the 
West because I have a hostage to fortune there in the form of a 
defended locality which cannot hold out for more than a limited 
time without support of armour. In this event, my armour would be 
out of supporting distances of the GAZALA Position. Admittedly 
the enemy will have divided his armour but he may well still have 
sufficient to attack the GAZALA Position and beat us to it at a 
time when my armour is unable to intervene.
This I fully realise may never arise. It certainly won’t if the enemy 
re-acts before a fourth defended position has to be established. 
Personally I believe he will re-act because such is his nature, but 
I cannot see that we are forcing him to do so. This we won’t do 
until we are in a position to threaten his main L. of C. in Western 
CYRENAICA. This cannot happen for some time, i.e. until we 
have established a defended post at GANIA.
I must be prepared with a plan in case he does not re-act early, 
and I do NOT want to go on extending our commitment into the 
desert, weakening GAZALA and presenting our armour with a 
task beyond their capabilities, which I believe this to be.
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So I definitely do not want to establish a fourth defended locality 
unless the enemy has re-acted either by:-
(a) having attacked us and suffered a serious defeat to his 
armour;
or (b) without having first seriously fought, has moved the 
main portion of his armour West of a North and South 
line through MECHILI.
4. I am convinced that we must do all we can to provoke the armoured 
battle early in the proceedings and as far East as possible. While 
I realise that we cannot in the estimated balance of tank strengths 
advance and attack him in his own prepared ground, I feel equally 
convinced that in this desert the attacker has a tremendous advantage 
over the defender. I would therefore prefer not to be rigidly 
committed at this stage to the establishment of further localities.
5. To conclude, what I ask is that, should the enemy NOT re-act early 
and fight, I may be left a free hand after the establishment of “A”, 
“B” and “C” localities to take such action as I calculate will cause 
him to do so, while still maintaining the principle of establishing 
further localities at a suitable time.
You will have got my signal about alterations in our disposi-
tions. There have been no grand indications today to confirm his 
anticipated action, but there has been over these last few days a 




Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 12 May 1942
1. You will have read by now the J.I.C. paper on IMMEDIATE 
ENEMY INTENTIONS, which was sent up to you this morning. 
I think the evidence is sufficiently strong to support the conclusion 
that the enemy intends to carry out offensive operations in the near 
future.
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2. I feel that the move forward of Battle Headquarters Panzer Army 
and Africa Corps and the artillery shoots close to the South African 
front are other significant factors.
3. As regards the timing for an attack, there are indications that he 
would still like another week or two, but I know you agree with me 
that one cannot take any chances in this respect. Even though he 
may have planned zero day early in June, moves on our part might 
well force him to start sooner.
4. We have been giving a lot of thought to what plan the enemy may 
adopt. I realise you will have been doing the same, but feel you 
may like to hear the conclusions we have reached.
I feel that the enemy may carry out one of the following two 
plans:-
(a) Make his main attack against 1st South African Bde and then 
go for TOBRUK, but moving first against HACHEIM as 
a diversion, in the hope of drawing off our main armoured 
forces to the Southward.
(b) To feint and exert pressure on the Northern portion of your 
front, and make the first stage of his main attack the capture 
of the HACHEIM area, after which he will use this as a base 
to assist his attack on TOBRUK.
For either of the above plans he will also do all he can to disrupt 
our communications and our system of command and supply 
by making the most ruthless and determined attacks by highly 
specialised troops on headquarters, aerodromes and vital points 
on our lines of communication.
5. The following precautions strike me as being important in meeting 
such an attack:-
(a) Strictest orders to be issued that troops in position stay and 
fight in their positions, even though they may be cut off for 
a day or two.
(b) Adequate reserves of ammunition, food and water to be made 
available in the weapon pits and alongside the guns.
(c) A good alarm system to be established in rear areas.
(d) Our main armour to be positioned so that it can compete 
with either plan of attack.
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I have no doubt you have already dealt with all these points, and 
many others which I am not competent to consider.
6. I am disturbed at the lack of information we get from the air of 
the enemy’s strength and disposition behind his forward positions. 
I know any Tac R is immediately pounced upon by enemy aircraft, 
but I am wondering whether it is not worth while laying on a really 
big show with the maximum fighter cover. I look on this as very 
important indeed. We must know what he is doing with the mass 
of his armour.
7. I have ordered the 3rd Indian Motor Bde to move to MATRUH, 
and 10 Motor Bde to EL ACROMA, so as to strengthen the defence 
of your L of C.
8. We are trying a new way of getting information out of P.W. 
RUDOLF. I feel sure he knows something about the enemy’s 
future plans.
9. There is one other matter which I feel may need attention, though 
I daresay you have already dealt with it thoroughly, as is your habit.
It is the behaviour of troops and transport in rear areas when 
they hear that the enemy is supposed to have “Broken through”. 
I remember the tendency to panic and dash wildly to the rear 
when the Germans went for SOLLUM last November. True, it 
was mostly transport and so-called non-combatants who were 
affected, but the general result was pretty bad, I think. The exact 
opposite should be the case. Anyone who has a weapon should 
go to meet the enemy, not run away from him, while transport 
carrying much-needed supplies for the troops in front must also 
go forward, using due caution, and join the units dependent on it. 
I hope you will agree with the general principle underlying this, 
and see that it is enforced. Battle discipline must be enforced, and 
enforced ruthlessly. The German relies on causing panic, and we 
must prevent it.
10. I need not stress the need for the most thorough defence of all 
headquarters, and particularly, of course, your own, even at the 
risk of some increased discomfort. If necessary headquarters must 
be moved into areas where they are automatically protected by the 
presence of fighting troops unlikely to be moved. You will of course 
see that protective troops turn out frequently for practice alarms.
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I am sorry to stress these obvious precautions, but I feel that 
some of our commanders may be too happy-go-lucky in these 
matters, and apt to regard the hunting about of headquarters 
by the enemy as rather a joke! It is not the actual commanders I 
am worried about so much (though I should hate to lose any of 
them!!) as the absolute necessity for maintaining the system of 
command in running order. Naturally the closer you can be to the 
command of your striking force the better, and I understand you 
have arranged for this.
11. One other matter, and that is the need for hitting back at once 
with whatever may be available, as soon as the enemy’s main line 
of attack is known. There should be lots of chances of getting in 
on his tail, and subordinate commanders on the spot must take 
the initiative and go in on their own with the object of causing the 
utmost destruction behind the main thrust, and thus delaying it 
and eventually bringing it to a halt for want of nourishment. This, 
too, I am sure you have rubbed in to all concerned.
12. Finally, the need for being ready down to the last button for the 
counterstroke we have discussed before. The more this can be 
considered, discussed and gone over on the ground the better, 
I feel.
13. On reading this over I feel you may think I am not trusting you, and 
trying to teach you your job. You know me well enough, I hope, to 
know that this isn’t so! If you do feel this way however – you must 
say so!!
I have told the C.I.G.S. that if the enemy attacks us, we would 
welcome it, as he would be playing our game, so you must excuse any 
apparent over-anxiety on my part to see that we take full advantage 
of his temerity. I am sure you will.
JRL, AUC 844
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 12 May 1942
Very many thanks for your letter of the 11th (DO/70/6) just 
received.
Have written you a long and grandmotherly (I am sorry to say!) 
epistle about possible enemy action. Hope you won’t mind my 
having done so. I am only out to help in any way I can!
2. Of course I will give you all the time you want to discuss 
BUCKSHOT. You and I and Tom Corbett will go into secret 
session – no one else – so we can talk as freely as we like and no 
record!
3. I see your difficulty very clearly. I have always seen it, and it is of 
course the weak spot in the plan. But few plans are without one 
weak spot, and we must hope for the best when the time comes.
4. I can assure you that I will not tie you down to any premature 
action in establishing a fourth locality. We must be guided by the 
situation at the time. This came out quite clearly in the small war 
game we played here.
JRL, AUC 845
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 13 May 1942
I had hoped that I should be able to send you by Liaison Officer 
today my full appreciation of what I consider to be the enemy’s likely 
intentions and actions in my area, and the course that I recommend 
should be adopted to counter these. But I feel that I would like to 
get all the facts marshalled before sending this, and it would not 
be completed in detail until tonight. I will therefore bring it down 
myself tomorrow, or, if I am unable to come myself, by hand of 
another officer who will be in possession of the necessary facts to 
discuss this with you if you can see him.
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2. MAIN FEATURE OF THE APPRECIATION.
In the existing comparative strength of our own and enemy tanks 
I feel that we are in a position now, and this position will improve 
daily, of being able thoroughly to defeat the enemy’s armour forward, 
i.e. forward of the frontier position. But the achievement of this 
will, I appreciate, be a long drawn out struggle, and it is, in my 
opinion, dependent on three things:-
(a) Water. We must secure for our own use all water points from 
inclusive GAZALA to exclusive BARDIA. Equally we must 
prevent the enemy capturing for his use any of these water 
points plus the BARDIA water source, the water in storage 
in the Frontier boxes and the source at BUQ BUQ.
(b) Aerodromes. It is essential that we secure our aerodromes in 
the area between GAMBUT and exclusive BARDIA, thus 
preventing the enemy from neutralising our air effort.
(c) TOBRUK. We must ensure that this is absolutely secure and 
that the reserves of water and supplies there and in No. 4 
Fwd Base are not in danger. To do this we must be quite 
certain that no seaborne or airborne attack on TOBRUK itself 
succeeds, and we must equally be sure that we can hold the 
enemy on the line ACROMA – EL ADEM to give depth to 
our defensive system.
My maintenance situation is such that I have sufficient reserves 
in TOBRUK and No. 4 Fwd Base to enable me to fight an intensive 
battle forward for a period of not less than three weeks. These 
reserves exist there now and their quantity will increase daily as 
time goes on.
I do not consider that at present, particularly in view of the 
likelihood of air and seaborne attack, that I am really secure in 
TOBRUK, and this I can only be if I can produce another two 
Bde Gps for this purpose. These additional troops I can only find 
from 5 Ind Div, whose task is, as you know, to secure the Frontier 
positions in the event of serious attack upon us.
I do not feel that there is any real danger of my getting bottled up 
in TOBRUK because I am quite convinced that we can break our 
way out without difficulty provided we do not get into TOBRUK 
itself with our main forces and keep the enemy at a distance from 
the South and S.E. faces of it.
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3. POLICY.
I am of course not quite completely in the picture of your calls 
elsewhere, calls which may make this plan of mine too risky. I feel 
that if we can defeat the enemy forward, and this I believe to be 
quite possible, it does not matter if my L. of C. is cut for a time; it 
will not seriously prejudice the main battle if the enemy gets a large 
raiding force into the CAPUZZO R.H. area, it will not be disastrous 
if he interferes with our communications at MATRUH. I therefore 
feel that the best employment for the 5 Ind Div is [Annotation: 
I never told him to do this did I.] to strengthen our defences of the 
aerodrome areas, TOBRUK and EL ADEM. This will, of course, 
mean a major change of policy, involving your releasing me from 
the obligation to secure the Frontier positions while fighting the 
battle forward. I.e. keeping one division there.
4. I am of course taking no action in regard to these points, other 
than to have my reconnaissances carried out so that they may be 
effected quickly, until I hear whether you approve. The above is 
naturally only a very brief outline in which I have attempted to 
explain briefly the main issue.
5. I was very glad to get your special wire concerning the dispositions 
of the 1 Armd Div, because it showed me that I was thinking on the 
same lines as you. Their concentration forward will be completed 
by the evening of the 16th.
JRL, AUC 849
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 16 May 1942
Our conversations and discussions yesterday and the day before 
have assured me that you have a grip on the situation, and know 
how to deal with it, whether the enemy attacks us or we carry our 
offensive against him.
2. I feel that you have our offensive plan firmly in your mind, and 
that you will be able to exploit the opportunities it is likely to offer 
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you to the fullest possible extent. It is a thoroughly flexible plan, 
and this is its strongest point.
3. By establishing yourself round the enemy’s SOUTHERN flank 
you at once begin the encircling process, which the German seems 
to dislike so much. When and how far you can continue this envel-
opment after the first phase must depend on how the enemy reacts 
to it. I do not think this is really a weakness of the plan, although 
at first sight it may seem to be. Having got your forward pivot of 
manoeuvre you are at liberty to threaten SEGNALI, MECHILI 
or even BENGHASI from it.
4. In order to turn your initial move to the best advantage, it is essential 
that you should have the best possible information of the enemy, 
and you must insist on the R.A.F. making the maximum effort to 
give you this. I realise the difficulties as pointed out by Coningham 
last night, and I am sure he will do everything he can to surmount 
them.
In addition you must, and I am sure you will, make the boldest 
use of ground reconnaissance of all kinds, and particularly of 
officer patrols, to find out the position and movements of the 
enemy armoured forces. It is not too much to say that the fate of 
your battle will depend on the receipt by you of early, accurate and 
continuous news of the enemy, and this is worth running any risks 
to obtain. I know you are in full agreement with me on this point.
5. I feel myself, and I feel it even more strongly after hearing your 
views, that the enemy’s extreme NORTHERN flank may well 
prove to be a weak joint in his defence, and that the most careful 
and thorough plans should be made to take advantage of this should 
opportunity offer.
6. Although our action after you have established your initial group of 
defended localities may depend partly on the enemy’s reaction to 
this move, this need not prevent you, I think, from thinking ahead 
and keeping always in view the main aim of the offensive action, 
which is to threaten BENGHASI. Every effort should, I feel, be 
made to effect this aim, consistent of course with the principle of 
concentrating your striking force in the area where it is likely to 
be most needed, and whence it can strike at the enemy should he 
attempt to disrupt our plans by a counter offensive directed against 
our rear areas. I believe that a lot can be done with light forces, 
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which can evade the enemy if heavily attacked and yet keep him 
on tenterhooks and so force him to attack our main concentration.
7. We are both pretty sure now that the enemy intends to forestall our 
offensive by launching an attack of his own, and that this is likely 
to happen with the next ten days or so. From what we know of his 
plans and preparations, it seems as if his attack, if it does materialise, 
will be determined and heavy, with the object of inflicting a severe 
reverse on us and capturing TOBRUK, as a prelude to a further 
advance against EGYPT. I feel content that your dispositions and 
plans, as explained to me yesterday by you, are adequate to meet 
this attack, and I have no doubt that you will defeat the enemy 
heavily.
As you will realise, it is of the utmost importance that you should 
be able to turn from the defensive to the offensive, immediately the 
opportunity offers, and it is absolutely essential that you should be 
able to carry your counter-offensive to the maximum depth into 
the enemy’s position, and then turn it into a pursuit.
Plans for this counter-offensive and pursuit must be prepared 
with the greatest care, and be capable of translation into immediate 
action. Any delay or hesitation may rob us of a decisive victory. 
I know you are well aware of this, and I am sure you will see that 
all your commanders realise it too, and at once.
All commanders must be impressed with the supreme need for 
speed and vigour in following up the enemy, and giving him no 
respite. A large proportion of his force is Italian, and once he starts 
to go back, the greatest risks are justified to keep him on the run. 
We know ourselves how difficult it is to stop a pursuing enemy who 
holds the initiative and exploits it with boldness.
8. One last word in connection with a possible counter-offensive.
I think myself that any advance by us in pursuit of the enemy 
should be on a two corps front and not placed under one commander. 
The second course is, I feel, likely to result in lack of flexibility 
and to undue centralisation of control at headquarters of the Army. 
I wonder if you agree with me.
JRL, AUC 854
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   415 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
416
194
Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 19 May 1942
One (.) My intention is to carry out the instructions in paragraph two 
of your message of May 10/2 (.)
Two (.) I am assuming that your telegram is NOT meant to imply that 
all that is required is an operation designed solely to provide a distraction 
to help the MALTA convoy but that the primary object of an offensive 
in LIBYA is still to be the destruction of the enemy forces and the 
occupation of CYRENAICA as a step towards the eventual expulsion 
of the enemy from LIBYA (.) If I am wrong in this assumption then I 
should be so informed at once as plans for a major offensive differ entirely 
from those designed merely to produce a distraction (.) I am proceeding 
as if my assumption is RIGHT (.)
Three (.) Assuming that a major offensive is to be carried out but 
that its inception must be so timed as to provide distraction to help the 
MALTA convoy the actual moment of the launching of the offensive 
will be governed by three consideration (:) first the sailing date of the 
convoy (,) second enemy action between now and then (,) third the 
relative air strength of the enemy and ourselves (.) All these are under 
close and continuous examination here (.)
Four (.) There are strong signs that the enemy intends to attack us 
in the immediate future (.) If he does attack our future action must 
be governed by the results of the battle and can not be forecast now (.)
Five (.) Assuming that the enemy does not attack us first it is my 
intention that General RITCHIE shall launch his offensive in LIBYA 
on the date which will best fit with the object of providing the maximum 
distraction for the MALTA convoy (,) and at the same time (,) ensure 
the fullest degree of readiness in the forces carrying out the offensive (.) 
These considerations are mutually conflicting as you will realise and 
entail a certain degree of compromise which it will be my responsibility 
in consultation with the other Commanders-in-Chief to determine (.) 
The importance of avoiding an abortive attack has already been fully 
set out in No. CC/36 of 6 May from Commanders-in-Chief to Chiefs 
of Staff and does NOT need further explanation from me (.)
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Six (.) In conclusion may I ask your consideration of the fact that owing 
to the narrowness of our margin of superiority over the enemy both on 
the land and in the air (,) the success of a major offensive can NOT be 
regarded as in any way certain (,) though everything will be done to make 
it as certain as possible (.) In any event success is NOT likely to be rapid 
or spectacular as progress will probably have to be methodical owing to 
the special nature of this problem (.)
Seven (.) I feel therefore that it is of the greatest importance that in 
the first instance NO publicity at all should be given to our intention to 
carry out a major offensive even after it has been launched (.) Still less 
should the public be led to hope for a speedy and striking success (.)
Eight (.) This telegram has been seen by the Minister of State, 
Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and Air Officer Commanding-
in-Chief who agree with it (.)
JRL, AUC 857
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 19 May 1942
Thank you so much for your letter DO/PSC/11 of 16 May, which 
I was delighted to receive.
2. RECONNAISSANCE.
Photographic air recce is at last beginning to bear fruit and good 
results last night from careful interpretation show 150 Tanks, with 
over 800 M.T., in the area GABR EL ALMEIMA U.79 – BIR ES 
SFERI U.67. There is probably more M.T. and the whole concen-
tration represents, I appreciate, the equivalent of one division. 
There may be more outside the area covered by the photographs. 
We have already got the country to the East or this covered, but 
interpretation is not yet complete.
I arranged yesterday for special officers’ patrols to go in behind 
the enemy positions to get information. This will be done either by 
parties in to lie up, and/or to send up a couple of individuals into 
the enemy’s position in daylight in a captured German vehicle. The 
latter is the better, and I believe they could drive about picking up 
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all sorts of information and get away with it. Anyhow, it is worth 
trying.
3. PLANNING.
Directly after getting back I had a Conference with Corps 
Commanders and gave them the policy which is:-
(a) The Battle of the GAZALA – HACHEIM Position.
(b) Turning to the offensive during (a).
(c) “BUCKSHOT”.
This is the order in which the planning must go and in this priority. 
(b) and (c) go more or less together.
4. TURNING TO THE OFFENSIVE.
This either starts with “BUCKSHOT” or, if the enemy attacks 
first, at some time during the course of the battle of the GAZALA 
– HACHEIM Position. In the former case – “BUCKSHOT” – we 
have to create the situation which causes the enemy to sally forth 
and attack us on ground of our choosing. In the latter case the 
enemy will have done this for us.
In both sets of circumstances, once the enemy has attacked, 
our action either to resume or to turn to the offensive, has much 
in common.
All the possibilities are being investigated, including driving 
through towards TMIMI, and possibly MECHILI too, with the 
object of severing the enemy’s communications with his main supply 
bases on the JEBEL and forcing him into the desert. These plans 
must include a large scale raiding force – basis a motor Bde Gp – 
to be directed either on to Western CYRENAICA or possibly as a 
first step to threaten MECHILI from the West. I would, however, 
make it clear that whatever the course adopted we must stick to 
the plan of developing the Desert Route and the railway must be 
constructed across it.
As I told the Corps Commanders, our whole attitude, and this 
attitude is to permeate through the Army, is that if the enemy should 
attack this is indeed the chance for which we have been praying 
and preparing; the chance to thrash him on our own ground and 
then turn to the offensive.
I believe there will be no lack of speed in getting ourselves on 
the move forward once the chance occurs.
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5. ENEMY INTENTIONS.
Most secret sources reaching me last night give the impression that 
he is pressing on all he can with his preparations. Almost indecently 
speedy, I think! This implies some fixed target date which cannot 
be altered. This may be to coincide with operations in Russia, but 
that date might be changed. What cannot be changed is the moon, 
so I believe his attack will come between the 25th May and 1st June.
There is no doubt that his plans involve land, sea and airborne 
operations in conjunction with one another, but it is mighty difficult 
to come to any very concrete decision respecting the scale of attack 
of the last two – sea and airborne.
Also, I feel, there are stronger and stronger indications that 
TOBRUK is to be the main objective. Further, I think there are 
indications – demands for more assault boats and the like – which 
show a greater possibility of an attack on GAZALA and a thrust 
on TOBRUK by the Coast. Not that this need be of necessity his 
main effort; I think he would go along the top of the escarpment 
too if he could. Anyhow, I had a real good look at that part of the 
area yesterday, and feel quite happy about it. The key of course 
is the top of the escarpment above GAZALA and this the South 
Africans fully appreciate.
6. TWO CORPS FRONT FOR COUNTER OFFENSIVE.
You raise this in the last paragraph of your letter. I would prefer 
not to be committed. If I am to strike deeply into enemy territory 
I must eliminate every useless mouth. For this reason it might 
well pay me to have one L. of C. only. Two Corps would tend to 
get in each other’s way on one L. of C. and two corps mean more 
overheads. These are reasons in favour of following up with one 
Corps whilst using the other to make good in rear.
You mention “lack of flexibility” and “undue centralisation”. 
I think these can be overcome if one gives the Corps Commander a 
directive on policy and leaves him to run it. These were the lines on 
which Jumbo Wilson worked with Dick O’Connor so successfully.
However, I am keeping an open mind and having the various 
possibilities examined.
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I have just had BRIGGS191 into see me and it is good to have 
him back again. He knows just what is needed here. The enemy 
seems to be getting very large tonnage through BENGHASI. I will 
discuss this with D.M.I.
McCreery told me that you were anxious about the armoured 
disposition as given. So was I. At the Corps Com[ma]nd[e]rs 
Conference I asked Norrie to explain them. I am glad to say he 
prefaced his remarks by saying that he’d ordered repositioning to 
take place which fitted in exactly with what I wanted. The whole 
show is far more in hand now.
JRL, AUC 859
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Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 20 May 1942
One. Your paragraph 2. Your interpretation of the instructions contained 
in my OZ/192 of May 10 is absolutely correct. We feel that the time 
has come for a trial of strength in CYRENAICA and that the survival 
of MALTA is involved.
Two. The greatest care will be taken to prevent newspaper speculation 
here about attacks either way in CYRENAICA. If and when a battle 
begins public will merely be informed heavy fighting is in progress. 
You must impose the same restriction at your end and we can consult 
together about any definite pronouncement.
Three. Of course we realise that success cannot be guaranteed. There 
are no safe battles. But whether this one arises from an enemy attack 
and your forestalling or manoeuvring counter stroke, or whether it has 
to be undertaken by you on its own, we have full confidence in you and 
your glorious Army, and whatever happens we will sustain you by every 
means in our power.
Four. I should personally feel even greater confidence if you took direct 
command yourself as in fact you had to do at SIDI REZEGH. On this 
however I do not press you in any way.
191 Brigadier Raymond Briggs, commanding 2nd Armoured Brigade.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   420 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
421
Five. Ought not the New Zealand Division to be nearer the battle 
front? If you want any help in dealing with the New Zealand Government 
pray refer to me.
JRL, AUC 860
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 20 May 1942
I am sending you this by Corbett, as I feel that you should know 
how I think the enemy may attack you. I have had my ideas put on 
the enclosed maps in order to make them clearer.
Corbett is thoroughly in my mind, and can explain any doubtful 
point to you.
Do not think I am trying to dictate to you in any way, but this 
coming struggle is going to be so vital that I feel that you must have 
the benefit of our combined consideration here, though I realise 
we can not be so conversant with the details of the problem as are 
you and your staff.
2. As you already know, I feel that there are two main courses open 
to the enemy:-
(i) To envelop our SOUTHERN flank, seizing or masking BIR 
HACHEIM en route and then driving on TOBRUK. This 
would probably be accompanied by a strong diversion with 
plenty of artillery, dive bombers and smoke against your 
NORTHERN flank, aided possibly by landings from small 
craft in rear of the GAZALA inlet, with a view eventually to 
clearing the coast road to TOBRUK.
(ii) To put a very heavy attack on a narrow front with tanks, 
artillery, dive bombers, smoke and lorried infantry against 
the centre of the main position, with the object of driving 
straight on TOBRUK. This would probably be helped by a 
feint against BIR HACHEIM in which the Italian tanks might 
well be used with the aim of drawing off the main body of 
your armour to the SOUTH, and so leaving the way open 
for the main thrust.
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This course would also almost certainly include an attack 
from the sea round about GAZALA for the same object as 
before.
3. I feel that the second course is the one he will adopt, and that it 
is certainly the most dangerous to us, as if it succeeds it will cut 
our forces in half and probably result in the destruction of the 
NORTHERN part of them.192 We must of course be ready to deal 
with the enemy should he adopt the first course, and in either event, 
you must of course be most careful not to commit your armoured 
striking force until you know beyond reasonable doubt where the 
main body of his armour is thrusting.
4. Now, as to the method I think he is likely to adopt, to put the second 
course into effect.
I believe he will try to put the main body of his armour through 
our front on both sides of the GADD EL AHMAR ridge, which, as 
you know, runs more or less EAST and WEST along the boundary 
between the 1st S.A. and 50th Divs. This attack will be supported 
by every kind of weapon, including especially dive bombers and 
anti-tank artillery. It will be pushed relentlessly on a narrow front.
As we agreed the other day, it is likely that such an attack will 
break through in spite of our mine fields. Let us assume that it 
does break through on a comparatively narrow front.
I think that then he will immediately put out defensive flanks, 
taking full advantage of the main coastal escarpment to the NORTH, 
and of the escarpment which runs along the TRIGH CAPUZZO to 
the SOUTH. If he can get his anti-tank and other artillery protected 
by infantry established on these escarpments, he will have established 
a corridor which may be difficult to cut, especially for your armour 
if it is positioned as at present, somewhat far to the SOUTH.
Having secured his flank, he will drive in on TOBRUK, assisted 
almost certainly by parachute attacks on the place itself and the 
troops guarding the entrances, and, possibly, also by landings from 
the sea which may be supported by naval bombardment.
At the same time he may try to open the GAZALA defile for 
the passage of M.T. and troops by landings from assault boats 
EAST of it.
192 Rommel’s offensive, commencing on 26 May, developed more in line with the 
scenario Auchinleck outlined in 2(i).
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As I have already said, this main attack will almost certainly be 
accompanied by a strong and resolute feint against BIR HACHEIM, 
which will develop into a real attack if it has any initial success.
5. I know that you have taken and are taking numerous measures to 
meet an eventuality such as I have described, but I must tell you that, 
speaking from an office chair at a great distance from the battlefield, 
I wonder whether you should not put your armoured reserve a good 
deal further to the NORTH where it can hit the enemy immediately 
he emerges from his break through, and before he can establish a 
defensive flank, which all our experience teaches us he will certainly 
try to do. I suggest that both your armoured divisions complete 
should be positioned astride the TRIGH CAPUZZO. It does not 
look from the map as is this would be too far NORTH to meet the 
main attack should it come round the SOUTHERN flank, instead 
of against the centre as I anticipate. Your covering troops should 
give you good warning of any main enveloping movement on your 
left, even if you do not hear of it before it starts.
As always, the difficulty will be to decide which is the real attack, 
and which the feint.
6. I feel that your reaction to my suggestion that you should put 
your armour more behind the centre of your position will be that 
your SOUTHERN flank will be left bare of any mobile troops to 
delay and harass the enemy, and also of any armoured units to give 
immediate support to the Free French. I propose to send you at 
once the 3rd Indian Motor Bde, which, though not absolutely fully 
equipped, is fit for battle. I suggest you might like to keep this on 
your SOUTHERN flank, and that they will obviate any need to 
leave either of the motor Bdes of the two armoured divisions in this 
area. I consider it to be of the highest importance that you should 
not break up the organisation of either of the armoured divisions. 
They have been trained to fight as divisions, I hope, and fight as 
divisions they should. Willoughby Norrie must handle them as 
a Corps Commander, and thus be able to take advantage of the 
flexibility which the fact of having two formations gives him.
Moreover, you will be getting the 1st Armoured Brigade before 
long, and it should join the 7 Armd Div, I feel, thus making both 
divisions similar.
As regards armoured support for the French, I suggest that if 
you move your armoured divisions further NORTH you might 
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spare some infantry tanks for them. I am sending you up as soon 
as possible the 7th R Tanks, with one Valentine squadron of the 4th 
R Tanks and two Matilda squadrons of its own, to increase your 
force of infantry tanks.
As to the rest of the infantry tanks, I suggest that if possible 
they should be placed so as to support the infantry in that part of 
the position which is likely to bear the brunt of the enemy attack. 
I admit that this may be uneconomical, as tending to immobilise 
them, but I feel that it is essential to give this infantry all possible 
support in order to encourage them to hang on. It is of the highest 
importance that they should hold on whatever happens. I will be 
glad if you will consider this also.
7. If you can stop the enemy short of TOBRUK and then get at him 
in flank with your armour and in rear with infantry and guns, I feel 
you may have the chance of scoring a decisive success.
I think, therefore, that you should at once lay minefields across the 
corridor between the two escarpments to the WEST of ACROMA, 
and cover these with guns. You will see from the sketch what I mean.
I suggest also that you should consider mining the coastal corridor 
also in more depth, so as to stop any breakthrough by that route, 
which, though it might not be serious, would be a serious nuisance 
and divert effort from the main task of destroying once and for all 
the enemy’s armour.
8. Finally, I suggest that you should fortify EL GUBI and protect it 
with mines. I am sure you will feel much more comfortable when you 
have something there threatening any wide turning movement from 
the SOUTH against TOBRUK or from the EAST against SALUM, 
unlikely as this may seem to be. I know you want to keep 5th Indian 
Div as compact and uncommitted as possible for use as in a mobile 
role, should opportunity offer, either under Gott or under yourself. 
I am absolutely certain that this is right. I am sending you, therefore, 
at once the 11th Inf. Bde of 4th Indian Div to replace 29th Inf Bde 
in CAPUZZO, in case you still feel you need another Bde there as 
well as the 2nd Free French Bde. If you don’t so much the better, 
as you might then relieve the 9th Inf Bde of the 5th Indian Div in 
TOBRUK, and so increase your mobile reserve. You could then use 
a brigade of the 5th Indian Div for EL GUBI if you feel so inclined.
The 11th Inf Bde is NOT mobile, and I do not want it committed 
forward of SALUM unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. I am 
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bringing the whole of 10th Indian Div from IRAQ , and the leading 
brigade will be sent up to you as soon as it arrives in relieve of 11th 
Inf Bde, which I shall then hope to get back here, as it is part of 
the garrison allotted to CYPRUS.
9. I am also bringing from SYRIA the Guides Cavalry (armoured 
cars and wheeled carriers) which I will give you if you want them 
to replace a battle-worn unit, or for the pursuit which I hope to 
see you carrying out.
10. I suggest that you must reorganise your system of command for 
this battle. For a defensive battle I feel you must have your mobile 
reserve, that is, your armoured force, freed from all static commit-
ments and responsibilities. Your Army falls, as I see it, into two 
parts, one whose task it to hold the fort, which is the GAZALA 
– TOBRUK – EL GUBI – EL HACHEIM quadrilateral, and the 
other whose task it is to hit the enemy wherever he may thrust and 
destroy him. I think GOTT should be solely responsible for the 
first, and NORRIE for the second. I would relieve the latter of all 
responsibility for BIR HACHEIM at once.
I hope you will agree to this, as I think it is of first importance.
11. I am sorry to have inflicted such a long letter on you, but as I said 
before, so much hangs on this battle that I feel nothing must be 
left undone by anyone to help win it.
As you know, I have absolute confidence in you and your troops, 
and I am sure that if the enemy attacks, you will deal him a blow 
which he may find it difficult, if not impossible, to recover.
That is the object.
JRL, AUC 861
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Auchinleck to Winston Churchill, 22 May 1942
ONE. Thank you very much for your telegram of May 21st and for 
confirmation of your instructions contained in your message of May 
10th. I am now absolutely clear as to my task and I will do my utmost to 
accomplish it to your satisfaction.
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TWO. Thank you too for your arrangements regarding publicity which 
will be scrupulously followed by me here.
THREE. Am most grateful for your most generous expression of 
confidence in the army I command and in myself and for the assurance 
of your support, the measure of which has been proved to us so often 
and so amply in the past.
FOUR. Much as I would like to take command personally in LIBYA I 
feel that it would NOT be the right course to pursue. I have considered 
the possibility most carefully and have concluded that it would be most 
difficult for me to keep a right sense of proportion if I became immersed 
in tactical problems in LIBYA. I feel that a situation may arise almost at 
any time when I shall have to decide whether I can continue to reinforce 
and sustain the 8th Army without serious hindrance, or whether I must 
hold back and consider the building up of our NORTHERN front, 
which I am now weakening in order to give General RITCHIE all the 
help possible. On the balance I think my place is here but you can rely 
on me I hope to adapt myself to the situation and to take hold if need 
arises. I am in very close touch with General RITCHIE and he is fully 
in my mind. I hope all will be well.
FIVE. I have considered fully the desirability of bringing the New 
Zealand division out of SYRIA into EGYPT. Apart from the political 
aspect, which I am sure you could settle as you so kindly offer to do, there 
are other considerations. I am loath to denude SYRIA of troops just now, 
partly because of the uneasy political situation in the country itself, and 
partly because of the possible effect on the TURKS, of whose attitude I 
am NOT too sure. I feel they mean well, but circumstances may be too 
strong for them, and it is most important that they should NOT get the 
idea that we are weakening or becoming unable to support them. I am 
already bringing 10th Indian Division, a well-trained formation, from 
IRAQ to reinforce 8th Army should need arise, and have meanwhile sent 
up a brigade of 4th Indian Division as an interim reinforcement. With 
these reinforcements the 8th Army will about reach saturation point so 
far as power to provide the army with food and WATER is concerned. 
WATER especially is a very serious problem. Moreover the N Z division 
has been severely denuded by the government of senior officers who are 
needed to command newly-raised troops in NEW ZEALAND, and it is 
now training officers to replace these. I am watching the whole situation 
very closely, and IF I have to put the rest of 4th Indian Division into 
CYPRUS to provide against a possible threat to the island, I should 
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probably have to bring the N Z Division down to EGYPT, but I would 
rather NOT move it at present.
SIX. Once more I thank you for your most sustaining message. There 
will be hard fighting, as there was before. I have great confidence in our 
troops and in our dispositions. I have a firm hope of victory and pray 
that it may lead to greater things.
JRL, AUC 865
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 23 May 1942
I hope that CORBETT’S visit here has eased your mind in regard 
to the positioning of the armour and the roles that have been 
allotted to them. I am extremely sorry that you should have been 
exercised in your mind about this on account of the fact that the 
exact positioning had not been accurately given. You have so many 
things other than this to worry about. The mistake was, I feel, due 
to McCREERY being given some wrong information from the 
map board here.
2. APPRECIATION.
All the indications are I think that we may expect him to attack 
very shortly. Ground observation, confirmed by air photography 
yesterday, shows that three “F” lighters were in BOMBA. They 
would not be there for supply purposes; they would not be sent 
there for practising seaborne operations; they would not be sent 
there long before they were needed to be used. All these pointers 
to seaborne operations starting fairly soon. On the other hand they 
were not loaded, which is strange were they going to carry tanks, 
for these I think they would probably load at DERNA and only 
move them forward to BOMBA at the last possible moment. They 
may of course be a “plant”!
There is more activity on the German “Y” this morning though 
little ground activity yet reported, and I think this may possibly 
portend a movement forward of the 21 Panzer Div which I myself 
feel is probably still somewhere South of TMIMI. It is difficult 
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   427 02/03/2021   11:15 am
The MiliTary PaPers of field Marshal sir Claude auChinleCk
428
to forecast where his main thrust will come, it will certainly be 
combined with one or more diversionary efforts and undoubtedly 
with a distracting and disrupting operation by sea and air.
His recent very considerable increase in transport, and the fact 
that the rate of discharge at BENGHAZI port will have enabled him 
materially to economize in road transport between TRIPOLI and 
that place, will give him a greater circuit of action for his striking 
force. I still feel that if his maintenance makes this possible he 
will try to go round our Southern flank. In any case there will be a 
diversion there and this will probably be the Italian Mobile Corps. 
There are certainly indications of an interest on his part in the 
BREGHISC – ALEM HAMZA ridge and the main thrust may, of 
course, come here. But it will be a difficult and costly operation for 
him as our minefields are strong and our positions there well sited, 
well supported with artillery and well dug-in. Anyhow, whatever 
course he may adopt, our main strength is the counter with our 
armour to destroy him. We are ready for this, TEWTS have been 
held, the ground carefully studied, and I feel confidence that our 
armd forces are prepared to operate either to the South or to the 
North-West.
The sea landing side has been buttoned up. Any landing, other 
than on a major scale starting from Europe, must, I think, be limited 
to the portion of the coastline between TOBRUK inclusive and 
GAZALA. There may be small disruptive parties elsewhere as far 
to the East as my rear boundary. We have an adequate watching 
system with suitable communications and this has been interwoven 
with the existing R.A.F. and A.A. warning systems. The difficulty of 
course is that we cannot cover with fire permanently every possible 
beach at which he might land, but I think our system will give us 
the earliest possible warning of where a landing takes place. I have 
arranged with “Mary” Coningham that his job will be to put down 
the highest possible scale of air attack on any landing to delay and 
disrupt it while I move up the troops to deal with the situation. 
My calculations at present are that the scale of attack is unlikely 
to be greater than a large sized Bn Gp with full supporting arms, 
accompanied by up to 50 tanks. No doubt sea bomb and mines as 
a side issue.
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3. THE “ARENA”.
I spent a long day yesterday with Willoughby studying the ground 
and the positioning of troops for the battle there after a conference 
with Strafer to co-ordinate the action of his various armd columns 
going into this battle. I was to have done this the day before, but 
had to postpone it on account of CORBETT’S visit. I feel quite 
satisfied that an enemy armd force that gets into this “arena” area 
opens itself to fighting at a great disadvantage and should offer us 
every chance of destroying it utterly. The minefield connecting 
ACROMA escarpment and the sea was reconnoitred yesterday, and 
mines are on the way up now. The other minefield running from 
ACROMA Southwards will go as far as approximately B.674 in 
Square 3842 leaving a gap from that spot Southwards as far as B.653 
in square 3841. The escarpment running Eastwards from the latter 
point as far as about B.651 in square 3941 is a very good obstacle 
except at certain places which can be easily defended from the top. 
This will give us a tank obstacle from ACROMA Southwards and 
then turning East along the escarpment with gaps astride the EL 
ADEM – ACROMA road and between the escarpment at B.653 in 
3841 and B.674. Both these gaps will be filled by dummy minefields 
and covered by our guns and their use thus denied to the enemy. 
Work on this minefield is starting at once.
Our strength for our “arena” battle will, I have come to the 
conclusion, be greatly strengthened if we have a post at point 
209 in 3743, and I have ordered one to be established there, and 
I am arranging to give it some 75 mm post guns and one 88 mm. 
From this point one can see the whole of the Northern part of the 
“arena” and also interfere with any effort by the enemy to use the 
escarpment passage just to the West of B.111 in square 3743. This 
point dominates EL UET ET–TAMAR in 3742.
4. 2 ARMD BDE.
I am most anxious to keep the GRANTS in this BDE and the 6 
pdrs just about to be issued somewhere near where they can fire, 
but I have told Willoughby NORRIE to go into the question of 
making the necessary arrangements for moving everything else up 
now; all details to move Grants etc at the greatest speed in case 
of need. Everyday of added training there enormously improves 
the fighting value of the Bde. They are coming on well, their 
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equipment is improving and their training with the GRANTS is 
getting better daily.
5. COMMAND.
I wish I had an additional Divisional H.Q. to run the Southern 
flank, including the command of the Free French, 3 Ind Motor 
Bde and the 29 Inf Bde at GUBI, but none is available. I cannot 
spare the 5 Ind Div H.Q. Willoughby193 is letting me know today 
how this is being organised and I am proposing to send him over 
my BRA and extra staff and Signals to co-ordinate this for him 
or he will run it himself with his own R.A. staff. I will of course 
provide the additional Signals.
P.S. I am anxious about the preparation for the “PALMERSTON”194 
party. This is a show to which I attach the very greatest importance. If 
things look not too good I can lay it on quickly and I believe it might 
well turn the scale of the battle. This is, of course, quite apart from the 
possibility of its use for this counterstrike after the enemy’s armour has 
been broken. So naturally I am most anxious that there should be no delay 
and that all preparations be finished ahead with least possible delay. This 
includes moving the T.L.C.’s up here and the sailing up of the tanks.
JRL, AUC 867
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 23 May 1942
Very many thanks for you DO/70/6 of the 21st May, which reached 
me last night. Tom Corbett also got back yesterday evening, so I 
feel now that I am pretty well in your mind for the time being.
2. I am now quite happy about the positioning of the armoured 
divisions, and I am glad we were thinking on the same lines; this 
is always comforting!
193 Lieutenant General Willoughby Norrie, commanding 30 Corps.
194 A British special forces operation designed to dislocate the Axis headquarters in 
the Cyrenaica region.
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I hope 3rd Indian Motor Brigade will prove adequate for the 
job you are giving them. They ought to be good.
3. I am glad you hope to be able to establish a pivot at GUBI, even 
if you do not find it necessary to occupy it permanently. I feel it 
rounds off the position and gives it the depth on the SOUTHERN 
flank, which I think was needed.
4. I quite understand about the infantry tanks, and the dispositions 
as explained by you seem excellent to me. I had a mistaken idea 
that before you moved up the armoured divisions, the 1st Army 
Tank Bde column behind the 150th Infantry Bde area has a sort of 
roving commission. I agree that you have got them where you want 
them, including those in the ACROMA column, which should be 
most useful. I am glad you hope to be able to give some tanks to the 
Free French at BIR HACHEIM. I am sending up H.Q. 32 Army 
Tank Bde to join you at once.
5. I agree with all you say about new minefields, and that these should 
be most valuable as giving more depth to the position as a whole.
6. I hope you will not have to denude the reserves of mines for the 
frontier positions to too great an extent. Let me know about this, 
and whether you want more. I feel too that any troops stationed in 
the frontier positions should go on working on them to the best 
of their ability. One never knows what may happen in this kind of 
war!!
My latest information, which is up to the end of April, shows 
the minefields 60% to 70% completed in HALFAYA/SALUM 
and only 20% in EL HAMRA; while infantry positions are shown 
as 50% complete in both areas. What about the water supply at 
HAMRA? Someone said the pipeline has been taken up again? 
I suppose this was necessary, but I feel rather uneasy about it, and 
would like to know how you view the situation.
7. I note what you say about the division of responsibility between the 
two Corps H.Q., and I agree that it would be difficult to adopt my 
suggestion, and that you are right to keep things as they are. My 
only reason for making the suggestion was that I did not like the 
possibility of Willoughby Norrie being bothered about a feint attack, 
or even a real attack, on BIR HACHEIM while he was fighting a 
decisive action to the NORTH! I quite see that BIR HACHEIM 
as well as EL GUBI and the New Guards Bde defensive locality 
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may each all be pivots of manoeuvre for the amour, and therefore 
of great interest to 30th Corps.
8. I am glad you hope to be able to maintain the organisation of the 
armoured divisions, though I fully realise that you or Norrie may 
very well have to change brigades from one division to the other, 
once the battle is joined. This doesn’t matter, and the organisation 
is, as you know, designed to permit of it being done.
9. I note what you say about the armoured car units. I must warn 
you that it may be necessary, in the first instance, to keep back the 
Guides at BAGUSH to give better protection to the important 
installations and landing grounds in that area, now left rather bare 
by the forward move of the 3rd Indian Motor Bde. I will, however, 
release them for you as soon as I can. I feel that even if they reach 
you a bit late they may form a very valuable replacement for a 
battle-worn unit, and it is just as well to have something up one’s 
sleeve! This applies also to the 10th Indian Div.
10. There are two further suggestions I would like you to think over.
(i) I feel it might be most valuable if you could possibly mount 
some kind of diversionary operation before the enemy 
launches his attack. The object would be to throw him off 
his balance and delay him. As you know, every day gained 
just now is worth a lot to us, particularly in connection with 
the availability of 1st Armoured Bde. I wonder if you could 
put in an attack to throw forward the northern part of your 
line, pivoting, say, on the point of junction of the 3rd and 2nd 
South African Bdes, and aiming at pinching out the enemy 
localities near the coast in the area between Kilos 90 and 95.
This would avoid offering an exposed flank to an armoured 
counter-attack, and might make the enemy nervous about 
TMIMI and MARTUBA again, both of which are very 
sensitive parts of his anatomy, I feel! I realise that you would 
probably not wish to disturb the troops already holding the 
line, and so possibly weaken their chances of resisting attack, 
and it is not easy to see where you are to get fresh troops from. 
All the same, I feel that you might get a lot of help from some 
such operation if it came off at the right time, and that is why 
I suggest it for your consideration.
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(ii) If I am right in thinking that the enemy main thrust is likely 
to come in against the 1st South African Bde salient, I feel 
that he must already be collecting a considerable quantity of 
heavy and medium artillery in the TEMRAD – BREGHISC 
area. Would it be possible to raid this area with a fairly strong 
force by night, and do all the damage you can to anything you 
find? The troops used would have to go “all out” of course, 
and be prepared to suffer relatively heavy loss, and to stop 
at nothing to gain their object.
I feel there is something in this idea. I believe that jolts of this 
kind might go a long way to lowering the morale of his troops, 
and especially of the Italians. Remember how he reacted to your 
Martuba raid. Will you consider the possibility?
JRL, AUC 868
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 25 May 1942
Your DO/PSC/11 of 23rd May has just reached me and I am 
delighted to have got it. I am so pleased to feel that you are happy 
about the positioning of the armour. I was sure that you would be 
once you were in possession of the correct facts. Since I last wrote 
we have moved our Headquarters some 6 or 7 miles further East 
to a position about a mile North of the main road.
2. The advance party of the 3 Indian Motor Brigade has arrived up 
and gone forward to report to 30 Corps. I am not quite sure how 
soon they will be able to take over completely to relieve 7 Motor 
Brigade on the Southern portion of the front as they are deficient of 
certain items, the chief amongst which are wireless sets. However, 
we will get on with this matter as soon as this is possible.
3. 29 Infantry Brigade moved off morning 24th from the CAPUZZO 
neighbourhood to GUBI for the establishment of the defended 
locality there. Reconnaissances were carried out previously, and 
this affair is being carried out as an operation to practise them in 
the speedy establishment of a Brigade defended locality. I wired to 
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you last night asking whether you would allow me to use one Bn. 
of 11 Indian Motor Brigade for a position which I feel necessary 
in the BEL HAMED/EL DUDA area, which will ensure that no 
small parties of the enemy who may penetrate can sit on the axis 
road and deny its use to us. Furthermore, a small locality here will 
be able to cover No. 4 Forward Base should the enemy succeed in 
getting any parties through there. Thank you for agreeing.
4. Thank you for sending up the Headquarters of 32 Army Tank 
Brigade which will be of inestimable value to us for the co-ordination 
of the action of “I” tanks behind 1 S.A. Div.
I have just had C.G.S’s message about an Operational H.Q. of 
4 Ind Div being made available to control the left flank. This is 
splendid and I have replied accordingly.
5. We are having to use mines previously earmarked for the defences 
in the Frontier area to enable us quickly to provide the additional 
anti-tank mines needed to strengthen up the GAZALA – 
HACHEIM position, and this is undoubtedly a weakening of the 
Frontier line. Full details of the situation have already been sent 
to you, and the summary in round figures is as follows:
Mines – frontier area. [Annotation: What about some more?]
Laid on Frontier .. .. 25,000
Stacked on Frontier .. .. 135,000
Total on Frontier .. .. 160,000
Issued from Frontier’s stock  90,000
Original demand for Frontier  250,000.
The pipeline at HAMRA was taken up because it was needed to 
provide the necessary piping for the pushing on of our pipehead 
to BIR HACHEIM. The situation regarding water in the Frontier 
defences is as follows:-
(a) There is a pipeline from HABATHA to HAMRA which 
enables water carried by train to HABATHA to be pumped 
to HAMRA. The storage at HAMRA is satisfactory.
(b) In the SALUM – HALFAYA area there are 2,000 tons stored. 
BIRS for another 500 tons have now been prepared and a 
search for BIRS for another 500 tons is now being made. 
[Annotation: Does it evaporate much?]
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There has not been much work done on the Frontier defences 
this month as you will have realised. The South African L.O.B. 
[Labour Battalion?] have been going on steadily and the French 
have done a bit. We have done some tidying up on the stores and 
equipment side.
Personally I am satisfied that we can fight in this position now. 
I do not for one moment suggest that it could not be improved, 
for this it certainly can be and strengthened too, but I would say 
that it is fightable as it stands today. But I would like more mines 
to replace those used forward.
6. While I quite agree that it would be an excellent thing for us to carry 
out a limited offensive operation with the object of throwing the 
enemy off his balance before he attacks, I myself do not feel that, 
as at present situated, and especially having regard to the relative 
strengths of ourselves and the enemy, I can afford to do so. May I 
take the two suggestions contained in your letter in turn.
7. PIVOTING FORWARD THE RIGHT FLANK.
In order adequately to threaten TMIMI and MARTUBA, we 
would have to stay there and this would involve a very considerable 
lengthening of our present position. It would, in fact, I estimate, 
increase the length of the line by 5 to 6 miles, and I do not feel that, 
having regard to the number of guns available, we can well afford to 
undertake this extra commitment. As you say, the difficulty will be 
to find fresh troops for this operation, and in my own estimation it 
would be necessary for us to use tanks for the purpose. Furthermore, 
I feel that in doing this we would be undertaking an operation that 
is not on ground of our own choosing and has been prepared by 
the enemy, and this enemy would be unshaken by any previous 
operations and, as far as I can see, unweakened there. I am not 
quite clear about an operation of this sort not offering an exposed 
flank to an armoured counter attack unless it is your intention that 
this action should be carried out entirely North of the escarpment 
except for infantry infiltrating along the top of the escarpment 
itself? For the above reasons I am not keen on this plan.
8. RAID ON TEMRAD – BREGHISC.
This plan might, I feel, offer a better chance of achieving the 
object, but at the moment I think it is extremely hard to say that 
the enemy is, in fact, concentrating heavy and medium artillery 
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in that neighbourhood. So much depends on whether it is his 
intention to attack in the ALEM HAMZA area as his main effort. 
The difficulty I would find in laying on this operation now is that 
of discovering a real objective for the raid. The area is some 8 
to 10 miles from the nearest point of our minefield and would, 
therefore, entail a deep penetration. I do not think that it can be 
undertaken without VALENTINE tanks and, if this is the case, it 
means re-positioning these tanks within our defended system and 
I would definitely prefer that this is not undertaken at the moment. 
I will, however, go further into this matter today.
9. While I do feel very much that a limited offensive on the lines 
suggested might well be a tremendous help I feel myself to be 
tied by the legs somewhat because, as I have said before, I cannot 
lay my hands on fresh troops for the operation. Furthermore, an 
operation in the Northern part of the front, if it is really to achieve 
the object of unbalancing the enemy before his attack, depends so 
very greatly on whether the enemy does really intend to attack for 
his main effort in that part of the world. Personally I am doubtful 
if this will be the case. I only pray it may be. After going over the 
ground, seeing to our plans, and with the additional minefields 
there, I feel that no place could suit us better for his attack than 
here.
10. There is not much to report from the front this last 24 hours. We 
took a prisoner from ASIDA belonging to H.Q. of the 90 L[igh]t 
Div. He is lying a lot I believe. But yet there are some indications 
that something more has been moved down there, though no signs 
yet of large numbers of tanks. These, I believe are still mostly 
behind the BREGHISC – SEGNALI gap.
It seems to me that, broadly speaking, the armour is in two 
groups, but it is so far impossible to say whether these groups are 
made up of:
(a) (i) Italians in the South,
(ii) Germans in the North.
or (b) (i) Italians and about 100 (one Bn.) Germans in the South,
(ii) Rest of the Germans in the North.
I believe it is either one or other of these combinations, probably 
(b) I should deduce from photographs.
JRL, AUC 872
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 26 May 1942
Many thanks for your letter of the 23rd, which reached me yesterday.
I am most grateful to you for the information about your defences 
and dispositions in what you call the “Arena”. It is a great help to 
have these accurately shown on my map in the War Room, as I 
can then follow your plans, and also the battle should it ever take 
place in this area.
2. I quite see your point about the 2nd Armoured Brigade being able 
to go on with its training as long as possible in the SOUTHERN 
area, and I am sure you are right. When it moves is entirely a matter 
for you to decide. I am glad to hear they are getting on well, and I 
hope they will get a chance before long of getting their own back 
on the Bosche. I am certain they will take it.
3. I am glad we have been able to give you Tuker and an operational 
headquarters from 4th Divisional H.Q. I take it he will be under 
30th Corps H.Q. He is staying the night with me.
4. I have never discarded the possibility of the enemy making his 
main thrust round the SOUTHERN flank, and it would be most 
dangerous to make up one’s mind that he must attack in one place 
only. Nevertheless, my opinion, for what it is worth, is that the great 
majority of the indications point to a very heavy attack on a narrow 
front on the NORTHERN sector of your front, probably against the 
front of the 1st South African Bde. If this attack does materialise, it 
will, I feel certain, be supported by the largest possible concentration 
of artillery and dive bombers, and the effect of this bombardment 
may be such as to crush the defence, temporarily at any rate.
This was Rommel’s plan for attacking TOBRUK, as you may 
remember. A narrow thrust, and then a fanning out along a natural 
obstacle to form a defensive flank, while the spearhead continued 
to go on. I hope that in the break through he may lose heavily in 
tanks and men, and thus offer a weakened force for your armoured 
divisions to hit and destroy. It is possible, however, that the weight 
of the supporting fire may be so great as to prevent the defending 
infantry and artillery from taking any serious toll of his tanks.
Have you considered the desirability of altering the infantry 
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and artillery dispositions in this sector I wonder? I expect they 
have the usual alternative positions, but I was thinking of a more 
drastic alteration than that, even amounting to an increase of depth 
in the position by withdrawing troops from the forward areas, and 
so reducing the effect of his initial bombardment. I feel this merits 
close examination, which of course I am not competent to give it 
at this distance.
5. Once again, at the risk of being tiresome, I would like to stress the 
absolute necessity for preventing him establishing defensive flanks 
if he does try to attack in the way I have suggested. Don’t think I 
am becoming a mono-maniac on this subject! I do feel, however, 
that if he does try this method, he will put all his resources into it, 
as it depends for success on speed, which can only be made possible 
by brute force. Do not forget that he does not know that we know 
as much as we do, nor can he yet have found out how much the 
measures taken recently by you have strengthened your position 
generally. He may yet deliver himself into your hands by attacking 
where we are stronger than he thinks. I hope he does!
6. If he comes by the SOUTH, time should be on your side, and you 
ought to get ample warning from your motorised troops, armoured 
cars and the air. An offensive on this flank will very soon expose 
his supply lines to your attack, and should give you the chance of 
having at his weak infantry, once he has committed his armour 
beyond BIR HACHEIM. Do you agree with this?
7. We are agreed, I know, that the most difficult thing to decide will be 
when to change from the defensive to the offensive. I feel the time will 
surely come when this decision has to be made, and when it is made 
everyone must spring forward to the attack, and seek out the enemy 
wherever he is, and give him no peace till he is destroyed. I know you 
have impressed this on all commanders, but it can not be said too 
often, so please keep saying it! We are apt to be slow in the uptake, 
and may lose precious chances thereby, unless everyone is imbued 
with the idea of swift and daring action when you give the word.
8. One other matter, which I expect you have already planned and 
arranged.
If the enemy does break through on a narrow front, I am sure he 
will do his best to neutralise our armoured forces by attacking them 
heavily from the air with low-flying aircraft armed with anti-tank 
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guns, which we know he has. As the issue of the whole battle is likely 
to rest on your ability or failure to bring his “Blitz” to a standstill 
on ground of your choosing, and then to destroy his tanks before 
they can get back to the protection of his guns and infantry, I feel it 
is essential that our air should be used to the limit to keep our own 
tanks in being, and to prevent them being neutralised or destroyed 
by the enemy’s air. I am convinced that this must be their primary 
task in the circumstances I have envisaged. How they do it is not 
for me to attempt to say, but it seems pretty obvious that heavy 
direct support will be needed over the battlefield itself, whatever 
more distant help may be given by attacking enemy aerodromes. 
How do you feel about this?
9. I have just got your letter of the 25th, signed by Jock Whiteley.
I am glad you are happy. So am I generally, though I feel I may 
not have made myself clear about the possibilities of a heavy raid 
on the enemy forward areas with the object of destroying guns 
and tanks if found.
I was thinking of a fast-moving bold affair at night, certainly 
not using tanks. I had no idea of using tanks, and I agree that this 
would be a mistake at present. I know you may feel it difficult to 
find troops, but you have now got quite a lot of them, certainly 
many more infantry than the enemy has, as his divisions are still 
pretty weak, if our information is correct, and I have no reason to 
suppose it is not.
I would like you to consider this proposition again and have 
it examined if you can. I feel myself that anything you can do to 
upset the enemy at this juncture may be tremendously valuable. 
I feel, too, that plans for offensives all along the front must be made 
ready to put into effect immediately opportunity offers. I gather 
you have done this?
10. In your para 10 you say that the bulk of his tanks appear to be 
behind the BREGHISC – SEGNALI gap. Our latest information 
goes to show, I think, that his big German tank concentration is 
behind TEMRAD and to the NORTH. We can’t both be right! 
I have asked D.M.I. to check up on this. We agree that the Ariete 
Division and some German infantry are in the SOUTH.
11. I hope to get this off by TUKER in the morning.
JRL, AUC 877
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 28 May 1942, 
with annotations by Auchinleck
We have been thinking hard over the possibility of your changing over 
to the offensive immediately you have cracked the enemy armour, which 
you now seem to have got where you always wanted it. Well done you!
I enclose the result of our thinking, for what it may be worth.
I have specified certain formations for certain tasks, but only in order 
to prove to myself that the troops needed would be available, and not 
with the slightest intention of laying down the law about them.
I feel we must be ready to move at once, whichever way the cat jumps. 






As a result ACROMA battle, enemy original armoured attacking 
force practically wiped out.
Enemy left with, say:-
100 ITALIAN tanks – in arena, & some escaped
50 – 60 GERMAN tanks – TEMRAD area
Four ITALIAN divisions of about 4 – 5000 men (strength 
27 May) and 20 f[iel]d guns and 15 A.T. guns each.
Part of 90 GERMAN Light Division, say 3 Bns and 12 
f[iel]d guns.
2. OUR RESOURCES.
1 ARMD BDE GP complete - 150 tanks
Residue 1 and 7 ARMD DIVS - 100 tanks
Residue 1 ARMY TK BDE - 50 tanks
32 ARMY TANK BDE - 75 tanks
TOTAL: 250 medium and 125 heavy tanks.
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375 BRITISH tanks against 250 GERMAN and ITALIAN tanks
Three Infantry Divisions of about 52,000 men and 216 fd guns 
holding our positions GAZALA – TOBRUK – BIR HACHEIM.
5 and 10 IND DIVS mobile and available for offensive, plus possibly 
greater part 3 IND MOTOR BDE GP as well as two Motor Brigade 
Groups of 1 and 7 Armd Divs.
If necessary, two infantry Brigade Groups (not fully mobile) of 4 
IND DIV can also be made available to hold defensive positions 
and so release mobile infantry for the offensive.
3. OBJECT
Object is to destroy the enemy army as soon as possible, so as to 
prevent it slipping to the WEST.
4. METHOD
Enemy’s SOUTH flank is always in this theatre, his vital point. 
Therefore, assuming that we can now count on reasonable superi-
ority in tanks and great superiority in infantry, we should go straight 
for it. Our immediate objective should be, therefore, SEGNALI.
To pin the enemy further to the NORTH, we should put in a 
secondary attack, preferably with 50 DIV. and heavy tanks against 
TEMRAD, while 1 S.A. DIV demonstrates against enemy extreme 
LEFT but does NOT push home attack as we want enemy to stay 
in this area.
Further to encircle the enemy, all available light mobile forces 
should strike hard at MECHILI and even BENGHASI, while 
LRDG and “COMMANDOS” must harass enemy L of C every-
where possible.
The main air target should be enemy communications forward of, 
and including BENGHASI, and his aerodromes in the same area.
5. ALLOTMENT OF TROOPS
(i) MAIN ATTACK ON SEGNALI
All medium tanks and half heavy tanks.
Armd Car Regts and Motor Bde Gps of 1 and 7 ARMD DIVS.
5 IND DIV.
10 IND DIV.
Two Regts Medium Artillery.
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(ii) SECONDARY ATTACK ON TEMRAD
50 DIV
Half heavy tanks
One Regt Medium Artillery
(iii) MOVEMENT ON MECHILI AND BENGHASI
3 IND MOTOR BDE GP [Annotation: ? Report of stragglers? 
How effective will 3 Ind Motor Bde be?]




1 FREE FRENCH BDE GP
(v) TOBRUK AND EL ADEM etc
5 and 11 IND Inf Bde Gps. [Annotation: How effective will 
3 Ind Motor Bde be?]
SITUATION B.
1. Two possibilities:-
Enemy Armoured Force in ACROMA area after severe losses 
attempt to escape:-
(i) SOUTH Both alternatives with help of attack directed EAST 
from TEMRAD.
(ii) WEST
2. If enemy Armoured Forces attempt to escape SOUTH:
OUR ACTION:
(a) Our Armoured divisions pursue and all available mobile 
columns from 50 DIV, 1 FREE FRENCH BDE GP and 3 
IND MOTOR BDE shepherd enemy SOUTH and harass 
his flanks and rear.
(b) Attack by 50 DIV to secure SIDI BREGHISC area 5 IND 
DIV to take over 50 DIV front and be prepared to pass 
through 50 DIV after they have captured and consolidated 
BREGHISC, 10 IND DIV to TOBRUK – EL ADEM.
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3. If enemy Armoured Forces attempt to escape WEST:
OUR ACTION:
(a) Enemy passage of our defences opposed and harassed by 
heavy tanks and garrisons of our defences.
(b) Our Armoured Divisions and all mobile troops together with 
5 INDIAN DIVISION move via HACHEIM on SEGNALI 
with eventual objective enemy’s rear, area EZZRIAT 
– TMIMI.
(c) 50 DIVISION holding attack directed on BREGHISC
(d) 10 INDIAN DIVISION to relieve 50 DIVISION.




Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 3 June 1942
1. You will have had my signal in answer to your U.1205 of today.
2. I am glad you think the situation is still favourable to us and that 
it is improving daily. All the same I view the destruction of 150th 
Brigade and the consolidation by the enemy of a broad and deep 
wedge in the middle of your position with some misgiving. I am 
sure, however, there are factors known to you which I do not know.
3. I feel myself,
(a) that if the enemy is allowed to consolidate himself in his present 
positions in the area SIDRA – HARMAT – MTEIFEL, our 
GAZALA position including BIR HACHEIM will become 
untenable eventually even if he does not renew his offensive.
(b) that situated as he is, he is rapidly becoming able to regain 
the initiative which you have wrested from him in the last 
week’s fighting. This can not be allowed to happen.
4. I agree with you entirely that you can not let your armour be 
destroyed in detail and that you can not risk it against his now 
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strongly defended front NORTH and SOUTH of EL HARMAT. 
Therefore he must be shifted by other means and quickly before 
he can begin to act against the exposed SOUTHERN flank of 
50th Division or against BIR HACHEIM, or in an attempt to cut 
your supply line EAST of EL ADEM, all of which seem possible 
courses for him to adopt.
5. I feel that the quickest and easiest way to shift him is by an offensive 
directed towards TEMRAD so as to threaten his bases, coupled 
with threats from SEGNALI and the SOUTH against his lines 
of supply.
His tanks can not be in two places at once and you still have some 
infantry tanks with which to support your infantry and protect your 
artillery of which you should have a good deal now. It is I think, 
highly important that you should keep at least one infantry division 
concentrated and complete in mobile reserve, so that you have at 
your disposal a really strong weapon with which to strike. I am a 
little perturbed by the apparent dispersion of 5th Indian Division, 
but I daresay it is more apparent than real.
6. I repeat that in my opinion you must strike hard and at once if we 
are to avoid a stalemate, that is unless the enemy is foolish enough 
to fling himself against your armour. I wish he would but I don’t 
think you can count on this at present. [Annotation: de Guingand 
knows what is in my mind.]
JRL, AUC 896
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Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 3 June 1942
Your special message reached me in the middle of last night. Thank 
you so much for it. I agree almost entirely with all its contents, but 
there are one or two points I would like to make.
The two alternatives appear to me to be:
(a) to resume the offensive as early as possible directed on the 
line TMIMI – AFRAG;
(b) to deal first with the “cauldron”.
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Of these two alternatives it had been my intention to resume the 
offensive and leave the armour to mask the “cauldron” and I left 
this H.Q. at 5.a.m. this morning for a conference with the Corps 
Commanders to get this fixed up. For various reason, with which 
I am dealing, replacements in armour are not coming through as 
quickly as they should. This is due to the crews not being collected 
together quickly enough; that is most serious. It will be righted 
today, [Annotation: Yes! I hope so.] but the net result is that I now 
feel that our armour may not be able to contain the enemy while 
the offensive is in progress and the enemy’s armour may therefore 
be a real danger to me being able to continue supplies forward and 
against the rear of the GAZALA – ALEM HAMZA position.
2. I was, as you are, most keen to carry out the offensive with the right 
shoulder forward, but the enemy in his present position makes 
it extremely difficult to form up a Division behind our present 
frontage between the GAZALA and ALEM HAMZA without 
fear of its preparations being interrupted. For this reason I had to 
discard that plan.
3. My next idea was to make a very wide turning movement with the 
5 Ind Div South of HACHEIM directed on AFRAG, but after 
the information I have had from the Corps Commanders today 
respecting the strength of our armour I cannot risk this.
4. It is absolutely essential that we should wrest from the enemy the 
initiative which he is now starting to exercise and this must be done 
at the soonest possible moment. In the circumstances I have decided 
that I must crush him in the “cauldron” and the plan for doing 
this will be a pincer movement, one arm coming from the North 
with 69 Inf Bde supported by “I” tanks, the other from the East 
to be carried out by 5 Ind Div supported by 4 RTR and 22 Armd 
Bde for exploitation. This latter will, of course, be the main thrust, 
the one from the North I would not bring further South than 
SIDRA 3641. Much of the preparatory reconnaissance and work 
for the main thrust has already been covered by the operations of 
10 Inf Bde and I am re-assured in my belief of the feasibility of 
this operation being carried out by night by the fact that Frank 
MESSERVY is of opinion that it is quite feasible. I hope by this 
means to drive a wedge through the enemy’s anti-tank defences 
under cover of darkness and seize the ground in the vicinity of 
GOT EL SCERAB, and this will enable me to exploit the armour 
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through this corridor into the rear of the enemy and close the gaps 
behind him. Once it is completed we will return to the offensive 
generally on the lines of the right shoulder forward.
5. I am going at once into the question of a raiding force to threaten 
the MARTUBA and DERNA landing grounds, and I am sorry 
that I had not understood your intention in regard to this matter.
6. The operation I have decided to undertake is the one which can 
be put into action quickest and will therefore wrest the initiative 
from the enemy in the shortest possible time.
7. Freddie de GUINGAND takes this letter and can give you more 
details of my plan.
JRL, AUC 897
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 3 June 1942
You asked me yesterday about the date of the convoy which you said 
you urgently required to know. I hope De Guingand has given you 
the information today. I must admit that I feel that this date will 
not now have nearly as much influence on any offensive movement 
you have in mind as must the tactical situation which will result 
from the present fighting.
2. You would not, I imagine, think of holding back your offensive 
solely to synchronise with the sailing of the convoy. I feel that your 
offensive must be made immediately the tactical situation on your 
front permits. The primary effect of a successful offensive will be 
to deny the landing grounds in the area MARTUBA – DERNA to 
the enemy. The second and even more important result would be 
to allow us the use of these landing grounds for our own aircraft, 
thus greatly increasing the cover for the convoy.
The sooner we can produce these effects the better, and the 
longer we have to consolidate ground gained before the convoy 
sails, the easier it will be to produce the second result, which is 
supremely desirable.
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3. Of course if things should go really well, and we can get on even 
still further, so much the better, as the power of the enemy air to 
interfere with the convoy decreases as he is driven further back. 
This again is another reason for getting forward as soon as it is 
humanly possible to do so. But I know you realise all this just as 
well as I do, and I have no doubts at all that if you can get on, you 
will.
4. You will, I am sure, have made all arrangements for suitable forces 
to defend the landing grounds, should we get them, from enemy 
counter-attacks, which must be expected. It will mean getting a 
good lot of anti-aircraft artillery forward pretty quickly I imagine.
5. I saw Stirling this morning, and I think he has a good show laid 
on.195
6. The news this morning did not surprise me. I expected the enemy 
to renew his efforts to carry out his original plan as soon as he felt 
he had a secure base inside our position. He should, however, be 
nothing like as strong as he was before. In particular, your relative 
superiority in tanks should be much greater, and I feel you may 
have a good chance of cracking him now. I hope you will keep him 
out of BIR HACHEIM, as if that goes I feel our mobility will 
be greatly restricted, and his ability to worry our flanks and rear 
correspondingly increased.
7. I feel a little anxious lest he should now turn against 50 Div from 
the SOUTH, using his anti-tank guns to form a protective flank 
to the EAST and so keep off our tanks. I expect you are ready for 
this.
8. It may be that he intends to try his double attack against our 
NORTHERN front once more, that is tanks from the East and 
tanks, artillery and infantry (90 Lt Div) from the WEST. I know 
you are ready for this too.
9. I am puzzled whether the attack on HACHEIM was a feint to draw 
off attention from a real attack in the NORTH, or whether the 
reverse is the case. He has sent apparently an equal number of tanks 
in each direction – towards TAMAR and also BIR HACHEIM. 
195 Presumably the SAS jeep raids on Italian airfields in the vicinity of Fuka on 
7 July, led by Major David Stirling.
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It looks as if the HACHEIM attack was meant to succeed. I hope 
it hasn’t!
No more now. Good luck to you and your men. I think of nothing else.
JRL, AUC 898
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Directive defining the duties of the 
Minister of State, Middle East, 4 June 1942
The directive of the Minister of State approved by the Prime Minister 
now stands as follows:-
1. The Minister of State in the Middle East will represent the War 
Cabinet in that area and will act in its name.
2. The principal task of the Minister of State will be to ensure a 
successful conduct of the operations in the Middle East by:-
(a) relieving the Commanders-in-Chief as far as possible of 
extraneous responsibilities;
(b) giving the Commanders-in-Chief political guidance;
(c) settling promptly matters within the policy of His Majesty’s 
Government, more particularly where several local authorities 
or Departments are concerned;
(d) Keeping the War Cabinet and Ministers generally informed 
of what is happening in his sphere.
3. Examples of (a) above are:-
(i) Relations with the Free French.
(ii) The administration of occupied enemy territory (subject to 
paragraph 4 below).
(iii) Propaganda, and subversive and economic warfare.
(iv) Financial questions of an emergency character.
(v) Civil supply questions, including the Middle East Supply 
Centre.
4. As regards the administration of occupied territory, the Commander-
in-Chief, Middle East, and the General Officer Commanding-in-
Chief, East Africa, have delegated their powers to the Chief Political 
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Officers at Cairo and Nairobi respective. These two Officers will keep 
the Minister of State generally informed. With the concurrence of 
their respective Commander-in-Chief, they have discretion to refer 
matters to him and take his instructions when reference to London 
is unnecessary or would entail unacceptable delay. The Minister 
of State for his part will be entitled to give directions to the Chief 
Political Officers, with the agreement of the Commanders-in-Chief, 
on matters which seem to him to require such directions.
5. The Minister of State will be fully informed of the approved 
policy of His Majesty’s Government on all major issues. If any 
question should arise on which he requires special guidance, he 
will, provided that there is time, refer the matter home. He will, 
in any case, report constantly to His Majesty’s Government and 
will receive from time to time their directions. His normal channel 
of communications will be through the medium of His Majesty’s 
Embassy in Cairo and the Foreign Office, but he may also make use 
of any other available and convenient channel. He will also address 
personal telegrams directly to the Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence whenever convenient. On Departmental matters he will 
communicate with Departments direct. In general, except where 
an immediate decision is required, he will consult the Minister 
concerned on any proposed action before it is taken if it is not 
clearly in accordance with approved policy. When on grounds of 
urgency the Minister acts on any important matter without prior 
consultation with London, he will report the circumstances as soon 
as possible to the appropriate department.
6. The Minister of State will preside over meetings of the Middle 
East War Council and Defence Committee.
7. On the diplomatic and political side, the Minister of State will 
co-ordinate so far as is necessary the activities and recommenda-
tions of His Majesty’s representatives:-
(i) acting in Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia (subject to certain reservations), Aden 
the Aden Protectorate, Persia, Abyssinia, British Somaliland, 
occupied territories (Eritrea and Italian Somaliland), Syria, 
the Lebanon, Cyprus and Malta, and
(ii) concerned with the Yemen and French Somaliland.
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This instruction in no way detracts from the existing individual respon-
sibilities of His Majesty’s representatives in the above territories of their 
official relationships with their respective departments at home.
JRL, AUC 899
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Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 9 June 1942
ONE. I have been continually thinking about your great battle and 
how we can best sustain your Army, so that it may be fought out to a 
victorious end. Here is some good news.
TWO. The 8th Armoured Division is now at the CAPE and the 44th 
Division is nearing FREETOWN. We have deliberately kept an option 
on the ultimate destination of these Divisions until we could see our 
way more clearly.
THREE. Some time ago I promised the Australian Government that 
if AUSTRALIA were seriously invaded we should immediately divert 
both these Divisions to their assistance. AUSTRALIA up to date has 
not repeat not been seriously invaded, and in view of Naval losses which 
JAPANESE have sustained in the battles of the CORAL Sea and off 
MIDWAY Island, we regard a serious invasion in the near future as 
extremely improbable.
FOUR. We are also prepared, though we have never promised 
WAVELL to send both these Divisions to INDIA if it looked as though 
the JAPANESE had an invasion of INDIA in mind. This also seems 
extremely improbable at the moment and INDIA have already got the 
2nd, 5th and 90th BRITISH Divisions.
FIVE. We have therefore decided with the full agreement of the Chiefs 
of Staff, that the 8th Armoured Division and the 44th Division should 
be sent to you unless AUSTRALIA is threatened with serious invasion 
within the next few days. You may therefore make your plans for the battle 
on the assumption that the 8th Armoured Division will reach SUEZ at 
the end of June and the 44th Division by mid-July.
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SIX. Thereafter, depending on the general situation then prevailing, you 
should be prepared to send to INDIA one of your INDIAN Divisions and 
the 252nd INDIAN Armoured Brigade. Pray let us have your proposals 
so that we may tell General WAVELL.
SEVEN. A detailed account of the exact state of the 8th Armoured 
Division and of the technical preparedness of its tanks, together with the 
exact loading on the various ships and their dates of arrival, is being sent 
you separately. You can thus make the best possible plans for disembarking, 
organizing and bringing it into action in the most effective manner with 
the least delay. We feel that with this rapidly approaching reserve behind 
you, you will be able to act with greater freedom in using your existing 
resources. All good wishes. Message ends.
JRL, AUC 910
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 10 June 1942
1 (.) Thank you for your telegram OZ/240 (24) of 9/6 (9/6) for which 
I am most grateful (.) I feel much encouraged by your good wishes 
and hope I will be able to show you some results for all the hard 
and bitter fighting of the past two weeks (.)
2 (.) The prospect of our getting the 8 Armoured and 44th Divisions in 
this theatre is most welcome and encouraging (.) I realise that the 
decision may be changed but am proceeding at once with plans to 
make best use of these formations (.) The commander 8th Armoured 
Division is now in CAIRO (.)
3 (.) I note that I may be required to send an Indian armoured brigade 
and an Indian infantry division to INDIA later (.) As you know 
we have nothing like enough troops to defend PERSIA or to meet 
a German attack through ANATOLIA (.) I realise these threats 
may NOT materialise but nevertheless I must plan to meet them (.) 
I realise that the threat to INDIA may materialise quicker and in 
more serious form than a threat to my NORTHERN and NORTH 
EASTERN fronts (,) and that the allotment of troops to meet these 
eventualities can be made by you alone as the largest strategical 
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issues will be involved (.) I mention the matter of our commitments 
in PERSIA IRAQ and SYRIA only to remind you that the chances 
of a successful defence in these theatres with our existing resources 
are small (,) unless we receive substantial reinforcements before 
the enemy have penetrated too deeply (.)
4 (.) The knowledge that these two fresh and powerful divisions are 
on the way will as you say greatly increase my freedom of action 
in respect of the forces I already have (.) As you probably know I 
have already brought considerable forces from IRAQ to LIBYA 
to str[e]ngthen 8th Army (.)




Letter from Brigadier Jock Whiteley, BGS Eighth 
Army to Auchinleck, enclosing some notes 
dictated by Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 
entitled ‘Appreciation of Situation by 
Comd. Eighth Army, 0900 hrs, 11 June 1942’, with 
annotations by Auchinleck noted in italics.
Your signal of 11/6 arrived just before breakfast this morning. General 
Neil had arranged to go forward to see the Corps Comds, leaving here at 
9 o’clock. He dictated some notes to me before he went and in the short 
time available I have tried to put them in the best form that I can. I thought 
it would be better to give you the material in a somewhat disjointed form 
by today’s L[iaison]. O[fficer]. rather than to delay an answer.
General Neil thinks that you are not in touch quite with our picture 
and suggests that you send up a Senior Staff officer tomorrow if you 
can manage to do so.
I have not even had time to check it.
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   452 02/03/2021   11:15 am
commander in chief, middle east, 1941–42
453
ENEMY AND OWN TROOPS.
ARMOUR.
1. I consider that our armour and the enemy armour is very evenly 
balanced. It is probable that our armour reinforcements are likely 
to be slightly in excess of those of the enemy. Your U 1339 10/6 
ours 330 tanks. 270 with ? 10/6. Enemy 200250?? Enemy G = 220? 
I = 60? = 280
INFANTRY.
2. I estimate that the enemy has the equivalent of 10 ½ Bde Gps. He 
has suffered some casualties but he has not been forced to withdraw 
any formations.
3. We have the equivalent of ten Bde Gps made up as follows:-
50 Div 2
5 Ind Div 1 – 9 & 10 Bdes?
10 Ind Div 1 – 3 Bdes
1 S.A. Div 2
2 S.A. Div 3
11 Ind Bde Gp 1
Total 10.
If the Free French Bde Gp succeeds in withdrawing without heavy 
casualties it should be possible to put them into the line again in 
the course of a few days.
4. We have the following Bde Gps re-forming:
3 Motor Bde Gp on a reduced scale.
21 Bde Gp. – 25 Bde Gp ? ? ?
9 Bde Gp. – where is the other?
Moreover 5 Ind Inf Bde Gp will be arriving shortly.
5. Numerically, therefore, our relative strengths in infantry are evenly 
balanced. The morale of our infantry is infinitely superior, but 
the lack of training of some formations prevents us from taking 
advantage of this moral superiority. 1 SA Div, 2 SA Div, which?
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ARTILLERY.
6. The enemy is definitely stronger than we are in A.Tk guns. He has 
perhaps been able to recoup some of his losses by captures from 
us. On the other hand we have more ROBERTS guns deployed 
today than at any previous period of the operation because in the 
initial stages we had the greatest difficulty in issuing ROBERTS 
guns to troops engaged in operations.
Deduction: Our forces are very evenly balanced with those of 




7. At the moment we are not seriously troubled by enemy air action and 
we have received the greatest help from our own Air Force. Provided 
we can continue to operate our Air Force from the GAMBUT group 
of landing grounds we expect to continue to enjoy this superiority.
MAINTENANCE.
8. Our maintenance arrangements are elastic. We have
(a) approximately seven days dumped at every locality;
(b)  considerable holdings of all types (with minor exceptions) at 
TOBRUK, No. 4 Forward Base and CAPUZZO. The over-
running of one of these bases would not cripple our position.
(c) We can maintain our force from TOBRUK or from No. 4 
Forward Base or via a Southerly desert route direct from 
CAPUZZO.
We have therefore considerable advantage in dispersed reserves 
and in dispersed lines of supply.
PROBABLE ENEMY ACTION.
9. I consider that the enemy is aiming at strengthening his position 
in the Cauldron with a view to passing to the offensive as soon as 
possible. In the meantime he hopes that we will attack him in what 
is a strong position. If we do not do this I consider that he will 
either:
(a) strike North with a view to isolating the two Divisions of 
13 Corps on the GAZALA posn, or
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(b) strike East against our communications.
(c) go away (d) stay put
There are local indications that his intention is to strike East and, 
in my opinion, this is the most probable course. What are they?
10. As a preliminary to striking East the enemy may occupy GUBI 
as a pivot of manoeuvre. This will be an isolated position for him 
and we must take full advantage of it. Yes how? In the meanwhile 
we must lift the minefield.
11. The enemy’s L. of C. is precarious. Since we have started harassing 
them East of the minefield he has been forced to conform to the 
extent of air action and withdrawing troops and anti-tank guns. 
Confirmed? To what extent?
COURSES OPEN TO US.
12. My aim is to destroy the enemy armoured forces. The more we 
can succeed in doing this the easier will our subsequent task be. 
The two main courses open to me are:-
(a) To attack him in the Cauldron.
(b) To attack his weakest spot along the L. of C.
The essential condition which I must fulfil is to leave a force around 
the Cauldron area sufficient to give me security. My infantry 
resources do not enable me to occupy any more positions. I must 
therefore pin my main reliance upon armour to stem any enemy 
advance from the Cauldron. Or artillery & anti-tank pos[itio]ns? 
Enemy does not stop us with his armour.
13 (a) I have examined the possibilities of attacking the Cauldron 
from the South. Our old minefield would delay this attack 
and surprise would be difficult to achieve. I reject this.
(b) I have considered repeating the attack from the North and 
from the East to gain the observation over the Cauldron. This 
has failed once and I do not consider that I have the resources 
to attempt it again. I have therefore rejected this.
(c) An attack on the Cauldron from the West through the enemy 
gaps would be hazardous because we would have to make a 
final approach through the defiles in the minefields which the 
enemy must be assumed to hold. There would be no surprise 
and therefore I reject this.
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14. Harass the vulnerable enemy L. of C. with all the resources that I 
can spare from the “Arena” area.
This is a very vulnerable point to the enemy; although the fall of 
HACHEIM will release considerable forces I consider that these 
will not be enough to afford protection to his L. of C. from the 
North and from the South between the minefield and CHERIMA 
and ROTONDA AFRAG. If necessary I am prepared to go wide 
to the West to get my target. What is the target?
If, in the meanwhile, the enemy attacks me I should hope to 
inflict greater loss upon him than he will on me. In this way we 
may be able to pave the way to destroy his armour but I am not 
relying on this.
PLAN.
15. My plan is therefore to attack his L. of C. which I regard as his 
main vulnerable point:
(a) From the North on 50 Div front. Valentine tanks will be used 
to support these attacks.
(b) From the South with a Motor Bde Gp and with such armour 
as I can spare from the “Arena” area without endangering 
security.
At the moment I estimate this to be approx. 30 Stuart type tanks. 
I am keeping the closest watch on the tank situation because on 
this depends whether I can increase or decrease this detached tank 
force. In this way I hope to force the enemy to conform either by 
attacking me or by withdrawing troops from the Cauldron area 
to protect his L. of C. A Piddle? Knightsbridge? What decision does 
this lead to?
16. To take advantage of the situation which may result from this action 
I must be able to pass an armd div quickly from the “Arena” area 
to the West of the minefield. I intend to do this through the gap 
on 50 Div front. I am straining every nerve to ensure that this will 
be possible when I require it.
17. In the meantime I am taking all possible precautions to safeguard 
the GAMBUT aerodrome area and my L. of C.
JRL, AUC 916
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Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 13 June 1942
My dear C.I.G.S.
Thank you very much for your long letter of the 16th May which 
reached me on the 3rd June.
2. Charles Gairdner196 has arrived and is hard at work preparing his 
course, he hopes to get it going in early July. It is not so easy to find 
students but I think I have got together a good lot. I had hoped to 
include Hayden197 of the 150th Infantry Brigade but I hear he is a 
prisoner unfortunately.
Please do not bother about the location of the course. It will 
do very well in Palestine, I am sure, unless it has to remove itself 
to avoid the enemy! I hope this won’t happen! I am sure you are 
right about the aircraft and I gather the Union have cut down their 
services. The location of the course is very suitable I think and 
Gairdner is pleased with it. I hope D.M.T. or his deputy will be 
able to pay us a visit and have a look at it, and also at our Training 
Centre, in which all tactical and weapon training schools are now 
concentrated.
3. I am still trying to get the right solution for the organisation of 
command on our northern and north-eastern fronts. As you know 
I am planning to keep the Germans out of the good air base area 
around Teheran and to do this, I hope to be able to move into Persia 
at least four divisions and one or two armoured divisions from the 
rest of the command. This will entail switching 10th Army into 
Persia and relieving it of responsibility for Iraq. The two together 
would be too much for one commander I feel.
4. This would fit in all right with my original idea of making 9th 
Army take over Northern Iraq as well as Syria with a Corps H.Q. 
in each. I can only find the troops for Persia by stripping Iraq and 
196 Major General Charles Gairdner who was sent to establish a Staff College in 
Palestine, having commanded the 6th Armoured Division in the UK. In August 
1942 he was to take command of 8th Armoured Division in the Middle East.
197 Brigadier C. W. Haydon.
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Syria, and this can be done only if there is no threat to Anatolia. 
On present calculations the decision to move troops into Persia 
from Syria (one New Zealand and one Australian division) and 
Northern Iraq (one Indian division) must be taken about the 15th 
July. You will realise that it will be a very difficult decision to take, 
and that it must, in any event, be a tremendous gamble. By that 
time, possibly, the policy of reinforcing this command may be more 
defined, and I might perhaps expect to get troops to fill some of 
the large gaps in Syria and Iraq, but I do not feel I can count on 
this until the situation in India becomes more settled. In any event 
with such small resources and such large commitments, I feel that 
the whole business is a terrible gamble and I believe you are of the 
same opinion.
5. Well there it is, and I am making all preparation to meet the worst 
case, which is pressure in Libya, a threat to Syria and Iraq through 
Anatolia and a drive from the Caucasus towards the Persian Gulf. 
As I have said before as plainly as I can, we can not expect to do 
more than delay a really determined advance by the enemy with 
our present resources in these circumstances. You I am sure realise 
this and I hope the Defence Minister does too.
6. If the Germans delay the launching of their new offensive much 
longer, they may not arrive on the northern frontier of Persia until 
mid-autumn, in which event the climate may prevent a further 
large scale exploitation.
I do not think it would be wise to rely on this, as we are too apt 
to rely on the weather and the terrain to stop our enemy for us.
7. If there is a threat to Anatolia and we can not send troops from 
Syria and Iraq to fight the enemy in northern Persia, then I feel it 
is only a question of time before he can reach the head of the Gulf 
and the oil supplies.
He will naturally begin bombing them as soon as he is estab-
lished in Teheran.
8. We can not organise the defence of northern Persia unless we have 
full facilities now for reconnaissance and preparation in the Russian 
sphere as well as our own, and that is why I have been so insistent 
on obtaining the Russian consent to this. There is no way out of 
it. We must have these facilities, otherwise we can not hope to be 
ready. Time is short enough as it is.
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9. This brings me back to the organisation of command. With 9th 
Army responsible for Syria and northern Iraq and 10th Army for 
Persia, we must I think have a base and line of communications 
commander whose responsibilities will include the Iraq and Persian 
bases and the two lines of communication up to and including 
Baghdad in the west and up the Persia railway in the east, possibly 
as far as Teheran itself. This commander should I feel combine in 
himself as well the functions of a Deputy Adjutant and Quarter-
Master General responsible directly to the L.G.A and G.H.Q. and 
through him, of course, to me.
I think we must do this as the responsibility for maintenance 
in this huge area can not be placed upon the shoulders of an army 
commander, whose chief business should be to fight the enemy. 
There will, in effect, be a detached echelon of G.H.Q. at Baghdad 
or Basra, thus ensuring the maximum of decentralisation so far as 
local detailed administration is concerned, and also the essential 
minimum of co-ordination by G.H.Q. This eastern base, as opposed 
to the western base in Egypt and Palestine, will serve the right 
wing of the 9th Army and the whole of the 10th Army. General 
control over big movements must continue to be exercised by the 
Director of Movements at G.H.Q. over the whole command. This 
responsibility can not be divided in my opinion.
I enclose a note giving my proposals. Riddell-Webster does not 
like it but I do not think his objections can be sustained and I do 
not agree with his proposed solution. So for the only time, I think, 
since we have worked here together, I am going to overrule him!
10. If the project of defending northern Persia fails to materialise we 
shall have to think again but I still feel that northern Iraq will have 
to come under the 9th Army in order to ensure proper co-operation 
on this front, especially with the Air Force.
11. Quinan is all right but he is, I think, a better administrator and 
organiser than strategist. However, I have no serious complaint to 
make, though I do feel that for the command in Persia we might 
do better. He has lots of energy and drive and is getting on well 
with the planning and preparation. We hope to have a war game 
on the north-eastern front problem next week, and I will see how 
he comes out of that.
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12. You will have seen that the Australian Government on their own 
have made Morshead a Lieutenant-General and that the New 
Zealand Government are following suit with Freyberg!
So that settles that little problem!
13. I am glad to hear that you think Japan does not intend to invade 
India or Australia. I was much perturbed by the original appre-
ciation sent us by the Chiefs of Staff, which seemed to envisage 
an immediate attack on Ceylon coupled with an invasion of India. 
I hope you are right, and it certainly seems as if you are, for Japan 
seems to be turning on China. I wish we could help the latter. With 
China out of the war I feel Japan will be in a very strong position, 
which it may take us years to upset.
14. I am not personally so anxious about fifth column activities in India. 
Although there is a lot of political froth on the surface, I believe the 
great majority of the solid mass of the people are behind us. So far 
there has been no sign of any dangerous tendencies in the Indian 
Army in this theatre at any rate. They are fighting magnificently 
and are an example to all.
15. As to the Libyan front, I knew you would not like our arguments 
based on mathematical calculation of tank strengths. As I told 
you we have been into the whole problem most exhaustively, and 
have prepared very full appreciations which when all was said and 
done led us to exactly the same conclusions as the mathematical 
calculations! Moreover I know from past experience that the 
mathematical argument is the only one which gives a safe basis 
for discussion with the Defence Minister. In fact this mathematical 
calculation holds the field at this very moment. Ritchie is counting 
his tanks until he has enough to hold the enemy in front while he 
strikes him in the rear with the rest. I am afraid you can not get 
away from it in the Desert, where movement is practically free 
everywhere. It sounds terrible, I know, but its true all the same. 
I think Sandy Galloway will bear me out. You mention that some 
of my arguments made it difficult for you to support my case. 
I am sorry that this was so and I’d very much like to know what 
these were. I used the same arguments with Cripps and Nye and 
they seem to have accepted them, but I am only too anxious to 
do all I can to help you, as I know how greatly you have helped 
me and are helping me. Believe me, I am most grateful to you. 
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I imagine that you are glad now that we did not adhere to the 15th 
May target in view of the strength the enemy has since disclosed. 
I know I am!
16. I am sorry I could not agree to come home. I wonder whether the 
vastness and complexity of this command is even yet realised at 
home. It does not seem to us out here that it is. I really do not feel 
that I can lightly lay down my responsibilities for what may easily 
be a month’s absence, judging by the irregularity of the air service, 
if anything at all is brewing on any of my fronts. In any event I 
think it is a good principle that the higher commander should go 
forward to see the lower, if he can manage it, and not vice versa! 
I know you agree with this!!
As for taking cover behind the Defence Committee, that you 
know is not true. The whole mechanism of the joint direction of 
the war in this theatre is very delicately balanced as I think you 
realise, and any attempt by one of the three commanders to take 
action on his own, or even to receive and answer instructions 
addresses solely to him is liable at once to throw it out of gear. 
I am scrupulously careful therefore never to act on any privately 
received signal even from the Prime Minister without consulting 
Tedder and the Admiral.198 I think you will admit the results have 
been satisfactory.
17. I think we really have done a good deal about the exchanging of 
officers to which you refer. I will send you a list of recent changes. It 
includes Arthur Smith, Galloway, Lloyd George Clark, Aizelwood, 
Collingwood Barker (Signals) and others. I will certainly let you 
know at once of any others who should have a change. Marriott199 
is one.
18. We all like Casey very much. He lacks Lyttelton’s knowledge and 
experience, and is a little inclined perhaps to bother over details, 
particularly of strategy, but he is very good indeed and is going to 
be a success I feel.
19. We shall be very glad to see the A.G. whenever he can come. I wish 
you would come with him!
198 Admiral Sir Henry Harwood, C in C, Mediterranean.
199 Brigadier J. C. O. Marriott commanding 22nd Guards Brigade.
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20. I won’t say anything about the battle in Libya. I have given you the 
fullest accounts I can and I hope they have been what you want. It 
has been and still is a most anxious time for all of us. We have had 
heavy losses but so has he I hope. I have just got back from 8th 
Army HQ. The battle did not go well yesterday but Neil & I have 
decided to hang on & fight it out.
JRL, AUC 922
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal J. C. Smuts, 14 June 1942
General THERON200 has shown me your signal G/20037 (20037) of 
12/6 (.) A strong counterattack was put in against enemy centre on 
5/6 June and had initial success but was counter attacked in its turn by 
strong enemy forces and driven back with heavy loss (.) HACHEIM 
had in my opinion largely fulfilled its purpose and I think RITCHIE 
was right to evacuate it when he did although it may have released some 
though not many enemy troops to move against us in NORTH (.) Chief 
enemy attacks against HACHEIM seem to have been by bombing and 
shell fire (.) FREE FRENCH losses were not heavy apparently and 
they are now reorganising (.) After discussion with THERON who fully 
understands am communicating your message to FREE FRENCH 
through General CATROUX and not to General KOENIG as former 
commands all FREE FRENCH forces (.) Considerations explained to 
THERON who will inform you later (.) Have just got back from 8 Army 
H.Q. (.) Situation is serious but by no means irretrievable and I am 
confident that RITCHIE will retrieve it (.) Enemy is not (R) not in an 
enviable position and is being attacked and harassed on all side (.) Quite 
understand that there is feeling of concern in UNION and realise this 
makes things difficult (.) For this reason I am also concerned but I am 
doing my best to right the situation and pray that I may be successful (.) 
There is no doubt that superior enemy antitank gun gives him very great 
200 Major General Frank Theron, Smut’s senior liaison officer to GHQ , Middle 
East.
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advantage which he is very ably exploiting to the full and our tank losses 
are serious although every effort is being made to recover damaged tanks 
and replace losses [.]
JRL, AUC 924
213
Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 15 June 1942
1 (.) Have ordered General RITCHIE to deny to the enemy general line 
ACROMA – EL ADEM – EL GUBI (.) This does NOT mean that 
this can or should be held as a continuous fortified line but that the 
enemy is NOT to be allowed to establish himself EAST of it (.) 
The two Divisions from GAZALA position will be available to help 
in this (.) ALTHOUGH I do NOT intend that EIGHTH ARMY 
should be besieged in TOBRUK I have NO intention whatever of 
giving up TOBRUK (.) My orders to General RITCHIE (vide my 
signal CS/1256 14/6 to CIGS) are
(A) To deny general line ACROMA – EL ADEM – EL GUBI 
to the enemy (.)
(B) NOT to allow his forces to be invested in TOBRUK (.)
(C) To attack and harass the enemy whenever occasion offers (.)
Meanwhile I propose to build up strong as possible reserve in 
SALUM – MADDALENA area with the object of launching 
counter offensive soon as possible (.)
2 (.) N.Z. DIVISION already moving should be fully concentrated in 
about ten or twelve days but leading elements will naturally be 
available earlier if required (.)
3 (.) Trust information you are getting in my signals to C.I.G.S. is 
adequate [.]
JRL, AUC 925
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 16 June 1942
War Cabinet interpretation is correct (.) General RITCHIE is putting 
into TOBRUK what he considers an adequate force to hold it even 
should it become temporarily isolated by the enemy (.) Basis of garrison 
is four bde gps with adequate stocks of ammunition (,) food (,) fuel 
and water (.) Basis of immediate future action by 8 Army is to hold 
EL ADEM fortified area as pivot of manoeuvre and to use all available 
mobile forces to prevent enemy establishing himself EAST of EL ADEM 
or TOBRUK (.) Very definite orders to this effect have been issued to 
General RITCHIE and I trust he will be able to give effect to them (.) 
Position is quite different from last year as WE and NOT enemy now 
hold fortified positions on frontier and can operate fighter aircraft over 
TOBRUK even if use GAMBUT landing grounds should be temporarily 
denied to us (.) It seems to me that to invest TOBRUK AND to mask 
our forces in the frontier positions the enemy would need more troops 
than our information shows him to have (.) This being so we should be 
able to prevent the area between the frontier and TOBRUK passing 
under enemy control (.) I have discussed matter with Minister of State 
and other Commanders in Chief who agree with the policy proposed.
JRL, AUC 929
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Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 16 June 1942
One. I am thankful you have succeeded in regrouping the 8(8)th 
ARMY on the new front in close contact with your reinforcements, and 
the Cabinet was very glad to know that you intend to hold TOBRUK 
at all costs. Let us know whether much stores fell into enemy’s hands.
Two. We cannot of course judge at the present time battle tactics 
from here. Certainly it would seem however that advantages would be 
gained if the whole of our Forces were engaged together at one time if 
the initiative could be recovered. It may be the new situation will give 
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you this opportunity, especially if the enemy, who is evidently himself 
hard-pressed, is given no breathing space.
Armoured Warfare seems to favour the offensive because it allows a design 
to be unfolded step by step, whereas the defensive, which was so powerful 




Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 17 June 1942
I enclose an extract from a telegram I have just had from the Prime 
Minister. As it seems so exactly to coincide with your views and 
mine on the subject, I want to be able to tell him that we are acting 
on it at once. Hence my insistence, which I hope you will forgive, 
on the prime need for not waiting to reorganise 1 S.A. Div and 
50 Div, which presumably came out as formed units, and for getting 
their artillery and mobile infantry into action again at once under 
Gott, who is now I understand, in command of all the forward area.
2. The enemy must be kept under the heaviest pressure, and the 
action of the Tobruk troops yesterday sets an excellent example. 
I want to see your troops working wide to the West, well beyond 
El Adem, and biting at the enemy wherever met, especially by the 
Italians who are now having to come into the open.
3. You must not tolerate Trieste [Division] messing round Gott’s 
southern flank.
4. I think “Mary” Coningham’s effort is perfectly magnificent, and 
an inspiration to all of us, including myself.
5. The return I have of food, water, ammunition and fuel in TOBRUK 
seems satisfactory, and I am assuming that you are taking the most 
urgent action to make up deficiencies such as 25 pdr and S.A. 
ammunition by road convoy.
Are you happy about the water situation? All available storage 
should be filled to capacity if this has not already been done.
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6. I presume the troops in the SOLLUM – HAMRA defences are 
pressing on with their completion and finishing up minefields and 
wire etc. It is as well to have this base as secure as possible before 
we go forward in force again.
7. If you are going to keep the 201st Motor Bde in the TOBRUK 
sector, I trust they will be used to the full in their mobile capacity 
to attack the enemy. I am sure this is your intention.
8. Your present tactical H.Q. seems somewhat inaccessible from the 
air. Are you staying there, or can you find a more convenient place?
9. I have said it so often before that I am afraid you must be sick of it, 
but I say it again! The task of the 8th Army now is not to receive 
blows but to give them, and to give them on an ever increasing 
scale until we can go forward again in a general offensive.
10. I am sure the enemy is exhausted and weakened, and would give 
anything for a period of rest and reorganisation now. Also he has 
great anxiety over his fuel situation.
11. We must keep him under pressure, and this calls for the greatest 
personal energy on that part of all concerned, commanders and 
staff, officers alike from the highest to the lowest.
12. I rely on you personally to see that the necessary drive and 
ruthlessness is forthcoming.
13. If any of your commanders are tired, send them back to rest. You 
have a surplus at the moment I think.
Good luck and go to it.
JRL, AUC 934
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal J. C. Smuts, 19 June 1942
Many thanks your G/20460 18/6 (.) Have NO intention of giving up 
TOBRUK which I hope is only temporarily isolated (.) RITCHIE will 
defend TOBRUK and the strong SALUM HAMRA MADDALENA 
position prepared long ago against such a contingency as has now arisen 
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and will do all he can to keep situation fluid in the space between SALUM 
and TOBRUK by using maximum number mobile troops available (.) 
These will also I hope harry enemy communications (.) Meanwhile I 
am planning as always to destroy enemy (.)
KLOPPER201 commands in TOBRUK and has full confidence 
RITCHIE and myself (.) He will make himself as offensive as possible 




Letter from Auchinleck to 
Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie, 20 June 1942
I have been thinking over the position as regards your Corps Commanders 
and have come to the following decisions.
I propose that GOTT should take over the 30th Corps from NORRIE 
and train and command the striking force now being built up.
NORRIE is in need of a rest, and there is no other employment 
available for him here, so I shall send him home and recommend him 
for further employment there.
My proposal for the 13th Corps is RAMSDEN.202 The fact that he 
knows the conditions and is apparently offensively minded is strongly 
in his favour.
As the matter is so very urgent, I have embodied most of the above 
in a signal I have just sent you about the reorganisation of your Army.
JRL, AUC 939
201 Major General H. B. Klopper, who had commanded 2nd South African Division 
and, on 15 June had taken command of all troops in the Tobruk garrison.
202 Major General William Ramsden, GOC 50th Division, 1940–42. Commanded 
30 Corps, July to September 1942 as Acting Lieutenant General.
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Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
(in Washington) to Auchinleck, 22 June 1942
Begins. Your telegrams of 20th and 21st instant and MINISTER OF 
STATE’s No. MS/20 of 21st received, also CABINET’s telegram No. 
OZ.544 in reply to your NO.CC/68.
C.I.G.S., DILL and I earnestly hope stern resistance will be made on 
the SOLLUM frontier line special Intelligence has shown stresses 
which Enemy has undergone. Very important reinforcements are on 
their way. A week gained may be decisive. We do not know exact days 
of deployment NEW ZEALAND Division but had expected it would 
be by the end of the month. Eighth Armoured and Forty fourth are 
approaching and near. We agree with General SMUTS that you may 
draw freely upon Ninth and Tenth Armies as the danger from North 
is more remote. Thus you can effect drastic roulement with the Three 
Divisions now East of the Canal.
TWO. I was naturally disconcerted by your news which may well put 
us back to where we were eighteen months ago and leave all the work 
of that period to be done over again. However I do not repeat not feel 
that the defence of the DELTA cannot be effectively maintained and I 
hope no-one will be unduly impressed by the spectacular blows which 
the Enemy has struck at us.
(My 06353/22 Part Two follows)
PART TWO FINAL
I am sure that with your perseverance and resolution and continued 
readiness to run risks, the situation can be restored, especially in view 
of the large reinforcements approaching.
THREE. Here in WASHINGTON the PRESIDENT is deeply moved 
by what has occurred and he and other High UNITED STATES author-
ities show themselves disposed to lend the utmost help. They authorize me 
to inform you that the Second UNITED STATES Armoured Division, 
specially trained in Desert warfare in CALIFORNIA, will leave for SUEZ 
ABOUT July 5th and should be with you in August. You need not send 
the INDIAN Division and 288 INDIAN Armoured Brigade back to 
INDIA as proposed. Measures are also being taken, in addition to those 
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described in the Chiefs of Staff telegram No. C.O.S.(M.E.) 275 to divert 
INDIA-bound aircraft to the LIBYAN theatre. The HALPRO force is 
remaining and will be brought up to full strength. I have told C.A.S. 
to give you his schedules of deliveries, including the four HALIFAX 
Squadrons, unless he has already done so.
FOUR. The main thing now is for you to inspire all your forces with 
an intense will to resist and strive and not to accept the freak decisions 
produced by ROMMEL’s handful of heavy armour. Make sure that all 
your manpower plays a full part in these critical days. His MAJESTY’s 
Government is quite ready to share your responsibilities in making the 
most active and daring defence.
JRL, AUC 946
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Field Marshal J. C. Smuts, 22 June 1942
Since my latest report to you I have had further news from RITCHIE (.) 
The enemy assault on TOBRUK on June 20 developed with great speed 
and by 2200 hrs enemy had gained possession of the portion of TOBRUK 
occupied EAST of TOBRUK – EL ADEM road (.) KLOPPER reported 
that all his tanks were out of action and half his guns lost (.) Under the 
circumstances he asked RITCHIE for permission to fight his way out (.) 
RITCHIE immediately authorised him to do so (.) But later KLOPPER 
reported that almost all his M.T. had been captured by the enemy and 
consequently only a small proportion of the garrison could attempt to 
fight their way out (.) Before communication was finally closed with 
EIGHTH ARMY KLOPPER reported that organised resistance was 
breaking down and he was doing the worst (,) which RITCHIE concluded 
was capitulation (,) and considered to be the only possible course (.) 
Report from EIGHTH ARMY received 1930 (1930) hrs 21 June stated 
that yesterday morning there were indications that some posts are still 
holding out (.) It is too early yet to say whether any parts of garrison 
have broken out but in view of the capture of so much of their M.T. by 
the enemy I do not except that much will have come away.
JRL, AUC 948
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 23 June 1942
The unfavourable course of the recent battle in CYRENAICA culmi-
nating in the disastrous fall of TOBRUK impels me to ask you seriously 
to consider the advisability of retaining me in my command (.) No doubt 
you are already considering this and quite rightly but I want you to know 
that I also realise the probable effect of the past months fighting (.) 
Personally I feel fit to carry on and reasonably confident of being able 
to turn the tables on the enemy in time (.) All the same there is no doubt 
that in a situation like the present (,) fresh blood and new ideas at the top 
may make all the difference between success and stalemate (.) I acted on 
this idea myself last summer when I replaced BERESFORD-PEIRSE203 
and CREAGH204 by new men (.) After steeping oneself for months in 
the same subject all day and every day one is apt to get into a groove 
and to lose originality (.) For this theatre originality is essential and a 
change is quite probably desirable on this account alone apart from all 
other considerations such as loss of influence due to lack of success (,) 
absence of luck and all the other things which affect the morale of an 
army (.) It occurred to me that you might want to use ALEXANDER 
who is due here in a day or two (.) Personally I do NOT think WILSON 
could do it now but he might (.) I have thought over this a lot and feel 
I must tell you what I think [.]
JRL, AUC 950
222
Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 24 June 1942
1 (.) I deeply regret that you should have received this severe blow at so 
critical a time as a result of the heavy defeat suffered by the forces 
203 Lieutenant General Noel Beresford-Peirse, who Auchinleck had removed from 
command of the Western Desert Force in September 1941.
204 Major General Sir Michael O’Moore Creagh who was removed from command 
of 7th Armoured Division in September 1941.
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under my command (.) I fear that the position is now much what 
it was a year ago when I took over command except that the enemy 
now has TOBRUK which may be of considerable advantage to him 
not only from the supply point of view but because he has no need 
to detach troops to contain it as was the case last year (.)
2 (.) The considerations governing continued resistance in the Frontier 
position at SOLLUM and SOUTH of it are set out (,) clearly I 
hope (,) in signal CC/69 of 23/6 to Deputy Prime Minister from 
Middle East Defence Committee which was repeated to you (.) In 
the circumstances this position is untenable against determined 
enemy attack because of our weakness in armour and any attempt 
to hold other than with mobile forces which can evade encirclement 
must in my opinion result in further defeat of our forces in detail (.) 
I have therefore agreed to its evacuation by all except mobile forces 
whose task it is to maintain themselves in and about the Frontier 
positions for as long as they can (,) and if forced to withdraw (,) 
to continue to keep the enemy as far to the WESTWARD as 
possible (.) Meanwhile the bulk of our infantry is occupying and 
organising the MATRUH position where a new armoured reserve 
is also being built up as fast as possible so as to be ready to meet the 
enemy armour should he try to attack this position (.) The forces 
holding this position will comprise 50 DIV (two Bdes only) (,) 50 
and 10 IND DIVS (three Bdes each) and N.Z. DIV (complete) 
also one or more of 1 (,) 7 and 10 ARMD DIVS according to the 
availability of tanks (.) 8 ARMD DIV will be added to this force 
when it arrives and after the necessary training to fit it to fight in 
the Desert (.) We have learned by experience that troops fresh from 
the U.K. are a liability rather than an asset in Desert fighting until 
they have had the requisite training (.) It is my firm intention to 
resume the offensive immediately our armoured forces are strong 
enough to give a reasonable chance of success and far reaching 
plans for reorganisation to make our formations more suitable for 
the task they have to do are well advanced (.)
3 (.) I have already drawn two and a third infantry Div from 9 and 
10 Armies besides one Corps HQ and signals (,) two Armoured 
Car Regts (,) one medium artillery regiment (,) two field artillery 
regiments and one A.Tk Regt (.) Not counting Polish (,) Greek (,) 
Free French and Trans-Jordan contingents which are not yet trained 
or equipped for battle there remain in this vast area one and two 
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third Indian infantry divisions (,) one Indian Armoured Brigade 
Group just being issued with its tanks (,) One Indian Armoured 
Car Regt and the 9 Australian Division (.) I am prepared to take 
great risks but must remind you of what occurred in SYRIA and 
IRAQ and very nearly in PERSIA early in 1941 when the enemy 
began infiltrating by air into these countries (.) NOT ONE of 
these countries is stable or yet sure of our ultimate victory (.) Quite 
apart from any question of resisting enemy attack there is always 
present a grave risk of internal trouble which might well lead to 
incalculable damage to our bases and oil supplies unless we have 
troops at hand to deal with it (.) I do NOT feel at the moment that 
I can draw any more troops from this area nor do I think that the 
tactical situation in the WEST demands more INFANTRY (,) what 
is required is more ARMOUR and this is NOT available from 9 
or 10 Army Fronts (.) End of First part.
PART TWO final (.)
4 (.) We are deeply grateful to you and the President of the United 
States for the generous measure of help which you propose to give 
us and for the speed with which you are arranging to send it (.) 
The Second United States Armoured Division will indeed be a 
welcome reinforcement as will the Grant and Lee tanks diverted 
from INDIA (.) Your assurance that the Indian infantry division 
and the Indian Armoured Brigade need NOT now be sent back 
to INDIA will greatly ease my difficulties in regard to the internal 
security problem in IRAQ and PERSIA (,) especially in the oilfield 
areas (.) Air Marshal TEDDER informs me that the diversion of 
aircraft to this theatre and the permission to retain the HALPRO 
force here will strengthen our hands immensely while the HALIFAX 
Squadrons will greatly increase our offensive power in the air (.)
5 (.) With regard to your para four (.) I believe that practically without 
exception the troops in the 8th Army are as determined to beat 
the enemy as ever they were which is saying much and that their 
spirit is unimpaired (.) As to accepting decisions brought about 
by enemy action we will do all we can by improving our tactics 
and leadership to prevent their recurrence but as you know we 
are trying to train an army and use it on the battlefield at the same 
time (.) We are catching up but have NOT caught up yet (.) As to 
using all my manpower I hope I am doing this BUT infantry can 
NOT win battles in the desert so long as the enemy has superiority 
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in armour and nothing can be said or done to change this fact (.) 
Guns and armour and just enough infantry to give them and their 
supply organisation local protection are what is needed (.) Masses 
of infantry are NO use without guns and armour (.) We can NOT 
have too many guns or too many tanks and the tanks must be 
American medium tanks which can stand up to German tanks and 
NOT Crusaders with only two pounder guns in them (,) though 
Crusaders with six pounder guns should be all right (.)
I thank you personally most sincerely for all your help and support 
during the past year and deeply regret the failures and setbacks of the 
past month for which I accept the fullest responsibility.
JRL, AUC 953
223
Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
(in Washington) to Auchinleck, 24 June 1942
1. Do not have the slightest anxiety about course of affairs at home. 
Whatever views I may have about how the battle was fought or 
whether it should have been fought a good deal earlier you have 
my entire confidence and I share your responsibilities to the full.
2. I have just shown your message to the President who was strongly 
moved and means to come to our aid. The difficulties about shipping 
the American Armoured Division which are considerable are in 
process of being flattened out. The Americans are also trying to 
send a large number of a new kind of anti-tank rocket gun, of which 
they have great hopes.
Meanwhile you have heard of the American air reinforcements 
which are already being directed to the Middle East. Plans are being 
formed to send another large wave perhaps 100 long-range bombers 
as fast as possible, also to hurry out to you further improved Grant 
tanks. Shall propose to President tomorrow placing an American 
General under your command, with a seat on the Middle East 
Council, observing that he would speak both for American air 
and Army units.
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3. Please tell Harwood that I am rather worried about reports of undue 
despondency and alarm in Alexandria, and of the Navy hastening 
to evacuate to the Red Sea although various precautionary moves 
may be taken and “Queen Elizabeth” should be got out at earliest. 
I trust a firm confident attitude will be maintained.
PART 2.
The President’s information from Rome is that Rommel expects 
to be delayed three or four weeks before he can mount a heavy 
attack on the Mersa Matruh position. I should think the delay 
might be greater.
4. I hope the crisis will lead to all uniformed personnel in the Delta 
and all available loyal manpower being raised to the highest fighting 
condition. You have over 700,000 men on your ration strength in 
the Middle East. Every fit male should be made to fight and die for 
victory. There is no reason why units defending the Mersa Matruh 
position should not be reinforced by several thousands of officers 
and administrative personnel ordered to swell the battalions or 
working parties. You are in the same kind of situation as we should 




Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 25 June 1942
Am taking over command 8 Army from RITCHIE this afternoon (.) 
Propose send him on leave temporarily to PALESTINE but consider 
he should go home soon as possible and be given command of a corps 
or a General Staff appointment (.) I feel that though sound and resolute 
he is apt to be slow and I fear Army has to some extent lost confidence 
in him (.) Shall use DORMAN SMITH as my Chief of Staff leaving 
CORBETT to represent me at G.H.Q.
JRL, AUC 957
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 28 June 1942
Appreciation situation regarding defence of EGYPT (.)
One (.) Enemy in WESTERN DESERT is still markedly superior to 
Eighth Army in Tanks (.) Owing absence natural obstacles to mechanised 
movement and ease which given superior tank force desert flank of all 
positions (,) except EL ALAMEIN – QATTARA Depression line can 
be turned (,) armour still remain dominant factor governing retention 
of initiative (.)
Two (.) ENEMY (.) Has gained all recent successes with his three 
German divisions (.) ITALIANS have played minor part (.) His tactics 
have been excellent while his adherence to first principles (,) speed of 
movement and ability to keep forward troops supplied have been most 
remarkable (.) His leaders are well trained and know how to re-act to 
situations usually to be expected in battle (.) Success will have greatly 
heightened German morale locally (,) but nationally his morale is steadily 
deteriorating so that with an end of success he is likely to go to other 
extreme (.) Italian morale will also be higher but their reaction will 
be even greater should the tide turn (.) So far as we know enemy is 
unlikely to get much more in reinforcements of material and MEN 
but hope of gaining EGYPT might lead to diversion of forces EVEN 
from RUSSIA (.) Against this his sea communications with LIBYA are 
again becoming precarious and he is always experiencing scarcity one 
commodity or another (.) Occupation of EGYPT would greatly ease 
his supply problem (.) His ability to keep his forces supplied should he 
try to advance against the DELTA can NOT (R) NOT be accurately 
forecast BUT he has done great things already and has captured much 
of our transport so we must be prepared for this (.)
Three (.) OBJECT (.) Our object must be at all costs to prevent the 
enemy stopping our supply of men and material through the RED SEA 
ports BEFORE we have rebuilt an adequate armoured force to regain 
initiative and resume offensive (.) Also essential to prevent him increasing 
his armoured forces in LIBYA and this entails maximum interference 
with his sea communications (.)
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Four (.) SEA COMMUNICATIONS (.) Retention of MALTA and 
ALEXANDRIA and of aerodromes as far WEST as possible in EGYPT 
is essential if we are seriously to interrupt enemy sea communications 
with LIBYA (.)
Five (.) AIR STRENGTH (.) We cannot (R) not resume the offensive on 
land until we have rebuilt our armoured forces to the required strength (.) 
Meanwhile our only offensive weapon is our air striking force which it 
is essential to maintain at the maximum possible strength as it alone 
enables us to retain any semblance of the initiative (.)
Six (.) INTENTION (.) My intention with which A.O.C. in C. is in 
full agreement is to keep Eighth Army in being as a mobile field force 
and resist by every possible means any further attempt by the enemy to 
advance EASTWARDS (.)
Seven (.) METHOD (.) First (.) Utmost delay possible without entailing 
encirclement or destruction Eighth Army will be imposed on enemy on 
FUKA line and then on EL ALAMEIN position (.) Second (.) Should 
withdrawal from EL ALAMEIN position be forced on us (.) Eighth Army 
(less 1 S.A. Div) will withdraw along the “BARREL TRACK” leading 
from DEIR EL QATTARA to CAIRO and continue to oppose enemy 
should he try to advance on CAIRO direct (.) 1 S.A. Div now holding 
EL ALAMEIN defended area will withdraw on ALEXANDRIA (.) 
Third (.) 1 S.A. Div, 9 Aus Div and improvised forces and columns 
now forming in DELTA will constitute DELTA FORCE under Lieut.
Gen. STONE and be responsible for defence WESTERN edge 
DELTA (,) for fighting enemy step by step if he penetrates DELTA 
and for defending ALEXANDRIA (.) Fourth (.) If enemy moves along 
coast on ALEXANDRIA Eighth Army will attack his SOUTHERN 
flank and rear (.) If he moves direct on CAIRO (,) DELTA FORCE will 
attack his NORTHERN flank and rear (.) Fifth (.) Meanwhile striking 
force will be built up ready to assume offensive by BARREL TRACK 
or coast road or both according to situation (.) Sixth (.) If driven from 
EL ALAMEIN position I shall assume direct control of both Eighth 
Army and DELTA FORCE with an improved operational H.Q. outside 
CAIRO (.) Lieutenant-General CORBETT will take over Eighth Army (.)
Eight (.) Instructions to give effect to these plans have been issued and 
preparations are in hand.
JRL, AUC 961
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Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 3 July 1942
On the First of July we told you our special information that enemy after 
feinting at your Southern flank would attack centre of your position 
about where 18 (18) Brigade lay and thereafter turn Northwards to cut 
off EL ALAMEIN strong point.
This is exactly what he appears to be trying to do. Are you getting 
these priceless messages (which have never errored) in good time. Every 
such telegram ought to be in your hands without a moment’s delay.
Two. How is the 8 (8) Armoured Division getting on and when can it 
come wholly or partly into action. What is the state and position of 9 (9) 
AUSTRALIAN Division. Have they got all their guns.
Three. Should be glad to have your opinion at leisure about how 
ROMMEL’s tanks would get on among Canals and irrigation of DELTA.
Four. GERMANS are enquiring whether inundations have been 
made. This was all planned two years ago with WAVELL. Presume it 
has been carried out. Whole idea is that EGYPT should be defended 
just as drastically as if it were KENT or SUSSEX without regard to 
any other consideration than destruction of the enemy.
Five. Everyone here greatly heartened by your splendid fight. Over-




Cipher message from Lieutenant General 
T. W. Corbett to Winston Churchill, 3 July 1942
Am answering for Commander in Chief to avoid delay (.) Your message 
being passed to him with this reply (.)
ONE (.) Every special source message goes direct EIGHTH ARMY 
and received there as early as at G.H.Q. (.) These messages of great 
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value (.) Some arrive in time to be operationally of use others not so (.) 
Things can be checked your end (.)
TWO (.) 8 ARMOURED DIVISION (.) two squadrons Valentines 
already gone forward to reinforce EIGHTH ARMY manned by personnel 
1 ARMY TANK BRIGADE (.) Personnel of this Division start landing 
4 (4) July (.) Dependent on physical condition of men possible move 
forward one armoured brigade group complete about middle July (.) 
Not yet possible forecast readiness second brigade owing necessity 
replacement tanks already sent EIGHTH ARMY and provision artillery 
support (.) 9 AUSTRALIAN DIVISION less one brigade group arrived 
in ALEXANDRIA defences from which one battle group moving today 
join EIGHTH ARMY (.) This battle group composed of twentyfour 25 
prs with proportionate escort anti-tank and infantry (.) Third brigade 
group completes arrival ALEXANDRIA area 4 (4) July (.) Steps taken 
put whole Division on mobile basis (.) Divisional artillery has seventytwo 
25 prs and fiftyfive anti-tank guns of which fifteen are 6 prs (.)
THREE (.) Tank movement among waterways and irrigation channels 
much restricted (.) No reason suppose ROMMEL could do any more 
with his tanks in this area than ourselves (.) Large numbers tank hunting 
commandos formed from schools and depots for operations in enclosed 
DELTA area (.)
FOUR (.) ALEXANDRIA area (.) Complete inundations not possible 
yet as essential retain use of aerodromes which would be affected (.) 
Remaining inundations now being put into effect (.) CAIRO area (,) 
partial inundation carried out (.) Completion of scheme still under 
negotiation with EGYPTIAN Government (.) Water in West branch 
of NILE which is normally fordable in many places at this time of year 
being increased (.) Arrangements have been made to defend the DELTA 
with every available man and all resources.
MOST IMMEDIATE CLEAR THE LINE.
JRL, AUC 968
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Cipher message from 
Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Nye, VCIGS, 
to Lieutenant General T. W. Corbett, 6 July 1942
The fall of TOBRUK after such a very short resistance involving the 
capture of so many prisoners and the loss of so much material seems 
from this distance quite inexplicable. AXIS reports state that the General 
surrendered and in any case it is evident that the greatest capital can be 
made by enemy from the whole incident which has caused considerable 
criticism in this country of the fighting spirit of our Commanders. 
Cabinet wish Deputy Adjutant General to enquire and report as soon as 
possible on the circumstances in which the capitulation took place and 
in particular on the conduct of the General in command.
JRL, AUC 971
229
Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 8 July 1942
Please see personal 99606 (VCIGS) 6/7 from VCIGS to CORBETT (.) 
I can NOT believe that Cabinet has ordered my D.A.G. to report 
independently on an operation carried out under MY command and I 
shall be grateful for an early explanation of this request which seems to 
be extraordinary (.) If the Cabinet intend to send out a Committee of 
Enquiry from home well and good but to depute a staff officer of mine 
without my sanction is not tolerable to me and I am sure was NOT 
intended (.) I would greatly appreciate direct instructions from you on 
matters of such personal importance (.) As CORBETT has told VCIGS 
I have already instituted an enquiry into the fall of TOBRUK under 
WILSON who is a very competent judge (.) I do not propose to take 
any other action [.]
JRL, AUC 973
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Letter from Field Marshal Sir John Dill, 
British Joint Staff Mission, Washington 
to Auchinleck, 9 July 1942
Many thanks for your letter of the 24th June which has just reached me.
I realised at the time what terrible anguish you were suffering in those 
days when Rommel was driving forward & you were losing so heavily. 
I was hoping that you might be able not to attempt to hold Tobruk because 
of the difficulty of giving it a sufficient garrison and the still greater 
difficulty of keeping it supplied with such a reduced Mediterranean 
Fleet. But of course I was in no position to judge such matters at this 
distance and when you decided to hold it no one could have anticipated 
that it would not hold out – at any rate much longer.
But I happened to be somewhat mixed up on a fairly high level with 
our defeats in March 1918. At that time things could not have looked 
worse & we certainly had nothing left with which to hold Amiens. And 
yet the tide turned & as so often happens when the enemy was at the top 
of his [best?] he made mistakes. It took us a long time to find out that 
the Bosche had really shot his bolt.
In these days the army did not lose faith in Douglas Haig & yet he 
had unquestionably suffered a great defeat. And I am quite sure that 
your Army has not lost faith in you. They know as everyone else knows 
that you took over command of the 8th Army at a very critical period 
and what you have achieved & are achieving in the El Alamein area must 
have created great confidence.
The Americans – that is what they call the top Americans have been 
splendid. In no way critical – at any rate to our faces – and all out to 
help in any way they could.
Brooke was here when your telegram about which you speak in your 
letter reached him. So of course was the P.M. There was, I may say, 
great relief when they knew that you had taken command of the 8th 
Army yourself. There may have been some bewilderment at the turn of 
events but there was no criticism – unless perhaps “it’s a pity he didn’t 
do it sooner” if you can call that a criticism.
The war is still young and you have already played an important part 
in it & you have I am sure a still greater part to play. So keep fit & keep 
the confidence in yourself that others have – I in particular. And do all 
you can to keep under the sensitiveness which I have always known you 
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have & will never entirely eliminate. However sore & bumped you may 
feel after your desperate battles, you must remember that you are filling 
a historic & even an heroic part and it is the last battle that counts. When 
Americans came to me when things were looking very bad I told them 
that we had had a bad beating but that one of our national characteristics 
was that we never knew when we were beaten. And even if the Army is 
beaten as long as its Commander is not beaten it will come again. Good 
luck to you & give my love to your Lady when you write. She certainly 
won’t think you have let her down any more than I do.
JRL, AUC 974
231
Letter from Lieutenant General N. M. Ritchie 
to Auchinleck, 12 July 1942
I am due to leave to-morrow for home and am sorry that I have not seen 
you again before my departure.
Thank you for your letter of the 26th June205 which I prize having 
received. It has been a great help. I have not replied before as I well 
realise that you have little time for reading in these days.
This is just to bid you au revoir, for I hope I may serve you again 
some day. It will still be a long drawn out struggle, But I know you will 
win however hard the battle may prove to be.
Perhaps I can be of some use at home even if all I can do is to do 
something towards getting those who matter there to understand the 
equipment aspect – guns and A.F.V.s
The last fortnight has been the greatest hell, this feeling that one 
was doing nothing to help in shouldering some little part of the burden 
that rests on you.
I know the Eighth Army will win.
JRL, AUC 975
205 This must have been a private letter, telling Ritchie that he was being removed as 
GOC in C of the Eighth Army. No copy survives in the Auchinleck papers.
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Cipher message from Auchinleck to 
Winston Churchill, 14 July 1942
1 (.) Of Valentines received with 8th Armoured Div. first 67 (67) 
inspected revealed that approx. 500 (500) items required workshop 
attention (.) Time spent on each tank varied from 140 (140) to 200 
(200) hours (.)
2 (.) General conditions of these tanks was better than those received 
earlier this year but the performance of the engines was below 
standard (.) Some higher gears could not be engaged (.) In a 
number of cases the cylinder head gaskets were blowing (.) All 
engines required tuning and adjustments to steering gear had to 
be carried out (.) In most cases clutch withdrawal levers required 
adjustment (.) All 2 (2) pdr guns required buffer piston clearances 
checked (.) This is an M.E. modification which must be done in 
U.K. (.) They are not marked so checking had to be done (.)
3 (.) Approx. 160 (160) items of tank fittings were deficient of which 
120 (120) were important such as towing shackles (.) Armament 
components (.) Periscope components (.) Power traverse control 
boxes (.) Some of these items may have been pilfered in transit (.)
4 (.) There was no (R) NO evidence of bad stowage or of serious damage 
in transit (.)
5 (.) The general condition of the majority of the tanks is that to be 
expected after a long voyage which involves movement by Road (,) 
Rail and Sea under varying climatic conditions (.) Tanks cannot 
(R) NOT be battle worthy after such a voyage without considerable 
attention [.]
JRL, AUC 980
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Letter from General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS 
to Auchinleck, 17 July 1942
My dear Auk
Very many thanks for your letters, I am so sorry not to have answered 
them sooner.
1. You have constantly been in my thoughts since Rommel started his 
attacks, and I have so well realized the difficult and anxious times 
that you have been through. I only wish that it was possible to do 
more to help you from this distance.
2. It is such a joy to see you gradually regaining the mastery over 
the enemy. I do hope that this heavier equipment in the shape of 
6 pr. tanks, and latest American tanks, will arrive soon enough to 
provide the additional striking power you require. Neil Ritchie has 
just arrived, I had a long talk with him yesterday and am having 
another long one tonight. I shall see that he also has talks with all 
the D.C.I.G.S. department so that we may gather from him all we 
possibly can as to required improvements in equipment, etc.
3. I did not answer your very kind wire of June 23rd more fully as I had 
seen the Prime Minister’s wire to you expressing full confidence in 
you. It is his confidence that is the important factor. You know how 
temperamental he is apt to be at times, so I hope you do not attach 
too much importance if occasionally his telegrams are not quite as 
friendly as they might be. I can assure you that I do all that is within 
my power to guard you against unnecessary repercussions from 
outside, and to let you carry on with the least possible interference. 
But even with the best will in the world, results often fall short of 
what I should wish! I should however like you to realize how much 
I feel for you in the difficult times you have been through, and to 
know that you can rely on me to do all I can to help you from this 
end.
4. I have now got your organization for your Northern front and am 
getting it pushed through. It seems a little top-heavy at present 
with the reduced forces that are in Syria, Iraq and Persia, but it 
provides a sound basis to build on if we can find forces for you. 
That is the main difficulty at present! Archie Wavell at a pinch can 
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spare two Divisions, and we are preparing to send two more after 
the 51st Division. This might assist in delaying the initial German 
penetration into Persia if Russia cracks, but will not go far. The whole 
matter is only of time and space. If we could succeed in checking 
the Germans in Northern Persia during the Winter there might be 
an opportunity of building up some force before the Spring, but 
even this would be dependent on diverting shipping from all other 
proposed enterprises of Americans and ourselves! We are at present 
hard at it working out all the various alternatives and should soon be 
able to let you have some sort of plan to meet a crack on the Russian 
front. But as you say with our limited resources both in forces and 
in shipping we are compelled to gamble whether we like it or not!
You are quite right and we must not rely on weather and terrain 
exercising an undue delaying effect on the enemy. I have just 
returned the latest J.I.C. estimate to them on that account. Their 
estimate of rate of German advance through Caucasus and through 
Persia is far too optimistic as to the slow rate of advance.
5. I have had particular difficulties both with the Foreign Office and 
the Cabinet with reference to the reconnaissance facilities which 
you have been asking for in Northern Persia. They refuse to realize 
how essential this reconnaissance is to our future defence. I am 
hoping that with our rather better relations with the Russians we 
should now succeed in getting something done.
6. From what you have told me of Quinan I do not feel very happy 
about his power of command in the event of Persia becoming 
an active front. Have you any idea of replacing him under such 
conditions?
7. I am glad the Australian and New Zealand Governments solved 
your problem of Freyberg’s rank. That should now keep him happy 
and quiet!
8. I am so glad that you like Casey, I thought you would from what I 
saw of him here.
9. Our visit to America was useful in many ways, and at any rate 
secured additional equipment for you. But the problem of running 
a co-ordinated war with them is not going to be an easy one! There 
are many interests and many ideas that conflict, and it will take 
superhuman efforts to direct all the power that is being created 
into the best channel for an early conclusion of the war!
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10. I have every hope of being able to escape to pay you a visit before 
long, and am preparing plans. Shall let you know results as soon as 
I can fix something definite. Am looking forward to it tremendously.
With very best of luck to you in your trying and difficult task.
JRL, AUC 984
234
Special Order of the Day, to all ranks of the 
8th Army from Auchinleck, 25 July 1942
You have done well. You have turned a retreat into a firm stand and 
stopped the enemy on the threshold of Egypt. You have done more. You 
have wrenched the initiative from him by sheer guts and hard fighting 
and put HIM on the defensive in these last weeks.
He has lost heavily and is short of men, ammunition, petrol and other 
things. He is trying desperately to bring these over to Africa but the 
Navy and the Air Force are after his ships.
You have borne much but I ask you for more. We must not slacken. If 




Letter from Auchinleck to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, 25 July 1942
My dear Alan
Thank you very much indeed for your letter of the 17th July which 
arrived on the 22nd and so reached me very quickly.
I would like you to know how greatly I appreciate what you said 
in it and, still more, the way in which you said it! Your confidence 
and encouragement mean very much to me.
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2. We have succeeded, though only just I am afraid, in regaining 
some measure of local initiative, and I think that it was due to our 
first effort in this direction, the threatening of his Southern flank, 
which stopped the enemy continuing with his designs to attack El 
Alamein from the South-West.
Our subsequent efforts in the North against Tel El Eisa and the 
Ruweisat Ridge in the centre kept the ball rolling and made the 
Germans move their troops about to stiffen the Italians.
We also inflicted considerable loss on the Italian part of his Army 
in these operations. I was disappointed when our big effort of the 
21st/22nd July came to nothing as I had great hopes of it. I still 
do not know the full story of the battle in the centre, but it does 
seem as if the 23rd Armoured Brigade, though gallant enough, lost 
control and missed direction. The Infantry, too, seem to have made 
some avoidable mistakes. Perhaps I asked too much of them, but 
one can only plan on the information available. Well, there it is, we 
undoubtedly gave the enemy a rude shock, judging from the many 
intercepted messages from the various enemy units, but we failed 
to get our object, which was to break through. The Australians had 
some success in the North and gained more depth to their position 
West of El Alamein. In the South the efforts of the 7th Armoured 
Division were most disappointing, especially as they had been 
reinforced by the 69th Infantry Brigade. The grain of the country 
is against them and the enemy is strongly posted though he can 
not be strong in numbers, I feel.
We are going on trying to find a way round or through in the 
South, but I am not too hopeful about it at the moment.
3. The enemy has now got his German infantry, irrespective of what 
formation or unit they belong to, sandwiched in between the 
remnants of his Italian divisions along the whole front, so that we 
can no longer fall on Italians and put them in the bag as easily as 
we did at first. However, we are watching for a weak spot and will, 
I hope, find one soon. I feel that owing to the great length of front 
he is holding the enemy can not have much depth to his position, 
except in the centre, where he holds his German armour in reserve. 
His Italian armour is behind his Southern sector. The trouble is 
that I have really no reserve with which to stage new attacks or to 
keep up the momentum of an attack once started.
I have to transfer troops from one part of the front to another, 
and this takes time as the distances are great and the going often 
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atrocious. Moreover, there is no cover from the air and large 
movements must be made at night if secrecy is to be obtained.
4. This lack of flexibility due to the absence of a real reserve is 
aggravated of course by the impossibility of detaching subordinate 
Dominion formations, such as a brigade group, or a divisional 
artillery, from its parent division, whether it is New Zealand, South 
African, or Australian. All commanders of these formations are only 
too anxious to help but they are all adamant on the principles that 
their troops shall fight under their own direct command only. In 
the light of past events, and of political conditions, this is under-
standable, but it does make it most damnably difficult to get any 
real flexibility, particularly as the brigade or brigade group is really 
the fighting unit in this theatre and not the division, whatever the 
theorists may say. You will I am sure understand that I make no 
reflections on the qualities of these troops who are magnificent 
fighters, taken all round, though they vary in degree. They are, 
moreover, none of them really trained for highly mobile fighting 
such as this. You will ask why aren’t they trained after their stay in 
Syria and Palestine? Well, there are several reasons.
First, they were working hard on the various defensive positions 
which had to be prepared as an insurance to set off our deficiencies 
in numbers. Secondly, it has never been possible, and never will 
be possible I am afraid, to give divisions in quiet areas, anything 
more than a training scale of transport, and without a full scale 
of transport, you can not really train units to be fully mobile in 
mechanised war, where everyone moves in a motor vehicle of 
one sort or another. Thirdly, these Dominion forces, magnificent 
material as they contain, are very hard to teach. They are apt to 
think that once they have been in battle, they have little to learn 
and are on the whole deeply suspicious of any attempts by us to 
teach them. Some of them say quite openly that we are incompetent 
ourselves and so unfit to teach them or anyone else. They are not 
alone in their opinion of course! Fourthly, there is no doubt that 
their intensely democratic feelings make it most difficult for their 
officers to insist on real hard work being done, when they are out 
of the battle zone. They simply do not understand the meaning 
of continuous and intensive training. Freyberg is an exception of 
course and does insist on hard training, but he has very few trained 
or experienced officers to back him up and he has had to send the 
best of his leaders back to New Zealand.
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You will think, perhaps, that I am complaining of my tools, but 
I am not. I only want you to realise that commanding an army of 
this composition is not a straightforward business to be conducted 
on the simple lines advocated in F.S.R. and the textbooks! I am 
sure you do realise this, but I doubt if others do. However, the 
enemy has his “Wops”206 to contend with, so the difficulties are 
not all on our side!
5. I agree that our Northern front organisation looks ridiculously 
heavy now that there are only about four brigade groups in the 
whole area, but we must plan against the possibility of our having to 
deploy large forces in Persia and Northern Iraq. I quite realise the 
problem continually before me, and our planning staff are always 
working at it. As it is we are just taking a hundred per cent. risk 
on the Germans not being able to get through the Caucasus, and, 
unless we are definitely prepared to abandon Egypt, I do not see 
what else we can do. I said as much in my telegram to the Prime 
Minister the other day. As regard the command there, I think it is 
all right for the present and preparations and planning are going 
well.
Quinan has as you know managed to get into some sort of touch 
with the Russians, but their attitude is that they will defend the 
Caucasus and Persia, and that, if they fail, it is no use our thinking 
we can do anything! I have Corbett in mind as a successor to Quinan 
when the time comes. He has lots of energy and foresight and has 
made a special study of all that part of the world and has thought 
deeply about the use of armour in these wide desert countries. In 
fact his ideas are in my opinion considerably ahead of teaching 
at Home, or even here, in spite of all the experience gained in 
the Western Desert. I should then want a new C.G.S. and will be 
very grateful if you can produce one for me. As you know I think 
already, Gammel207 and I do not make a good pair so please leave 
him out of it.
6. The Eighth Army will need a commander of its own again someday, 
I suppose, though I propose to stay here until the present battle ends 
one way or another. I think I must see it through and I certainly want 
to, though it is not too easy filling a dual role. However, Corbett is 
206 Derogatory term applied to Italians.
207 Lieutenant General Sir James Gammell.
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doing excellently in Cairo, and I deal only with the biggest points 
of policy, though there are quite a lot of these, as you can imagine.
I believe Gott might command Eighth Army well and so far 
as I can see he shows no signs of weariness and is learning how 
to handle big formations every day. He has, however, been a long 
time in the Desert and he might go to Ninth Army in Syria, that 
is if you consider he is ripe for an Army command. He impresses 
me most favourably in every way.
I think that when Wilson has finished these enquiries he might 
go, though he is admirable in his handling of his problems in Syria 
and has shown no recent signs of tiredness. We should then want 
a commander for Eight Army from Home or India. (Beresford-
Pierse208 would not be suitable, in my opinion). He must be a man 
of vigour and personality and have a most flexible and receptive 
mind. He must also be young, at any rate in mind and body, and 
be prepared to take advice and learn unless he has had previous 
Western Desert experience.
7. I am sending Harding home to give you all we know of the recent 
fighting and my views for the future. I hope he will supply all the 
information you need. I think he is wholly admirable and I would 
like him back please as soon as you can send him, as I want him for 
my second D.C.G.S., which appointment will, I hope, be sanctioned 
by you soon. I feel it necessary and it will not mean an increase as 
I will reduce the D.M.T. to a Brigadier again.
8. I have decided to relieve Whitely as B.G.S. Eighth Army by de 
Guingand. He badly needs a complete change and I hope you will 
be able to find him a niche in the planning organisation for which 
he is eminently suitable. I do not think he is cut out for high staff 
appointments in a field formation, though he is first class in high 
G.H.Q. appointments. He is, worth promoting to Major-General in 
my opinion and I hope you will consider him for this. He certainly 
deserves it on his record of the last two years. I have sent in a special 
report on him.
208 Lieutenant General Sir Noel Beresford-Peirse who was then Commander 
15 Indian Corps.
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9. Ramsden209 is doing well in command of 30th Corps and he and 
Gott and I are working well and very closely together. I have 
Dorman-Smith210 helping me here and have found him most 
valuable. Messervy211 has been deputising for him as D.C.G.S. but 
is now off to India to raise and train a new armoured division.
10. I can not tell how much I appreciate the way in which the Prime 
Minister and yourself have given me your confidence or how grateful 
I am for all the help you have given and are giving us. I will do my 
utmost to repay you by sparing no effort to defeat the enemy and 
remove the imminence of the threat to Egypt, but I do not want to 
hold out hopes of an early decision. I feel that we have been near it 
once or twice during the last month, but the scales are very evenly 
balanced, and on the 1st July I would not myself have gambled on 
our being able to stay on this position for more than a few days. 
The troops have recovered themselves wonderfully, I think, and 
have acquired a new tactical technique, based really on the proper 
use of artillery and the retention of mobility, remarkably quickly. 
They have still a great deal to learn of course, but the gunners 
have been very good indeed, and the Bosche does not like our shell 
fire at all, now that it is centrally controlled and directed. We are 
using a terrible lot of 25 pounder ammunition, but that can not be 
helped.
We may yet have to face a withdrawal from our present positions, 
but I hope this will not be necessary. Should it be unavoidable we 
have now got a strong defensive position, organised in depth for 
thirty miles and more, based on strong points, within supporting 
field artillery range of each other and sited to command all the 
intervening ground and to deny this essential observation to the 
enemy. These strong points are to be held by the minimum number 
of infantry with some artillery, while the great mass of the artillery 
escorted by sufficient infantry, who will be fully mobile, is to remain 
209 Major General William Ramsden who had commanded 50th Division, 1940–42 
was placed in command of 30 Corps as a Temporary Lieutenant General in July 
to September 1942.
210 As Acting Major General, Eric Dorman-Smith was acting in an unorthodox role 
as, effectively, Auchinleck’s Chief of Staff in the field.
211 Major General Frank Messervy, who having commanded 7th Armoured Division 
was to take command of the 43rd Indian Armoured Division.
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mobile and operate in the intervening spaces, moving to attack the 
enemy, wherever he may try to penetrate.
Behind this system again is a similar but smaller system based on 
the Wadi Natrun obstacle which fits in with the Western defences 
of Alexandria, the defences along the water line of the Delta and 
the Mena defences, which include the barrage, covering Cairo. 
Whatever happens I intend to keep the Eighth Army or the greater 
part of it as a mobile field force. I feel the enemy will need great 
strength to battle his way through this defence, and that if he tries, 
this theatre will become even more of a “second front” than it is 
now, and become a serious drain on his air and land resources, 
thus aiding Russia.
Apropos of this demand for a “second front”, we feel that you 
have already a “second front” of no mean importance here! As to its 
being necessary to establish a “second front” in Europe, Northern 
Africa and the whole of the Mediterranean basin, is, I suggest, really 
“Europe” for strategical purposes, and inseparable from it. Would 
it not be a good thing to try and make the public understand this?
I still hold very strongly that the way to beat the enemy is from 
the South, through Italy into Austria and thence into Southern 
Germany. I feel convinced that an attempt to battle a way into 
Germany from Northern France through the strongest part of 
his defensive system and into the stronghold of Prussianism, is 
likely to land you in a war of position which may last as long as 
the last one did!
JRL, AUC 988
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Cipher message from Winston Churchill 
to Auchinleck, 27 July 1942
ONE. I have not troubled you with messages while you have been so 
fearfully engaged but you and your Army have never been out of our 
thoughts for an hour.
TWO. It seems to me you have the advantage of ROMMEL in the 
air, communications and above all in the reinforcements which luckily 
we sent in good time.
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THREE. I should be glad if you would let me know when the 44th 
DIVISION will be able to go into action and I hope you will find it 
possible to let it fight as a Unit and not be forced to melt it down like so 
much else for the exigencies of battle.
FOUR. Could you also reassure me about the SIWA OASIS on 
which I asked C.I.G.S. to send you a telegram. I have no doubt you 
have thought it all out.
FIVE. C.I.G.S. is coming out to you early next week. He will be able 
to tell you about our plans which are considerable. See my immediately 
following telegram which should be deciphered by your personal staff.
JRL, AUC 989
237
Letter from Winston Churchill, 
writing from Cairo, to Auchinleck, 8 August 1942
Dear General Auchinleck,
On June 23 you raised in your telegram to the C.I.G.S. (telegram 
CS/1316) the question of your being relieved in this Command, 
and you mentioned the name of General Alexander as a possible 
successor. At the time of crisis to the Army His Majesty’s 
Government did not wish to avail themselves of your high-minded 
offer. At the same time you had taken over the effective Command 
of the battle, as I had long desired and had suggested to you in my 
telegram OZ.261 of May 20. You stemmed the adverse tide and at 
the present time the front is stabilized.
2. The War Cabinet have now decided, for the reasons which you 
yourself had used, that the moment has come for a change. It is 
proposed to detach Iraq and Persia from the present Middle Eastern 
theatre. Alexander will be appointed to Command the Middle 
East, Montgomery to command the Eighth Army, and I offer you 
the Command of Iraq and Persia including the Tenth Army, with 
Headquarters at Basra or Baghdad. It is true that this sphere is 
to-day smaller than the Middle East, but it may in a few months 
become the scene of decisive operations and reinforcements to the 
Tenth Army are already on the way. In this theatre, of which you 
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have special experience, you will preserve your associations with 
India. I hope therefore that you will comply with my wish and 
directions with the same disinterested public spirit that you have 
shown on all occasions. Alexander will arrive almost immediately, 
and I hope that early next week, subject of course to the movements 
of the enemy, it may be possible to effect the transfer of responsi-
bility on the Western battlefront with the utmost smoothness and 
efficiency.
3. I shall be very glad to see you at any convenient time if you should 
so desire.
Believe me.
P.S. Colonel Jacob who bears this letter is who charged by me to offer 
my sympathy in the sudden loss of General Gott.212
JRL, AUC 990
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Letter from Lieutenant General T. W. Corbett 
to Auchinleck, 14 August 1942
My dear Chief,
I feel I should be unable to say these things, and so I am writing them 
to you.
I want you to know that I am exceedingly proud of having had the 
privilege of serving you in war as your principal Staff Officer. The short 
time I have been with you has been full of constructive work, the fruits 
of which are yet to be seen.
You have been laying foundations which one day will prove their 
soundness. I know that you retain the implicit confidence of the troops 
you have been commanding. When the story of the battle that started 
on 25th May is told, it will, I know, enhance both your prestige and your 
reputation as a soldier.
Your achievement in stopping the rot in a beaten army, in restoring its 
morale so speedily, in wresting the initiative from a triumphant enemy, 
212 Lieutenant General William Gott had been selected to command Eighth Army 
but he was killed when his transport aircraft was attacked on 7 August 1942.
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and inflicting on him crippling losses, will one day be recognised. I shall 
make it my business to see that it is.
I am convinced that by depriving you of your Command, the Higher 
Direction of the war is making a grievous mistake for which I very much 
fear the Allied Nations will yet have to pay a terrible price. I pray I may 
be wrong.
I am most grateful to you personally for all your help and consideration 
always, and for the trust you have placed in me. Although I have done 
my best I feel that it has not been enough.
May the day soon come when you are back in an important Command, 
and allowed to play the part that people of your experience alone can 
play to ensure victory. As I said to you, there is no successful British 
Commander in this war so far. There could not be one yet, considering 
the disabilities from which any Commander, however good, must suffer 
in the Armies of the Empire which have had to serve their apprenticeship 
in war, and learn what total war really means.
You of all the Commanders-in-Chief who have so far led our Armies 
are the only one who has defeated the Germans in the field.
So much for our official relationships. I would like to tell you that my 
friendship for you and my regard are firmer than ever. You have all my 
sympathy, and all my very best wishes.
JRL, AUC 994
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Alexander, Field Marshal Harold Rupert Leofric George (Earl 
Alexander) (1891–1969). Commanded 1st Infantry Division and 1 Corps, 
1939–40. C in C Burma, 1942. C in C Middle East, 1942–43. Eisenhower’s 
Deputy Land Force Commander, Mediterranean, 1943–44 (18th Army 
Group and 15th Army Group). Supreme Allied Commander, Mediter-
ranean, 1944–45.
Amery, Leopold Stennett (1873–1955). Conservative MP for South 
(later Sparkbrook) Division of Birmingham, 1911–45. Secretary of State 
for India, 1940–45.
Anderson, Lieutenant General Desmond (1885–1967). GOC 45th 
Division, 1940; Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1940 and 
GOC 46th Division, 1940. Commanded 3 Corps, 1940–43 and 2 Corps, 
1943–44.
Beresford-Peirse, Lieutenant General Sir Noel (1887–1953). 
Commanded 4th Indian Division, 1940–41 and Western Desert Force, 
April–Sept. 1941. GOC Sudan, 1941–42; Commander 15 Indian Corps 
1942 and GOC in C Southern Army, India, 1942–45. Welfare General 
in India, 1945–47.
Blamey, Field Marshal Sir Thomas (1884–1951). GOC 6th Australian 
Division, 1939–40, Commander 1 Australian Corps, 1940–41 and Deputy 
C in C Middle East and GOC Australian Imperial Force, 1941–42. C in C 
Allied Land Forces, South West Pacific Area, 1942–45.
Boyle, Admiral William Henry Dudley (12th Earl of Cork and 
Orrery) (1873–1967). C in C Home Fleet, 1933–35 and C in C Ports-
mouth, 1937–39. C in C RN forces, Norway, 1940.
Brooke, Field Marshal Alan (Viscount Alanbrooke) (1883–1963). 
Commanded 2 Corps, BEF, 1939–40 and Home Forces, 1940–41. Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, 1941–46.
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Casey, Richard (Baron Casey) (1890–1976). Member of Australian 
House of Representatives for Corio, 1931–40 and Minister for Supply 
and Development, Australia, 1939–40. Australian Minister to the USA, 
1940–42. Minister of State Resident in the Middle East and Member 
of the War Cabinet of the UK, 1942–43. Governor of Bengal, 1944–46. 
Re-elected to Australian House of Representatives for La Trobe, 1949 and 
Minister for External Affairs, 1951–60. Governor General of Australia, 
1965–69.
Cassels, General Sir Robert Archibald (1876–1959). Adjutant 
General, India, 1928–30; GOC in C, Northern Command, India, 1930–34 
and C in C, India, 1935–41.
Coningham, Air Marshal Sir Arthur (1895–1948). Commanded 4 
Group, Bomber Command, 1939–41. Commanded 204 Group, 1941 
and Desert Air Force 1941–43. Formed 1st Tactical Air Force in French 
North Africa, 1943 and was AOC in C Second Tactical Air Force, 1944–45. 
Known as ‘Mary’, a play on ‘Maori’ due to his upbringing in New 
Zealand.
Corbett, Lieutenant General Thomas (1888–1981). Commanded 
4 Indian Corps, Middle East, 1942. Chief of the General Staff, Middle 
Eastern Command, March to August 1942. GOC 7th Indian Division, 
1942–43.
Creagh, Major General Sir Michael O’Moore (1892–1970). 
Commanded 7th Armoured Division, 1939–41 and 3 Armoured Group, 
1941–42. Commanded Hampshire and Dorset District, 1942–44.
Cunningham, General Sir Alan (1887–1983). Commanded 5th Anti-
Aircraft Division, followed by 66th, 9th and 51st TA Divisions, 1938–40. 
GOC East Africa, 1940–41. Commanded Eighth Army, 10 September to 
26 November 1941. Commandant, Army Staff College, 1941–42. GOC 
Northern Ireland, 1943–44 and GOC in C Eastern Command 1944–45. 
High Commissioner and C in C Palestine, 1945–48.
Cunningham, Admiral Sir Andrew (Viscount) (1883–1963). Deputy 
Chief of Naval Staff, 1938–39. C in C Mediterranean, 1939–42 and 1943. 
Head of British Admiralty Delegation to Washington, 1942. First Sea 
Lord, 1943–46.
De Guingand, Major General Sir Francis (1900–79). Director of 
Military Intelligence, Middle East, 1942. BGS, Eighth Army, 1942. Field 
Marshal B. L. Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, 1942–45.
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Dill, Field Marshal Sir John Greer (1881–1944). Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, 1940–41, Head of British Joint Staff Mission to Wash-
ington, 1941–44.
Dobbie, Lieutenant General Sir William (1879–1964). GOC Malaya, 
1935–39; Colonel Commandant RE, 1940 and Governor and Commander 
in Chief, Malta, 1940–42.
Dorman-Smith, Brigadier Eric (1895–1969). Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff, Middle East, 1942. Commanded 160th Infantry Brigade 
in the UK 1942–43 and 3rd Infantry Brigade in Italy, 1944. Known as 
‘Chink’. After retiring from the British Army he changed his surname 
to Dorman-O’Gowan.
Freyberg, Lieutenant General Bernard (1889–1963). GOC New 
Zealand Division and Commanded New Zealand forces in the Medi-
terranean for the campaigns in Greece, Crete, North Africa and Italy, 
1941–45.
Galloway, Lieutenant General Sir Alexander (1895–1977). BGS, 
Eighth Army, 1941–42. Director of Staff Duties, War Office, 1942–43. 
Commanded 1st Armoured Division, 1943–44 and 3rd Infantry Division, 
1945.
Gatehouse, Major General Alexander (1895–1964). Commanded 4th 
Armoured Brigade, 1941–42 and 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions, 1942.
Godwin-Austen, Lieutenant General Sir Alfred (1889–1963). 
Commanded 13 Corps in Eighth Army, 1941–42. Director of Research, 
War Office, 1943. Vice-Quartermaster-General, War Office, 1943–45. 
Quartermaster General, India, 1945–47.
Gott, Lieutenant General William (1897–1942). Commanded 7th 
Armoured Division and 13 Corps in Eighth Army. Chosen to command 
Eighth Army, but killed when his transport aircraft was attacked, 7 August 
1942. Known as ‘Strafer’.
Grigg, Sir (Percy) James (1890–1964). Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State for War, 1939–42. Member of Parliament for East Cardiff and 
Secretary of State for War, 1942–45.
Gubbins, Major General Sir Colin McVean (1896–1976). Commis-
sioned into RFA, 1914. Served in north Russia, 1919 and Ireland 1920–22. 
As Lieutenant Colonel served in G (R) (later MI (R)) preparing manuals 
on irregular warfare, 1938–39. August 1939 Chief of Staff to British 
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military mission to Poland. October 1939 liaison officer with Czech and 
Polish forces in France. March 1940 recalled to UK to form ‘independent 
companies’ and commanded them in Norway. Formed auxiliary units in 
England, Summer 1940. November 1940 transferred to SOE as Acting 
Brigadier; Major General and Head of SOE September 1943. Retired 
1946.
Haining, General Sir Robert (1882–1959). GOC Palestine and 
Trans-Jordan, 1939–40; Vice Chief Imperial General Staff, 1940–41 
and Intendant General, Middle East, 1941–42. Retired 1942.
Harding, Field Marshal Sir John (1896–1989). BGS, Western Desert 
Force and 13 Corps 1940–42. Director of Military Training, Middle 
East 1942. Commander 7th Armoured Division, 1942–43. Chief of 
Staff to Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, 1944–45. Commander 
13 Corps, 1945.
Holmes, Lieutenant General Sir William (1892–1969). Commanded 
42nd Division, 1938–1940 and 10 Corps, 1940–41. GOC British Troops, 
Egypt, 1941–42; GOC Ninth Army, 1942–45.
Hope, Victor Alexander John (2nd Marquess of Linlithgow) (1887–
1952). Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 1922–24 and Viceroy and Governor-
General of India, 1936–43.
Hutchinson, Lieutenant General Sir Balfour (1889–1967). Deputy 
QMG, Middle East, 1940–42; GOC Sudan and Eritrea, 1942–43 and 
QMG, India, 1944–45.
Hutton, Lieutenant General Sir Thomas (1890–1981). GOC Western 
Independent District, India, 1938–40; Deputy Chief of General Staff, 
India, 1940–41; Chief of the General Staff, India, 1941; GOC Burma 
1942 and Secretary War Resources and Reconstruction Committees of 
Council (India), 1942–44.
Ismay, General Hastings (1887–1965). Secretary, Committee of 
Imperial Defence, 1938–40 and Chief of Staff to Minister of Defence, 
1940–45. Known as ‘Pug’.
Kennedy, Major General Sir John (1893–1970). Director of Military 
Operations and Intelligence, War Office, 1940–43. Assistant Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (Operations and Intelligence), 1943–45.
Lumsden, Major General Herbert (1897–1945). Commanded 1st 
Armoured Division and 10 Corps, 1942. Winston Churchill’s special 
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representative to General Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific, 1943–45. 
Killed when a Japanese aircraft hit the bridge of the USS New Mexico, 
6 January 1945.
Lyttleton, Oliver (Viscount Chandos) (1893–1972). Controller of Non-
Ferrous Metals, 1939–40; Conservative MP for Aldershot, 1940–54; 
President Board of Trade, 1940–41; Minister of State and Member of 
the War Cabinet, resident in Cairo, June 1941 to February 1942; Minister 
of Production 1942–45.
McCreery, General Sir Richard (1898–1967). Commanded 2nd 
Armoured Brigade, BEF, 1940. Major General AFV Middle East, 
1942. Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, 1942–43. 
Commanded 10 Corps, 1943–44 and Eighth Army, 1944–45.
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3rd Infantry Brigade in Bordon and Palestine, 1935–38 and 49th (West 
Riding) Division, 1938–40. Initial C in C Land Forces, Narvik, 1940. 
Retired from the Army, August 1940. Employed in offices of the War 
Cabinet, 1941. Military Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, 1941–47.
Martel, Lieutenant General Sir Giffard Le Quesne (1889–1958). 
Commanded 50th (Northumbrian) Division, 1939–40. Commander 
Royal Armoured Corps, 1940–43. Head of Military Mission at Moscow, 
1943–44.
Messervy, Lieutenant General Frank (1893–1974). GSO1 5th Indian 
Division, 1939–40; commanded Gazelle Force, Sudan and Eritrea, 
1940–41 and 9th Indian Infantry Brigade, 1941. Commanded 4th Indian 
Division, 1941–42; 1st Armoured Division and 7th Armoured Division, 
1942. DCGS, Middle East Command, 1942. Commanded 43rd Indian 
Armoured Division, 1942–43; 7th Indian Division 1944 and 4 Corps, 
Burma, 1944–45.
Monckton, Walter (1st Viscount Monckton) (1891–1965). Director-
General of the press and censorship bureau in the Ministry of Information 
Office 1939–40 and Director-General Ministry of Information 1940–41. 
Head of propaganda and information services in Cairo and member of 
the Middle East war council 1941–42. Acting Minister of State resident 
in Cairo, February–May 1942.
Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard Law (Viscount Montgomery) 
(1887–1976). GOC 3rd Division, 1939–40, 5 Corps 1940, 12 Corps 1941 
and South-Eastern Army 1942. Commanded Eighth Army 1942–43 and 
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British Group of Armies and Allied Armies 1944. Commanded 21st 
Army Group 1944–45. CIGS, 1946–48. Chairman of the Commanders in 
Chief Committee of the Western Union 1948–51 and Deputy Supreme 
Commander Europe, NATO, 1951–58.
Morshead, Lieutenant General Sir Leslie (1889–1959). Commanded 
18th Infantry Brigade, Australian Imperial Force, 1940–41 and 9th 
Australian Division, 1941–43, along with all AIF personnel in the Middle 
East from March 1942. On returning to Australia with 9th Australian 
Division in 1943, he commanded II Australian Corps 1943–44, Second 
Australian Army 1944 and I Australian Corps, 1944–45.
Norrie, Lieutenant General Sir (Charles) Willoughby (Moke) 
(1893–1977). Commanded 1st Armoured Brigade, 1938–40 and Inspector 
RAC, 1940. GOC 1st Armoured Division 1940–41 and 30 Corps, 1941–42. 
Major General, Royal Armoured Corps, 1942–43.
Nye, Lieutenant General Sir Archibald (1895–1967). Commander 
Nowshera Brigade, 1939. Director of Staff Duties, War Office, 1940–41. 
Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1941–46.
Pope, Major General Vyvyan (1891–1941). Commander 3rd Armoured 
Brigade, 1939–40. Director of AFV at the War Office, 1940. GOC 
30 Corps September 1941. Killed in an air accident on 5 October 1941.
Portal, Marshal of the RAF, Sir Charles (1st Baron) (1893–1971). Air 
Member for Personnel on the Air Council, 1939–40; AOC in C, Bomber 
Command, 1940 and Chief of the Air Staff, 1940–45.
Pownall, Lieutenant General Sir Henry (1887–1961). CGS, BEF, 
France 1940. Inspector General Local Defence Volunteers/Home Guard 
1940. GOC Northern Ireland 1940–41. Vice Chief Imperial General 
Staff, 1941. C in C Far East 1941–42 but Japan entered the war before 
he could take up command. Chief of Staff, South West Pacific, 1942. 
C in C Ceylon, 1942–43 and Persia and Iraq, 1943. Chief of Staff, South 
East Asia Command, 1943–44.
Quinan, General Sir Edward (1885–1960). District Commander, 
Waziristan, 1938–41. GOC Iran and Iraq, 1941–42; GOC Tenth Army, 
1942–43 and Commander North Western Army in India, 1943.
Ramsden, Major General William (1888–1969). Commanded 25th 
Infantry Brigade, 1939–40; 50th Infantry Division, 1940–42; 30 Corps, 
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July to September 1942 and 3rd Infantry Division, 1942–43. Commander 
Sudan Defence Force and British Troops, Sudan and Eritrea, 1944–45.
Richardson, General Sir Charles (1908–94). Instructor, Middle East 
Staff College, 1940–42; GSO1 (Plans), Eighth Army, 1942 and BGS, 
Eighth Army, 1943. Deputy Chief of Staff, US Fifth Army, 1943. BGS 
(Plans), 21st Army Group, 1944–46.
Riddell-Webster, General Sir Thomas (1886–1974). Director of 
Movements and Quartering, War Office, 1938–9; Deputy Quarter Master 
General, 1939–40 and GOC in C, Southern India, 1941. Lieutenant 
General i/c Administration, Middle East, 1941–42 and Quarter Master 
General to the Forces, 1942–46.
Ritchie, General Sir Neil (1897–1983). BGS, 1939 and commanded 
51st (Highland) Division, 1940–41. Deputy Chief of Staff, Middle East 
1941 and GOC Eighth Army (with acting rank of Lieutenant General), 
26 November 1941 to 25 June 1942. Commanded 52nd (Lowland) 
Division in UK, 1942–43 and 12 Corps in North-West Europe, 1944–45. 
GOC in C, Scottish Command, 1945–47; C in C South East Asia Land 
Forces, 1947–49 and Commander British Army Staff, Washington, 
1949–51.
Scobie, Lieutenant General Sir Ronald (1893–1969). AAG, War 
Office, 1938–39 and Deputy Director of Mobilisation, 1939–40. BGS, 
Sudan, 1940–41 and commanded 6th (renamed 70th Division), 1941. 
GOC Tobruk Garrison October to December 1941. Deputy Adjutant 
General, Middle East, 1942 and GOC Malta, 1942–43. Chief of Staff, 
Middle East, 1943 and commanded British troops in Greece, 1944–46.
Shearer, Brigadier Eric James (‘John’) (1892–1980). Career army 
officer 1911–29. Retired from the army to join Fortnum & Mason Ltd. 
of which he was joint managing director, 1933–38. Returned to the 
army on the outbreak of war and was Commandant of the Intelligence 
School in Britain 1939 and Director of Military Intelligence, Middle 
East, 1940–42.
Slim, Field Marshal William ‘Bill’ (1891–1970). Commanded 10th 
Brigade, 5th Indian Division, 1939–41; 10th Indian Division, 1941–42 
and 4 Indian Corps, 1942. Moved to Burma he commanded 1 Burma 
Corps (Burcorps) 1942; 15 Corps in India 1942–43 and C in C Eastern 
Army (renamed Fourteenth Army) 1943–45.
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Smith, Lieutenant General Sir Arthur (1890–1977). BGS, British 
Troops in Egypt, 1938–39 and CGS, Middle East 1940–42. GOC 
London District and Major General commanding Brigade of Guards, 
1942–44. GOC in C, Persia and Iraq Command, 1944–45; GOC in C 
Eastern Command, India, 1945–46; CGS, India, 1946; Deputy C in C, 
India, 1947 and commander, British troops in India and Pakistan, 1947.
Smuts, Field Marshal Jan Christian (1870–1950). Prime Minister and 
Minister of Native Affairs, South Africa, 1919–24 and Prime Minister 
and Minister of External Affairs and Defence, South Africa, 1939–48. 
Officer Commanding Union of South Africa Defence Forces 1940–48 
and appointed a British Field Marshal in 1941.
Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur (1st Baron) (1890–1967). 
Director General of Research and Development, Air Ministry, 1938–40; 
Deputy AOC in C, Middle East, 1940–41 and AOC in C, Middle East, 
1941–43. Commander Mediterranean Air Command, 1943 and Deputy 
Supreme Commander, SHAEF, 1943–45. Chief of Air Staff, 1946–50 
and Chairman of British Joint Services Mission, Washington, 1950.
Tuker, Lieutenant General Sir Francis (1894–1967). Director of 
Military Training, GHQ , India, 1940–41; commanded 34th Indian 
Division, 1941–42 and 4th Indian Division 1942–44. GOC Ceylon, 
1945 and commanded 4 Indian Corps, Netherlands East Indies 1945. 
Commanded Lucknow District, India 1945–46 and GOC in C, Eastern 
Command, India, 1946–47. Known as ‘Gertie’.
Wavell, Field Marshal Archibald (Viscount) (1883–1950). C in C 
Middle East, 1939–41 and C in C India, 1941–43. Supreme Commander, 
South West Pacific, 1942. Viceroy of India, 1943–47.
Whiteley, General Sir John (1896–1970). BGS (Operations) Middle 
East, 1940–42 and BGS Eighth Army, 1942. Deputy Chief of Staff at 
Eisenhower’s Allied Force Headquarters, 1942–43. Head of Intelligence, 
then Deputy Head of the Operations Section, SHAEF, 1944–45. Army 
Instructor, IDC, 1945–47 and Commandant of Royal Military College 
of Canada, 1947–49. DCIGS 1949–53; Chairman of the British Joint 
Services Mission, Washington and UK Representative on the NATO 
Standing Group, 1953–56. Known as ‘Jock’.
Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland (Baron) (1881–1964). 
Lieutenant General commanding British troops in Egypt, 1939, 
Commander of expeditionary force to Greece, February 1941, GOC 
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British troops in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, May 1941, GOC Ninth 
Army in Syria and Palestine, Dec. 1941, C in C Persia–Iraq 1942–43 
and C in C Middle East, 1943. Supreme Allied Commander, Mediter-
ranean, 1944. Head of British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, and 
British member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1944–47.
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262, 265, 269, 275, 
281, 283, 291, 301, 304, 
313–15, 317, 320, 322, 
326, 329, 345, 372, 373, 
375–6, 386, 454, 467
30 Corps  205, 237, 244, 249, 
262, 265, 281, 283, 291, 
314, 318, 329, 346, 402, 
432, 433, 437, 467
Divisions:
1st Armoured Division  157, 
186, 193, 223, 242, 275, 
292, 300, 305, 308, 311, 
313, 314, 334, 342–3, 345, 
386, 413, 441, 471
7th Armoured Division  165, 
186, 190, 212, 216, 225, 
226, 230, 242, 244, 265, 
274, 285, 311, 314, 317, 
342–3, 362, 365, 376, 384, 
386, 423, 441, 471, 486
8th Armoured Division  450–1, 
468, 471, 477, 478, 482
10th Armoured Division  471
2nd Division  450
3rd Division  89
4th Division  81, 82, 83, 84
5th Division  450
6th Division  180, 181
18th Division  155, 251, 267, 
295, 324
44th Division  450, 451, 468, 492
50th Division  81, 82, 83, 84, 
86–7, 174, 177, 181, 195, 
208, 250, 251, 267, 282, 
335–6, 339, 345, 373, 376, 
422, 441–3, 444, 447, 453, 
456, 465, 471
51st Division  484
52nd Division  19
70th Division  198, 239, 282, 345
90th Division  450
Brigades:
1st Armoured Brigade  396, 423, 
432
2nd Armoured Brigade  238, 
333, 345, 391, 429–30, 437
4th Armoured Brigade  230, 
238, 248, 308, 309, 310, 
314, 334
7th Armoured Brigade  303, 356
22nd Armoured Brigade  203, 
226, 230, 238, 245, 284, 
287, 391, 396, 402, 445
23rd Armoured Brigade  486
1st Army Tank Brigade  334, 
345, 431, 478
32nd Army Tank Brigade  431, 
434
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22nd Guards Brigade  237, 244, 
251
24th Guards Brigade  21, 37, 50, 
52, 63
7th Infantry Brigade  362
9th Infantry Brigade  453
10th Infantry Brigade  445
11th Infantry Brigade  231, 424
18th Infantry Brigade  260, 477
21st Infantry Brigade  53
29th Infantry Brigade  424, 430, 
433
50th Infantry Brigade  313
69th Infantry Brigade  376, 445, 
486
150th Infantry Brigade  240, 
250, 292, 301, 304, 306, 
314, 334, 336, 431, 443, 
457
201st Motor Brigade  466
Units:
11th Hussars  256
12th Lancers  274, 284, 383
14/20th Hussars  137, 138
Royal Gloucestershire Hussars  
90
102 Anti-Tank Regiment 
(Northumberland Hussars) 
379
Royal Tank Regiment  186, 367
3rd Royal Tank Regiment  274
4th Royal Tank Regiment  424, 
445
7th Royal Tank Regiment  424
Royal Horse Artillery  311
Lovats Scouts  43
1st Scots Guards  52, 57
1st Irish Guards  54, 55
1st King’s Own Royal Regiment  
136
2nd South Wales Borderers  47, 
53, 54
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers  2, 7
2/5th Essex Regiment  239–40
11th South Staffordshire 
Regiment  84
2nd King’s Shropshire Light 
Infantry  5
Independent Companies  21, 
37–8, 42–4, 50, 53 n. 13
Long Range Desert Group  188, 
218, 258, 275, 346, 388, 
441
Brooke, Field Marshal Alan
and armoured formations  295–7, 
323–4, 355–6, 483
concerns about Auchinleck’s 
appointments  158–9, 296, 
322, 398
mediating between Auchinleck and 
Churchill  30, 153, 157–8, 
160, 261, 297, 354–5, 379, 380
Brooke-Popham, Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Robert  107, 267
Buckshot (Operation)  387, 405, 411, 
418
Bulgaria  107
Cakmak, Gen. Fevzi  116
Calcutta  110, 117
Capuzzo  243, 244, 248, 251, 346, 384, 
413, 422, 423, 424, 433, 454
Casey, Richard  162, 381 n. 177, 404, 
461, 484
Cassels, Gen. Sir R. A.  14, 16, 18
Catroux, Gen. Georges  373, 382, 462
Cauldron  26, 444, 445, 454, 455, 456
Chatfield Committee  18, 323
Cheshunt  3
Churchill, Winston
on command of Eighth Army  25–6, 
31, 159–60, 233, 253–4, 268, 
420, 425–6, 492–3
concerns re. armour  155, 156, 
170–1, 203, 299, 353–5, 365, 
389–90, 477, 482
demands of Far East  287–8, 450–1
requests consultation with 
Auchinleck  363–5
urges offensive action  30–1, 153–8, 
170–3, 177–8, 192–5, 202–3, 
214–15, 299–300, 360–1, 
364–5, 379, 417, 420–1, 468–9, 
473–4
Commandos  37, 194, 257, 342, 346, 
388–9, 441
Coningham, Air Marshal Sir Arthur  
164, 225, 247, 255, 275, 282, 285, 
305, 328, 414, 428, 465
Conservative party  74
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Corbett, Lt. Gen. Thomas  159, 360–1, 
387, 404, 411, 421, 427, 429, 430, 
474, 476, 477, 479, 488, 493
Cornwallis, Sir Kinahan  122–3, 144
Creagh, Major General Sir M. O’M.  
186, 187, 190, 470
Crete  143, 166, 179, 196, 209, 213
Crusader (Operation)  155, 196–8, 208, 
210
Crusader Tanks  29, 245, 345, 353, 354, 
365, 473
Cunningham, General Sir Alan  25, 27, 
153, 159–60, 161, 164, 188, 189, 
190, 196, 197, 205, 206, 210, 211, 
212, 216, 218–24, 226, 227–8, 
232–3, 243, 246–7, 253–4, 259, 
262, 263, 268, 365
Cunningham, Admiral Sir Andrew  
164, 176, 211, 290, 306
Cyprus  169, 170, 173, 177, 181, 195, 
250, 251, 267, 282, 308, 348, 362, 
374, 425, 426, 449
Cyrenaica  26, 122, 126, 166, 169, 170, 
173, 177, 214, 217, 224, 226, 250, 
268, 284, 287, 318, 330, 342, 
344–5, 347–50, 363, 368–71, 387, 
389–90, 395, 405, 406, 416, 418, 
420, 430, 470
Czech Battalion  198, 262
De Burgh, Gen. Sir Eric  120
De Guingand, Maj. Gen. Sir Francis  
28, 161, 360, 444, 446, 489
de Villers, Maj. Gen. Issac  235, 241, 270
Delhi  13, 18, 104, 140–1, 147, 148
Derna  226, 266, 269, 274, 292, 299, 
300, 318, 330, 331, 333, 346, 347, 
349, 365, 370, 371, 378, 427, 446
Dewing, Brig. R. H.  61
Dill, Field Marshal Sir J. G.  1, 14, 20, 
25, 39, 45, 47, 52, 63–4, 75, 101, 
108, 115, 125, 134, 139, 143, 153, 
154, 157–8, 159, 160, 165, 176, 
179, 185, 187, 189, 199, 203, 221, 
224, 468, 480
Dobbie, Lt. Gen. Sir William  202, 290, 
297, 350
Dodecanese  126
Dorman-Smith, Brigadier Eric  16–17, 
27, 28–9, 31, 154, 158, 258, 490
Douglas, Air Marshal Sholto  264
Dowler, Col. Arthur  49, 52, 62, 63
Dunkirk  79
Egyptian Army  256
El Adem  194, 237, 243, 248, 252, 255, 
300, 327, 331–3, 336, 345, 347, 
348, 349, 373, 374, 384, 401, 402, 
412, 413, 429, 442, 444, 463, 464, 
465, 469
El Alamein  26–7, 29, 159, 475, 476, 
477, 480, 486, 490–1
Elvegaarde  59
Enemy aliens  81
Enniskillen  2
Fareham  81
Fermanagh, Co.  2
Franklyn, Lt. Gen. H. E.  89, 359
Fraser, Peter  189, 212, 239
Fraser, Maj. Gen. W. A. K.  124, 141–2
Fraser, Brig. William  52, 53, 54, 63
Free French  144, 154, 163, 182, 208, 
249, 250, 253, 257, 283, 291, 292, 
309, 313, 314, 326, 345, 359, 373, 
376–8, 423, 424, 430, 431, 442, 
448, 453, 462, 471
Freeman, Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid  
196
French Army  20–2, 37, 42, 43, 45, 47, 
49, 53–62, 68
Freyberg, Lt. Gen. Bernard  162, 189, 
206, 211, 212, 213, 236–7, 239, 
243, 245, 257, 302, 325, 339, 399, 
460, 484, 487
Gallivare  40
Galloway, Lt. Gen. Sir Alexander  160, 
216, 247, 271, 304, 310, 316, 319, 
460, 461
Galway, Co.  2
Gambut  217, 237, 243, 248, 254, 329, 
336, 412, 454, 456, 464
Gammell, Lt. Gen. Sir James  48, 57, 
89, 359, 381, 488
Gatehouse, Maj. Gen. Alexander  252, 
308, 309–11
Gazala  26, 264, 265, 266, 269, 270, 
285, 314, 318, 327, 328, 331, 342, 
345, 346, 349, 370, 371, 376, 383, 
392, 395, 401–2, 405–6, 412, 418, 
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419, 421, 422, 425, 428, 434, 441, 
442, 443, 445, 454, 463
Godwin-Austen, Lt. Gen. Sir Alfred  
190, 204, 212, 225, 229, 232, 234, 
235, 237, 262, 265, 270, 273, 283, 
290, 291, 292, 293, 300, 301, 304, 
307, 313, 317, 319, 339, 365
Gorringe, Lt. Gen. Sir George  10
Gott, Lt. Gen. William  26, 190, 204, 
212, 225, 226, 238, 309, 310, 315, 
317, 319, 320, 325, 326, 345–6, 
424, 425, 465, 467, 489, 490, 493
Grant Tanks  197–8, 216, 269, 284, 309, 
343, 353–4, 362, 372, 386, 391–2, 
395–6, 406, 429–30, 472, 473
Gratangen  55, 59, 60, 61
Greece  107, 126, 129, 166, 179, 196, 209
Griffith, Sir Ralph  15
Grigg, Sir P. J.  16, 351, 360
Gubbins, Maj. Gen. Sir C. McV.  50, 
53, 54, 57, 71
Gurkhas  5, 11, 103, 112
Habbaniya  25, 106, 123–4, 125, 126, 
131, 133, 146
Habforce  106 n. 3, 147
Haifa  129, 131, 184, 258 n. 78
Haig, Gen. Sir A. B.  120
Haig, Field Marshal Sir Douglas  166, 
480
Haining, Gen. Sir Robert  78, 88, 173, 
176, 182, 183
Harding, Field Marshal Sir John  252, 
310, 398, 489
Harrington, Lt. Col. H. H.  9–10
Harstad  20, 21, 44, 47, 52, 62, 63, 67, 
68, 71
Hartvig  59, 60
Hawker Audax  110
Heath, Lt. Gen. Sir Lewis  111, 115
Hemnesberget  52
Herjangs Fjord  59, 60
Hogg, Maj. Quintin  273
Holden, Maj. Gen. W. C.  109
Holmes, Lt. Gen. Sir William  188, 
207, 240, 283, 296, 322, 325, 
359–60, 381, 404
Home Guard  23–4, 73–4, 80 n. 5, 
90–5, 102
Hong Kong  6, 142
Hope, V. A. J. (2nd Marquess of 
Linlithgow)  135, 136, 140–4, 
147–50, 165
Hundalen  46, 56, 59, 61
Hurricane aircraft  22, 143 n. 40, 155, 
170 n. 8, 287
Hutchinson, Lt. Gen. Sir Balfour  182
Hutton, Lt. Gen. Sir Thomas  120, 280
Imperial Defence College  14, 113
India
air defence of  108–10, 114, 120
North-West Frontier  14, 109, 110
war economy in  116–17, 129–30, 134
India Office  101, 116, 122
Indian Army  101, 108–9, 117–19, 
271–2, 337–8, 351–2, 393–5
Divisions:
3rd Division  19
4th Division  111, 163, 181, 203, 
205, 211, 213, 225, 234–5, 
237–8, 242, 244, 248–9, 
251, 265, 269, 282, 285, 
292, 300–1, 305, 307, 313, 
315, 318, 320, 328, 346, 
424, 426–7, 434, 437
5th Division  111, 181, 208, 267, 
282, 362, 374, 412, 413, 
424, 430, 441, 443, 444, 
445, 453
8th Division  137
9th Division  118 n. 26, 137
10th Division  136, 141–2, 425, 
432, 441–3, 471
14th Division  295, 324
17th Division  267, 295, 324
Brigades:
3rd Cavalry Brigade  137
252nd Armoured Brigade  451
288th Armoured Brigade  468
3rd Motor Brigade  301, 321, 
409, 423, 430, 431, 432, 
433, 441–2, 453
11th Motor Brigade  434
5th Infantry Brigade  225, 231, 
244, 274, 316, 442
7th Infantry Brigade  244, 313, 
315, 335, 346
9th Infantry Brigade  424
11th Infantry Brigade  225, 248, 
316, 424, 442, 453
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15th Infantry Brigade  118 n. 26
17th Infantry Brigade  146
21st Infantry Brigade  145
22nd Infantry Brigade  118 n. 26
29th Infantry Brigade  316, 345, 
362
38th Infantry Brigade  274, 293, 
320, 362
138th Infantry Brigade  250
Airborne Brigade  103, 147–9
Regiments:
Guides Cavalry  425
13th Lancers  137
18th Cavalry  188
Madras Regiment  119
Bengal Regiment  119
Bihar Regiment  119
Assam Regiment  119
Battalions:
62nd Punjabis  5–12
1/1 Punjab Regiment  14–15
3/1 Punjab Regiment  316
1/6 Rajputana Rifles  316
1/5th Gurkha Rifles  5
2/5th Gurkha Rifles  5
Labour companies  204, 213
Indian States Forces  137, 138
Indian Territorial Force  119
Indianisation  25, 105, 118–19, 272
Indo-China  106–7
infantry training  370, 453. See also 
armoured doctrine and training
Iran  123, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 139, 
165, 184
Iraq  25, 104, 105–6, 111, 115, 118, 
122, 123, 124–47, 156, 165, 169, 
174, 177, 184, 185, 200, 208, 
240–1, 251, 259, 264, 267, 273, 
276–8, 279–83, 295, 324, 339, 
367, 395, 398, 399, 425, 426, 
449, 452, 457–9, 472, 483, 488, 
492
Iraq and Persia Command  492–3
Irwin, Lt. Gen. Sir Noel  359, 381
Ismay, Gen. Hastings  13–14, 157, 
159, 190–2
Italian Army  193, 195, 231, 234, 248, 
264, 269, 270, 285, 295, 298, 
318, 332, 346–7, 372, 389–90, 
395–7, 436, 439, 440–1, 475, 486
Japanese military  104, 106–7, 162, 253, 
256, 257, 267, 273, 287, 337–8, 
393–5, 450, 460
Jebel  314, 316, 318, 330, 331, 332, 384, 
405, 418
Jiarabub  188
‘Jock’ columns  29, 154, 163, 237, 243, 
244, 248, 252, 255–6, 269, 385
Karachi  10, 120, 121, 124
Kennedy, Maj. Gen. Sir John  280
Kipling, Rudyard  89
Kirkuk  131, 140, 143, 147
Kiruna  40
Knightsbridge  26, 456
Kut  8–12, 146
Kuwait  131
Laithwaite, Sir Gilbert  122, 123, 136
Lake, Lt. Gen. Sir Percy  8, 12
Langstone  3
Laycock, Lt. Col. Robert  257
Lebanon  181, 359, 449
Linlithgow, 2nd Marquess of. See Hope, 
V. A. J.
Local Defence Volunteers  73, 80, 82. 
See also Home Guard
Longmore, Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Arthur  122
Lulea  40
Lumsden, Maj. Gen. Herbert  242, 
315, 362
Lyme Regis  85
Lysander aircraft  110
Lyttleton, Oliver (Viscount Chandos)  
161–2, 173, 236, 239, 245, 254, 
258, 302, 304
McCandish, Col. J. E. C.  256
McCreery, Gen. Sir Richard  186, 187, 
188, 386, 420, 427
Mackesy, Maj. Gen. P. J.  20–2, 37, 
47–9, 52–6, 62–4
MacMunn, Gen. Sir George  13
Madfai, Jamal  146
Madras  6, 119, 120, 149
Malaya  111, 114–15, 121, 136–7, 138, 
142, 167, 253, 273, 287
Malta  166, 193, 202, 212, 285, 290, 
297, 347, 350–1, 353, 354, 363, 
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364, 365, 367–70, 380, 416, 420, 
449, 476
Margesson, David  344
Marriott, Brig. J. C. O.  265, 268, 269, 
275, 291, 293, 461
Marshall-Cornwall, Lt. Gen. J. H.  207
Martel, Lt. Gen. Sir Giffard  85, 259, 
279, 280, 289, 295–6, 310, 315
martial races  17, 103, 119
Martin Maryland Bombers  110
Matilda Tanks  245, 345, 353, 354, 376, 
396, 424
Maude, Gen. Sir Frederick  11–12
Maund, Capt. L. E. H.  52
Maxwell, Maj. Gen. Aymer  239
Mayne, Maj. Gen. Mosley  115
Mechili  223, 266, 274, 275, 301, 302, 
304, 307, 313, 318, 326, 329, 
330–2, 335, 346–7, 349, 370, 371, 
384, 406, 407, 414, 418, 441, 442, 
443
Messervy, Lt. Gen. Frank  203, 212, 
274, 291–2, 293, 307, 362, 398, 
445, 490
mines  237, 361, 424, 428, 429, 431, 
434, 435, 455
Minister of State (Cairo)  157, 161–2, 
163, 173, 176, 195, 211, 221, 222, 
233, 236, 239, 245, 254, 258, 302, 
304, 381, 404, 417, 448–50, 464, 
468
Ministry of Supply  203, 206–7
Mo  22, 50, 52–7, 63, 71
Modernisation Committee  17–18
Monckton, Walter  162, 303, 381–2
Montgomery, Field Marshal B. L.  1, 
24, 26, 27, 28, 74, 86–8, 89, 98–9, 
161, 164, 492
morale  88–9, 95–8, 102, 114, 214–15, 
223, 352, 393–4, 453, 475, 479, 
485, 490–1
Morris, Lt. Col. G. M.  11, 12
Morshead, Lt. Gen. Sir Leslie  198, 
399, 460
Mosjoen  39
Mosul  12, 118, 130, 139, 143, 147, 181
motor transport  191–2, 386
Mountbatten, Lord Louis  19
Muspratt, Gen. Sir Sydney  15, 16, 101
Namsos  20, 39, 40, 45, 46, 71
Narvik  20–2, 37–72, 179
New Zealand Army  128, 181, 189, 206
Division  205, 211, 213, 222, 225, 
226, 229, 234–5, 236–7, 243–4, 
250, 282, 302, 339, 421, 426–7, 
468, 471
5th Brigade  254, 329, 335, 345
Construction companies  204, 213
Nixon, Gen. Sir John  8
Norrie, Lt. Gen. Sir C. W. M.  205, 
206, 210, 211, 212, 226, 238, 257 
n. 75, 262, 283, 293, 314, 336, 
342, 346, 386, 401, 420, 423, 425, 
429, 430, 431, 432, 467
Norton, Lt. Gen. E. F.  109
Norway  37–72
Norwegian Army  66
Norwegian Government  66, 67, 68
Nosworthy, Lt. Gen. Sir Francis  187, 
296
Noyes, Lt. Gen. Sir Cyril  120
Nye, Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald  366, 374, 
378, 379, 393, 404, 460, 479
O’Connor, Lt. Gen. Sir Richard  161, 
419
officer supply  118–19, 271–2, 337–8
Ofot Fjord  45, 59
oil  23, 105, 127, 131, 248, 265, 285, 
286, 386, 394, 395, 458, 472
Oyord  60, 61
Palestine  106, 121, 147, 177, 180, 182, 
184, 198, 277, 375, 397, 398, 449, 
457, 459, 474, 487
Palmerston (Operation)  430
Peirse, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard  
220–1, 264
Persian Gulf  127, 133, 194, 394, 458
Peshawar  15–16
Philpotts, Capt. A. B.  187
Pienaar, Maj. Gen. D. H.  293
Pittick, Lt. Gen. Edward  236, 239
Platt, Lt. Gen. Sir William  189, 190
Polish forces  21, 22, 42, 60, 68, 209, 
262, 286, 301, 304, 313, 326, 345, 
471
Pope, Maj. Gen. Vyvyan  163, 185
Port Said  7, 18, 126, 128
Port Sudan  127, 128, 138
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Portal, Air Marshal Sir Charles  220, 
263
Portsmouth  81
Powell, Brig. Donald  147
Pownall, Lt. Gen. Sir Henry  18, 159, 
259, 260, 268
propaganda  114, 135, 149–50, 209, 
238, 240, 344–5
Quinan, Gen. Sir Edward  113, 124, 
130, 135, 141–2, 144–7, 360, 399, 
459, 484, 488
Ramsden, Maj. Gen. William  240, 
467, 490
Rashid, Ali el Gailani  123
Ravenstein, Maj. Gen. Johann von  
237, 240, 257
recruitment (India)  103, 119, 149–50
Red Sea  127, 129, 134, 474, 475
Redman, Brig. Harold  361, 375
Reid, Brig. D. W.  231, 265, 269, 285, 
342
Richardson, Gen. Sir Charles  28
Riddell-Webster, Gen. Sir Thomas  
207, 387, 399, 459
Ringwood  84
Ritchie, Lt. Gen. Sir Neil
appointed to command Eighth Army  
26, 27–8, 153–4, 160–1, 218, 
221, 222, 224, 226–7, 233
on armoured forces  390–2, 453
Auchinleck loses confidence in  161, 
452–6, 463–4, 465–6, 474
Churchill’s concerns about  160
and Corps Commanders  160, 301, 
317, 336, 339
Dill’s concerns  160
removed from command  161, 474, 
481
situation reports from  224–6, 
229–32, 234–5, 264–6, 268–70, 
273–6, 284–7, 291–3, 317–19, 
326–9, 341–3, 375–9, 383–9, 
400–3, 405–7, 411–13, 417–20, 
427–30, 433–6, 444–6, 452–6
Roger, Sir Alexander  117–18
Rombaks Fjord  45, 55, 59, 61, 68
Rommel, Gen. Erwin  26, 28, 156, 195, 
242, 243, 248, 249, 252, 263, 281, 
294, 308, 312, 322, 324, 333, 338, 
340, 437, 469, 474, 477, 478, 480, 
483, 491
Roosevelt, F. D.  191
Ross rifles  80
Royal Air Force  37, 44, 175, 196, 214, 
269, 292, 299, 305, 306, 309, 340, 
344, 345, 367–9, 414, 428, 439, 
465, 476
Royal Indian Air Force  120
Royal Indian Navy  120, 149
Royal Military Academy, Woolwich  3
Royal Military College, Sandhurst  3–5
Royal Navy
HMS Aurora  59
HMS Devonshire  68
HMS Effingham  45, 47, 48, 52, 57, 
59, 60
HMS Protector  59
HMS Resolution  59
HMS Southampton  22
HMS Vandyck  69
HMS Vindictive  59
Russia. See USSR
Sabine (Operation)  105, 106, 111, 113, 
115, 116, 120
Salisbury Plain  84
Salonika  107
Sandys, Lt. Col. E. D.  70
Scobie, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald  198, 262, 
400
Scorcher (Operation)  143
Secunderabad  120
Segnali  383, 384, 386, 401, 414, 436, 
439, 441, 443, 444
Sergison-Brooke, Lt. Gen. Sir Bertram  
380
Shaiba  121, 123, 131, 133, 146
Shearer, Brig. E. J.  159, 188, 190, 192, 
242, 247, 297, 302, 306, 322, 327, 
329–30, 340, 360
Sicily  196, 199, 367
Sidi Barrani  174, 180, 187, 204, 243
Sidi Rezegh  216, 217, 235, 236, 242, 
243, 245, 248, 250, 254, 255, 302, 
306
Sikorski, Gen. Władysław  209, 212
Simla  10, 13, 16, 17, 140–1
Singapore  104, 118, 256, 267, 287, 
338, 394
Skaanland  45, 46, 48, 62, 67, 68
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Slim, Field Marshal Sir William  113, 
142, 146–7, 164
Smith, Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur  224, 235, 
239, 242, 246, 248, 252, 254, 256, 
260, 262, 268, 300, 303, 304, 306, 
309, 313, 325, 340, 343, 360, 380, 
461
Smuts, Field Marshal J. C.  162, 188, 
191, 193, 200, 241, 243, 304, 343, 
358, 462, 466, 468, 469
Sollum  151, 172, 177, 178, 179, 203, 
211, 222, 231, 244, 329, 409, 466, 
468, 471
Sorreisa  67, 68
South African Army  155, 162, 174, 
181, 188, 200, 205–6, 210, 243, 
253, 255, 262, 270, 272, 275, 282, 
303, 313, 326, 343–4, 408, 419, 
435, 467, 487
Formations:
1st Division  210–11, 229, 240, 
320, 345, 376, 422, 441–2, 
453, 465, 476
2nd Division  162, 225, 235, 237, 
242, 244, 254, 293, 346, 
373, 442, 453
1st Brigade  236, 237, 240, 244, 
245, 292, 408, 433, 437
2nd Brigade  432
3rd Brigade  432
Units:
4th Armoured Car Regiment  
346
Southampton  81
Spears, Maj. Gen. Edward  163, 381–2, 
404
Staff Colleges  13, 15, 357–8, 377, 
397–8, 457
Stephens, Gen. Sir R.  90
Stirling, Maj. David  388, 447
Stone, Lt. Gen. R. G. W. H.  283, 325, 
476
Stuart Tanks  326, 345, 353–4, 392, 456
Sudan  127, 129, 134, 183, 187, 190, 
349, 449
Sudanese troops  349
Suez Canal  7, 126, 128, 157, 197, 240, 
394, 450, 468
Suwaidi, Tewfiq  115
Sweden  39–41, 43, 46, 56
Syria  126–9, 132, 134, 139–40, 143–4, 
154, 166, 168–9, 170, 174, 180–2, 
184, 185, 195, 198, 200, 208, 236, 
250–1, 258, 264, 276–7, 279–80, 
290, 324, 339, 340, 345, 359, 362, 
373, 377, 399, 425, 426, 449, 452, 
457–9, 472, 483, 487, 489
tanks, British
comparison to Axis  154, 163, 312, 
347, 369–70, 372, 391, 395–6, 
440–1, 453
quality  29, 202–3, 206–7, 312, 324, 
482
supply of  166, 170–1, 174, 177, 472
Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur  
161, 164, 167, 174, 175–6, 196, 
211, 220–1, 262, 263–4, 287, 302, 
461, 472
Tengeder  301, 304, 313, 314, 331–2, 
383, 384, 401
Territorial Army  19, 21, 43, 70, 73, 79
Thailand  106–7
Theron, Maj. Gen. Frank  201, 303, 
462
Thornhill, Col. Cudbert  114
Tidworth  72
Tiger (convoy)  143, 170
Tigris  8, 11, 135, 145–6
Tmimi  265, 266, 302, 313, 314, 316, 
318, 331, 346, 383, 418, 427, 432, 
435, 443, 444
Tobruk  26, 155, 156, 158, 161, 162
1st siege of  180, 194, 217, 225, 
229–30, 255
2nd siege of  464, 470, 479, 480
Townshend, Maj. Gen. Charles  8
Trans-Jordan  130, 131
Trappes-Lomax, Lt. Col. Thomas  57
Tripoli  165, 166, 217, 260, 273, 275, 
295, 338, 344, 346, 347, 367, 368, 
369, 428
Tromso  47, 55, 67, 68, 69
Trondheim  20, 39, 40
Tuker, Lt. Gen. Sir Francis  305, 306, 
307, 310, 319, 320, 326, 328, 336, 
379, 437, 439
Turkish army  7–12, 107, 115–16, 132, 
279
Turner, Lt. Col. C. E.  74, 90–1
Tyrone, Co.  2
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   521 02/03/2021   11:15 am
522
indeX
ULTRA  27, 155, 156, 365
USA Army  468, 472
USSR  20, 155, 168, 171, 176, 177, 
192–5, 198, 200, 202, 253, 267, 
278, 280, 286, 295, 324, 365, 373, 
419, 458, 475, 484, 488, 491
Valentine Tanks  29, 156, 242, 245, 
341, 345, 348, 353, 354, 365, 370, 
391, 392, 396, 424, 436, 456, 478, 
482
van Ryneveld, Gen. Sir Hesperus  303
War Cabinet  22, 30, 50, 104, 125, 154, 
156, 161, 176, 177, 278, 366, 448, 
464, 492
War Office  20, 24, 30, 31, 50, 53, 61, 
62, 74, 87–8, 98, 105, 114, 120, 
133, 136, 137, 150, 176, 203, 246, 
253, 256, 260, 281, 297, 303, 337, 
341, 350, 365, 389
water  8, 10, 160, 204–5, 213, 229, 234, 
331, 347, 348, 361, 408, 412, 426, 
431, 434, 464, 465
Watson, Maj. Gen. Daril  208, 270, 271
Wavell, Field Marshal Sir Archibald  
24, 25, 104, 107, 111, 112, 115, 
116, 121, 122, 142, 143, 157, 159, 
165, 166, 170, 171, 176, 177, 179, 
194, 195, 200, 260, 267, 271, 273, 
276, 278, 280, 288, 322, 363, 364, 
450–1, 477, 483
Weld, Brig. C. J.  145–6
Wellington College  3
Wemyss, Lt. Gen. H. C. B.  99
Westland Wapiti  110
Wexford, Co.  2
Whipcord (Operation)  196, 199, 202
Whiteley, Gen. Sir John  197, 202, 203, 
209, 362, 374, 388, 439, 452
Wilson, Field Marshal Sir H. M.  159, 
161, 178, 180, 182, 188, 258, 259, 
273, 283, 296, 322, 325, 359, 364, 
380, 381, 399, 419, 470, 479, 489
Wright, Maj. C. H. B.  9
Younghusband, Maj. Gen. G. J.  9
Yugoslavia  107, 116, 272
2441 (Boydell - Auchinleck Papers).indd   522 02/03/2021   11:15 am
